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ABBIRAQI
Ihe aim of this study has , been to provide, asihr 
as possible, an accurate outline of developments in Dahoman 
political society during the course of the nineteenth 
century* She findings of this, the major part of the work, 
have then been used as a check against descriptions of the 
Eon state based on ahthropological evidence* In this way 
it has been attempted to place the ihstitutions of Dahoman 
corporate life in the context of their historical develop­
ment and at the same time to cast some light on how they 
actually functioned in the nineteenth century.
Eighteen eighteen provides a useful starting point 
for an investigation into latter Dahoman history since 
the revolution which took place in that year represented 
both the high water mark of chiefly factionalism and the 
beginning of a vigorous attempt to establish a strong 
monarchy. Ihe conflict between those trying to build a 
centralised government and those determined to preserve 
the powers of the feuding ruling class dominated the 
politics of Dahomey from the Revolution until the Erench 
invasion*
Other issues, above all those of foreign and 
economic policy, of course, also influenced the course 
of Dahoman history in these years. Disputes over policy, 
however, merely aggravated an already existing crisis; 
they did not create the tensions in Eon society. It was 
the continual internecine struggle indulged in by the 
various sections of the Dahoman ruling class which 
dominated political life, shaped the institutions of 
Dahoman government and gave nineteenth century Eon 
history its peculiar character.
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C H A P T E R  I
THE ACHIEVEMENT OP STABILITY
1818-1835
A revolution which took place in the Kingdom 
of Dahomey in 1818 drove the ruling monarch* King 
Adanzan, from his throne* He was succeeded hy a 
distant relative, Prince Gahkpe, who on his accession 
adopted the name of Gezo. Both men were descendants 
of Agadga, the greatest of Dahomey1s eighteenth 
century rulers. Adanzan traced his ancestry through 
Teghesou who, though a younger son, had succeeded his
father as King of Dahomey. Gezo was descended from
1one of Agadga* s elder sons.
The overthrow of the reigning monarch was the 
culmination of a period of near-anarchy "brought about
1 For a guide to Dahomey in the nineteenth 
century see I. Akin job in, Dahomey and Its 
Neighbours, 17/ -1818. Ph.D. London 19^3*
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■by the decay of the vigorous monarchical system 
created by Agadga. It was an event which had far- 
reaching consequences for the future of the Fon state.
Three themes, whose interweaving gave later Fon history 
its distinctive pattern, had their origins in this
revolution. It marked the coming to power of a regime 
committed to the winning and maintenance of Fon indepen­
dence of the Yoruba: it saw the beginning of an imaginative 
new attempt to establish the monarchy as the motivating
force in Dahoman politics; it was at that date that 
Europeans, or Afro-Europeans, had their first opportunity 
pf playing a major part in the internal affairs of the 
Fon state* The changes to which these new departures 
led, and the reactions to these changes were the forces 
dominating nineteenth century Fon history.
The historian of eighteenth century Dahomey argues 
that the fall of Adanzan was brought about by wide­
spread dissatisfaction at the failure of the ruling
1 ibid.
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line to end tiie long term slump in Dahoman external 
trade. While there can he little doubt that this 
recession weakened the position of Adanzan1s branch 
of the royal family vis-a-vis rival claimants to the 
throne, it seems unlikely that it led directly to the 
unseating of the King. It is certainly true that 
Adanzan1s early attempt to find an economic alternative 
to the slave trade in large-scale agricultural pro-
4
duction was an absolute failure. The decline of the
Whydah slave trade was, however, halted long before
the coup of 1818. The ending of the British slave
trade during the Napoleonic wars brought Portuguese
and Spanish slavers flocking to those areas of the
coast not dominated by England. Whydah was amongst
these places. In 1811 and 1812 no less than forty-
five ships from the great Brazilian slave-importing
2
port of Bahia traded at Whydah. Spanish vessels
1 ibid., p.285
2 ® 70/1591*. P. B. Irby to W.E.White 5.1.1812: 
Admin. 1/1996, P.P. Irby to J.W.Croker
9.1. and I*. & 10.3.1812. Quoted in Akinjobin 
op.cit., p.287.
-Im­
plying the American flag probably also traded there*
The increase in Whydah1 s trade may have been set off 
hy the fact that an 1810 Anglo-Portuguese anti-slave 
trade treaty included Whydah amongst the ports from 
which the Portuguese were permitted to continue the 
trade* It seems more likely that Whydah1 s trade had 
already revived and that the Portuguese, knowing 
Whydah *s value, deliberately had the port excluded 
from the prohibited sections of the coast. Whether 
the treaty’s provisions were simply a reflection of 
the existing state of affairs or whether they actually 
promoted a revival of trade in Whydah, it is certainly 
true that after 1810, if not before, the slave trade 
flourished there as never before.
It can be argued that this revival came too late 
to save Adanzan’s position; that his branch of the 
royal family was already too discredited by the slump 
to benefit from an increase in prestige arising from 
expanding trade. However, the coup which unseated 
Adanzan did not come until 1818— at the very least 
seven years after the slave trade had begun to flourish
- 5 -
again in Whydah* This suggests that the revolution 
came about not as a consequence of the slump, hut 
as a result of increasing prosperity. Additional 
weight is given to this view by the fact that it was 
only as a result of the revival in trade that the 
enemies of Adanzan were able to find a wealthy ally 
whose financial baching made their attempt to over­
throw the established monarch successful.
The outsider whose financial weight tipped the
scales against Adanzin was a Brazilian, Francisco
1
Felix De Souza, who had for some time been operating 
as a slave trader at various points along the coast of
1 De Sousa’s early career has already 
been fairly clearly delineated: see 
I.Afcinjobin, op*cit.» pp.291-2* This 
account is broadly confirmed by two 
nineteenth century commentators:
F.O. Sl|/819, T. Hutton to W.B*Hutton, 
Cape Coast 7.8.1850 & A.L.D*Albeca 
!Au Pays des Eoues1, Tour Du Mond6- 
1895. P*98* See also J.F.Almeda Prado, 
*Les Relationsde Bahia avec Dahomey’, 
Revue d’Histoire des Colonies, XLI, 
195^ 4*, and N.F.De Souza, 1 Contributions 
a l’Histoire de la Famille De Souza’, 
E.D. XIII. Some authors who met De 
Souza describe him as a European: 
others state that he was a mulatto.
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the Bight of Benin* He had come first to Whydah in 
the last decade of the eighteenth century as an employee 
of the Portuguese slaving fort* Later he had Begun 
trading for himself, and had, at various times, 
estahlishments at Both Badagry and Little Popo. He 
was in fact the man-on-the-spot who Benefited from the 
revival of the slave trade*
As De Sousa* s wealth accumulated he of course 
Became a man of importance on the coast. He seems, 
however, to have over-estimated this newly acquired 
importance and to have conducted himself in a manner
offensive to the traditional authorities* His later 
activities indicate that he was an exceedingly vain 
man anxious to cut a dash in the society in which he 
found himself* The suBordinate position in which 
Dahoman monarchs traditionally kept foreign traders 
could not have Been at all to his liking* He felt 
himself, it seems, entitled to a position of power 
and influence commensurate with his new-found wealth. 
Such feelings could not have led him to cherish an 
affection for the established Fon monarchy* At any
- 7 -
rate he quarrelled with Adanzan— ostensibly over some 
trading dispute* He was even brought to Abomey, tried, 
and imprisoned. Although this disgrace finally made 
him Adanzan1 s implacable enemy, his confinement did 
not last for long. Through the assistance of a group 
of Adanzan* s Bahoman enemies he succeeded in making his 
escape from Abomey. In order to ensure that he would 
in future be able to enjoy unmolested the fruits of his 
prosperity, he then formed a close alliance with Prince 
Gankpe, the leader of a group of dissidents within the
•i
Fon royal family. De Souza’s wealth was now made freely 
available to aid G-ankpe in an attempt to dethrone Adanzan.
It is difficult to assess the exact nature of the 
political situation which existed in Abomey at the period 
when G-ankpe formed his alliance with De Souza. The only 
two really useful accounts of Adanzan*s deposition give 
different and often conflicting accounts of the political 
background. They are, moreover, based on local tradition 
and such accounts have to be used with care when they
1 I.Altinaobin, op.cit., p.292: E.Dunglas,
B.D,XX. p.i+2: P.O.Ek/ 819 T.Hutton to 
W.B.Hutton, Cape Coast,7.8.1850.
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describe politico-religious events of such importance#
There is no doubt that oral tradition was manipulated 
after Gankpe’s accession in order to present that 
Prince's activities in the most favourable light 
possible* As a result the tales of Adanzan1s cruelties,
in which both abound, may be safely ignored. When these
are neglected the first account is found to outline a 
situation in which Gankpe, described as the King's 
brother, was not Adanzan's only rival* A plot against
the King was first of all hatched by one Djossevo---
said to be a descendant of one of Tegbesoufs former
wives and not therefore a member of the royal family. 
Although DJossevo offered Prince Gankpe both a large 
bribe and the position of heir to the throne, Gankpe 
would have nothing to do with this conspiracy* In 
a short time D3ossevo's support dwindled away to 
nothing. According to this version, general hatred 
of Adanzan eventually became so great that the King 
himself asked Gankpe to take the throne.^
1 A.Le Heriss^, L'Ancien Royaume du Dahomey.
PP*313-h.
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The second account describes G-ankpe as the 
“brother of the King, and Djossevo again appears 
with a non-royal pedigree* In this version, however, 
Djossevo features as a favourite of Adanzan who gave 
him his daughter in marriage and even intended to 
make him his heir* This, much fuller account, differs 
entirely from the first in that it relates that Gankpe*s 
coming to the throne was the result^ not of a request 
made by Adanzan, hut of a conspiracy between the Prince
•i
and De Sousa*
Since the story of Gankpe*s ancestry has been
p
tampered with, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
D3ossevo*s has also been altered* He was in fact
1 E.Dunglas, E*P*XX, pp*
2 I.Akinjobin, op* cit* * p.292^
Akinjobin has shown clearly that 
Gankpe was a descendant of one of 
the elder sons of Agadga* Oral 
tradition probably presents Gankpe 
as-Adanzan*s brother in an attempt 
to minimise the sacriligious nature 
of Gankpe*s usurpation of the throne# 
The politics of the period are some­
times complicated by the fact that 
Gankpe*s brothers and sisters are 
often presented as being also Adanzan* s 
close relatives*
10 —
probably descended from a younger son of King 
Tegbesou* He too must have had followers who 
wished to see him become King* This competition, 
for the throne, makes it very unlikely that Gankpe 
gained the throne peacefully. Monarchical power, as 
had already been shown by the murder of King Agonglo, 
Adanzan1 s father, was dangerously near to breaking 
down. By 1;818 the monarchy had evidently become so 
weak that the direct line of Tegbesou had to struggle 
more or less openly with other branches of the royal 
family for possession of the throne. The divisions 
in the Fon aristocracy seem to have been perpetuated 
by the fact that no one groxip could ever gain the
1 Agonglo was murdered in 1797. 
I.Akinjobin, op.cit., p.273, 
considers fchat Adanzan succeeded 
as a very young child. This seems 
unlikely since, in 1818, according 
to tradition related by Dunglas, 
thfe King had a number of grown-up 
sons, one or whom was Vi-Daho or 
heir apparent. His powers at the 
beginning of his reign may have been 
very limited not because of his age, 
but because of the increasing powers 
of the gre&t Chiefs.
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upper hand. When one seemed to he becoming too 
powerful the others united against it. This is 
presumably why Djossevo first conspired against 
Adanzan but, later, in the face of Gankpe*s increasing 
power, he allied with the King. The importance of 
De Souza* s alliance with G-ankpe was that the baching 
of the wealthy trader gave Gankpe the edge over even 
the combined forces of the others. It gave him the 
wherewithal to rally waverers to his side and it enabled 
him to provide his followers with sufficient arms to 
be fairly confident of victory in a showdown.
His friendship with De Souza therefore gave 
Gankpe his chance to break: the deadlock in Dahoman 
politics. The alliance itself was designed to 
bring great benefits to both men. In return for his 
finanicial assistance, De Souza, upon the successful 
outcome of the coup, was to be rewarded— —if his later 
position is a reliable guide to the terms of the 
alliance— -by being given the designation of King*s 
most trusted Councillor. He was to be created a
- 12 -
•i
Dahoman Caboceer, to he given full control of all 
Dahoman relations with the Europeans and, in order
to hut tress the fortune that made all this possible, 
he was to he given the monopoly of the export of 
slaves from Whydah. Basically, the arrangement was 
that G-ankpe was to gain the throne while De Souza 
was to have his trading position safeguarded and his 
social aspirations satisfied.
G-ankpe himself, before the actual coup, seems to
have been, if not in hiding, at least in exile from
2
the Court at Abomey. His mother, Agossi-Eve, had 
already been sold into slavery by the King. De Souza, 
after his escape from Abomey, prudently stationed 
himself out of reach at Little Popo,^ where he awaited
1 A Portuguese term used in contemporary 
literature to describe an extremely 
important Eon dignitary.
2 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.3§. G-ankpe was
at this time a hunter in the Cana area.
3 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.38
i- I.Akinjobin, op.cit.. p.292
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developments* The chief organiser of the conspiracy 
was GankpeTs "brother, Tometin# His other "brothers, 
Adoitkonou, I.inkinehoun and Topa, and his sisters
A
Sinloutin and Negban were also closely involved*
These five, along with Gankpe himself, were sometimes
2said to have even made a "blood pact with De Sousa* 
Whether this was or was not the case, they certainly 
all worked together against Adanzan#
Apart from Gankpe, his family, and De Souza, the 
two most important men in the conspiracy were the Migan 
Atindebakou and the Mehou Atakin-So-Eou* The available 
evidence does not indicate clearly why these men and, 
indeed, many lesser Chiefs lent themselves to forwarding
1 These men & women are sometimes presented 
as close relatives of Adanzan. In fact 
they were distant cousins of the King*
Bee I.Akinjobin, op*cit* * p.5*
2 P*Hazoume, Le Pacte de Souza au Dahomey, 
p.28: 3?*Canot, Memoirs of a Slave Trader, 
p.165: E.Dunglas, E*D.XX* pp 
Authorities differ as to who, besides
De Souza and Gankpe, actually made the pact*
" ' v 1 , ,
Gankpe1 s: ambitions• Possibly they inherited family
ffudi3:'‘',ei.ther-‘;!wi'th Adanzan!s or Djossevo's branch of
the.,royal family;1 possibly, too, they were attracted
to Gankpe by his promising a more vigorous expression
■ 2  / 
of Pon anti-Yoruba feeling* Gankpe may have indicated
that if he became King the payment of tribute to Oyo
would stop* fhere are, however, indications that, one
of; the issues which sparked off, the coup was Adanzanfs
.1 A.De Herisse, blAhcien Royaume du^ Dahomey,
p •315 s G r a l  tradition, relates only that "Adanzan 
did hbi-treat these Ministers of State with the 
respect ,and courtesy .which was their due.
2 Ihe Ponymay have b^bnodiscontent with 
Adanzan'S suhservianee; to Oyo* During 
his rbign it is possible that the Oyo 
placed, a . garrison in. the Pon. city of
vGana*:' See below, p.26.
3 I.Akiniobin, op.cit., pp*277* E.Dunglas,
E.D.XX, pp.38^3^ A.Le Herisse, op.cit. 
p .313* Oral tradition gives Gezothe 
credit of having first witheld the payment 
of tribute1.
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■f
refusal to attack a vulnerable Yoruba town. These 
indications are however so vague and contradictory
that they cannot be considered reliable evidence.
probably
The actual coup d!etat took place in 1818,ywhen
all the Chiefs were gathered together in Abomey for
2
the great festivals of July— August. Adanzan was
seized by the leading officers of state and then
1 P.Forbes, Dahomey and the Dahomans,
Vol.I., ppT^T^35T~VbTTll77-W ^ 4 - 7 :
R*Burton, A Mission to Gelele, King of 
Dahomey (1862 Ed.) Vol.II.,f.401.
Forbes writes that Adanzan1 s refusal
to aid the dispossessed heir to the King 
of Jena led to Adanzan’s overthrow. The 
name of the heir was Dekun. This name 
seems to link Jena with another Fon con­
quest, Inoubi (see below, p.U6 )The 
tale does not in any other respect re­
semble the story of the conquest of 
Inoubi. Probably Forbes confused two 
traditions which were superficially 
similar in that they both centre around 
treachery and betrayal. Burton repeats 
Forbes story but adds that Jena was 
otherwise known as Lefou-Lefou, the name of 
another town sacked by the Dahomans.
Since Forbes twice mentions Lefou-Lefou 
this seems unlikely. All in all the 
story is too confused for any major 
deduction to be based upon it.
2 Political action in Dahomey frequently 
took place at this time, when all the great
men of the state were assembled. For an . QQ
outline of these festivals see Chap.VI. p.
-  16 -
deprived of his sandals, the symbols of royalty*
Gankpe, who took the Strong* name of Gezo, was
1
immediately acclaimed King in his place* It was a 
saeriligious act and G-ezo was expected by some to die 
within three days* The gods failed to intervene, however, 
and Gezo continued to enjoy the consolations of the 
unrighteous* Adanzan himself took his deposition phil­
osophically and, indeed, settled down to live to a ripe
old age in honourable confinement* It was his sons who
2
put up a stiff resistance* Daapo, the Vi-Daho, fought 
fiercely in Abomey where the Agrigone palace was destroyed 
before his aunt, Nagban,^shot him and thus put an end to 
his intrah-sigenoe• A number of Adanzan* s other sons were 
killed in a struggle with a body of pro-Gezo troops under 
the command of the Migan* Still others fled to the Alla da
1 K* Dunglas, B*D*XX* * pp.UU-8*
2 The Vi-Daho— the literal meaning of 
the word is grandson— was the Grown 
Prince* For an analysis of the role 
of the Vi-Daho in Fon politics, see 
Chap. VI. p. U3U-U0
3 This lady, whose name is sometimes 
written Na-Bekonsi had no reason to 
love Adahzah1s family since the King 
had recently taken a swing at her with 
a sword. Le. Herisse, op* cit* p*315
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area, where they long remained in hiding* Gezo's
rival, Djossevo, was seized and killed* Presumably
his family either fuund safety in flight or were also
murdered. A company of Amazons, perhaps the whole
2Amazon body, refused to recognise the usurper. These 
Amazons, one and all, foxxght to the death for their 
legitimate sovereign.3 Opposition to Gezo's seizure 
was not therefore confined only to the royal family.
Oral tradition, in order to present Gezo's 
usur^tion as a popular movement, tends to minimise 
the resistance encountered by the new regime. However,
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX. p.kl* D;Jossevo was 
arrested and was never heard of again.
2 Dr.Repin, 'Voyage to Dahomey', Tour du 
Monde 1865; A.Le Herisse, op.cit.. p.66. 
Writing in the 1850s, Dr.Repxn states 
that Gezo was brought to power by an 
Amazon revolt. This seems to be a mis­
interpretation of the fact that Gezo, 
after his accession, recreated the 
Amazon Corps* Le Herisse states that 
Gezo built the Amazon forces. This 
suggested that the whole existing
Amazon body was destroyed at his accession.
5 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, pp.42-9. The above 
description of the events following 
Adanzanfs deposition is based on Dunglas*
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it is fairly obvious that Gezo only triumphed after 
a hard struggle* Moreover, even after his success in 
seizing the throne, the new King's position was by no 
means secure. What had been done could be undone. In 
the shifting sands of Pon political life the position 
of a usurper was bound to be even more difficult than 
that of a legitimate monarch. To secure his own safety 
he had to bring the turbulent ruling class under control 
and to re-establish the monarchy as the dominant force 
in Pon politics. It was to this end that Gezo devoted 
his long reign.
Immediately after the successful outcome of the 
coup De Souza gained his agreed reward; he became Chacha 
of Whydah. in origin the title was a purely personal 
one; it may have referred to De Souza's way of walking, 
to his physique, or to the manner in which he made his 
escape from Adanzan's Abomey. The term soon became 
institutionalised and can be taken to describe De Souza's 
position as the high Pon dignitary who monopolised the
1 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., p.237: 
E.Dunglas, E.DT XX,1 p.A3.
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Whydah slave trade and who controlled Dahoman relations 
with the Europeans. The Chacha's tenure of office was 
of course dependent upon Gezo1 s continuing as King.
The Chacha therefore continued to aid the King by 
providing both the wherewithal necessary to keep the 
great Chiefs happy and the weapons of war to control 
dissidents* The two men were still dependent on each 
other and as a result set about creating conditions 
which would give the regime security of tenure* The
monarch's dependence on an outsider was of course a
new development in Pon politics: it was, indeed, the 
factor that gave Gezo the opportunity of organising 
his realm so as to gather power into his own hands. 
Probably some of those very Chiefs who had supported 
the new King's bid for the throne would have hesitated 
if they had realised that Gezo, with De Souza's
assistance, was intent on curbing their powers.
In the disturbed conditions prevailing at the 
time of his accession, Gezo's most urgent requirement 
was to have a reliable armed force at his immediate
disposal. Accordingly, the King set about reorganising
the army> He seized the opportunity provided by the 
annihilation of the Amazons, or at least a section of 
the Amazons to create a new body of female warriors 
absolutely loyal to himself* This he did by building 
up a new corps composed entirely of young female 
captives whoy because they were not of the Pon nation, 
would; Abe loyal to the King alone * Although this was
a long-term policy the girls had to be trained from
childhood— —he ensured that the Amazon regiments, whom 
he made his own private bodyguard, would never be involved 
in Pon internal strife# In the menatime, on De Souza's ■ 
advice, he built up a new body of Dahoman fighting men.
These were formed into a trained regular or standing
2  , ‘ A '  - /  ' •
Aarmy. They were probably equipped, at De Souza's
expense, With the best available weapons of ;
1 A*Le Herisse, op»cit*, p*66* Le Herisse, 
considers that the Amazon regiments were 
Gezo's original creation* This was not 
of course the case# The view is, however, 
no doubt a reflection of the fact that he 
completely reorganised the corps*
2 A#Le Herisse, op*cit», p*58*
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war. Unlike the personal followers of the various 
Chiefs, or the forces raised by a general levy, this 
new "body was always at the ready and owed allegiance 
directly to the King. The regular army was evidently 
designed to deal as much with internal insurrection as 
external attack*
Perhaps the most difficult of Gezo's early problems 
was the question of how to reward his followers without 
weakening the monarchy. Many of these supporters were 
his own closest relatives; most of them probably expected 
to gain positions of great influence and importance.
In the past it had been the policy of the Dahoman kings 
to exclude close relatives from any position of power. 
Members of the royal family might well use the powers 
of office to forward their own claims to the throne. Gezo 
must have been well aware that even those of his relatives 
who in the past had served him loyally might in the futurd 
be tempted to advance their own interests at the expense 
of those of the King* Nevertheless, he dared not slight
1 For the organisation of the army see 
Chapter VI v*k6h-73
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and thus alienate his royal followers. A way out of 
his dilemma was found by creating for those relatives 
high-ranking, but powerless positions of second-in-
1
command to all the great civil and military factionaries* 
Presumably De Souza also saw to it that these Princes 
did not lack material wealth. The aspirations of the 
royal family were thus satisfied without essentially
weakening the King’s position.
Although Gezo was able to avoid giving power in 
the bureaucracy to his relatives, he could not, at his 
accession, have had full control over the by that time 
largely hereditary officers of state. No doubt a 
number of officials had opposed the new King: it is 
possible that Gezo replaced these men. There is, 
however, no record of any such change and it is 
doubtful if Gezo was able to bring about a major re­
shuffle. Moreover, the most important bureaucrats, 
the Migan and the Mehou, certainly remained in office.
If the King could not change his Ministers he had to
1 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., pp.33 nnd
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see to it that a climate of opinion was created in 
which the majority of them would, willingly co-operate 
with him.
As a result of the fact that his position at home
was weak, Gezo, during the first few years of his reign,
evidently avoided being involved in any foreign conflict.
Peace at home and a rebuilding of the army were both
essential preliminaries to a foreign war. Nevertheless,
he did set about preparing for a break with Dahomey’s
overlord, Oyo.
Since it was necessary to prevent foreign meddling
when Dahomey went to war with Oyo, Gezo’s first move
in foi’eign affairs was to win the friendship of Dahomey’s
1
most powerful neighbour, Ashanti. This did not prove too
1 A.Boahen, ’Asante-Dahoman Contacts’, Ghana 
Notes and Queries No.7. January 19651 
J.Duncan, Travels in West Africa, Vol.II, 
p.27A: R*Burton, op.citT, (1862”Ed.), Vol.I 
p.196, fn. Vol.II,pVI}-02; J.Dupuis, Journal 
of a Residence in Ashantee. Vol.I.pp.2hU--5 
and p.21$: VoLII pp.23-A|X). Gezo built a 
palace at Abomey, called Kumasij various 
reasons have been given for this. The 
evidence has been studied by A. Boahen who 
concludes that the palace was so named to 
commemorate the^friendly relations existing 
between the two states.
—  2.L\. —
difficult. The two states had long maintained amicable 
relations and the advent of a new regime in Dahomey 
was not allowed to interfere with the long-standing 
friendship: a friendship which was, indeed, to endure 
until the coming of the Europeans. Gezo probably at 
about the same time, established good relations with 
the states of Borgou, to the north of Dahomey. Indeed, 
by 1820 he seems to have won general recognition for 
his new regime both within and without Dahomey. In 
that year he was able to play a major role in the 
election of a new King of Savalou. This state was
traditionally a vassal of Dahomey but had a completely
1
separate political organisation. That Gezo could assert
his power in an outlying area like Savalou certainly 
indicates that Gezo was everywhere recognised as at 
least de facto King of Dahomey.
It seems likely, however, that Gezo waited for
a suitable opportunity before rushing into a war with
1 J.Berge, 'Etude sur le pays Mahi',
Bulletin de Commite His^orique et
Scientifique, A.O.F., Oct.-Dec. 1928,
P.743.
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Oyo. If Oyo delegates were demanding tribute he no
A
doubt simply delayed giving an answer* Probably the 
period of waiting came to an end in 1822 when the out­
break of the Owu wars must have made it nearly certain 
that Oyo was, at least for a time, quite unable to take 
any decisive action against Dahomey. Gezo then seems 
to have announced his determination never to pay tribute 
to Oyo. Indeed, two nineteenth century writers state 
that the King went further and destroyed an Oyo garrison
p
which was at that time occupying Cana. Although there 
is no other evidence either of the exi stance of such a 
garrison, or of a Pon attack upon it, this may well be 
merely a reflection of the fact that the Dahoman^s were 
very unwilling to admit that they were ever so closely
1 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., p.319* E.Dunglas, 
E.D.XX, p.277. Both writers talk of 
Gezo Ts refusal to pay tribute. Even if 
Adanzan had already declined to pay, the 
Oyo would have resumed their demands when 
a new King came to the throne.
2 R.Burton, op.cit., pp.125-6:
J.Skertchley, Dahomey As It Is, pp.118-9*
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subjected to Oyo. If there was such an Oyo stronghold
it could not have heen long in existence^ otherwise it
was almost hound to have heen mentioned in the relatively
plentiful literature of the nineteenth century. Possibly,
then, the Oyo placed a garrison in Cana during Adanzan1 s
reign at a time when the Pon central government was at 
1
its weakest. At any rate, whether or not Cana features
in the story, the Pon, soon after their refusal to pay
tribute, learned that the Oyo were assembling a hostile
army at Gommbo on the left bank of the River Ouemd'.
Rather than wait to be attacked, Gezo, with a force of
199 hand-picked men, fell upon and destroyed the invaders
at Paouignan a village to which the Oyo had been
2
■ lured by a ruse.
1 P.Morton-Williams, fThe Oyo Yoruba and the
Atlantic Trade, 1670-18301, Journal of the
Eist.Soc. of Nigeria, Yol. Ill, No.I, Dec.
1 9 This could fit in with the policy of 
colonisation towards the sea which Oyo was 
planning around this time.
2 A.Le Heriss^, op.cit., pp.319-320 
E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p
Dunglas incorporated many of the traditions 
Herisse associated with this battle into 
what would clearly appear to be a later 
campaign against a General called Adjinakou. 
See below, PP*37-U1*
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Since the victorious Fon army was so small and 
since the attacking force had formed so quickly it 
seems unlikely that the Yoruba force came directly 
from Oyo. The invading army may have been made up of 
the remnants of the Gana garrison* Morelikely it was 
made up, primarily, from various Yoruba units brought 
together by surviving Oyo consuls in neighbouring 
territories* Although the details of the campaign 
remain unclear it is certain that Gezo at this time 
put and end to Oyo claims to sovereignty over Dahomey*
The success of this move against the long-hated 
Yoruba oppressors must have greatly strengthened the 
new Kingfs position. He made the most of this by 
instituting what became known as the Oyo customs—  
a yearly celebration at Gana to commemorate Dahoman 
independence— the highlight of which was the sacrifice 
of a number of men dressed in the style of the Oyo.
She Fon were obviously not going to be permitted to 
forget quickly the triumphs of the new regime.
1 J.Skertchly, op.cit* * pp.118-19: 
R.Burton, op;cxt♦♦ pp.125-6.
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Whatever military prestige Gezo had gained, he 
remained for at least the first decade of his reign
heavily dependent on the Ghacha, who was at the time 
reaping the benefits of his intervention in politics.
His monopoly of WhydahTs slave trade had given De Souza 
extraordinary opportunities to accumulate vast wealth*
His control of Whydah gave him exclusive rights over 
the only port north of the line from which the Portuguese 
claimed to he able to trade freely in slaves. Bven 
though no Anglo-Portuguese anti-slaving treaty, after 
that of 1810, mentioned Whydah, Portugal certainly seems
to have considered that the slave trade there was legal
ifor some time. In spite of the fact that officers of 
the British Anti-Slave Squadron refused to acknowledge 
that Whydah was entitled to receive special treatment,
De Sousa was still issuing Portuguese licences permitting
2
vessels to take on slaves at that port in 1821.
1 This can be deduced from the fact that 
upon the dissolution of the Portuguese- 
Brazilian connection, the two powers had 
a long aispute as to which one inherited claims to Whydah.
2 P.O.814-/19* G. R.Collier to Admiralty, 
Lisbon 27.12.1821.
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Doubtful though their value may have been, the
Chacha's licences certainly appear to have fostered
confidence in his reliability as a slave factor^ and
during the 1820s, at least, his trading operations
were highly successful. In 1821 the Commodore of the
British Anti-Slave Squadron estimated that 100 slaving
1
vessels anchored annually off Whydah and Dagos. In
1826 another British officer reported having seen 9
2slaving vessels at one time lying off Whydah, and in 
that same year 30 to h0 ships were said to have been 
seen at Whydah, waiting for the Ghacha to supply them 
with slaves. In July 1828 De Souza even had an agent, 
in Freetown, buying up condemned slaving vessels for 
re-use^ and in July 1830 9 slaving ships were again
seen together at Whydah.^ The officers of the British
1 F.0.84/19, G.R.Collier to Admiralty, 
Lisbon 27.12.1821.
2 F*0. 8I4./3 Commodore Bullen to Admiralty, 
Bight of Benin, 12.11.1826
3 F.0. 8U/819, T.Hutton to W.B.Hutton,
Cape Coast 7*8.1850.
k Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra 
Leone, p.196*
5 F.0.8^/I1h, A.Gordon to Admiralty,
1.7.1830
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Anti-Slave Squadron were well aware that De Souza's 
trading operations were extensive, but legal wrangles 
with Portugal prevented their being able to do much 
to limit his activities*
2
Although even in the 1820s no longer a young man,
Francisco Felix remained active and vigorous, thoroughly
enjoying his newly achieved status. As the Kingfs ally
he was of course powerful throughout Dahomey. In
Whydah itself he ruled as an uncrowned king. Although 
3
the Yeovogun retained the right to deal with the 
internal affairs of Whydah province, politically and 
socially, the new King's ally was by far the most im­
portant man in the town.
De Souza's way of life was that of an
1 C.Lloyd, Ihe Favy and the Slavd Trade, 
pp*39-60.
2 P.0.84/819* I •Hutton to W.B. Hutton, 
Gape Coast 7*8*1850. De Sousa was 
reported, in 1849* to have been aged 81 
when he died: he would therefore have
been 52 in 1820.
3 Yeovogun. was the Governor of
Whydah province. See Ghap.VI. pp. 
448-449 *
oriental potentate. At M s  death he left innumerable 
proge'nj. All his personal effects, his food, his 
clothing, his furniture , were, of the best: all were
imported from abroad. He intended to be spectacular 
even in death, his main provision for the hereafter being 
the possessioh of a silver coffin. When in the company 
Of Africans, he played^ to the full, the role of a great 
Dahoiaan dignitary. He observed theirvcustoms^ spoke 
their lah^age,; entered fully into their, debates; and 
..seldom ’moved:- without, an attendant host of praise singers 
and armedvfollowers.
When with Europeans he switched immediately to the 
role of a gfbat Brazilian gentleman. His hospitality 
was legendary, his manners exquisite: indeed, he
carried this affectation further by attempting, where 
he could, to exOit something, of a humanitarian, in-
V . , - .. . ^ ; , v . ■" ; 2  * . •. ;
fiuenoe in Bahoman society. Dhis humanitarianism, of ^ 
course, stopped short, of giving offence to those with
1 P.O. 84/775* Duncan to Palmerston 22.9.1849*
2 . P.B#Porbes, p#107*
J.Skertchly, op.cit., p.167*
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whom he dwelt in harmony. What evidently mattered 
to feini more than anything was that everyone should 
treat him with respect and deference* His life was
1
dedicated to maintaining an aura of personal grandeur.
De Souza1 s display of splendour was not, however,
purely ostentatious: it had the political purpose of
giving a clear idea of the vast resources upon which
the new regime could draw. The Court, at Ahomey, also
lived in a fashion made magnificent hy De Souza's
2lavish donations. Indeed, Gezo perhaps gained as 
much prestige from De Souza's expenditure on useless 
luxury goods as he did from his purchase of weapons of 
war*
1 P.0.84/8199 T.Hutton to W.B*Hutton,
Cape Coast, 7*8.1850; T.Canot, Memoirs 
of a Slave Trader, pp.164-7• Most 
nineteenth century writers on Dahomey 
devote at least some space to De Souza*s 
career. Hutton and Canot, however, knew 
him personally and they have left good 
accounts of him— accounts which are 
essentially in accord*
2 One famous example of the type of gift
made hy De Souza to the King was a large 
wheel-mounted vessel named Si Key du Dahomey. 
Gezo loved to have this trundled around the 
court. See P.P.Forbes, op.cit.» Vol.II, p.8.
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Even in the 1820s, however, at the height of 
his seeming prosperity, there was a "basic flaw in 
De Sou.zafs trading arrangements* This was more than 
that his capital was "being constantly frittered away 
in ostentatioiis extravagances* It was simply that he 
was an incompetent "business man* He kept neither &n 
inventory nor accounts. His success had come about 
as a result of extraordinary good luck rather than 
"by either hard work or clear-sighted enterprise* His 
early prosperity was due to the fact that he happened 
to he in the right place at the right time* The 
maintenance of success was due to his monopoly of 
Whydah* He may have had a great deal of political 
sagacity; he certainly had little or no commercial 
acumen* Nevertheless, as the Ghacha of Whydah he had 
won considerable fame; so great was his reputation that
1 T*Canot, op*cit* * p*i66; I.Akinjobin, 
op* cit* * p.292. Canot states that 
De Souza was illiterate. Akinjobin 
considers that a signature appearing 
on document dated 18O3 may be his.
Considering his methods of conducting 
business it seems unlikely that De 
Souza was literate*
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innumerable cargoes of goods were sent out to him from 
Brazil* These consignments were never refused. Every­
thing that came for De Souza was landed on shore, tony 
of the goods landed on the Whydah beach were stolen; 
other consignments rotted away before they were collected. 
Many of the goods supplied to him were used to glorify 
his own establishment at Whydah. Much was sent to the 
King in Abomey. Eew of these goods were ever paid for*
De Souza simply could not provide sufficient slaves to 
satisfy the demand. Captains and supercargoes were 
continually kept hanging around Whydah. In order to 
prevent them pressing their claims too forcefully De 
Souza provided for them every type of diversion and 
amusement. Ships were said to have broken up on the 
beach while awaiting consignments of slaves from De 
Souza. Some slavers, in despair of ever getting cargoes, 
often simply sailed away. Obviously this state of 
affairs could not last for ever. The Chacha's reputation 
was however so considerable and the slave trade in the 
nineteenth century was such a risky business that the
Brazilian importers were accustomed to long delays in
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payment* De Souza was judicious in the despatch of 
what slaves he had, and kept making port payments on 
his debts* In the hope that he would soon pay the 
balance, his trading partners for long continued to 
give him credit.^ De Souza1 s luck therefore held for 
some considerable time* For more than a decade he had 
the use of goods for which he had never paid. In spite 
of the fundamental insecurity of his commercial empire, 
therefore, his support enabled G-ezo to lay the foundations 
of a new and powerful monarchy*
The nature of the Chacha^ operations had of course 
some effect upon the policies of the new regime. The 
demand for slaves on the coast most certainly caused the 
King to indulge in numerous slave-trading ventures. Many 
of the slaves exported from Whydah were, however, probably
1 F*0.Sb/S19> T.Hutton to W*B.Hutton,
Gape Coast 7•8.1850: T.Canot, op.cit., 
pp.l61j.-7* This account of De Souza1 s 
business methods is based mainly on a 
letter by the mulatto merchant, Thomas 
Hutton (see f.n*3 P.fflJ* It is con­
firmed to a remarkable extent by Ganot’s 
observations*
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"bought, not captured. In the eai\Ly 1820s, at least,
the King does seem to have confined his attention to
the old Fon raiding grounds in the Mahi country to
the north of Abomey. He could not raid far towards
the west for fear of antagonising Ashanti. Neither
do the Fon at this period appear to have raided into
2Eg’ba or Egbado territory. Probably, however, they 
did begin to make their power felt after the battle 
of Paouignan, not only in the Mahi country but in 
Yoruba country on their north-eastern frontier. This 
Fon activity, together with the increasing wealth of 
the King of Dahomey, seems to have excited the hostility
1 H.Glapperton, Journal of a Second 
Expedition into the Interior of Africa,
pp*83 & 123. Olapperton met a group 
of Dahomans who he later discovered 
to be slave traders.
2 P. Mort012-Williams,1 The Oyo and the 
Atlantic Trade* 1670-1830, Journal
of the Hist. Soc. of Nigeria, Vol.Ill,
No.I. December 196A* The eastern 
trade route from Oyo to Badagry was 
still functioning in the late 1820s. 
This makes it unlikely that the Fon 
had begun raiding eastwards far to 
the south of Ketu.
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of Dahomey's nearest north-easterly neighbours,
Save and Ketu. In the mid-l820s a Yoruba army, 
closely associated with the two states, proceeded to
•j
invade Dahomey* This army was led by one Adjinakou
the Elephant, sometimes described as Balagoun of Oyo.
Oral traditions give differing versions of the
2
circumstances surrounding Adjinakou1 s attack. They 
are however agreed on the fact that the invasion was 
instigated by Oyo in an attempt to re-assert her 
sovereignty over Dahomey. One of them, possibly to 
emphasise the Oyo connection, even incorporates the 
events of the Faouignan campaign into the story of 
Adjinakou. That the Eon would be happy to record a 
great and glorious victory over the massed might of 
the dreaded Oyo army is not surprising: such an event
1 Taking into consideration the fact that 
Save probably was conquered in the early 
1830s, and that the Eon conducted a 
series of campaigns between that against 
Adjinakou and the final one against Save, 
the war against the former probably took 
place at some time in the mid-l820s.
2 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX. pp.56-7:
A.Le Herisse, op.cit., p.321.
-  38 -
credit
would reflectynot only on the new regime hut also on 
the nation at large* Nevertheless, it does seem 
unlikely that Adjinakou's army was an official Oyo 
punitive expedition* In the first place it is doubtful 
if Oyo in the 1820s would have been capable of sending 
out a major expeditionary force. In the second place 
the Adjinakou war seems to have been an episode in 
a developing hostility between Dahomey and its north 
and north-eastern neighbours. The campaign was pre­
ceded by Fon attacks on Mahi towns, and led directly 
to a campaign against the Yoruba town of Save* It 
was in fact part of a series of events in which Oyo 
was not really involved*
Adjinakou’s attack appears to have been made in 
an attempt to curb the growing power of the Fon* It
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, pp.56-7.
The tales may or may not have 
been amalgamated by Dunglas's 
informants. In spite of this 
amalgamation, however, Dunglas's 
version contains a great deal of 
useful information.
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was an attempt made by those who feared and felt
threatened hy this growing power the Mahi, Save'",
and Ketu* Incidental evidence provided hy oral 
tradition tends to supplement this view: many of 
Adjinakou’s troops were said to have come from Sav^ 
and Ketu: Adjinakou himself, although at one point 
described as Balagoun of Oyo, is also reported to have 
heen a native of Savd*: after his capture it is implicitly 
stated that he was impaled with his face turned towards
1
Savd' presumably as a warning to the people of that state#
Another tradition records that Oyo sent against the
2
Dahomans the ’Partisan, Adjinakou1* This description 
may indicate that Adjinakou was more the leader of an 
irregular war hand, cut adrift hy the breakdown of Oyo 
authority, than an official commanding a punitive ex­
pedition* Such a group of near-condottiers, especially 
if Adjinakou had Sav^ connections, might easily have heen 
hired hy the enemies of Dahomey and might or might not 
have had the blessing of Oyo*
1 E,Dunglas, E.D.XX, pp#56-7.
2 A.Le Herisse, op#cit., pp.320-21.
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Ohother op not the oatac tvom Oyo*
/i&3inato*fB attools eortataXy revived Won memories of 
pm&t imtaiX&artiona tit the hands of the Yoruba mid XeCl 
tlnem to exaggerate the threat to toeir eeawity*
Both the Qhnolm and the King of Porto dtgvq advised
4
Qom to muk® the heat porno h© eoulft with the invaders* 
Tno King* however* reseed to .yield to tho fear© of hie 
friends and abselivtoXy declined to tate measures to 
obtain p©&«©* The enoay appears to I w  crossed the 
River 0uew v/MXe 0©so ami M e  army were engaged in 
the soige of the Mahi &il3L«»top town of EaltpaXofco* The 
peogile of that tomi* perched on their MXX* sow the 
invading way* wMXe the Fon below could not* The 
ill-advised rojoictae of the beeeigod ©itisens fore* 
warned Ooeo of hie enetaloo* approach and ho \?an able 
to tiimi M e  army quickly upon the four thousand
i uJtTS?* «■*
1 A.Ls HesSlQBO, asaftjSJS^ ,, S>|>*331**2U
a a *&© U0S4.0B©, op«oit*» p#331* 33*0!inglea»
f&@ Jp$ggu?e o£* UpQOO is 
pi»omhly an oaaggomtlon* Dusglaa states 
that the Inva'iing awiy ba<l a stvosg oavalx*y
Wii M b  is psoMMy only, an •infiieatioa'i 
that ?fiefflos»;loa"of eighteenth oentusy Gyo 
campaigns we3?e iBCO®o|>atocl la the vcpalon 
o£* the tsmelitioa he teas?tU ‘
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followers of Adjinakou. The Yoruba were evidently
taken hy surprise and were soon put to flight.
Adjinakou himself was captured and put to an ignominious 
i
death.
The major enemy having heen put out of action, the
Pon resumed their expansion in Mahi country. The town of
Kakpaloko, which had greeted the approach of Adjinakou with
such glee, was the first to be destroyed "by the triumphant
Pon. Rather than fall into the hands of the Bahomans,
its King, Bagnon, jumped to his death from the highest
2point within his town* As the result of over-confidence 
amongst the Pon troops, however, a later Pon expedition 
against the Mahi proved to he a complete disaster. Two 
of the King’s brothers, Assogbaou and Toffa, were cap­
tured and put to work as agricultural labourers. This 
humiliation was too much for Toffa, who, in a fit of
1 A.Le Iierisse, op. cit., pp. 321-2:
P.Bunglas, P.P.XX. pp.56-7*
Herisse has been followed in giving 
the broad outline of events: Bunglas 
provides the details.
2 E.Bunglas, op.cit., pp. 58-9.
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of temper, attacked and killed the Mahi who super­
vised his labour. For this crime he was himself put 
to death. This was felt as an insult, not only by the 
royal family, but by the whole Fon nation. A new, well- 
organised expedition was therefore quickly despatched 
northwards. The Mahi towns which had successfully 
resisted the earlier Fon attack fell in rapid succession 
before this renewed onslaught. The chief Mahi town,
Hounjeroto, v/as captured: Assogbaou was freed. The
2
stain on Dahoman honour was thus wiped out.
Just as the early raids on Mahi country appear to 
have led to Adjinakou1 s attack, these further Fon advances 
led to open war with Save. The King of that state, 
Ekutchoni, had sent thirty soldiers to the aid of 
Hounjeroto. These warriors had been killed by the Fon 
after the capture of the town. Ys/hen he heard of this 
deed, Bkotchoni • sent word to Gezo that he was on the 
point of attacking Yegon, a town lying between Save and
1 These events form the subject matter 
of Paul Hazoumes's novel, Doguicimi.
2 E.Dunglas, op.cit. B.D.XX, pp.64-5
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Dahomey: he declared that he would not now stop there
hut would advance and destroy Abomey. The Fon, deter­
mined to forestall a Save attack, themselves sent an 
army to Yegon* The people of that town greeted the 
Fon as liberators, gave the Dahomey army a number of 
men to act as guides and even sent a detachment of their 
own troops with the Dahomans in their march on Save* 
Thanks to the expert guidance of the Yegon men, the Fon 
were able to make, from the north, a successful surprise 
attack at dawn on Save* The town was sacked and the 
skull of King Ekutchoni sent to Abomey, where it was
A
later used as a drinking cup. Although there is 110 
direct evidence, it seems likely that Save, from that 
time, acknowledged Fon overlordship and began to pay 
tribute to Dahomey*
It seems probable that in the 1820s, or early 1830s, 
both Porto Novo and Ketu also began to pay tribute
1 E.Dunglas, op.cit., pp. 67-8. Dunglas 
considers that this campaign took place 
between I830 and 1835. Since the attack 
on Save followed directly on that of 
Hounjeroto, it probably took place in 
the early 1830 s.
— )j/j —
to Dahomey* Both kingdoms had long been accustomed
to claim the protection of Oyo* With the collapse
of the Oyo empire and the emergence of Dahomey,
temporarily at least, as the strongest of the states
in the western part of the former empire, it was
perfectly natural that they should do so. There is
certainly no record of armed conflict between Dahomey
and these states. Possibly Porto Novo had already
drifted into this position of subordination to Dahomey
before Adjinakou1s attack. The King of Porto Nove is,
in oral tradition, definitely linked with De Souza as
being one of the friends who advised G-ezo to make peace
1
with the Yoruba at the time of that attack. The 
tributary relationship probably became more definite
as Dahomey*s power increased. By the 1840s Porto Novo
2
was certainly considered a vassal of Dahomey. So, too, 
was Ketu. Probably after the defeat of Adjinakou and
1 E.Dunglas, op.cit., p.19, f.n*3
2 P.O.84/893? Commander Wilmot to 
Commodore Bruce, •Harlequin*, 
off Lagos, 11.2.1852.
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the overthrow of Bkotchoni this state also came
to acknowledge Dahoman supremacy.
Having consolidated their position in SaW,
Ketu, and Porto Hovo, the Fon, in the early 1830s,
2
seem to have begun expanding into Fgbadoland.
Their first move in this case was probably to attack 
and destroy the town of Inoubi. Two years later they 
dealt in a similar manner with Lefou-Lefou. These 
attacks may have been made simply in order to obtain 
slaves. They were more likely to have had the 
additional purpose of extending Fon power in the
1 F.F.Forbes, op.cit., Vol. I p.20.
Forbes declared that Ketu became
a vassal of Dahomey as a result of 
an agreement, not as a result of war.
2 P.Morton-Williams, fThe Oyo Yoruba and 
the Atlantic Trade, 1670-18301, Journal 
of the Hist. Soc. of Nigeria. Vol. Ill
December 1961^ . Morton-Williams considers 
that Oyo control of Fgbadoland may have 
broken down soon after 1830.
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*1
area* The King of Porto Novo, who had claim 
to sovereignty over a number of Egbado towns,
1 E.Dunglas, op* cit* * pp*76-77:
A*Le Herisse, op*cit*, P*3^:
S.Johnson, A History of the Yorubas. pp*227-3°
P.Forbes, op* cit*, Vol*I pp*31 & 38> Vol. IX pp.21+-7: 
R. Burton, op* cit * * Vol. II p. 1+01 •
Johnson states that the attack on Lefou-Lefou 
(Refou-Refou) took place two years "before 
that of Inoubi. He tells how Inoubi was 
betrayed by an Oyo renegade named Dekun.
Dunglas considers that these attacks formed 
part of a chain of events leading up to the 
Fon*rEgba conflict of 1 851: he suggests 181+1 
as the probable date of the attack on Inoubi* 
Bunglas also related how Gezo, according to 
an Amazon tradition, on the advice of Be Souza, 
a little after the Alafin Atiba came to the 
throne, handed Bekun over to Oyo for punish­
ment. (See Chap. II p.61+). Now, Atiba became 
Alafin about 1837or ,36. Johnson states that 
Bekun lived for some time in Bahomey after the 
attack on Inoubi. If he was handed over shortly 
after Atiba* s accession and he lived some time 
in Bahomey, Inoubi must have been destroyed 
long before 181+1* Johnson, although he does 
not date Inoubi* s betrayal by Bekun, places it 
in the chapter before the accession of Atiba.
Le Herisse places the attack on Lefou-Lefou 
approximately two years after that on Kakpaloko. 
This seems to fit in more satisfactorily with 
Johnson*s evidence. Forbes, and following 
him, Burton, also mentions Dekun and Lefou-Lefou. 
They seem to refer, however, to different 
events. (See above, p.7 f.n. 1).
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may have drawn the Dahomans into the area hy asking 
their assistance. The Fon were, then, by the 1830s, 
extending their influence all along their eastern 
frontier*
In the first seventeen years of Gezo*s reign the 
status of Dahomey vis-a-vis its neighbours had changed 
remarkably. Instead of being a state, nominally, at 
least, still tributary to the Yoruba, Dahomey was by 
the mid 1830s a totally independent power with con­
siderable influence over the states on her borders.
This change was of course largely due to events outside 
the influence of Gezo. The Fon monarch had been 
incredibly lucky in coming to power at a time when the 
Oyo empire was on the point of collapse. The fact that 
Dahomey, an outlying province, was already a well 
organised state, gave her an enormous advantage in the 
initial stages of the realignment of political authority 
in the territory of the former empire. The Yoruba
1 S.Biobaku, op.cit., p.31. One of the 
most important Egbado towns, Ado, was 
claimed in the 18U0s to be a tributary 
of Porto Novo.
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state of Abeokuta, which was to he Dahomey’s major 
rival during the remainder of the nineteenth century, 
flnly consolidated its position in the 1830s. Until 
it did, Dahomey had no powerful rival able to prevent 
her from gaining control over the lesser Yoruba kingdoms 
on her eastern frontier. Gezo’s part in the changes should 
not, however, be under-estimated. That Dahomey was able 
to take advantage of the circumstances favourable to 
expansion was due to the fact that Gezo had, in that 
crucial period, imposed a fair degree of political unity 
upon the turbulent Fon aristocracy. Without this new 
and somewhat precarious unity it is doubtful if the 
Fon could have taken the decisive action they did. By 
the mid-l830s, Gezo had certainly established himself
as one of the most outstanding leaders of the Fon nation.
G-ezo had by then gained considerable prestige from
his successful break with Oyo, from his military victories 
and from the reduction of numbers of neighbouring states 
to positions of dependence. This, along with the influence 
he obtained by being able to tap De Souza’s wealth at 
will, made his place in Fon politics absolutely
- 1+9 -
secure. The simple passage of time aided Gezo’s 
augmentation of political strength. By the 1830s 
his early measures must have heen beginning to bear 
fruit. The first generation of loyally brought up 
Amazon bodyguards, for example, must have reached 
maturity. The natural removal by death of officers 
of state must have enabled Gezo to manoeuvre at least
■i
a few personal followers into key posts. Moreover, 
the last vestige of impropriety attending Gezo’s rule 
was finally svirept away during the years of triumphant 
siiccess. At the beginning of the reign, Gezo’s mother, 
Agosse-Evo, had been sold into slavery by Adanzan. The 
ritually-important duties of the Queen-mother could not 
not therefore be performed. Tradition relates, however, 
that at the time of bezo’s defeat of Adjinakou, his 
mother was brought back from the New World to Dahomey, 
and under the new name of Agontimme, she took up her
1 Fon beaurocratic posts were normally 
he©editory in the family. A powerful 
king seems to have been able to 
influence the choice of a relative 
to succeed a defunct beaurocrat.
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rightful place in the life of the Pon court. Although 
it is difficult to accept that Agosse-Evo was really 
found, and did actually return to Dahomey, the fact 
that some woman, at this time of triumph for the regime, 
did "begin to fulfil the ritual role of ^ueen-mother does 
seem to indicate that it was then that Gezo "became 
recognised as uncontested King of all the Dahomans.
In fact, although ostensibly more securely on the 
throne in the 1830s than ever before, Gezo's ability to 
dominate Pon political life was even then beginning to 
be undermined. This was because Be Souza was becoming 
more of an embarrassment than a support. The Chacha's 
long-suffering trading partners had awakened to the fact 
that he was a bad risk. As a result they gradually 
ceased to advance him credit. Whydah!s trade therefore 
began to dry up. The decline was noted by all who had
1 E.Dunglas, E.D. X X pp.65-U .
Dunglas obtained his information 
from the Whydah family of Bossou-Yevo. 
The founder of this family was the man 
who had been sent by De Souza to the 
Americas to find Agofssi-Evo and obtain 
her release.
reason to visit, Whydah* 2?he officers of the British
Ahti?-Slave Sqtiadrbn, not unnaturally, attributed it to 
■ , 1 . 
their own increasing vigilance* French naval officers
tended to agree* British West African merchants,
however, realised that this was not the true reason why
3 ■
the slave trade was abandoning Whydah* Anglo-Brasilians 
in other ports on the Bight were making their fortunes
without interferences the slave trade in Lagos in the
4  ■ -
1830s and 1840s reached unprecedented proportions*
1 House of Commons, 1842, XEj (551) p*226. 
Evidence of Lt*R*Leyigne*
2 .M.M*G•Senegal III, 5, Eauisse Oommerciale
de la Qote Qcoidentale d*Afrique par* 
M*Broquarit. Annees, 1838 e|t 1S39 •
3 House of Commons, 1842, XI (551) pp*36-37 
F*Swanzy, an Englishman with extensive 
trading interests in the Gold Goast, 
considered that the two cruisers stationed 
between Gape St.Paul and Gape Formosa had 
little effect on the volume of the slave 
trade•
4 D.Ross, •Ihe Career of Domingo Martinet
on the Bight of Benin* * Journal of African 
History* Vol* VI, Ho *1, 1965* 7
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Whydah* s difficulties were- in fact almost solely due 
to De Sousa* s incompetence and over-optimism. His 
creditors were, in the mid-1830s, becoming more and 
more insistent: their agents began to arrive at Whydah 
in droves. Since De Sousa had kept no record of his 
transactions the only metho&%open to him, when dealing 
with these creditors, were either to deny flatly that 
he had ever received the goods or to retire out of 
their reach to Abomey. The New World slave importers, 
in desperation, eventually began to send their repre­
sentatives to the King.
Gezo, of course, had no wish to embarrass De Sousa, 
and so for a period he paid no attention to the complaints 
that reached him. Only when the flow of goods to Whydah
almost ceased #as he forced to heed them. Upon investigation
*
it became obvious that De Souza was heavily in debt and 
that he had no means of paying his creditors. At a great 
conference held at Abomey, presided over by the King and 
attended by De Souza and his creditors* representatives, 
it was decided that the Chacha would have to give up his 
monopoly of the Whydah trade* The great man was reduced 
to the position of a Dahoman functionary levying tax,
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at the rate of one dubloon per slave, on the exports
of other merchants. Anyone who so wished could now
trade at Whydah, Although De Souza’s creditors could
have had little hope of ever getting their money bach
from him, they at least had the prospect of recouping
their losses hy themselves trading in Whydah in his
place* To the King, of course, the most important
part of the settlement was the possibility of there
"being again a revival of trade at Whydah*
By the late 1830s, then, De Souza was no longer
able to fulfil his role of chief supporter of Gezo’s 
power* He was unable to supply equipment to the Fon 
army, he could no longer make contributions to the royal 
treasury, and he ceased to be able to make gifts to the 
Chiefs. Ostensibly, as much deference as ever was paid 
to De Souza; it would have been impolitic, to say the 
least, to have admitted publicly the worthlessness of
1 F.0.8U/819, T.Hutton to W.B.Hutton,
Cape Coast 7*8*1850.
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of an alliance that had once been the main prop of 
the monarch. The De Souza connection had, nevertheless, 
ceased to be of much real value to Gezo. The loss was 
not immediately disastrous since the King’s early 
successes had, for the time being, secured his position. 
In order to Keep the Chiefs happy, and thus ensure 
continuing smooth functioning of his government, Gezo 
had nevertheless to maintain the momentum of his 
commercial and military successes. Any serious setback 
would threaten a return to the anarcby of the previous 
reign.
C H A P T E R  II
THE SEARCH FOR HBff ALLIES
1835-1852
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In the 1830s Gezo was faced with two separate 
although inter-related problems. First of all, in 
order to keep his Chiefs contented, he had to bring 
about a revival of Dahoman trade with the Europeans.
At the same time, in order to maintain his ascendancy 
in Fon politics, he had to see to it that such a 
revival benefited the Fon monarchy. Ideally, what 
he must have wanted was to create a system not unlike
that formerly operated by the Chacha one whereby trade
with Europe was used to forward the Monarch’s own 
political aspirations. Although his first and most 
urgent task was to end the period of commercial stag­
nation, Gezo never lost sight of the fact that it was 
essential for the well-being of the monarchy that the
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King, and not the over-mighty Chiefs, should benefit
directly from the profits of the trade*
Unfortunately, in the last analysis, Pon trade
with Europe depended upon the willingness of traders
to visit Dahoman ports. The Pon could not force
the merchants to come: all they could do was to try
to encourage them. In the late 1850s this proved
difficult* Although a number of Afro-Brazilian
merchants settled in Whydah after the ending of the
Chacha*s monopoly, none of them seem to have become
exceptionally prosperous* The great, volume of the
Bight*s slave trade was now done in Lagos* Whydah*s
commercial position remained unsatisfactory. A Prench
observer summed up the situation clearly in November 1844
*Le commerce des esclaves, malgr£ les
croiseurs, qui le "kraquent, a toujours
un grand d^veloppment sur c*ette fraction
de c8te; mais, & Whydah meme, il s’est
beaucoup ralenti* J*ai vu entierment vides
ces grands magasins de marchandises humaines,
1^adis toujours pleins.*
1 Extract from a report by Captain Monleon 
12.11.1844# Annales Maritimes et Coloniale 
1845, tom.III, p*505.
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Dahomey's trading position only began to show
a real improvement after 1846 when Grezp permitted
the ex-Lagos slave dealer, Domingo Kartinez, to set
■, . ■ , . 1 - ■ 
up trading posts on Porto Kove and Cotonou beaches.
In. the meantime, Cezo attempted to revive both
Dahomey's commerce and the fortunes of his supporters,
the De Souzas, by giving the sons and friends oi old
Francisco Felix the monopoly of trade in a number of
outlying ports# Ihese ports? were created, presumably,
in an effort to attract to the other Dahoman towns the
trade which, obstinately refused to .return to Whydah,
Ihat the monopoly rights were given, to the De Souzas
shows how reluctant the King was to allow the profits
of the trade to fall into the hands of any but his friends*
Cezo must have feared that the open trading he m s  forced to
1 See below, pp*74~75*
2 F#0*2/4 Consul Fraser's Commercial iteport,
May 1852: F*0#84/875 1*£*Forbes to Bruce
Whydah 18*1*1852*
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accept at Whydah might provide one of his subjects with 
the wherewithal to destroy his regime.
The out-lying ports experiment was not a success,
however, until 181+6. The D© Souza family remained 
associated with the Chacha’s immense debts and?although 
the younger members of the family seem to have been 
mildly prosperous, no great revival of the family’s
A
fortunes tooh place. The old trading system could 
not be restored even in a modified form. The King 
really needed a series of new European contacts.
The need for change was made all the more urgent 
by the fact that the remaining Dahoman slave trade was 
no longer supplying the goods which the Eon wanted. As 
a result of the increasing vigilance of the English anti­
slave trade squadron, the Afro-Brazilians, although still 
able to despatch slaves, were having great difficulty 
in importing trade goods. They were therefore having to 
pay for their supply of slaves in gold. The Eon were
1 E.0.8I+/775> Duncan to Palmerston,
22.9.18U9.
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thus deprived of the supplies to which they had become 
■\
accustomed. For purely commercial as well as political 
reasons Gezo had to develop a new relationship with the 
Europeans.
Such a new relationship did get under-way when the
2palm-oil trade began to develop in the Bight of Benin.
In 1838 a mulatto trader from the Gold Coast, Thomas 
3
Hutton, established a palm oil collecting post at
1 P.Verger, ’les Afro-Americains*, The 
Dos Santos Letters. Ho s.6-83, quoted
in C.W.Hewbury, The Slave Coast and its 
Rulers. p.40: C.Lloyd, op.cit., P#47*
The evidence comes from the 1840s. The 
situation must, however, have come into 
existence in the late 1830s after the 
Squadron began to seize Spanish and 
Portuguese vessels equipped for the 
slave trade.
2 N.J.Stillard, The Rise and Development 
of Legitimate Trade in Palm Oil With 
West Africa* . Birmingham M.A. Thesis 
1938, p*78* Stillard gives 1841 as the 
date when Hutton first began to operate 
from Whydah.
3 Thomas Hutton was a mulatto trader from 
the Gold Coast. He was a ’nephew* of the 
London palm oil merchant W#B.Hutton. 
Although his firm was independent, he
worked in very close association with 
the London Huttons. He was drowned off 
Lago s in 1857•
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1
Whydah# He had not been active there for long before 
he was joined by the Marseilles House of Regis* This 
French firm established itself in Dahomey in 1841, when 
its founder, Victor Regis,., obtained permission from the 
French government to set up a trading post in the former
V- ' * ' - ' ‘ 2 V  : .
French slaving fort at Whydah* Gtezo welcomed the traders,
presumably realising they might be capable of supplying
the demand that the slavers were no longer able to meet.
. 3
The Afro-Brazilians, apart from the Chacha, fearing 
that increased contact with the legitimate trade would 
mean closer supervision by the Squadroii, at first made
1 0#0,96/13, T.Hutton to Lt.Gtov.Winniett,
Gape Coast 22 *12#1847: House of Commons
Papers 1842, XI (551) P*667 evidence of 
W.B#Hutton# 1853 was the date Thomas 
Hutton gave. His uncle, W.B.Huttbh, was 
more vague and sometimes gives different 
dates#
; 2 M.M.C .Senegal IT, 42b, Regis to Marine,
Marseilles 8*9•1341: B.Sehnapper, ’la
Politique at le Commerce Francais dans 
Be G-olf e de Guinea, 1858-1871, p#l64-165*
3 Hduse of Commons Papers 1842, XI (551),
p#116 evidence of Oapt.H#Seward. Seward had 
heard of the Chacha offer to provide palm 
pil in exchange for goods# The fact that 
he no longer exported slaves probably 
influenced him in this*
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the, cblleeiion of palm oil as Aiffieult as possible* 
nevertheless, in spite of opposition, and in spite of 
the small amouht of palm oil immediately availableV 
the two European firms, with the ehqouragement;ofr the 
King, persevered and gradually increased their Whydah \
1  ' \ V ' ‘ • • ' 5  • • - '“" i ' :- V  , - ■ ■ -
' t r a d e * ' '  /  ' - ' /-■ ■ . .
^ommerciai difficulties were not the only problems 
demanding Gezo*8 attention at this time* Hew developments 
in Yorubaland were making essential a reconsideration 
of Fon policy in that territory. In the place of the 
crumbling 0yo empire there had emerged a series of strong, 
if quarrelsome Yoruba successor states* The era of
easy Dahoman eastward expansion was at an end: the Fon
how came into contact with a series of hew powers
created by the strife of civil war. Cne of the most 
important, the ^gba state of Abeokuta, was placed so 
as- to present a latent challenge to the position of
1 0*0.96/12, T.Hutton to W.B.Hutton,
Aghway, 7*12.1846: W.B.Huttpn to 
B*Hawes, Watling Street 6.7*1847* 
s; In his first year, T. Hut ton was able 
to export only enohgh palm oil to 
supply half a cargo for one small 
boat* • B*8ehnapper, op.cit*, p.172.
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supremacy which the Fon had lately established in the
south-western part of the former empire* In 1835? at
Osogbo, the Egba had won a decisive victory over Ibadan
and had established themselves, under the leadership
of an’ oixt standing chief named Shodeke, as one of the
most powerful units ixi the area's new political system*
In the later 1830s Abeolcuta. continued to grow in power
1
and population, and it soon became clear that in order 
to guard her trade routes to the sea the new state was 
likely to expand towards the coast.
Unfortunately, expansion southwards was liable to 
bring the Egba into direct conflict with the Fon^who 
had already established their suzerainty over Porto hovo 
and much of south-west Yorubaland. The Fon in the late
1830s and 18U0S seem to have had the intention of 
extending their domination even further along the coast, 
Presumably they felt that they might thus solve their 
economic difficulties. This must have been their aim 
in 1847 when they took part in an unsuccessful attack
1 S.O.Blobaku, The Egha and their neighbours, 
P.23-5.
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on Lagos. It was probably also their aim when they
enforced general recognition of their possession of
2
the beach as far as Badagry. They probably wished 
to interrupt the trade routes to their mador rival, 
Lagos: they may have even wished to reduce that town 
to a tributary position. At any rate, Fon ambitions 
of expansion to the east, and Egba ambitions of 
expansion to the south, seemed likely to come into 
direct conflict.
According to Aboman tradition, the Fon early 
recognised the danger inherent in the emergance of 
Abeokuta. Gezo, on the advice of the Chacha, in the 
late 1830s, established friendly relations Y/ith the 
Alafin, Atiba, so that if Dahomey found herself at 
war wijjh Abeokuta, Oyo would not take the opportunity
1 C.0.96/12, Extracts from a correspondent 
at Badagry to Y/.B. Hutton; enclosed in 
W.B.Hutton to B.Hawes, London 3/9/1814-7.
2 F.Forbes, op.cit., Vol.I P.11. Forbes 
noted that Dahomey claimed the beach 
at Porto Novo and Badagry. European 
traders at these ports had to pay 
tribute.
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1
to attack* The focus of Fon attention thus passed
from her north-eastern to her south-eastern frontier.
War between the Fon and the Egba did not, however,
break out as soon as might have been expected. Gezo
himself was evidently reluctant to risk a major conflict
at a time when his supremacy in Bahomey depended almost
entirely upon maintaining his reputation for su&oess.
He seems, therefore, to have attempted to restrain his
chiefs' expansionist ambitions. Luckily, Shodeke also
proved unwilling to go to wars he probably did not wish
2
to add another state to the active enemies of Abeokuta.
Gezo and Shodeke therefore concluded what amounted to a
3
non-aggression pact. However, since this pact dep©4ded 
entirely upon the ability of the two leaders to restrain
. 1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, pp.77* Good 
relations were established by 
returning to Oyo the traitor,
Dekun, who had betrayed Inoubi.
This was done soon after Atiba 
became Alafin (1836 or '37)*
See above, Ghap.I, p.46*
2 S*0*Biobaku, op.cit*, p*27.
3 F.O*84/892, Gezo to Queen of England, 
7*9*51* Letter written by Consul 
Fraser. R.F*Burton, op*cit»,
(1864 edition) Vol.II, p.463*
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their warlike followers, the peace of south-western
Yorubaland remained precarious.
For the time being &ezo was free to devote his
attention to the twin problems of commerce and relations
with the Europeans. In these fields new possibilities
were certainly opening up: the development of Vifriydah’s
palm oil trade was not the only factor drawing Dahomey
into the observation of Europe. As a result of the
circulation of new ideas on methods of destroying the
slave trade, Gezo, in the 18l+0s, began to receive a
stream of English visitors. These men proceeded to
draw the King’s attention to what the development of
the palm oil trade could mean for Dahomey. The first
•1
of these was a missionary, Thomas Birch Freeman, who 
in September, 18i+2, followed immigrant Sierra Leone
1 T.B.Freeman was a Methodist missionary 
fifty years on the Gold Coast. His 
father was West Indian. For his early 
career see G.E.Metcalfe, Maclean of the 
Gold Coast, pp.235-6.
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A
Creoles to Abeokuta. This visit aroused the jealousy
and sixspicion of the Fon and?in order to placate them^
2Freeman also paid a visit to Ahomey.
While in the capital the missionary was treated 
in an exceptionally friendly manner, and seems to have 
won the complete confidence of the King. In the course 
of several interviews which Freeman had with G-ezo; he 
outlined the current British view of commerce and progress 
in West Africa. He of cotirse urged the King to abandon 
hoth slaving and the practice of human sacrifice.
Besides this, however, he evidently opened the Kingfs 
mind to the possibility of laying out palm oil, coffee 
and cotton plantations and using their products to 
purchase the goods previously bought with slaves. He
1 For an account of the immigration of 
Creoles see Christopher Fyfe, op.cit., 
pp.227-8: J.F.A.Ajayi, Christian Missions 
in Nigeria pp.25-31 • J Herskovits 
Kopytoff? A Preface to Modern Nigeria9 
pp.2i4.-6O: S.0.Biobalm, op.cit., pp.25-6.
2 Humours had been circulating that 
Freeman intended to build a fort 
at Badagry and that the missionary 
was hostile to the Fon.
- 67 -
in fact introduced Grezo to the idea of systematically
exploiting the agricultural wealth of his country.
Such a programme would, according to Freeman, win
English approval and lead to England taking a friendly
1
interest in Bahoman affairs.
Gezo was evidently very impressed by Freeman and, 
in a letter to Queen Victoria, stated, that although 
Dahomey was a slaving^not an agricultural nation, 
further English visitors would be very welcome to 
Abomey. The King wished to know more of what England 
wanted of him* He added that he would very much like 
to see the English fort at Whydah reoccupied and British 
ships unloading cargoes of cowries, guns and gun-powder
1 T.B.Freeman, Journal of Various Visits, 
pp.235-61. M.M.S. British West Africa, 4. 
Typescript Ms* by Freeman. Paul Bllingworth, 
♦Christianity and Politics in Dahomey’, 
Journal of African History. Vol.V, 1964* 
There is no written record of these con­
versations with the King* It is, however, 
more than likely that he talked in this 
fashions he certainly did so later. A 
letter which the King had written to Queen 
Victoria certainly indicates that Freeman*s 
words were on these lines. See below, p.68, 
f *n.1.
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A
in Whydah harbour. Gezo was evidently beginning to
see a solution to his problems in the development of
a new relationship with England. Possibly he even
visualised the English taking the place of De Souza
as the main prop of his regime.
Freeman, too, was pleased with the outcome of the
talks he had had in Abomey. On returning to the Gold
Coast;he gave it as his opinion that Gezo, if well
2compensated, might even abandon the slave trade.
This was a somewhat over-optimistic view, nevertheless, 
it is evident that from this point onwards, Gezo, in 
order to gain the benefits which Freeman promised him, 
was prepared to bargain over the regulation of the trade.
The missionaryTs views on Gezo!s willingness to 
co-operate with the British were enthusiastically 
received both by the President of the Gold Coast Council, 
Mjfelean, and by Commander Foote of the West African Squadron. 
Foote even drew up an anti-slave trade treaty and a treaty of
1 C.0.96/2. Gezo to Queen Victoria, Abomey 
13»3**f8l0. See also Ellingsworth, op.cit.
2 C.0.96/2* Freeman to Njfelean. Mission 
House, Cape Coast 11.5.1810.
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am^ity and commerce for the King to sign* In return 
for giving up slave importing Gezo would have received 
an annual subsidy for two years* Mplean, spurred on 
hy Freeman, also determined to take positive action*
Out of the Gold Coast's limited resources he sent a 
sergeant to reside at Badagry* The sergeant's instruc­
tions were to protect the Sierra Leoneans and their 
missionaries and to co-operate with the Squadron in 
preventing the export of slaves from Badagry. He even 
wished to establish a similar post at Whydah. Thomas 
Hutton, however, frustrated hy the slavers' obstructionist 
attitude, and presumably fearing further difficulties, 
pointed out that if England wanted to prevent slaving
by force, at Whydah, a large garrison would have to be
%
established there. This Mfolean could noj do* The Colonial 
Secretary, reluctant as ever to extend English commitments, 
noted that the King had not at any time explicitly stated 
that he was prepared to give ttp slave exporting. The 
projected post was not therefore established. Freeman, 
who had expressed a desire to return to Abomey as soon
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as possible, was in the event recalled to England on
A
mission business. 1 For the time being, therefore, the 
English did not follow up this hopeful re-opening of 
relations with Dahomey.
Although Freeman's visit was not immediately
repeated^ , it had nevertheless far-reaching consequences. 
It was the factor which set off a chain of reactions 
that, within two decades, revolutionised Fon economic 
and political life. Soon after Freeman’s departure, 
Gezo seems to have begun the systematic production of 
palm oil for export. Moreover, he also appears to have 
begun to cut down on the number of people sacrificed 
each year in Dahomey. First of all he gained control 
of the numbers sacrificed by forbidding the Chiefs to 
undertake this rite. In the future such ceremonies
1 C.0.96/2. Stanley to Hill, 25.11.18U5 & 
16.12.18U5: C.0.96/2. Mclean to Stanley, 
20.5.18U3 & 16.9.18U3: C.0.96/2. T.Hutton 
to W.B.Hutton, 28.2.18U3: 0.0.267/182, 
Foote to Herbert, 15*5.l8U3i GeE.Metcalfe, 
op.cit., pp.301-U.
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were reserved for the monarchy alone. Having taken 
this action?he then gradually limited the number of 
human sacrifices made in Ahomey. The King also 
established a Gourt of Appeal at Ahomey, so that the 
monarch was in future in full control of all capital 
punishment carried out in Daliomey. The timing of 
these actions indicates that G-ezo was mainly concerned 
with improving relations with England* Nevertheless, 
this concentration of authority in the hands of the 
monarchy also served G-ezo fs long-term aim of increasing 
the royal power at the expense of that of the Chiefs.
G-ezo was not, however, able to pursue his schemes 
for internal reform. The rise of Abeokuta in the 1830s 
had not led, as might have been expected, to an immediate 
clash between the Foil and the Egba. Indeed, in 1 81|.0, the 
Fon were able to transfer, briefly, their attention to 
their western frontier1, where they conducted a successful 
raid on the town of Atakp^me.^ The peace between the
1 J.Duncan, Travels in West Africa. Vol. I
Vol.Il.p.305: Methodist, Missionary
F r e e m a n  s
2 S’.Forbes, op. cit., Vol. I pp.16-17
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Fon and the Egba in south-western Yorubaland nevertheless 
remained insecure, and relations soon began to deteriorate. 
The ambitious Egba continued to seek for a direct route 
to the sea and as a consequence began to penetrate into 
Egbado and Awori territory which ov/ed some allegiance to 
Dahomey. In 181+2 the Egba attacked and took the Egbado 
town of Otta. Although both Lagos and Ibadan offered to 
assist Otta, the Fon respected their pact with Egba and 
made no attempt to aid the town. A number of Egba Chiefs 
wished to continue the war and advance on Ado, an Awori 
ally of Otta. Ado was, however, a tributary of Porto 
Novo and therefore indirectly under the protection of 
Dahomey. Shodeke, probably in an attempt to avoid 
provoking a clash with the Fon, did not try to take the 
town but contented himself with a desultory seige. Be
that as it may, the Fon considered not unnaturally that
2
by these operations the Egba had broken the pact, and
1 S.O.Biobaku, op.cit, p.27
2 F.0.8^/920, Fraser to Clarendon, 
Lagos 30.5.1853.
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thus offered provocation to Dahomey,
G-ezo did not move precipitately. In spite of the 
pressure from his dhiefs he delayed for two years "before 
taking action. Nevertheless, hy 1&kh he seems to have 
felt that the Egha could no longer he left unchallenged 
to systematically undermine Dahomey1 s power in soixth- 
west Yorubaland, In that year he set out with his army
taken expedition was not a success. An Egha force, under 
the Balegun of Igbein^ intercepted the Eon army at Imogulu 
and drove it hack in disarray to Dahomey. Gezo even
The Eon had received a considerable setback one which,
it seems, many of the more powerful Dahomans were 
determined to avenge. Gezo and the more sober of his 
Chiefs must now, if not before, have realised that the 
Fon were facing hy far the greatest threat to their power
1 S.O.Biobaku, op.cit♦ p.31. 
E.Dunglas, E.D«XX, p.77 - c/- 
Ahouan and Ketu traditions relate 
that Imugulu was a sham fight. 
This seems to he disproved hy 
Gezo1s loss of his treasures.
town. This reluctantly under-
lost his war charms, umbrella, and stool in the fight 1
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since their defeat of Adjinakou many years before*
All the developments of the mid-l840s were not, 
however, to the King’s disadvantage. His policy of 
fostering the trade of Dahomey’s outlying ports began 
to bear fruit after an Afro-Brazilian slaver named 
Domingo Martinez was given monopoly rights ovex* the
•i
Porto Hovo and Cotonou beaches* Unlike the ’older* 
Afro-Brazilian slavers, Martinez was not aversd to 
dealing in palm oil* In fact he amalgamated the two 
trades very successfully. He was able to make large 
profits from exporting slaves}while at the same time 
his participation in the palm oil trade enabled him 
to supply the goods which his customers demanded. His 
example soon convinced the other slavers that they had 
little to lose and much to gain from the extension of
1 D.Poss, *The Career of Domingo Martinez 
on the Bight of Benin* Journal of African 
Iiistory, Vol. VI, No.1,"19^5: C.W.Newbury, 
op. cit., p.48. Newbury considers that 
Martinez established himself in the 1820s 
at Porto Novo and in the 1840s at Adjuda 
between Badagry and Lagos.
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the palm oil trade. In 181*6 the whole lagoon system
from the Popos to Badagry became fully open to that
traded The ports on Cotonou and Porto Novo beaches
became the twin centres of a trading system incorporating
both the slave trade and the palm oil trade. Martinez:
himself became the leading figure in the trade of the 
2Bight. Freeman’s effort to increase the cultivation 
of palm oil had therefore the unforeseen resiilt of greatly 
benefiting the slave traders.
As a result of these changes in the coastal trade, 
Gezo’s financial position in the latter 18l*0s was 
considerably easier than it had been in the first half 
of the decade. He benefited both from the general increase 
in trade, and from the ’presents* which Martinez, in 
order to keep in the King’s good graces, frequently sent 
to Abomey. Nevertheless, although Martinez’ decision 
to establish himself on Fon territory considerably aided
1 G.0.96/12, T.Hutton to W.B.Hutton,
Aghwey 7 • 12 • 1 81*6 •
2 D.Ross, ’The Career of Domingo Martinez 
on the Bight of Benin1 Journal of African 
History, Vol. VI, No.I 1965
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the royal finances, Martinez never played the political 
role in Dahomey that De Sousa had ceased to he able to 
play. Martines amassed great wealth, but not nearly 
such great wealth as De Sousa had been able to acquire 
in the freakish conditions of the 1820s* Moreover,
Martinez, unlike De Souza, was not committed to the 
support of G-ezo’s regime, and was not prepared to donate 
a considerable proportion of his income to maintaining 
the King in power. He had intervened in Lagos politics;^ but 
having had his fingers burned there, he presumably 
determined never again to take sides in the affairs of 
the state in which he operated. In Dahomey he remained 
simply a trader willing to work with any regime which 
left him in peace.
The increase in revenue therefore made no difference 
to Gezo’s need for political support from outside his 
realm. Indeed, the escalation of the Fon quarrel with 
Abeokuta was making such support more and more necessary. 
After Freeman’s departure the King had no further contact
1 ibid.
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1
with England until 181+5? when, without any official
encouragement, John Duncan, a former officer in the
Life Guards and a survivor of the 18M  M g e r  expedition,
visited Dahomey in the course of a journey undertaken on
behalf of the Royal Geographical Society, Duncan found
himself exceptionally well-treated in Dahomey and was
even allowed to travel in the interior of the country—
2a privilege seldom granted to Europeans* Geao seems to 
have been doing his best to attract English attention to 
his country* He was now particularly anxious to open
1 C.0*96/Uj Hill to Stanley, Cape Coast
16*5»kh and 16.11.kk: C.0.96/6, Hill to 
Stanley, Cape Coast Castle 26.2*ij.5, 
enclosing Commodore Jones to Hill 6.12. Mi: 
0*0*98/8, Memo on Whydah by Viscount 
Canning 23.Ip.enclosing undated C.O# 
note from Stephen to Canning. In 1 dhb the 
Lt. Governor of the Gold Coast tried to 
organise an attack on Whydah, which he 
considered a nest of slavers. The Foreign 
Office had hopes of ending slaving there, 
by negotiation while the Squadron considered 
that an attack would be difficult. Nothing 
came therefore of this proposal.
2 D.J.Duncan, Travels in Western Africa, 
London, 1857* The deference with which 
he was treated is reflected in what is
his nevertheless poor account of his visit.
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direct relations since the Egha, through the Church 
Missionary Society missionaries, were, in the 1840s,
*1
forging more and more intimate links with the English*
The King achieved his aim* After his departure
from Ahomey, Duncan sent a series of communications to
the Lt.Governor of the Gold Coast, and to the Colonial
Office, indicating that the King of Dahomey was anxious
to make further contacts with Britain and might even he
2
prepared to abolish the slave trade. Although these 
letters were greeted with suspicion at the Colonial 
Office, Lt. Governor Winniett of the Gold Coast 
welcomed Duncan*s initiative enthusiastically and, 
without consulting the Colonial Office, set out, accom­
panied hy T.B.Freeman, in March 1847> for Ahomey*
1 S.O.Biohaku, op*cit*, pp.27-37:
A. J.F.Ajayi, op* cit*, pp* 38-2+0 
& p. 66.
2 C.0.96/7* J.Lilley to Stanley,
Cape Coast 9• i2.i 8I4.3- 0*0*96/10, 
Duncan to 0*0*, Middlesex 17*8*1846.
3 C.0*96/7* Minute hy Stephan on 
J.Lilley to Stanley, Cape Coast 
9*12.1843: 0*0*96/7 Winniett to 
Gladstone, 23.7*1845*
Winniett* s aim was, to find out exactly how far Gezo 
was prepared to co-operate with Britain* In a spirit of 
optimism he tooja with him the; two treaties which Foote 
had drawn up on Freeman* s return from his first visit 
to Abomey. v ’■ f ' v  , . , ,  //
Qezo received the Lt• Governor and his party with 
every mark of respect, and at once signed the treaty 
-of Amityiahdt Commerce,* JEe declared, however, that since ^
; the slave trade had lphg be en the main-s tay of the 
Itehama^ could not fagree to abolish it V P
imediately*/-;;^:He wanted, a year in Which' to reflect ?pn ,: 
Winniett * s proposals and ashed that some Englishman might , 
visit him again in a year/s time* Presiuoably the King wanted 
to see how much room he had for manoeuvre by testing the 
feelings of his Chiefs when they assembled for the annual
1 C.G*5^/11, Winniett to Earl (^4y> 
Cape Coast 22*2*47#
2 Foote had offered a subsidy of £700: 
the 0*0* /redueedfthis. tp;£416,*.
3 C •0*96/11, Winniett to Earl Grey,
' 12.5.47. / •
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customs* Winniett fell in with the King’s wishes
and in the next year, again on his own responsibility,
sent the Secretary of the Gold Coast Council, Brodie
Cruikshank, to Abomey. The King’s investigation of
his Chief’s views must have reinforced his opinion
that Dahomey could not abandon the slave trade overnight.
Gezo refused to sign the anti-slave trade treaty, saying
that such trade was still essential to the economic
well-being of his country. In spite of all this,
however, the Fon monarch insisted that he wanted to
1
establish closer relations with England. Vi/hat he
evidently wanted was to establish a compromise perhaps
that he should receive some of the promised advantages 
if he consented to the regulation of the trade.
The conversations which Gezo had with these two 
officials, and the letter to Queen Victoria which resulted 
from them, throw a good deal of light on the Kings’s
1 C.0*96/13? Brodie Cruikshank1s report,
Whydah 9*11 * 18U8: Bro die Cruikshank to 
Lt.Governor Winniett, Cape Coast 18.11.18U8.
Report partly reprinted in C.W.Rewbury,
’British Policy Towards West Africa*,
Selected Documents, 1786-1 8~/U? PP*3U2-U
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1
political objectives. What the King seems above all 
to have wanted was to draw the English into Dahoman 
affairs in support of his monarchy* He may even at 
this time have visualised giving up the slave trade, 
if this was the only way in which he could obtain English 
assistance. He could not, however, rely upon sufficient 
support from his Chiefs to make such a policy immediately 
possible. Both he and his Chiefs were willing, however, 
to see the slave trade destroyed in every other port in 
the Bight except Whydah, The extinction of that trade 
in the other ports would put an end to the growth of 
wealthy coastal states like Lagos, If Whydah became the 
only slaving port in the Bight of Benin, Dahomey was 
bound to become more wealthy and therefore more powerful
than the other coastal states and might, indeed, be able
1 C.0.96/135 Brodie Cruikshanks report,
Why dah, 9*11*18485 Bro di e C ruik shank 
to Lt, Gov, Winniett, Gape Coast 
18.11.1 848. Report partly reprinted 
in C.W.Hewbury, ’British Policy Towards 
West Africa1, Selected Documents 1786-1874* 
pp.342-44* C.0.9^711 Winniett to Grey,
Cape Coast Castle 12,5,1847: C.O.96/13,
Gezo to Queen Victoria, Abomey 3,11,1848.
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to control them. The Eon Chiefs, on the understanding that 
this would come about, would have been agreeable to the 
regulation of Whydah’s slave trade.
Gezo himself evidently viewed the regulation of the 
slave trade as simply a preliminary to the effective English 
reoccupation of Fort St.James at Whydah, and the placing 
at Abomey of a permanent English Resident who would act 
as a royal adviser. The King evidently wanted the English 
to take the place of De Souza; Gezo and the English Resident 
in Abomey would work out policies which would be mutually 
beneficial and would together then enforce them; the 
English control of external trade and the power of the 
English garrison at Whydah would ensure that this could 
be done.
It seems likely that the King even foresaw the 
ultimate abolition of the slave trade. Hecould not 
of course have obtained the support of his Chiefs in 
this: after all, they did not share his main objective— —  
the building up of the power of the monarchy at the
expense of that of the Chiefs. The Fon slave trade 
would only be ended if it appeared to the majority of 
the most powerful Chiefs that it was too dangerotis for
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Dahomey to continue it, or if Gezo could rely on English 
support to over-ride the opposition of his Chiefs. The 
first eventuality was not dreamt of in 1848: the second 
depended upon an English force already being within 
Dahomey. It is more than likely that Gezo was astute 
enough to realise that the English, once established in 
Fort St.James, would press for the total abolition of the 
slave trade. That he did understand this, and set about 
making it possible to co-operate with the English, is 
indicated by the steps he took to establish the Fon 
economy on a secure agricultural foundation.
Under the influence of Freeman and Martinez, Gezo had 
already fostered the growth of agricultural production. He 
now set about establishing palm oil plantations throughout 
the country. In doing this he altered the economic balance 
of the country to the detriment of its chief port, Whydah. 
Most of the new plantations were situated on the edge of 
the Abomey plateau, between Abomey and Daba, a river port 
on the River Oueme* The products of these plantations 
could be transported fairly easily down the River Oueme 
to Lake Holme. They found their outlet to the sea at 
Cotonou, Godomey or Porto Novo. Other plantations lay 
near the river Cuffo in the west of Dahomey. As a port
-  81+  -
A
for the export of palm oil, Whydah tended to he by­
passed. There were of course also a number of plan­
tations in the Whydah area, but most of them seem to
A
have been served by the Afro-Brazilian merchants.
The bulk of Dahomey^ palm oil exports in the future
came to be exported down the rivers on the eastern and
western frontiers of the Fon state.
The construction of these plantations not only
altered the balance of economic strength in Dahomey,
it also changed the racial composition of the state.
The new royal plantations virere to be worked by slaves
captured in the various Fon raids on their neighbours.
There had for long of course been domestic slaves in
Dahomey, but the status of these plantation slaves was
entirely different. They could not be absorbed into Fon
society: there were now, therefore, groupings of hostile
peoples at various points all over Dahomey. Their
hostility to the state provided a fine opening for
2
internal subversion. It seems likely that changes such
1 F.Forbes, op.cit., Vol.I pp.11i+-6 & p.123
2 See Chap. Ill p. iI+i —1^2
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as these were not to the taste of all the great Fon 
Chiefs. Fear that Gezo's new policies were likely to 
endanger Dahomey at this time probably began to produce 
opposition to the King himself.
Less dramatically, but perhaps equally importantly, 
the King, in 181+8, spurred on by the pressure of famine, 
took steps to ensure that Dahomey!s actual production of 
food increased. In that year, on the advice of the Chacha, 
Gezo ordered that manioc be cultivated throughout the 
country. This crop had been introduced into the coastal 
areas by Afro-Brasilians of Whydah and from this date 
onwards was to play a large part in nourishing the 
inhabitants of the interior of Dahomey. Gezo had set 
about making his country agriculturally self-sufficient.
If the slave trade were to be abandoned the Fon economy 
would survive.
The English of course simply wanted the slave trade 
abolished as quickly as possible. They did not understand 
Gezo^ ambitions for them and they had no desire to play
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.79.
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a part in the polities of the coastal area. Winiett
nevertheless thought that garrisoning the fort at
Whydah and sending a Resident to Abomey would be
likely to bring about the ending of the slave trade#
Cruikshank, however, influenced by the Chacha, took the
vievir that Gezo benefited far too much from the slave
1
trade ever to willingly end it. Cruikshank therefore 
reported that the slave trade from Dahomey could be ended 
quickly only if coercion were used against that state.
The operation of a two-year blockade which was the only
type of coercion he thought might succeed -would, he
feared, harm the developing palm oil trade and involve 
England in disputes with foreign powers. Slaves from 
Dahomey might also be exported from other ports on the 
Bight. The use of force would, he thought, do more 
harm than good. England would therefore have to work
1 Winniett estimated Gezofs income from 
the slave trade at £10,000 per annum.
Cruikshank, who obtained his information 
from De Souza, put it at £60,000. The 
Chacha must have known that if the English 
did as Gezo wished, his own residual power 
would disappear. He seems, therefore, to 
have attempted to persuade Cruikshank that 
Gezo would never abandon the trade.
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for gradual improvement. He recommended only that
someone should be sent to Whydah to advise the King
and show him how to develop the agricultural wealth
of his country.
The Colonial Office had not been pleased with
Winniettfs initiative. His move might have led to
England taking precipitate action. After some
deliberation it was decided that although the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce would be ratified^the Lt. Governor* s
2other proposals should not be put into operation.
This was an unfortunate decision for Gezo. If the 
English had done as Winniett suggested and appointed 
an English Resident in control of a garrison at Fort 
St.James, such an official would probably have been 
drawn into Dahoman affairs in support of Gezo. The 
slave trade might even have been fairly rapidly abolished* 
Even Cruikshank* s less radical proposals proved little 
more attractive to the Colonial Office than those of 
Winniett.
 ^ 8^2^6/11, Colonial Office to Foreign
Oi i ice 19 • 11 • i+7 ♦
2 0*0.96/135 Colonial Office Minute on
Despatch, Winniett to Grey, Cape Coast 
Castle 7*2*1 81+8*
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Lord Palmerston*; at the Foreign Office, however, had 
become impatient of the GoIonia1 Office reluctance to 
aet^and he had now determined that the Foreign Office 
would move alone.
2
Early in 1849 Lord Palmerston appointed John Beecroft 
to the post of British Consul in the Bights of Benin and 
Biafra* The new Consul, who had for long been a resident 
on the Coast, was given the duties of preventing quarrels 
between the African Chiefs and promoting legitimate trade 
as a replacement for the slave trade. In May, 1849* 
Palmerston made an appointment concerning Dahomey even 
more closely. Earlier that year John Duncan, who had 
previously requested a government post at Whydah, informed 
the Foreign Office that he was about to return to Dahomey. 
Palmerston seized this opportunity to appoint him, under
the orders of Beecroft, as unpaid British Vice-Consul at
3
Whydah. Duncan, who took up residence alongside Hutton’s
1 S.J.Gavin, Palmerston* 8 Policy towards East 
and West Africa. Cambridge Pn»D» 1959*
2 K.O.Dike,/Beecroft, 1835-49*, Journal 
of the Historical Society of Nigeria.
Vo! •' I Dec ember, 195 £ *
3 F.0. 84/775* Memo to Lord Palmerston, 
4*5*1849: F.0*84/775* Lord Palmerston 
to John Duncan, 28.5*1849*
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employees in the Fort St.James at Whydah, was given the 
general task of promoting trade and civilisation within 
the Kingdom of Dahomey.
Although the appointment of a Vice-Consul was hy no 
means all that Gezo wanted of the English, the King does 
seem to have been gratified by what he must have.regarded 
as the first tangible sign of Britain’s willingness to 
co-operate with him. He therefore requested that Duncan 
and a naval officer visit him in Abomey in order to further
•i
discuss Anglo-Bahoman relations.
Duncan then proceeded to pay a second visit to Abomey, 
this time taking with him Lt.F.Forbes of H.M.S. Bonetta. 
Although cordial relations were established between the 
visitors and the King, nothing concrete resulted from the 
mission. During the negotiations Duncan again informed 
the King that Britain wished him to put an end to the slave 
trade and again listed the benefits which would accrue 
to him if he did so. Gezo again stated that he could 
not do so at once. It seems that the King determined 
to prove to the British that the opinions of his
1 F.0.8lj/775, Duncan to Palmerston
22.9.J+9.
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Chiefs, and the high expenses of his Court, obliged
him to maintain the slave trade, at least for a time*
The ambassadors were therefore requested to return to
, 1
Abomey at the time of the customs, in six months*
They would then see that the King could not possibly 
act as Britain wished.
Before the English ambassadors visited Abomey,
G-ezo had lost his old friend, Francisco Felix Be Souza*
2
The Ghacha died at the age of 81 on the 8th of May, 1849*
Although Be Souza had been for many years incapable of
backing Gezo effectively, it had been possible to pretend* 
as long as he lived, that the alliance was as potent as 
ever. He had in fact been a living reminder of the 
early glorious days of the reign* His death, in poverty, 
made a clear break with the time when his wealth had made
1 F.0.8U/775* Buncan to Palmerston 22*9• i+9s 
F.0.8I|/775* Gezo to Palmerston 7*9*49*
2 F.0.8U/775* Buncan to Palmerston 22*9*14.9: 
F.°.8^/819,T.Hutton to W.B.Hutton, Cape 
Coast 7*o*50* Upon the death of a subject 
the King was entitled to take over his
property* The King's agents found that
Francisco Felix possessed nothing of value 
and he died 30*000 dollars in debt to the 
King alone*
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Gezo's power invincible. The Chacha's eldest son, 
Isadora, succeeded to his father's office, but, 
burdened with his father's debts, and lacking his 
prestige, he was of even less use to the King than 
his father had latterly been. Gezo more than ever 
needed English support*
As a result of the Church Missionary Society's 
increasing commitment to the Egba view of events in 
south-western Yorubaland, it was, however, becoming 
less likely that England would supply the support which 
Gezo sought. The war in this area had in fact continued
intermittently since the battle of Imojulu: thd con­
tinuing Egba seige of Ado provided a constant reminder 
of Egba pressure and of Fon ineffectiveness in resisting 
it* Not that the Dahomans were always unsuccessful; in 
the spring of 181+8 they had seized and destroyed, as a
move in this power struggle, the large Egbado market town 
2
of Okeodan. After the destruction of Okeodan the
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.81. Isadore was 
chosen as Chacha by the King from among
three of old Francisco Felix's more 
important sons.
2 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.79*
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missionary identification with the Egba grew steadily 
greater: they seem in fact to have helped to mould 
vague Eg*ba expansionist aspirations into a systematic
n . 1policy, the aim and object of which was to gain easy
access to the sea. Dahomey and Lagos were the obstacles
in the way of this policy. In the missionary view the
Egba state was the only one in the area amenable to English
influence: Abeokuta ought therefore to be aided in what
they regarded as its cimsade against the slaving states—
Dahomey and Lagos. The latter states were considered to
2
be in close alliance against the forces of progress.
1 S.O.Biobaku, The Egba amd Their Neighbours, 
London Ph.D. 1951, p.127.
2 P.0.8Ii/858, Gollmer to Beecroft, Badagry
18.3*515 E. 0.8^/886, Eraser to Beecroft, 
Whydah 15.11*51. The only piece of 
evidence produced to support the idea of 
such an alliance was that Lagos soldiers 
were supposed to have been identified 
amongst the Eon troops who attacked 
Abeokuta in 1851. The Egba could well 
have invented this so as to encourage 
the British to aid them against Lagos. 
Vice-Consul Eraser discovered that only 
two months before the British attack on 
Lagos, Gezo had no knowledge of Lagos 
politics.
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Dahomey itself was branded an aggressive power which 
would never willingly abandon the slave trade.
The Church Missionary Society had extensive 
contacts both in England and on the Coast and;as a 
result,the missionaries1 view of the politics of south­
western Yorubaland was everywhere accepted. Reports that 
Gezo sought English friendship were discredited and 
disbelieved. Missionary-thinking in terms of pro-and- 
anti-slave trading states made it appear that the war 
in south-east Yorubaland was one between an aggressive 
slave power and a pacific people. In fact the struggle 
was one between two rival powers, both equally determined 
to dominate the minor states lying between them. It was 
not realised that there were elements in Eon society, as 
in Egba, which saw benefits for themselves in co-operation 
with England.
The missionary view of Egba-Eon relations received
much publicity in England and became popular on the 
i
Coast. Naval officers and officials, for the lack of
1 S.O.Biobaku, op.cit*, p.36
-  9h -
any other information, all accepted it. It formed
the background to the thinking of the new British
Consul, John Beecroft, who although he had been long
resident in Eernando Po had no direct knowledge of
Dahomey* As a result he had a tendency to i*ely on the
missionaries for information about Dahomey. This was
unfortunate for Gezo, in that, on Vice-Consul Duncan's
1
death in November 181^ 9, Beecroft was instructed himself 
to undertake the coming mission to Abomey. The instruc­
tions given to Beecroft indicate th&t the British Govern­
ment, influenced by Duncan's views, still hoped, at this 
point, to achieve its aims in Dahomey through friendly 
persuasion. The King was to be invited to sign an anti­
slave trade treaty and in return offered, if he pleaded 
financial difficulty, for the duration of three years, 
an annual pension of £3?000. If Gezo mentioned that he 
would like Eort St.James reoccuppied, he was to be informed 
that this was intended. If the treaty was signed arrange­
ments could be speeded up. Missionary-influenced thinking
1 Eorbes, op.cit.. Vol. I p*9U-
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was however apparent in that Beecroft was also 
instructed to exhort Gezo to refi*ain from any
■i
aggressive action against Abeokuta or the Popos.
In early 1850 the Dahoman^s gained what would
appear to have heen a costly victory over the Atakpames;
and the English ambassadors were requested to postpone
2for a short time their visit to the Dahomey capital.
They were not however long delayed and arrived, for a 
stay of nearly seven weeks, in Abomey, on the 12th May. 
Gezo!s aim during these weeks was evidently to convince 
these Englishmen both of his desire to fall in with 
their wishes and the impossibility, for the moment, of 
his so doing. He wanted the English to mitigate their 
terms so that his pro-British policy might win the 
support of a greater number of his Chiefs. In order to 
convince the ambassadors of his sincerity, and of his 
difficulties, the King allov/ed his guests far more
1 P.0.84/816, Draft instructions to Consul 
Beecroft, P.O. 25.2.1850.
2 P.0*84/826, Porbes to Panshavire, 6.4*1850.
P.Porbes, op.cit., Vol.I p. 16.
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opportunity of observing the processes of Dahoman 
decision-taking than any other visitor to pre-colonial 
Dahomey had ever been given. By doing this he seems to 
have considered that the ambassadors would be able to 
see for themselves the opposition which he would encounter 
if he tried to pursue in full the policy which they 
urged upon him.
G-ezo’s first proposal to Beecroft was that all the 
ports of the Bight of Benin except Whydah should be closed 
to the slave trade. This was the long-established ideal 
of Dahoman policy and must have been put forward by the 
King as indicating his basic bargaining position. What 
he evidently wanted was to work out a modus viv/endi 
between his desire for free trade at Whydah and England’s 
wish to end the slave trade everywhere. When Beecroft 
refused to consider Whydah as a free port the King 
proceeded to modify his terms by asking that five slaving 
ships per year might be allowed to pass through Whydah. 
When this too was rejected he suggested that one ship 
might be allowed to pass. This last proposal also proved
unacceptable. The ambassadors were not prepared to 
bargain   they demanded compliance.
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The King of course had long known that the English 
wanted him to give up the slave trade. He now learned 
that they also wanted him to end the war with the Egba. 
Erom his conduet at the beginning of the war?it would 
seem likely that he would have been by no means averse 
to making peace on the basis of the status q u o  in south­
western Yorubaland. Such a settlement did not, however, 
depend upon him, but upon the Egba who were, after all, 
the power which would benefit from a change. As the 
ambassadors themselves realised, after observing Eon 
deliberations, all the Chiefs were determined to attack
Abeokuta. The Eon, having had to contend for almost a
1
decade with gradual Egba encroachment, were determined
1 E.0.84/976, Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 15*2.1855:-
*1 have in my possession a 
list of more than 25 of the 
towns and large villages on 
the Dahoman frontier which 
have been swept from the face 
of the earth, and their inhabi­
tants either slain or taken captive 
by the Egba prior to the Dahoman 
attack on Abeokuta.'
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to strike a knockout blow at their enemies by destroying 
Abeokuta itself* Grezo informed the ambassadors that he 
simply could not agree to a cessation of hosjttiliijfes 
against that town* He carefully explained to them that 
it was more: than^ his throne was worth to agree to 
abolish^ iimediately^the slavetrade and at the same time 
give way to the Egba in Egbadoland.
When asked, if he would admit missionaries to Dahomey^ 
OOsp replied that- he: had already indicated that he would 
welcome them to Whydah but could not allow them to settle 
in Abomey. Both Eorbes and Beecroft thought that the ;
King, left to himself, would have agreed to missionaries 
penetrating even“to- Abomey; too many of his Chiefs were, 
however, opposed to this idea for him even to contemplate 
it. The ambassadors were not therefore satisfied even on 
this point. Neither did the King receive any satisfaction 
when he enquired about what most concerned him. On asking 
if Eort St.James was to be garrisonedand if dpmmander 
Eorbes might remain in Whydah as its governor, he was 
given the non-commital answer vriiiehthe ambassadors had 
received in their ins true tibnsy/ OommanderForbes, he was
1 See abpv&p p*$4.
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told, was not going to remain in Whydah but someone
else was going to be sent there to replace Mr,Duncan*
On only one, relevantly unimportant, point was agreement
reached, and this came about as a result of Gezo doing
as the English demanded* The King agreed to release a
Sierra Leonean family, the MaCarthy^s, who had been
seized and put in prison*
1
The embassy was therefore a failure. The ambassadors 
had indeed noted a great deal of what Gezo seems to have 
wanted them to note: it was realised that although the 
King desired England's friendship, he was not a free agent
1 For information on this embassy see£~ 
F.0.8h/816, Beecroft to Palmerston,
Fernando Po 13*8.1850: F. 0.8h/585,
Beecroft to Palmerston, Fernando Po 
1U.10.1851 s F.0.8U/816, Beecroft's 
journal and report, Beecroft to 
Palmerston 22*7.1850: F.0.8k/826,
Forbes'journal of his visit to Abomey,
Po rb e s to Comrno do re Fan shawe 2. h. 1 850:
F•0•8h/82 7, Fo rbe s to Commodo re Fan shawe 
18*7*1850. See also F.E.Forbes, op.cit., 
Vol. II p. in this work Forbes, at the
expense of Beecroft, somewhat over­
emphasises his own role in the negotiations.
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and could not therefore fall in with English wishes.
It was not deduced from this, however, as the King had 
evidently hoped it would he, that British policy should 
he modified so that Gezo could accept it. Britain was 
committed to abolishing the slave trade, not to regularising 
it. Beecroft, understanding that the Eon would not .volun­
tarily give up the slave trade, considered that they should 
be forced to do so. It Y/as not realised that by working 
with Gezo, Britain- might have achieved her aim more easily.
Reporting on his visit to Abomey, Beecroft, besides 
stating that the Fon would not immediately abandon the 
slave trade, recommended that no further negotiations 
should take place and that no further presents should 
be given until the Fon fell into line. The best method 
the Consul could think of, to force the Fon to toe the 
line, was to blockade the coast of Dahomey. In London, 
Beecroft!s report was found to confirm the already 
widely publicised missionary view. Palmerston, after 
reading it, agreed that it could no longer be hoped 
that Dahomey would voluntarily give up the slave
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trade. Instead of considering further negotiations, 
Palmerston gave instructions for the despatch of a 
strongly worded letter warning Gezo not to attack
A
Abeokuta. In this the Foreign Secretary’s reaction
proved exactly the same as that of the Commander-in-
Ghief of the Anti-Slave Trade Squadron, Commodore
Fanshawe, who, on receiving the ambassador’s report,
2had immediately sent just such a letter to Gezo.
Beecroft himself followed up his mission to Abomey 
with one to Abeokuta, where he found the Egba ready and 
willing to work with England. The British attitude to 
the political situation in the coastal area of the 
former Oyo empire was now defined. Before Beecroft’s
missions it had been possible, because of Gezo’s 
friendly attitude, that Britain might have been drawn 
into Dahoman affairs. Afterwards the Church Missionary
1 F.0.8U/816, Minute by Palmerston
on BeecroftTs report, Beecroft to 
Palmerston, 22.7.50.
2 F.0.8U/828, Fanshawe to Gezo,
23.7.50.
- 102 -
Society's view of Dahomey as the aggressive irrecon-
-J
cilable slave power 'became everywhere axiomatic.
The failure of the Beecroft-Forbes mission and 
the receipt of Commodore Fanshawe^ letter must clearly 
have demonstrated to Gezo that he could not yet obtain 
the English alliance for which he had so long sought. 
The English were not prepared to bargain: he could not 
accept theii5 terms. Moreover, the Fon were determined 
to settle their account with the Egba. Their deter­
mination was reinforced by the Egba destruction, in
o
late 1850, of a Dahoman-protected town named Ibege*
Gezo must have felt that he had no choice but to risk
1 F.0.8l!-/876, Campbell to Clarendon,
Lagos 15«2.1855« Only a few British 
voices were later raised to contradict 
this vie?/. Consuls Fraser and Campbell 
both pointed out that the Fon were not 
solely responsible for the Egba-Fon 
struggle in Egbadoland, Even then the 
broad view of Dahomey as anti-civilisation 
was not challenged.
2 F.O.8U/865, The English Missionaries in 
Abeokuta to Commodore Fanshawe,7*11 * 1850.
an all-out war on Abeokuta. At the end of February
1851, a Dahoman army said to have been made up of
10,000 male warriors and 6,000 female warriors, left 
1
Abomey under the command of the G-aou Akati, en route 
for the Egba capital. On the 2nd of March the army 
occupied Issagga, an Egbado town twelve miles from 
Abeokuta. The Chief of this town, Bakoko, although 
he submitted to the Dahomans, gave them false information 
concerning Abeokuta*s defences: he also sent messengers 
to warn the Egba of the approach <?f the Fon army. The 
Dahomans were therefore on the next day misled into 
attacking the alerted city where it was most stoutly 
defended. The Egba, besides having the advantage of 
fighting on their own ground, had also a supply of 
English ammunition and the benefit of European advice. 
However, it is doubtful if these links with England
1 Estimates of the size of the Fon army 
come mainly from Egba orientated 
sources. It seems unlikely that the 
Fon had 6,000 Amazon troops. A ^ third of 
that number seems more in keeping 
with later estimates of Amazon numbers. 
See Ghap. YI p. 1+67
- 101+ -
made much difference to the outcome of the battle.
Once the Fon had lost the chance of making a surprise
attackjthey could have had little hope of taking the
tovm. Abeokuta was simply too large and too populous
to fall to an army like that of the Fon. More than one
Englishman expressed astonishment that a tov/n as large
as Abeokuta should have lived in constant fear of the 
■]
Daho man s.
In spite of the fury of their attack the Fon were 
driven back from the walls of the Egba capital. They 
nevertheless retired in good order and next day had 
sufficient strength left to fall upon the treacherous 
town of Issagga. Before they could settle accounts with 
that town an Egba army arrived on the scene. After a 
pitched battle, in which they sustained further severe 
losses, the Dahomans were again forced to flee. This 
time the retreat continued until the Fon reached the 
safety of their own capital.
This was the first major defeat Dahomey had sustained 
since Gezo came to the throne. The Fon are said to have
1 F.0.81+/976, Campbell to Clarendon,
Lagos 6.12.1855
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lost 3?000 warriors in the campaign* The high number 
of casulaties was very important in that the dead had 
been mainly soldiers of the regular army. The Amazons, 
who had exhibited exceptional courage throughout the 
campaign, were pai’ticularly heavily hit. Such a high 
casuality rate could not easily be absorbed by a nation
-i
the size of Dahomey. The loss in man-power alone would 
have made the defeat a severe one for the Fon. The 
political consequences made it even more serious. The 
failure of this major expedition spelt oixt clearly 
Dahoman inability to curb the rising power of the Egba.
1 For the campaign against Abeokuta see:
E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.aa-f/The Church
Missionary Intelligence, pp. 165-6:
T. J.Bowen, Adventures and Missionary
Labours in Several Countries in the 
Interior of Africa from 1 8A9 to' 1856.
pp. 118-20: S. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 31 3-
16: A.K.Ajisafe, A History of Abeokuta,
pp.96-7: S.0. Biobaku, op .cit., pp. 1+3- 
ht R.Smith, *A Town Assaulted1, pp.37-
9 in 3T.F.A.Ajayi & R. Smith, Yoruba 
Warfare in the 19th Century: F.A.Ajayi,
op.cit., p.71• Most authorities agree, 
as seems most likely, that Gezo was with 
his army. Smith holds the opposite view. 
For the organisation of the Fon army see 
below, Chap. VI P.1+6I+-73.
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Immediately, the defeat meant that Dahomey lost all 
control of Egbadoland. The small states of that area 
aiitomatically gravitated into the orbit of Abeokuta 
nov/ that the Egba had proved themselves stronger than 
the Eon.
The defeat also placed in jeopardy the earlier
Eon gains in Yorubaland. The blow to Dahoman prestige
can be seen particularly clearly in Ketu;where there
grew up a party wishing to resist and even perhaps to
make war on the Eon. This group certainly did not gain
complete control of the state. Nevertheless, when a
Dahoman army advanced towards Ketu to collect Fon
prisoners of war sent there by the Egbas for exchange,
all Dahoman merchants wei*e expelled from the town, and
the Eon army defied. The Eon, who did not apparently
expect resistance, retired without even attempting to
seize the prisoners. Ketu was no longer over-awed by
1
Dahoman might. It is very unlikely that this newly 
awakened state continued to pay tribute. From defying
1 G.Parrinder, The Story of Ketu, pp.37-1+2.
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the will of Dahomey,it was a short step to actually 
joining the enemies of the Fon and making war on 
Dahomey. Although there is no definite evidence of 
Save!s reaction to Dahomey’s defeat hy Abeokuta it 
seems more than likely that this state also ceased at 
this time to acknowledge Fon suzerainty. It is certainly 
true that it was only in the 1880s that the Fon, after 
a series of major campaigns, were again able to humble 
these two Yoruba states. The disaster before Abeokuta 
led then to a crumbling of the Dahoman position all 
along the eastern frontier.
This decisive campaign effectively ended G-ezo’s
reputation for leading the Fon from success to success.
A disaster of such magnitude was bound to have its effect 
on Dahoman politics. Stripped of much of his prestige 
the King would not for long be able to control his 
ttirbulent Chiefs. He no longer had the overwhelming 
financial might of Be Sousa to rely upon for support.
1Moreover, both his carefully selected Amazon bodyguard,
1 R. Burton, op. cit., pp.263-i|.
- 108 -
and his regular army, had been decimated in the war.
They were so weakened that he could probably no longer 
depend on their being able to stamp out any disloyalty 
amongst his most powerful subjects. Gezo must have 
known full well that his position of supremacy in Fon 
affairs was in great danger. To preserve his authority, 
and perhaps even his life, he would have to obtain 
external support for his monarchy* In spite of previous 
failures the King therefore redoubled his efforts to 
enter into a close association with the English.
In April and May 1 851 Gezo sent a series of letters 
to the English authorities, requesting that an ambassador 
be sent to him and asking that the men-of-war off his 
coasts might supply him with armsJ The Dahomans probably 
did not know how much aid the English had given Abeokuta. 
Consul Beecroft nevertheless feared that the Dahoman
1 F.0.8ij/886, Gezo to Queen Victoria,
Whydah 26.ij..l851: F.0.81+/886, Gezo
to Queen Victoria, enclosed in Bruce 
to Admiralty, No. 51 of 1851: F.O.8I1/ 886, 
Yeovogan Dagwah for Gezo,fTo Whom It 
May Concern1, Whydah 1k.5.1851» enclosed 
in Beecroft to F.O., 19.2.1852.
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defeat would provoke Gezo to violence against any
English official in his territory. He therefore
delayed sending the newly appointed Vice-Consul,
-1
Vice-Consul Eraser, to Whydah.
By July of the same year, however, Beecroft decided
2
that Eraser could safely proceed. This decision was 
hastened hy the fact that Beecroft wanted to observe 
French activities in Dahomey— -at that time a French 
officer was actually in Abomey. Regis, the Marseilles 
palm oil trader, had feared that the visits of various 
English missions to Abomey would win specially favourable 
trading terms for English merchants active in Dahomey.
On his request a French official, Auguste Bouet, was 
sent to Abomey to assure Gezo that the French were 
deeply interested in the development of the palm oil
1 F.0.2/1+ Stanley to Fraser, 1+. 12.1850: 
F.0.81+/816, Palmerston to Fraser:
F.O. 10.12.1850, Fraser was appointed 
to replace Duncan* Unlike Duncan, he 
received a salary and was permitted 
to trade.
2 F.0.2/1+, Fraser to Palmerston,
Fernando Po, 30*6.18511 F.0.81+/886, 
Beecroft to Fraser, Fernando Po,
k* 7* 1851.
\ ,v>  : / V, ‘ - ■ - 1 1 0  - ■ . ■ \ ■ /■ • "■ 1 ,
trade imtis;.comii;ry. The purpose of the visit was ;
simply to ex^ahpe the prestige of the French trading
• in/i)ahomeys^ Vfchithough- Bouet took with him two brass
cannons as presents for the King, the French tod
the time, no intention of taking any polititol action
in Dahomey# Gezo and Bouet simply, signed a Treaty of
Amity and Gommeree like that the King had previously
■ -  -.v.. , w . . .  i * :
sighbd \^ ith Wiianiett#
Once in Dahomey, Fraser, on his own initiative, A
proceeded to visit Abomey. Although Gezo stated as
clearly as ever his, desire to reach an agreement with
England, the visit could not be termed a success. A
number of factors led to its failure. One was that
Fraser1s.instructions would not allow him to enter
into negotiations with the King until the King had
agreed to end the slave trade. Another was that a
letter; from Palmerston to the King was couched in such
1 H.M.QyAfrique IV- Marine to Begis,
Paris 10.1.51: E 1.6.XX. p.2. 1 Treaty 
of Amity and Commerce1 s A.Bouety
Boyaume De Dahomey1 in Ulustration 
July 1852; B.Schnapper, op.city# p.165*
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strong terms that it gave considerable offence in 
Abomey. Moreover, the whole background to the visit 
was poisoned by the fact that Fraser interpreted 
Beecroft*s recommendations literally, and refused to 
make any presents to the Fon.
Gezo seems to have seen Fraser’s uncompromising 
attitude as a move in the diplomatic game designed to 
make him more accommodating to English wishes. The 
King, evidently determined to play the same game, 
refused to accept that Fraser was really a representative 
of the British government. Fraser was even accused of 
being in the pay of the Egba,and of having stolen a 
letter sent by one of the Egba Chiefs to the King.
Gezo seems to have meant the English to know that he 
would make no further concessions^and that he now 
expected the English to modify their terms. That the 
treatment meted out to him was merely a diplomatic 
threat was, however, something that the dismayed and 
perplexed Fraser could not be expected to recognise*
1 F.0.8k/886, Fraser’s journal, Fraser to
Beecroft 15.11*1851: F.0.8k/892, Gezo 
to Queen of England, 7.9*1851.
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Upon his return to Whydah, Fraser was treated 
with a marked coolness by the Fon* To add to his 
growing sense of social and political isolation the 
Naval officers stationed off the Coast tended to 
communicate directly with the Fon by letter, without 
informing him of the nature of these communications*
•I
When he protested he was disregarded. At the same 
time his immediate superior, Beecroft, who was not 
interested in Whydah, omitted to keep him informed 
of what was happening in the eastern half of the 
Bight*
While Fraser was ploughing his lonely furrow 
in Whydah, events were moving quickly further along 
the CosSt. Influenced by the views of the missionaries,
the English had resolved to strike at what they by 
this time regarded as the core of the slave trader—  
Lagos. It had been decided to institute a blockade 
of the Coast. The Commodore of the Squadron
1 F.0.8k/886, Fraser to Wilmot, Y/hydah
29*7*1851: F.0.8k/886, Wilmot to Fraser,
1*k*51: F.O*8i|/88o, Fraser’s Journal, 
Ifjraser to Beecroft, 15*11*51.
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requested, and was given, permission to extend the
blockade to the other ports on the Bight.^ This
blockade was proclaimed on the 6th of December. The
King of Lagos was then driven from his throne and a
2pro-Egba monarch put in his place.
Although the blockade had been proclaimed on the 
6th of December, Fraser was not given official notice 
of this until the 21st of December.*^ Both he and the 
Whydah authorities had learned of the impending action 
on the 17th of December from the Captain of a merchant 
ship. This made Fraser’s position even more difficult 
in the sense that he had been unable to give the
1 F.0.814-/892, Bruce to Admiralty 1.11.91:
Badagry was regarded as a non-slaving port 
and therefore exempted from the blockade. 
This exemption confirmed French suspicion 
that the blockade was designed to forward 
English trading interests.
2 J.F.A. Ajayi, ’The British Occupation of 
Lagos 1 851 -61,’ Nigeria Ho.69* Aug.1961: 
J.F.A.Ajayi, Christian Missions in Nigeria
1 8U1 -91» PP*7U-7: S.0. Biobalm, op. cit. ,p. lj.6: 
C.Lloyd, opJLcit. ,PP»1 56-60: C.W.Newbury, 
cap. cit., pp. J.Herskovits Kop^off,
op.cit., pp.63-80. s
3 F.0.8L1/886, Bruce to Fraser, 6.12.51, 
marked ’Received* by Fraser 21.12.51.
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authorities any information on what was ahout to
1 2 happen* When the Vice-Consul did receive his instructions
they were to the effect that he should forward a letter from 
Commodore Bruce to the King, informing him that from the 
1st of January the Dahoman Coast would he blockaded until 
the King agreed to England’s demands# Upon receipt of 
this Gezo sent a letter to Whydah, requesting that Fraser 
and a Naval officer might go up to Abomey. After some 
indecision, Fraser and Commander T.G.Forbes of the Philomel 
set out separately for the capital. Forbes was accompanied 
by Thomas Hutton who was, at the time, in Whydah on business.
1 F.O. 84/886, Fraser’s Journal, entry 
18.12.51: Fraser to Beecroft, received 
by Beecroft 23.2.1852.
2 F.0.84/886, Fraser’s Journal, entry 
21.12.51: Fraser to Beecroft, received 
by Beecroft 23.2.1852.
3 F.O.84/892, Bruce to Gezo 17*12*51.
4 F.O.84/886, Fraser's Journal of October 
to December 1851: Fraser to Beecroft, 
received by Beecroft 23.2.1852:
F.O.84/892 T.G.Forbes to Commander Bruce, 
Whydah, 31*12.51: T.Hutton to Commander Forbes, 
Whydah 30.12.51, enclosures in Bruce to 
Admiralty 2.1.52. Gezo seems to have worked 
to gather as many of his ’English friends' 
around him as possible. He had already 
written to T.B*Freeman*
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The English "blockade of his coasts must have come 
as a very unpleasant surprise to the King of Dahomey. 
During the previous round of negotiations in which he 
had attempted to gain English support, he had, in order 
to get England to modify her terms, threatened to "break 
off relations: a threat that had "been his last diplomatic 
card. In the event, England, instead of altering the 
conditions under which she would co-operate, had seized 
a neighbouring state and now threatened to "blockade his 
coast. It must have appeared to Gezo that the English 
were also playing their last diplomatic card: that they 
were replying to threats with threats. The English, of 
course, long "before Eraser’s first visit to Ahomey, had 
determined that when the time was ripe they would "blockade 
the Dahoman coast. The "blockade had nothing to do with 
Eon diplomacy, "but G-ezo could not have known this.
Before the "blockade the majority of the Dahoman 
Chiefs had never had enough to gain from agreement with
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England to induce them to "be willing to make sacrifices 
in order to obtain it. Geso was now, it seems, able to 
work upon the fears of his Chiefs in order to get what 
he wanted. The English seizure of Lagos and the accession 
there of a pro-Egba King must have represented to the Eon 
the culmination of Egba policy. The Dahomans had already 
been driven ignominiously out of Egbadoland and their whole 
position in the East undermined. The allies of the Egba, 
the English, were now threatening to blockade the whole 
Bight. It must have seemed possible that other coastal 
towns might be seized— even Fon towns. The Egba and the 
English might together advance on the defeated and de­
moralised Dahomans. The very existence of the Fon state 
must have seemed to be in jeopardy.
A section of Fon opinion was probably outraged by
this insult to Dahomey and wished to defy all their enemies.
This was certainly the Dahoman reaction in 1876;when the
1
English again blockaded the coast. The more reasonable 
among the Chiefs seem to have been willing to pursue a more 
prudent course. Up until this time a working agreement
1 See Chap. Ill, p. 213-221
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with England had evidently been the dream only of
G-ezo and his immediate supporters; they had wanted
such an alliance for reasons of purely internal politics.
At least a section of the Eon ruling class, however, after 
the Egba successes, seems to have felt that it was neces­
sary to placate the English and draw them away from their 
alliance with the Egba. Gezo evidently now determined to 
use this feeling to put into operation the policy of co­
operation with the English for which he had worked so long.
The King had nevertheless to move very carefully.
The Dahomans probably felt insulted by the English proceedings. 
Gezo had therefore to agree to English demands but to do so 
in such a way that his agreement should not outrage Dahoman 
feelings by appearing an abject capitulation. The ambassadors 
who came to Abomey after the proclamation of the blockade 
were not therefore treated especially kindly. The luck­
less Eraser again became the victim of Dahoman pride. The 
King, wishing, it seems, to make clear his displeasure at 
English action, yet not wishing to insult the Queen of
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England, made Fraser his whipping hoy. Fraser was 
again denounced, in no uncertain terms, for his so- 
called anti-Dahoman activities. The representatives 
of the Afro-Brazilian community, who had heen summoned 
to Dahomey, also came in for a long harangue and were 
accused, not unjustly, of, for their own profit, attempting 
to harm Dahoman relations with England. Moreover, the 
English ambassadors as a group came in for a severe lecture 
in pro to col; this was sparked off by the wording of 
Commodore Bruce’s letter informing the King of the 
imposition of the blockade.
Throughout the proceedings however the King con­
tinually emphasised his desire to live in peace and harmony 
with the English. Moreover, he agreed to the most important
1 It looks as if it may have been an African 
diplomatic convention to blame an ambassador, 
rather than his state, for policies which one 
hoped to be changed. That no real hostility 
was harboured against Fraser is indicated by 
the fact that after what Geso regarded as the 
settlement of outstanding difficulties, the 
King took Fraser by the hand and assured him 
that all former epjnsity was forgotten.
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of England1 s demands. Probably “because of the 
necessity of not appearing to capitulate to the English 
the King refused to sign the ordinary anti-slave trade
■i
form which was submitted to him. What he did do was to 
approve a statement to the effect that the slave trade
was forever abolished within the Kingdom of Dahomey* He 
also agreed to make peace with Abeokuta. In a letter, 
which he dictated he made his position with regard to 
the Egba very clear. He stated that if two nations were 
at war it was suitable that a third, acting as an inter­
mediary, should bring about a peace settlement; the 
intermediary should, however, take pains to understand 
both sides of the story. England had tried to make peace 
but had only listened to the Egba version of the origins
1 It may be that he was for superstitious 
reasons unwilling to put his mark on a 
document. He had, however, done so on 
other occasions.
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of the quarrel. The English, the French*^  and the 
Egba should now send ambassadors to Abomey. The 
Europeans could then listen to both points of view 
and devise a fair solution. The English could hardly 
have been asked to do more than act as 'honest broker1.
There were three points in the unsigned standard 
anti-slave trade treaty upon which the King did not
touch during the negotiations presumably because he
did not consider them very important. The first of 
these clauses was the one which stated that the English 
should be allowed to trade freely in Dahoman ports. The 
English had in fact always been permitted to trade freely, 
and the King had frequently indicated that he wanted this 
trade to increase. It is, then, hardly surprisingly that 
he omitted to mention trade. The second unmentioned 
clause was one requesting that English missionaries be 
allowed to enter Dahomey. The English had already been 
informed that the missionaries would be welcome if they 
were to settle at Whydah. Gezo had already made his
1 Gezo wished to include the French in this 
peace-making operation, presumably so that 
Dahomey would not appear to be absolutely 
dependent upon England. The move could 
hardly at this point have been meant very 
seriously.
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attitude on missionaries clear to Beecroft. It is not 
unlikely that he considered that the English would he 
satisfied. The third point on which he did not touch 
was the one concerning human sacrifice. Gezo had already 
taken steps to limit this practice. To have asked his 
Chiefs to accept complete abolition would probably have 
been to endanger his whole policy. Moreover, it seems 
likely that the King was under the impression that this 
was not one of the more important of England's requests—  
recently he had heard far more about the slave trade and 
the Egba war. Gezo at any rate evidently felt that he 
had fairly met English demands.
The King seems to have considered that he had now 
acted as England wanted him to act. He must have expected 
the English to do as they had promised they would, if he 
fell in with their wishes. The leading English ambassador, 
Commander Forbes, was in fact relatively well pleased with 
the results of his visit to Abomey. He even remarked that 
although England had not obtained all that she wanted, the 
remainder would follow in due course. Fraser was more
pessimistic; he did not consider that the mission had been
- 122 -
a success. At the time, however, Fraser seems to have 
been incapable of taking an objective view of the 
proceedings. He had been denounced and then ignored 
by the King: Forbes had been treated with respect and 
had taken complete control of the negotiations. Forbes 
even reported, in a reference to Fraser's refusal to 
give presents, that Fraser had merited the King's 
dislike. The strain to which he had been subject in 
his exposed position in Whydah, and his natural objections
i
to being continually ignored, seems to have produced
some jealousy of Commander Forbes' achievement. The only
concrete reason which Fraser produced for considering the
mission a failure was that Gezo had not explicitly stated
1
that the missionaries would be admitted to Dahomejr.
1 The paragraphs concerning the Forbes 
Fraser mission to Abomey are based on 
the following:-
P.0.8VW6 Fraser to Beecroft, Whydah 17*1.52 
F.O.8I4/886 Fraser to Beecroft, Whydah 8.1.52 
F.0.814/893 T.G.Forbes to Bruce, Whydah 18.1.52 
enclosed in Bruce to Admiralty 16.2.52 
F.O.8I4/886, Gezo to Queen Victoria, Cana 12.1.52 
F.O.8I4/886, statement on slave trade approved 
by Gezo, 13.1.52.
- 123 -
By exploiting his chiefs1 fears of further defeat,
Gezo evidently felt that, he had put himself in the way
of obtaining his long-sought English alliance. By
agreeing to the abolition of the slave trade the King
had, however, cut away the main economic support of the
monarchy and the ruling class* Immediately after the
conclusion of his negotiations with the English, he
therefore took action to create a new economic basis
for the power of the monarchy* His plans, which depended
1
on English co-operation, set forth a system which not 
only would have provided a new economic foundation for 
the monarchy, but would have also made it more powerful 
than ever* In a very astute manner indeed, Gezo seems 
to have been utilising the unfavourable political cir­
cumstances in order to improve the position of the 
monarchy within Dahoman society. The new system wae 
to be based on a royal monopoly of the palm oil trade.
1 Both Fraser and Forbes reported these 
steps. It therefore seems probable 
that the King took pains to let the 
English know what he was about.
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Orders were given that all the palm oil and palm 
kernel trade should in fixture he centralised in the 
hands of* the King, If anyone sold these products 
except to the agents of the King, all his goods would 
he confiscated. Whydah was to he the only port in 
Dahomey through which the trade might he conducted: 
the other ports were to he closed. The amount of palm 
oil exported was to he measured on Whydah heach hy 
agents of the YeovogOn. Agents of the King were sent 
down from Ahomey to hegin the royal collection of palm 
oil. ^
The speed with which the King acted indicates 
that he expected that the English would immediately 
co-operate with him. The decision to abolish the slave 
trade and make peace with the Yoruha must have given 
considerable offence to at least a large section of 
the Dahoman ruling group. The attempt to complete
1 E.Q.8I4/886, Eraser to Beecroft, Whydah 17*1.52:
E.0.8A/8935 T.C. Forbes to Bruce 18.2,52:
Gezo may have at this time re-introduced 
the idea of the dual nature of the Eon 
monarchy. He may have created a twin for 
himself— to trade in palm oil.
. See Chap* VI, p. U26-&8
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this revolution by overhauling the economic power 
of the monarchy must have given even greater offence.
If the new system had been put into effective operation, 
the King would have been able to dominate the economic 
life and, as a result, the political life of the country. 
Gezo in fact would have improved on the position which 
he had held when De Souza was at the height of his power. 
The Chiefs were unlikely to accept this unless the King 
were backed up by a strong outside force. Clezo, evidently 
well aware of this, put his scheme forward when the English 
ambassadors were still in Dahomey, so that they would see 
that he meant to co-op'erate with England. He must have 
expected the English to respond by acting as they had
frequently promised they would* by re-garrisoning the
Whydah fort, and by placing in charge there a capable 
governor who would act in Dahoman affairs in co-operation 
with the King.
Although Gezo knevsf what he wanted, the English did
not. They could not make up their minds as to whether 
or not the King had met their demands. Commander Forbes, 
flushed with what he considered his Dahoman success, set 
out to obtain the adherence of the minor coastal Kings to
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the anti-slave trade treaty. They all signed: some,
(Vovo
like the King of* Port<^ , he cause they thought that
A
Dahomey had already reached an agreement with the English.
On the 11th of February, after this treaty-making process
had heen completed, the English raised the blockade of
2all those ports whose rulers had signed treaties.
Commodore Bruce, the Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron, 
could not make up his mind, however, whether or not the 
blockade of Dahomey should be lifted. He felt himself, 
that Gezo had complied with English wishes; he had 
however been instructed to obtain signatures to the 
standard treaty forms. Rather than risk the disapproval 
of his superiors he maintained the blockade of the Fon 
ports,and he sent Forbes and Fraser back to Abomey to 
attempt to induce the King to sign a normal agreement.^*
1 F.0.8^/893 Forbes to Bruce, Whydah 5*2.52:
F.O.8I4/886 Fraser to. Bee croft, 1.2.52 
enclosed in Beecroft to F.O. 28.6*52.
2 F.0.8I|/893 Brupe to All Whom It May Concern,
Whydah 11.2.52ft-^ F.0.8U/886, Bruce to Fraser,
Whydah 11.2.52; enclosed in Beecroft to F.O.
28.6.52.
3 F.O.8i4/89U Bruce to Admiralty 1.1+.52.
U Forbes and Fraser were in Dahomey from 
20th February to 3P& March, 1852.
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The Dahomans were of* course outraged by the fact 
that trade could be carried on in the minor ports of 
the Bight, while their coastline was still blockaded.
The return of the ambassadors with the same old demands 
added insult to injury. Gezo disregarded all that the 
ambassadors said and treated them to an harangue on the 
size and power of his Kingdom. It became obvious, during 
the course of their interview, that the King feared that 
the English were about to attack Whydah. Nevertheless, 
although he showed concern and bewilderment at English 
policies, he continued to protest his friendship for 
England. Before the ambassadors left, the King went so 
far as to assure Eraser that the past v/as forgiven and 
that he wanted him to remain in Fort St. James as English 
governor. Gezo evidently wanted the English to stop 
making demands which would reduce Dahomey to a tributary 
position and to begin to fulfil what he regarded as their
A
part of the bargain.
1 E.0.8I+/886 Eorbes journal 20.2.52 to 
4*3*52,enclosed in beecroft’s to E.O.
28.6.52: E.O.84/894 Eorbes to Bruce
6.5.52, enclosed in Bruce to Admiralty 
1 .4.52.
-  128 -
Commander Forbes1 second attempt to persuade Gezo 
to sign the normal anti-slave trade treaty did nothing 
therefore to end English indecision. Bruce, influenced 
by Forbes, continued to believe that Gezo wanted English 
friendship and declared that the best way of ultimately 
achieving English aims would be to co-operate with the 
King. The Commander-in-Chief was strengthened in this 
view by the fact that, with the forces at his disposal, 
he was aware, that he could not hope to coerce Dahomey 
into signing the treaty. He therefore recommended that 
the blockade of the Dahoman ports should be lifted.
The British government had no more idea of what to
do than had the Commander-in-Chief. It therefore agreed
that the blockade should end. On the 15th of June the
Dahoman ports were again open to trade— the blockade there
had lasted more than three months longer than at any port 
2
on the Bight. It had, moreover, been lifted for purely 
negative reasons. The English could think of no other
1 F.O.84/894, Bruce to Admiralty 1.4.52.
2 F.O.84/895* Bruce to Admiralty 15*6.52: 
Bruce to Admiralty 19.6.58,
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policy to pursue with regard to Dahomey. Only those
who had visited Abomey were convinced that G-ezo wished
to co-operate with England* The fact that he had not
signed the formal treaty indicated to the Government
that the King had no intention of doing what England
wanted. The missionary-inspired view of Fon policy was
so deeply entrenched that the positive achievements of
the Forbes mission, were passed over. What was noted and
remembered was that Gezo had not signed the treaty.
Owing to a series of unfortunate circumstances
England now came to break off all direct contact with
Dahomey. The English did not realise that Gezo was
evidently in the process of putting through an economic
and political revolution which might have made Dahomey
a model of what, in English eyes, an African state ought
to have been. After the failure of the second Forbes-
the
Fraser mission, the Naval authorities offere cyvice-Consul
1 C.W.Newbury, op.cit., pp.47“54 
This work gives an alternative 
view of England1s relations with 
the Fon in the 1840s and early 1850s.
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the opportunity of withdrawing from Whydah. Fraser, 
who had "been completely "bewildered hy his unpleasant
2stay in Dahomey, gladly hoarded an English war ship. 
Forhes had been, on his return from Abomey, very 
critical of Fraser’s conduct in Dahomey. He considered 
that in refusing to give the usual ’presents’ Fraser 
had given needless offence to the Fon. After his 
departure the Vice-Consul was therefore concerned to 
point out that others besides himself had been mistreated 
by the Fon. In particular he drew attention to the fact 
that one of Hutton’s agents in Whydah had been abused by 
the Whydah authorities. Although a later investigation 
proved that the conduct of the Whydah officials had in
1 F.0.8U/886, Strange to Fraser U*3.52.
2 F.O.81+/886, Fraser to Strange 5*3*52.
3 F*0.8Li/893> Forbes to Bruce 18.1.32, 
enclosed in Admiralty to F.0*10.U*52: 
F.0.8U/886, F.O. to Fraser 19.^*52.
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this case been quite justified. Fraser’s contention 
further added to English distrust of Dahomey.
Consul Beecroft, as always interested primarily 
in the eastern half of the Bight, took the opportunity 
of Fraser’s withdrawal from Whydah to place him tem­
porarily in Lagos, from where close contact with the
2Egba could easily be maintained. The Foreign Office 
soon followed up the logic of this move by suppressing
the Vice-Consulate at Whydah and appointing a new man---
Benjamin Cambell—  as Consul at Lagos. The new Consulate 
in Lagos had charge of British relations with all the
1 F.O. 8*4/886, Fraser’s journal 19*1*to
31*3*52: Stanfield to Fraser, Whydah 
1.3.52: Fraser to Beecroft, Fernando
Po 22.11 .52: Beecroft to Fraser, 1*4-9 *52: 
F.0.8U/89U* Bruce to Admiralty 1*4-4*52, 
Memo on Bruce&s despatch of 1*4-*4-52:
F. 0.8*4-/895, Bruce to Admiralty 15*11*52 
enclosing Foote to Bruce, Whydah 28.9*52.
2 F.O.8*4/886, Beecroft to Malmsbury,
Fernando Po 20.6.52: F.O.8*4-/920,
Beecroft to Malmsbury, Fernando Po
U*2.55*
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the states on the Bight of Benin. Direct official
contact between England and Dahomey was cut off.
A British Consul in Lagos had little chance of
hearing anything but the Yoruba version of Fon
affairs. This was especially so since in 1852
Thomas Hutton gave up trading in Whydah and transferred
2his business to Lagos. For the first time in almost 
a decade there were no Englishmen in Dahomey. All 
communications between England and Dahomey stopped 
just when G-ezo had worked himself into a position in 
which he depended on English support.
1 F.O. 2/9, F.O. to Beecroft 19*2.53:
F.O. to Fraser 19*2.53*
2 During the extended blockade of Whydah, 
Hutton withdrew his agents from that 
port. . The fact that he did not re-enter 
the Whydah trade after the blockade was 
lifted may be explained by the fact that 
the death of his uncle, William Hutton, 
necessitated a reorganisation of the 
firm’s trading activities.
C H A P T E R
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Gezo had taken a revolutionary gamble. With 
English backing he might have won through: without 
it he had practically no chance of success, The 
ending of the slave trade deprived the Chiefs of their 
major source of income: the attempt to ei^ect a royal 
monopoly of the palm oil trade would have made it 
impossible for them to recoup their losses. The 
imposition of peace with the Egba and the implied 
recognition of the destruction of Eon influence'in 
Egbado and Aworiland outraged Dahoman pride, Gezo 
had been able to put his ideas into operation only because 
his Chiefs feared an Anglo-Egba attack. When this menace 
receded, or when the King’s policies proved ineffective 
in averting it, the royal authority was bound to be 
challenged.
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Every facet of the new royal policy was not 
rejected at once* The extent of the opposition in 
fact only became gradually apparent* The first sign, 
however, that the King was pursuing a dangerous course 
came quite soon, when he proved unable to enforce his 
monopoly of the palm oil trade* Trading simply continued 
in its traditional pattern* Perhaps the establishment 
of a British force at Whydah and a British refusal to 
trade with anyone but the King might have enabled Gezo 
to carry out his economic revolution. The monarch did 
try to export^but without this British co-operation the 
royal attempt to monopolise the palm oil trade never even 
got off the ground*
Gezo was however able, after the signing of the 
agreement with England, to put an end to the export of 
slaves from Dahoman ports. The Eon did not even take 
advantage of the ending of the blockade to resume the
1 E.0* 2/20 Cambell to Clarendon, Lagos 7*3*51 
enclosing statement by Eursier and Williamson, 
Master and Supercargo of the Columbine, Whydah 
16.2.57. ~
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trade* When the minor ports on their borders, those
not directly under Fon control, began to revive slave
2exporting the Dahomans themselves remained aloof*
Gezo was therefore able, for a time at least, to enforce
the negative aspect of his new policy.
The King*s initially successful attempt to end the
Fon slave trade nevertheless eventually broke down. By
May 1854 the export of slaves from Whydah was again in 
x
full swing.^ The collapse of G-ezo* s policies was probably 
due to the fact that they had not brought the expected 
dividend— -an ending of Egba pressure on Dahomey* s 
eastern frontier. This became clear when the Egba resumed
their attacks in November 1853- This they did with troops
1 F.O. 84/920, Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 31.• 10*53-
2 D.Ross, *The Career of Domingo Martinez 
on the Bight of Benin*, Journal of
African History. No.1 Vol IV 1965 
Martinez at Porto Novo beach was, 
after the lifting of the blockade, 
the most outstanding offender.
3 F.O.84/850, Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 30-5*54: F.O.84/851, H.Wharton 
to J.Beecham, Accra 16.8.54* enclosed 
in Beecham to Clarendon, London 27.10.54*
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released from activities in the Lagos region.^ The Fon 
must have felt that in giving up the slave trade they
were making a useless sacrifice; the English had
failed to hold the Egba in check.
Gezo himself could not easily abandon his new 
policies. Having adopted a revolutionary course of 
action, he seems to have aligned the traditionalists 
against him. His only chance of regaining the power 
which must have been slipping f 1*0111 him, remained to win- 
external backing. He continued therefore to attempt to 
win English support. Having, he considered, put his own
part of the bargain with England into operation, he
could not, it appears, understand why the English had 
failed to do as they promised. He therefore asked his 
old friend, T.B.Freeman, to come to him; 1 Since he now 
had no Englishman near him to advise him. f This re guest 
co-incided with Freeman’s own plans and the missionary
1 M.M.C. Afrigue^ ojj, Extracts from letters 
from John Lartigue to V.Regis, Whydah
22 & 25.11.53.
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travelled to Abomey in May 1854* During an interview 
with, the King, Freeman was assured that Gezo still 
wanted to co-operate with England in putting down the 
slave trade,
G-ezo swore that for some time past he himself had 
taken no part whatsoever in the slave trade* The 
missionary was inclined to "believe him: the Court,
Freeman saw, had heen greatly impoverished since his 
previous visit: the Kingfs professed devotion to 
agriculture seemed to he confirmed hy the fact that the 
countryside in general appeared to he in a much better 
state of cultivation.^
Freeman used the opportunity provided hy his visit, 
to obtain permission to open a mission at Whydah. Having
1 F.O.8^ /93"! J.Beecham to Clarendon, 
Wesleyan Mission House, Wishin 24.10.54* 
It had alreacly heen decided to open a 
Methodist missionary post at Whydah.
On receiving the KingTs invitation 
Freeman went to Abomey, taking with 
him two other Methodist missionaries—  
Dawson and Wharton.
2 F.O.84/951 H.Wharton to J.Beecham 
Accra 16.8.54s F.O.84/951 T*B.Freeman 
to J.Beecham, Cape Coast 12.8.54*
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done so;he left Abomey and returned in August 1854 
to Cape Coast. Freeman1 s view that Gezo was still 
intent upon putting his peace policy into operation 
seems reasonable. It certainly accords with what is 
known of Gezo*s political aims. In the Foreign Office, 
however, Freeman*s views were treated with considerable 
scepticism: it was found impossible, there, to reconcile
the King*s statements with the continued export of slaves
from Whydah. British officials of course did not
realise that the King was not absolute, and that in order
to put his policies into operation he needed assistance.
Because of this official disbelief no attempt was made
to follow up Freeman*s findings.
Even without English backing, Gezo endeavoured to
make peace with the Egba. In late 1854* an exchange of
2
ambassadors was effected with Abeolcuta. The negotiations 
did not bear fruit: the triumphant Egba were in fact hardly
1 F.O.84/951 Memorandum on the Slave Trade in 
Dahomey, 14*11.1854.
2 F.0.84/95Q Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 6.12*54.
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likely to have made peace unless forced into it "by 
England. Moreover, Gezo seems to have completely lost
control of the Eon political situation: a war party at 
this time certainly became vocal in Dahomey. It was 
probably as a result of the growing strength of this 
war party that rumours of an impending Eon attack upon 
Abeokuta began to circulate amongst the Egba in January 
and February 1855* The fact that a large number of Eon 
Chiefs now saw, in an all-ofot war on the Yoruba, the only 
hope of Dahoman safety, made the implication of Gezo’s 
peace policy highly unlikely.
On the rumours of an impending Eon assault on 
Abeokuta being reported in Lagos, Consul Cambell despatched 
a letter to Gezo warning him against making any such
attack. In his letter, Cambell included an offer of 
mediation between the Eon and the Egba: England, he
promised, would see to it that the Egba would not molest 
2the Eon. This was exactly what the King wanted. He
1 E.O.8I4/976, Chiefs of Abeokuta to Cambell,
Abeokuta 29 & 31.1.55: F.0.81+/976, Cambell 
to Clarendon, Lagos 15.2.55*
2 E.0.81+/976 Cambell to Gezo, Lagos 26.1.55*
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immediately summoned Dawson, the newly-established 
missionary in Whydah, to Abomey, where he informed 
him that he had no Intention of attacking Abeokuta. 
Indeed, he emphasised his desire to co-operate with
England and complained bitterly that he had had no 
contact with English officials since he had agreed to 
abandon the slave trade. Gezo, moreover, developed 
Cambellfs offer of mediation: he requested that Cambell 
himself should come to Abomey to arrange a peace settle­
ment. Rather ominously, however, the King warned Dawson
1
that his will was not all-powerful in Dahomey*
It must have seemed to Gezo that the English were
about to behave as he had always wanted them to behave.
He was so delighted that he despatched to T.B.Freeman a
letter in which he offered, for his consideration, the
2same schemes as he had already outlined to Dawson*
1 P.O. 84/976* Dawson to Cambell, Whydah
22 & 29.8*55* Although Dawson’s interview 
with Gezo took place in April, he did not 
inform Cambell until August.
2 P.0.84/976 Extract from an undated letter 
from T.B.Freeman to E.Gardiner, Cape Coast, 
enclosed in Cambell to Clarendon.
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Cambell, when he received a statement of Gezo’s views, 
was not impressed: he replied that no Englishman could 
go to Abomey until there was a definite prospect that a 
normal anti-slave trade treaty would be signed: since the 
slave trade was still active in the Fon ports there could, 
he declared, be no real hope of this.** To Gezo, Cambell’s 
reply must have seemed singularly inappropriate. As a 
prior condition to doing what both he and the English 
wanted, Cambell required that the King do that which he 
could do only with English support. The Foreign Office,
acting on the same assumption as Cambell, approved the
2Gonsul’s reply.
In early 1855* then, Gezo was still hoping for the 
British backing which might restore his crumbling political 
position. After mid-1855* however, such a restoration must 
have become well-nigh impossible. At this time the 
discovery of a plot to overthrow the Fon state seems to
1 F.0.84/976, Cambell to Dawson,
Lagos 15.10.55.
2 F.0.84/976 Cambell to Clarendon,
15.9.55: F.0.8I}/976, Foreign 
Office to Cambell 29.12.55.
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have completely discredited the KingTs policies. What 
was discovered was a planned uprising of* all the Yoruba 
slaves on the Fon pal^ i oil plantations. It was to he
•i
led hy a number of* returned Brazilians, and was intended 
to co-incide with an Egba attach.
On the discovery of the conspiracy consternation 
reigned throughout Dahomey. The whole country appeared 
to be in a state of panic: every able-bodied man was 
called to arms. In order to prevent flight neither 
European nor African was allowed to leave the country.
The rising was discovered only just before it was due to 
take place: it was, however, discovered in time and the 
Eon were able to take action to prevent an insurrection.
Three thousand of the conspirators were rounded up, sent
2to Abomey, and immediately executed.
1 These TBrazilians1 were not the old- 
established slave traders, but recently 
freed slaves often of Yoruba descent.
2 E.0.8^/976, McClosky to Cambell,
Badagry 17.6*55: M.M.C. Goree et 
Dependencies XV-r Regis to Marine 
19.11.55* enclosing Monleon to 
Regis. This letter from an observer 
on the Coast is undated. Regis,
However, received it 21+.8.55.
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These mass reprisals removed the threat of a slave
A
revolt: an unassisted Egba attack could be faced, if not
with equanimity, at least with confidence. Nevertheless 
the conspiracy had been designed, and had come perilously 
near, to destroying the whole Eon state. The first 
reaction of the Eon leaders on the discovery of the plot 
was, of course, to take steps to ensure the safety of 
Dahomey. Their more considered reaction was to repudiate 
the policies which had brought this danger upon the nation. 
This Egba-Yoruba slave conspiracy in fact proved to be a 
major turning point in the history of 19th century Dahomey 
in that it finally discredited the innovations of the 
Gezoan monarchy.
To the Eon, it must have seemed that the King’s 
abandonment of the slave trade had brought nothing but 
English indifference, coupled with continued Egba hostility. 
Gezo1s measures to make the palm oil trade, rather than 
the slave trade, the basis of the Eon economy, had led not
1 E.O. 84/1002, Cambell to Clarendon, 
Lagos 10.7*55. Further groups of 
Yoruba ex-slaves, having the ill- 
luck to land at Whydah, were summarily 
executed.
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only to losses to those previously engaged in slaving, 
hut also to the creation of a large hostile population 
within Dahomey itself. Possibly the King’s reduction 
in the number of human sacrifices was also seen as 
constituting a danger to the continued existence of the 
Fon state.
Altogether, Gezo’s policies seemed to have placed 
Dahomey in a position of great danger. It was hardly 
surprising that many of the Chiefs came to view the 
future of Dahomey in terms of a return to traditional 
policies: in terms of refusing Europeans any say in the 
affairs of Dahomey: in terms of carrying out, to the full, 
traditional religious rites and, above all, of the under­
taking of a great military effort against their age-old 
enemy, the Yoruba. The Chiefs, who had previously simply 
passively resisted putting the new royal policy into 
practice, were now, it seems, greatly strengthened in 
their opinions and set about implementing their own 
opposition policy.
The leader of the group opposed to the policies of 
the King was one of his sons, Badahou. Prince Badahou’s
1 F.0.84/1221, Burton to Russel 23.3.64: 
R.Burton, op. cit., pp«334 & 143* f/n 1 •
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opposition to his father seems to have been partly 
a move in the normal struggle for succession and 
partly a matter of personal conviction: his later 
conduct clearly indicates that he was a traditionalist 
who believed that Gezo’s innovations would eventually, 
and inevitably, lead to the destruction of Dahomey.
There are indications that B&dahbu was greatly influenced
A
by the Priests, who may well have been outraged by
Gezo’s tampering with traditional rites. It seems
likely , that Badahou, who had been Vi-Daho since at 
2
least 1850, had for long been the focus of opposition 
to Gezo: that he had not been eliminated is an indication 
of the magnitude of that opposition.
After the discovery of the 1855 conspiracy, Badahou
and his supporters gained the upper hand in Dahoman 
politics to such an extent that after that date it was 
their policies which predominated, and those of the 
King had the support of only the minority. As one
1 R.Burton, op.cit.. p.267
2 P.Forbes, op.cit.. Vol II p.134
contemporary commentator noted three years later:
1II est yrai que ee Hoi^qui depuis plus 
de deux ana n* avait d* autre coriseil que 
M*Vidal (Regis chief agent at Whydah), 
memo pour ses affaires d * interieur, 
n* est plus que 1’ombre de son fils et
I • . ' - 'I. :
son Ministre* *
Because of the scare resulting from the discovery of the 
slave plot, many of the Chiefs turned to Badahou for 
leadership* liven the Mehou, it seems, at this point 
threw his weight behind Badahou* Since the Mehou was a 
very! old man-— -indeed, he was one of the Chiefs reputed 
to have helped bring Gezo to power--— it can be seen that
. 1 M.M.C .Afrique IVQdProtei to Marine, ! 
Whydah 20 i5*58 Protet attributed 
Gezo1 s loss of power to bad health* 
viDhere-ishowever, no evidence ^
v whatsoever that Gezo, although an 
, old man, was ailing* ■
2 M.M.C .Afri que, IVQd protet to Marine,
! Whydah 20*5•58# ySr .Repin, ’Voyage 
au Dahomey1 * lour du Monde 1863 » 
lombe I p.65. fiepin remarks that 
Gezo conducted negotiations with the 
Prench in private, so that the Mehou 
should not be present. Ihe Mehou$ : 
made a number attempts to discover 
exactly: what the ambassadors had talked 
about to the King.
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the abortive slave revolt had made a very considerable 
impression on the Pon leaders*
There were of course a number of factors 
influencing those who were opposed to Gezo-— -the group 
named the ’reactionary party’ by one nineteenth century 
observer* Nevertheless, Badahou’s following became 
well-nigh irresistible only after those frightened by 
the slave revolt turned to traditional politics in an 
effort to save Dahomey. The roots of much of the hard­
core opposition to Gezo among the great Chiefs, however, 
probably lay very deep in the past. A number of them 
had been undoubtedly opposed to the King throughout.
They had long resented his domination of political 
life, since this domination had both detracted from their 
importance and had limited their freedom to manoeuvre 
for their oy/n profit. Above all, they seem to have
disliked the fact that Gezo had obtained external support 
for his power: the De Souza^s, of course, were the particular
object of their hatred. This section of Badahou’s following
: ’ ';;:i >  ^  ' - / 1 4 8 ' '■->_ . : i V ; ' ■;v " . : ' .;
wanted (not only) to get i*id of Gesso, but also to
ensure that his efforts to establish a strong" 
monarchy would he ended once and for all* They wanted, 
in fact, a reversion to the politics of the early 
nineteenth century; Theirr opportunity to destroy Grezo/s 
work arose only When they could ally themselves with those ;• 
who desired a change in policy but were not necessarily 
opposed to having a powerful King*
Gezo himself did not repine under this reversal of 
fortune* Even at the time of the discovery of the slave 
conspiracy}he sent one of his Afro-Braxilian allies to 
Lagos, to find out if the English had supported this Egba-
inspired plot. Although this Fon representative was
informed that the British disapproved of Egba anti-Fon 
activities, Gezo by this time must almost have given up 
/ hope of English intervention. He nevertheless desperately 
needed outside support not only to achieve his ultimate
I E . 0*84/976, Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 30.8*55• Jose Francisco 
Be Santos, Gezo,s representative, 
was assured by Cambell that the 
English did not encourage the 
Egba. De Sahtos replied, 
significantly, that the contrary 
impression prevailed in Dahomey*
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aims but also to restore his position to what it had 
been during the greater part of his reign. The support 
of the Portuguese was now worthless: that of the British
was not forthcoming. Gezo therefore turned to the only
other European power with whom he was in contact the
French.
In spite of his advanced years, the old King began, 
at this point, to angle energetically for closer relations 
with the French. Naturally enough, he did this by 
attempting to co-operate fully with the only French firm 
then trading at Whydah, that of Victor R#gis. Gezo 
began to make friendly overtures to the agent in chief,
A.M.Vidal. At one point he suggested that two of his 
sons be educated in France so that they could eventually 
act as trustworthy intermediaries between himself and the
French* In fact the King made much the same approaches to 
the French in the 1850s as he had to the English ten years 
earlier.
1 After the withdrawal of the English firm 
of Hutton, Regis was left for a time as 
the only major European firm trading at 
Whydah. As such, Regis was the major 
benificiary of Gezo’s fostering of palm 
oil cultivation.
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Victor Regis applied to the French government to 
send an official delegation to Abomey; he. hoped hy 
humouring the King to obtain further trading privileges 
for his merchant House. The Ministry of Marine had at 
the time no political ambition in the area}but was 
nevertheless willing to assist the development of French . 
trade. A delegation of French officers led by Lt.Vallon
was therefore sent to Abomey in late 1 856 and again in 
1858. The embassies were exceptionally well received by 
the King, who even went so far as to show a disposition 
to embrace Catholicism. That he even expressed a willing­
ness to consider adopting Christianity indicates that his 
political position within Dahomey was so desperate that he 
was prepared to take any measure, however risky and 
unpopular, in order to gain foreign support.
The majority groups headed by Badahou, although 
willing enough to increase Dahoman trade by agreement 
with the French were of course opposed to G-ezo1 s attempts 
to involve the French in Dahoman affairs. The embassies
1 M.M.C* Afrique I V R e g i s  to Marine, 
Marseilles 26.2.56.
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failed in that the French obtained little that they 
wanted. In 1856 they were unable to arrange for the 
opening of a Regis trading post in Abomey itself: in 
1858 they were unable to arrange a bargain for the
A
purchase of indentured slaves for the French West Indies. 
Although it was arranged that two Dahoman boys should be 
educated in France, it later emerged that they were not
the King’s children. All that was achieved was in fact
2the regulation of routine trading matters. Gezo was no 
longer powerful enough to make trading concessions to 
those whose help he wished to obtain. His attempts to 
attract French support were absolutely ineffective because
1 F. 0.8I4./1031, Oambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 10.8.57 and 5*9*57: F. 0.81+/1061 , 
Cambell to Clarendon, Lagos 6.5*58.
S.0.Biobaku, op.cit.. pp.60-61.
B.Schnapper, op.cit., p 16 
Schnapper provides the trading 
background to this scheme.
2 M.M.C. Afrique IVn^ Protet to Marine, 
Whydah 20.5*58: A.Vallon, !Le Royaume 
de Dahomey! Revue Maritime et Colonial 
t.II & t.III 1961: Dr.Repin, ’Voyage 
au Dahomey1, Tour du Monde 1965. P*&5: 
Lt. Guillevin, ’Voyage dans l’interieur 
du Dahomey1, Nouvelles Ahhales des 
Voyages 1862.
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they were opposed by the greater part of the Fon ruling 
cl a S3*
Between 1855 and 1858 the struggle between Gezo 
and his son, Badahou, reached a position of stalemate
which could only be broken when one became strong enough
to destroy the other. That a protracted succession
struggle was in progress in Abomey is indicated by the
fact that during these years rumours of Gezo’s death were
continually in circulation. In July 1856, for example,
Consul Cambell heard from a number of different sources
that Gezo was dead and that his son, an inveterate enemy
1
of Abeokuta had succeeded him. Although the rumours 
proved false, their very existence indicated that the 
political fever in Dahomey had reached such a pitch that 
only the death of one of the contenders for power could 
end the dispute. It is significant that similar rumours 
circulated in the 1880s when a similar succession struggle 
was in full swing in Abomey. That Cambell heard tales of
1 F.0.84/1061, Cambell to Clarendon, 
Manchester, 2.8.58.
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Gezo’s death in July 1856 probably proves that it was 
during the first full meeting of the great Chiefs, at 
the annual customs after the discovery of the Yoruba 
slave conspiracy, that the opposition to Gezo became 
really powerful.
While Gezo was unsuccessfully trying to enter into
closer relations with the French, his opponents were also
trying to put their policies into operation. In 1856 and
1857 Badahou’s messengers toured the neighbouring states
of Ketu, Ibadan and Illorin, suggesting that an alliance
1
be formed against Abeokuta. Messengers were also sent 
to the ex-King of Lagos, Kosoko, at that time resident 
in Epe, asking him to use his influence to encourage the 
Ijebu to attack the Egba: he was also urged to shift his 
own base to Otta, from where he could stir up trouble for
1 F.O. 84/1002, Cambell to Clarendon, 
Lagos 26.6.56: F.O.84/1002, Alake of 
Abeokuta to Cambell, Abeokuta 18.6.56. 
Ketu was still divided as to whether 
or not to oppose Dahomey. This was 
reflected in the fact that although 
Badahou’s messengers were imprisoned, 
no warning was sent to Abeokuta.
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•1
the Egha in Egba dol and. Fon supporters of Badahou
were active again in Yorubaland during the following
2year. This time Oyo was included in their itinerary.
These tentative approaches to the Yoruba powers were 
not however hacked up hy any action on the Eastern 
frontier. Gezo, although losing ground, was in these 
years still strong enough to prevent any real Fon moves 
in renewing the war against the Egha.
The first important Fon advance against the Yoruha 
came in February 1858. In that month the Yoruha town
of Ekpo (Appo), near Ketu, was attacked and destroyed.^
The immediate aim of this large-scale raid was prohahly
to frighten Ketu to its pre-1852 dependence upon Dahomey.
In Fon politics, however, the raid marks the final triumph
of Badahou over Gezo. The first step in the attempt to
1 F. 0.84/1002, Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 26.6.56 and 4.11*56.
2 F.O.84/1031 Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 4*2.57: F.O.84/1061, Cambell 
Clarendon, Lagos 7*4*58.
3 F.O. 84/1061, Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 3*3*58.
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reverse the implications of the Fon defeat before 
Abeokuta had been taken. Ihe old King could no 
longer even restrain his opponents.
Ihis first implementation of Badahou1 s policies 
was closely followed by the death of Gezo* It seems 
more than likely that Badahou and his followers,having 
gained the upper hand, proceeded to dispose of the King* 
Gezo was probably removed during the annual customs of 
July-August 1853. Ihe official story given out at the 
time was that Gezo had died of smallpox; If Gezo did 
die of this disease it certainly struck most conveniently. 
Since the CTult of Sakpata (the Smallpox Quit) seems to 
have been traditionally hostile to the monarchy this 
was probably a conventional euphemism for regicide.
1 M.J.Hprskovits, pp.cit., t.I p.21
R.Burton, op.cit . T (1564 ed.) Vol.II 
p.406. Ihxs was the version given 
by contemporary writers.
2 M.Palau-Marti, Le Roi-dieu au Benin, Sud 
logo, Dahomey Nigeria Accodentale, p.153. 
See also Chap.VI pp.476-477• It may be 
significant that King Kpengala (1774-1789) 
is also said to have died of smallpox.
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A more recent account of ^esofs death rejects the 
smallpox theory and substitutes for it a tale of the 
King1^  having been assassinated by a Yoruba youth 
immediately after the sack of Ekpo. This version seems 
to be mainly based on the oral tradition of Ketu; it 
must therefore be treated with caution since nothing 
would have been more pleasing to the Yoruba than a tale
of how one of them had eventually Killed their greatest 
1
Fon enemy. It also appears to be founded on a misinter
. 2
pretation of a rumour which reached Lagos in 18624..
1. E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.91 : G.Parrinder,
op. cit., p• U 2 PThazoume, op. cit.. pp. 110-2: 
Th.Moulero, E.D. New Series. May 1965*No.2+ 
p.59. One Fon authority gives an outline 
of the story— P.Hazoume— it is possible that 
his source may also originally nave been
Yoruba. Moulero attempted to confirm this 
tale: he told a group of Dahomans the story 
a nd judged by their reactions that this 
version of Gezo 1 s death Y/as an accurate one. 
Too much reliance should not therefore be 
placed on his confirmation.
2 R.Burton,op.cit., p.364: E,Dunglas, E.D.XX, 
p.92. Dunglas lays considerable emphasis on 
this report, which declares that the King of 
Dahomey had died of wounds which he received 
in a slave 1rar&. At the time (186ft) this 
rumour was taken to refer to Gelele. There 
seems little reason to suppose that the report 
reflects anything more than the unrest in 
Dahomey during the unsettled reign of Gelele.
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Moreover, tliis theory does not fit into the known
sequence of events leading up to the death of Gezo*
1
The attack on Elspo took place in February 1858* Gezo
was alive Y/hen the French visited Abomey in April 1858.
The ambassadors might certainly have seen one of the
royal Ttwins1 who occasionally substituted for the monarch
2
on state occasions. These Frenchmen however seem in 1850
■5
to have had some close contact with the King. In this 
their experience differed entirely from that of a French 
ambassador who in somewhat similar circumstances visited 
Abomey in 1859*^ Altogether it seems likely that Gezo
1 F.O. 8lt/106l, Cambell to Clarendon, 
Lagos 3*3*58.
2 See Chap. VI. p.i+3U
3 M.M.C. Afrique IVg^ Protet to Marine, 
Whydah 20.5*58: A.Vallon, *Le Royaume 
de Dahomeyf Revue Maritime et Colonial 
t.II and t.III, 1961: Dr.Repin, fVoyage 
au Dahomey1 Tour du Monde 1863. p. 65: 
Lt.Guillevin, 1Voyage dans lfinterieur 
du Dahomey* Kouvelles Annales des 
Voyages 1862.
k The Bayol Mission: see Chap.V.p. 313-20
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was simply Tremoved* when his opponents gained the 
upper hand in Fon politics* This theory is given 
added weight hy reports circulating on the Coast that 
Gezo had in fact "been murdered*
The death of Gezo removed the man who was undoubtedly 
the dominant figure in the history of nineteenth century 
Dahomey, the period which the Fon themselves call their 
great century. Gezo was not only a great Dahoman King: 
he can claim a stature equal to that of any other African 
leader in the days before 1 things fell apart*. His 
greatest, although transitory, success, was to re-establish 
the power of the monarchy. His more enduring achievements 
were twofold: in the first half of his reign he led his
country to independence of Oyo: in the second half, after
1 Abbe Borgero to M.Planque, Whydah 3°»9*61, 
in *Annals of the Propogation of the Faith, 
1861 *: A.L.D*Albeca, *Au Pays des Evues*, 
Tour du Monde 1895* p. 105* Borgero, the 
first head of the Catholic mission in 
Whydah, reported that Geso was murdered. 
D’Albeca, the first French administrator 
of the Whydah region, also reported that 
he had been murdered. Both based their 
reports upon tales current in their period, 
at Whydah
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it 'became clear that the slave trade was doomed, he estab­
lished the prosperity of his Kingdom on a sound new 
economic basis.
The most remarkable aspect of Gezo’s career was his 
continued willingness to innovate— indeed, to rethink and 
redirect the most basic elements in his policies. At a 
time when the disintegration of the Oyo empire permitted 
Dahoman adventurism G-dzo energetically espoused military 
expansion. Later, when this adventurism brought the Fon 
into conflict with new states mightier than Dahomey, Gezo
saw the light and began working for a policy of peaceful 
co-existence. When the Afro-Brazilian slavers were at 
the height of their prosperity, Gezo saw to it that his 
country benefited from that prosperity. When the slave 
trade declined, Gezo took energetic steps to establish 
Fon wealth on a more secure footing. In this he was 
successful: even today, Dahomey is economically dependent
upon the export of palm oil from the plantations laid 
1
down by Gezo. The unpopularity of his later policies
1 J.Harision Church, West Africa, p.li-30
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eventually of course brought about his fall. His attempt 
to rebuild the strong Fon monarchy died with him* 
Nevertheless, it was Gezo’s achievement that he first 
brought about Dahoman independance and later provided 
the economic basis essential to the maintenance of that 
independance.
On the announcement of Gezo * s death Badahou, who
took the ’ strong’name of Geiele, was immediately proclaimed
King. His succession was not unopposed. Gezofs son,
Ouinsou, and that son!s mother, the Ya-Vedo, had to be
eliminated before Gelele*s position was rendered absolutely 
•\
secure. It may be that Ouinsou was simply a Prince 
competing with Badahou for the leadership of the ’reactionary 
party*. It seems more likely that Ouinsou was a close 
political ally of the old King: he may, indeed, have been 
the son whom Gezo would have wished to succeed him. That 
Ouinsou was able to put up some resistance at least indicates 
that Badahou did not have the support of the entire Fon 
ruling class.
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.102
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Apart from rival claimants and their royal partisans, 
no other enemies of tfelele are known to have been eliminated. 
Although one, at least, of the great Fon dignitaries is 
known to have been opposed to the new King, Gelele1 s 
accession did not prove the occasion for the outbreak of 
any large-scale fratricidal strife. The principal
Ministers seem to have remained in office. A bureaucrat 
as important as Daba, Yeovogun of Whydah (an undoubted 
supporter of Gezo), was not removed from his post: his 
power was merely circumvented by the appointment of a 
Gelelian, Prince Tcindato, to the newly-created position 
of ChaujJdad^ton of Whydah. Power, in Whydah, during the 
first half of the new reign, rested effectively with this
•i
official. It seems more than possible that other prominent
supporters of Gezo were dealt with in a similar fashion.
Gelele*s accession marked the end of the attempt to 
establish the monarchy as the all-powerful directing force
in Dahoman political and economic life. The new King was
1 M.M.C. Gabon IV-ru Caillet to G-in-G 
Gabon 17.1 0.61 : H3.M.A. Dahomey, Old 
Vicariate 1862: Abbe Borghere to 
Planque, Whydah $ 6.62,
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opposed by what was probably still an important group---
which certainly included the Yeovogun of Whydah* This 
was not in itself very unusual. What was significant 
was that Gelele*s enemies were those Chiefs who had 
supported Gezo*s attempts to construct a strong monarchy.
In order to gain the throne, Gelele had depended upon 
those who had opposed Gezo*s politics. They could have 
had no intention of allowing Gelele to begin building 
up the power of the monarchy. Political life in Dahomey 
tended to revert to the state of near-anarchy which had 
preceded the accession of Gezo.
Perhaps the most important immediate indications of 
this change was that after the accession of ^elele,the royal 
family was able to obtain important'posts in the state 
beaurocracy.** The first holder of the post of Chaundadaton
was a Prince of the blood royal: the Adanejan was also
2a member of the fcoyal family. This admission of 
members of the royal family to important posts in the
1 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., p.23
2 F^O, 82|/1221, Burton to Earl Russel 
2^ 3,3,61}.: R.Burton, op. cit., p. 138
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Administration gravely weakened the monarch*s hold on 
the machinery of government. Under Gelele, the Princes 
were able to use their new-found power to intrigue 
against the King himself.
During the first years of Gelele*s reign the King*s 
supporters remained happily involved both in indulging 
their hatred of Gezo*s innovations and in preparing to 
put into practice their own new policies. The first 
victims of the long-suppressed hatred of foreigners 
powerful in Dahomey were the De Souza family. Although 
the family had long ceased to be of any real political 
importance, Gezo had continued to treat them with respect. 
They now paid the penalty of their former eminence.
During the first years of Geiele*s reign the three leading
•i
De Souza brothers died in very suspicioiis circumstances.
1 R.Burton, op.cit., pp.72 and 78-80:
J.F.De Almedia Prado, *Les Relations 
de Bahia avec le Dahomey*, Revue 
d* His to ire des Colonies, XL"!, "TS'S'Ll-
pp.167-222: P.Verger, *Les Afro-Americains* 
Memoire de L TInstitut Francais d*Afrique
Noire, No,27, 1953* Isadore, the Chacha,
Ignacio and Antonio (or Kwaku) De Souza
all died at this time. The new head of
the family, Francisco Felix De Souza II,
continued to call himself the Chacha but,
in fact, held no official Dahoman position.
He was absolutely subserviant to the Fon
authorities.
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The powers formerly held By the Ghacha then reverted to 
the Fon administration in Whydah. Only those Afro- 
Brasilians who had confined their interests strictly to 
trade were left unmolested. Even they found their wishes
A
disregarded and their influence much diminished.
The attack on the Be Souzas was only a minor 
manifestation of the new regime’s determination to Bring 
to an end Gezo’s suhserviance to European influence. The 
revival of the practice of human sacrifice, as it had 
existed Before Gezo’s reign, was, in many ways, of much 
greater significance. This revival seems to have repre­
sented a rejection of European innovation and a reversion
to the traditions of Dahomey. It proDaDly symbolised 
some sort of mystical glorification of Dahoman independence. 
On a more mundane level it may have Been designed to terrify 
(and thus keep suBservient) the plantation slaves. The 
revival may also have Been designed to serve as a warning 
to Dahomey’s neighbours, that the Fon could no longer Be 
treated with impunity.
1 R.Burton, op. cit., p.61+:
D.Ross, ’The Career of Domingo 
Martinez on the Bight of Benin’,
JBurnal_Q.f„African History, Vol VI,
1965, No.1.
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A touch of irony is provided by the faet that
£020*8 funeral ceremonies provided the new regime
with its first opportunity to put the traditional
rites of human sacrifice into practice* Altogether,
between 1853 and 1861, there were probably at least
2,000 people killed during the sacrificial ceremonies 
1
at Abomey* Those killed were not the political enemies
of the new regime: the males were newly-captured slaves:
2
the women were either wives of servile origin, or also 
newly-captured slaves. Those members of the royal 
family who had opposed Gelele disappeared: they were
not sacrificed. Oreat dignitaries, who had been close 
allies of the old King, had, as has been noted, their 
powers circumvented: they were not buried along with the
King. Even the vulnerable foreign1 enemies of the new 
regime, the De Souzas, were not publicly executed.
Although no Europeans were sacrificed, a Frenchman, 
present during part of the grand customs, saw being killed
1 For a detailed account of these ceremonies 
see Chap.VI pp.488-492.
2 A.Le Berisse, op.cit., p.180.
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a number of Africans, wearing European clothes and 
with, their faces painted white. Since the De Souzas 
had ceased to he Dahoman functionaries, it is unlikely 
that these men were in fact their substitutes. This 
symbolic sacrifice of Europeans may have been intended 
to appeal to popular dislike of the European traders. 
Probably it was another gesture indicating the new 
regime’s determination to reduce Europeans to their 
proper position in Dahomey.
Pom military activity between 1858 and 1860 was to 
some extent, at least, motivated by a desire to take 
slaves for sacrifice. It was also designed to induce, 
in the smaller states on the Dahoman borders, a proper 
respect for Eon power— -to prove that the years of
military inactivity were over. The first of the raids 
promoted by Gelele’s followers had of course been the
1858 attack on Ekpo. This was followed in 1 860 by an
2
attack on Atakpame. in the same year yet another town
1 M.A.E.Afrique 51 : J.Lartigue,
’^ elation du Voyage a Abomey’.
This report has been partly reproduced
in a number of publications. See Chap. VI p.U92
2 P.Cornevin, Histoire du Togo, p.111
~ 167 -
in the Ketuan area, Idahim (idigny) was destroyed.
The^e were, however, relatively minor campaigns:
the real military pre-occupation of the new regime was 
in preparing for a new attempt to settle scores with 
the Egba. Gelele’s followers had "been attempting to 
find allies even before Qeao died. Although they could 
not have contemplated undertaking a major campaign until 
after the grand customs for G-ezo were over, they must 
have received considerable encouragement in 1860 when 
the IjayC-war broke out. Ibadan as well as Dahomey was
1 P. 0. 8l|/111 5, Brand to Russel, Lagos 9*3*60, 
enclosing Townsend and Abeokuta Missionaries 
to Brand, Abeokuta 7*2.60 and 27.2.60:
P * A.Talbo t, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria 
Vol. I, pp.1M-3: E.Dunglas, P.P.XX. p.103: 
J.P.Ade Ajayi,!The IjayfeWar TB6O-5T p.8 in 
J.P.Ade Ajayi & Robert Smith, Yoruba
Warfare in the 19th Century. Ketu seems to 
have made some attempt to intervene in this 
affair. Since the Pon were able to carry 
off their prisoners it would appear that 
they were victorious. The Egba feared a 
Pon attack in 1860. They thought that the 
Pon had returned home because of unfavourable 
omens. The Pon were so heavily involved in 
ceremonial at this time that it seems unlikely ' 
that they would have contemplated undertaking 
a majof campaign.
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now openly hostile to Abeokuta. During 1860 ambassadors
were continually moving to and fro between Ibadan and 
2
Abomey. It seems more than likely that some sort of 
offensive alliance was agreed upon*
In 1861, after the grand customs ended, a great army
mustered in Dahomey. The outbreak of smallpox amongst the
troops, however, effectively prevented any campaign being 
3
undertaken* jn the following March, the Fon army attacked
and destroyed the Egbado town of Isshaga. Dahomey thus
revenged the defeat of 1852 and at the same time cleared
]±
the way for a later attack on Abeokuta itself* It seems 
more than probable that the Fon had decided to attack 
Isshaga at this particular time on the advice of the
1 For an excellent account of the 
outbreak of the Ijayi war and its 
course, see J.F.Ade Ajayi, fThe Ijayi 
War 1860~5f in J.F.Ade Ajayi & Robert 
Smith, Yoruba Warfare in the 19th 
Century.
2 F. 0. Qk/'l 11 >5* Townsend to Brand, 
Abeokuta 29.5,60
3 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.108.
4 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p. 108-10 and 
E.D. II, pp.3$rU0. Among the 
captives taken at the sack of this 
town were a number of Christians.
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Basorun of Ibadan. In March 1 863 a Fon army again 
marched into Egba territory, and on the 7th destroyed 
the village of Ibara (Ibala). Although this village 
lay at the foot of the Ato Hill, near Abeokuta itself,
The Fon did not go on to attack the Egba capital. After 
having encamped in the area for some two and a half weeks, 
they simply returned to Abomey. The official reason 
given for this withdrawal was that Gelele had had a dream,
in which he had seen that if he refrained from attack he
2would be assured of victory in the following year. It 
is more likely that the Fon leaders disagreed amongst 
themselves as to the wisdom of whether or not an attack 
should be made.
In 1864, urged on, it seems,by Ibadan^ the Fon 
assembled an army of ten thousand and proceeded to march 
on Abeokuta. It was probably hoped to take the town
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, p.109 and 
E.D.II. p.
2 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX, pp.116-7 and
E.D.II, p.JLj.7.
3 J.F.Ade Afyi & Robert Smith, op.cit., 
pp.114-123^ Ibadan had taken ijayfi* 
but the war between Ibadan and 
Abeokuta had reached stalemate* It 
must have been hoped that a Fon attack 
on the Egba would break this.
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by surprise. The country through which the Fon had to 
pass was, however, heavily populated and when the Dahomans 
attacked at dawn on the 15th March, they found the Egba 
well prepared. The Fon assault was greeted by heavy 
fire from the defenders: very few Fon soldiers were able 
to penetrate the outer defences and those who did were 
soon despatched by the Egba. It soon became clear that 
the assault was a failure. When detachments of Egba 
troops emerged from the shelter of the fortifications 
and proceeded to attack,the Fon army was forced to retreat.
At the refording of the River Oueme, the Fon army 
became disorganised and the retreat became a rout. Rear 
the site of Ibara, about 5 miles from Abeokuta, the Egba 
fell on the army while it was attempting to regroup.
Again the Fon fled in panic; this time they were forced 
to abandon much of their baggage, including two bronze 
cannons. Hear the site of Isshaga the Egba again inter­
cepted the invading army and this time took a number of 
prisoners. By this time the Fon were suffering greatly 
from hunger and thirst and when the Egba attacked for the 
last time, at nightfall, near JdLba, a still greater number
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of prisoners were taken. During the night the Fon 
recrossed the River Yewa; only then did the Egba give
up the pursuit* Before reaching Dahomey the Fon had 
hoYsrever to beat off an attack by the army of Okeodon.
It seems that the people of this town, under the leader­
ship of the sons of the Chief, Anaba, who was slain by 
the Fon in 18^8, gleefully seized this opportunity of 
taking their revenge on Dahomey.
Reports reaching Lagos, maihly from the Egba, 
indicated that about 3*000 Fon soldiers had been killed 
or captured. This partisan estimate was no doubt greatly 
exaggerated especially since the Egba claimed that their
own losses were only 50 killed and 100 wounded. Even 
accepting the Egba figures, however, Fon losses were not
as great as those of 1852: losses in the crack Amazon
1
regiments were not nearly as high. The importance of 
this great defeat should not therefore be exaggerated.
The Fon lost no further territory; it simply confirmed
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX pp.120-5:
R.Burton, op.cit.,pp.55&-6U.
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the verdict of 1852 that the Fon were quite unable 
to re-establish their legemony in the Egbadoland 
region. G-ezo’s view that Dahomey was simply not 
strong enough to throw back the Egba had proved correct.
Although the Fon had suffered defeat when they 
attacked the Egba capital itself, their participation in
the 'XdayC' war was not totally unrewarding: the various 
pre-l861| campaigns had been successful: their resumption
of a warlike policy had provoked no European intervention.
There was no doubt that the Gelelians could claim some
success. For all that, it would appear that their failure
to destroy Abeokuta caused considerable political upheaval
in Abomey. Rumours reached Lagos in 1861^  that & e l e l e  was 
1
dead# a sure sign that the Fon were engaged in political 
in-fighting. The rumour proved false and the King survived; 
but it does seem very probable that it was at this time 
the Vi-Daho, Hanasou, began to gain a following. By 1870 
he was certainly very prominent in Fon affairs.^ If the
1 R.Burton, op.cit., P.36U
2 See below, p.20JLj.
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G-eleleans failed to satisfy the aspirations of the great 
Chiefs, HanasouTs following was hound to grow.
Gelelefs policies effected, in different ways, those 
Europeans with interests in Dahomey. The French, in 
spite of Gezo’s "blandishments, had never attempted to play 
anything "but a trading role in Dahomey and, unlike the 
leading Afro-Brazilian houses, were never molested. 
Nevertheless, the French did suffer in that their trade 
in the early years of Gelele’s reign, because of the
Dahoman concentration on war and ceremonial customs,
1
declined by two“thirds. There were no English traders 
in Dahomey at this time, but the change in Fon policy 
effected the Wesleyan mission situation at Whydah. The 
missionary found himself continually harrassed in his 
work.2 The indig^nities which he suffered were obviously
1 M.M.C.Gabon IV^ Caillet to C-in-C 17.10.81.
2 Rev. P.Ellingworth, TChristianity and 
Politics in Dahomey’, Journal of African 
History, Vol. IV" 1 96i+, No .'21 The Wesleyan 
missionary at this time, the Rev.P.B. Bernasko, 
found that on the accession of Gelele his work 
was Interrupted in a variety of ways. He was 
not allowed to preach against !Fon barbarities* 
and, later, he was not allowed to preach in the 
open air at all. He was, moreover, repeatedly 
summoned to Abomey to witness various ceremonial 
executions. Bernasko was not, however, himself 
the ideal missionary.
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intended as a direct insult to the British* This, 
together with the increase in Fon militarism and the 
revival of ceremonial sacrifice, however, served to 
confirm the accepted British view of the Fon state* The
English had no idea that a major change had occurred*
A group of French Roman Catholic missionaries, who
arrived in Dahomey in 1861, experienced treatment very
different from that meted out to the Wesleyans* They
were members of a recently founded Lyons group, the
Society of African Missions, who had determined to establish
a mission at Whydah, after hearing reports that they would
be welcomed there by the King of Dahomey* Although they
arrived after the death of G-ezo they were, indeed, welcomed
by his successor. This may have been due to the Fon fear
of English intervention when they made their long-postponed
attack on Abeokuta. The welcome accorded the Catholic
mission may also have been designed to encourage the
development of French trade and, above ill, the development
of the recent French interest in the supply of indentured 
1
labour. Certainly considerable efforts were made to avoid
1 The French attempt to buy indentured labour 
must still have been in their minds.
See above, p.
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giving offence to the Catholic missionaries. They were
even allowed to take up residence in the former Portuguese
1
fort at Whydah. As Pon interests changed, however, so
did their attitude to the Society of African Missions.
After 1862, the Pon outlook on European activity
hegan to undergo some considerable change. This is
illustrated hy the fact that the Wesleyan mission was no
2longer subjected to so much interference. It became 
even more clear when G-elele requested that an English 
Officer be sent to visit him in Abomey. The reason for
this change of attitude seems to have been that the Pon
*
hoped to be able to profit from the deterioration In Anglo- 
Egba relations which followed the English annexation of
•z
Lagos. ^
1 Annals of the Propogation of the Paith.
1865. Abbe Borghero to Rev. A.Planque,
Whydah June 1862: R. Cornevin, op. cit.,
pp. 278-301 • Prom the very start, Borghero 
noted that this goodwill could only be
maintained if no attempt was made to make
the Pon give up the slave trade or abandon
human sacrifice.
2 Rev.P.Ellingworth,’Christianity and Politics
in Dahomeyf, Journal of African History, Vol IV 
196A,No .2.
3 S.O. Biobaku op.cit., pp.67-78:
A.P.Ade Ajayi & Robert Smith, op.cit.,p.116
**
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The Officer Commanding the British Squadron,
Commodore Wilmot, upon learning of the King’s invitation, 
proceeded, himself, to Abomey in December 1862. Wilmot, 
it seems, had long been particularly well-disposed towards
the Pon: he had been in Whydah when Commander Porbes was 
conducting his negotiations with Gezo. Wilmot’s account 
of his reception was so favourable that the Poreign Office 
thought it worth while to allow the Consul at Pernando Po,
1 P.O.84/1031, Cambell to Commodore Adams, 
Lagos 27.3.57: P.O.82+/1175, Freeman to 
Earl Russell, 4.11.62: p. 0.84/1201, Freeman 
to Earl Russel1^ 9.1.63. The Raval officers 
throughout the 1850s and early 1860s were 
more inclined than the Lagos administration 
to take Pon protestations of friendship 
seriously. This was largely because they 
were not so constantly subject to the Egba- 
Anglican missionary view of Yoruba affairs. 
In 1857 Consul Cambell had squashed a 
proposal by a previous Commodore (Commodore 
Evans) to visit Gezo. Freeman did his hest 
to put a stop to Wilmot’s and Bltrton’s 
visit.
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1
Richard Burton, to proceed on the visit to Abomey that 
he had already requested he might make* It was, to say 
the least, ironic that Gelele's first invitation to a 
British officer was accepted, while those of Gezo, after 
1852, had, without fail been rejected* British policy 
was heavily influenced by the men on the spot and was, 
in consequence, anything but consistent.
The Consul was instructed to attempt to induce the 
Pon to admit and protect British trade— something which
the Pon had of course never refused to do* He was also
\
to advise them to abandon the various practices which the 
Europeans found offensive. Hore concretely, he was told 
to investigate the fate of the Christians captured by the 
Pon at Isshaga: if they were alive he was to attempt to
1 P.0.84/ Burton to Rftssell. Bonny River, 
23*5*1864* Richard Burton’s account of 
his visit i s c o n t a i n e d  in his often cited 
book, A Mission to Gelele. King of Dahomey*
The documents relative to the despatch of 
Burton’s embassy are contained in the Pre­
face to the 1864 edition* Appendix III of 
this also contains a copu of Commodore Wilmot’s 
report•
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procure their release. Perhaps most important of all,
Burton was to investigate the possibility of again
2
placing an English offical at Whydah.
Burton then proceeded to Abomey, where he remained 
from 23rd December 1863 to the 18th February 1 86U* 
Although he was inconvenienced by being kept waiting for 
his interview with the King, he was well received by the 
Pon. It was hardly surprising, however, considering the 
policies of the regime, that the Consul was unable to 
report that his mission had met with much success. The 
King absolutely declined to give up either the practice 
of human sacrifice or the slave trade: Burton was unable 
to discover the fate of the Christians. The King stated 
that a British official would only be allowed in Whydah
if he prevented the Squadron from seizing slave ships. 
The era in which the Pon had been prepared to compromise 
was over: C-elele had only wanted to find out if England
1 They were released in 1867, when Thomas 
Tickel visited Abomey.
2 Russel to Burton, P.0.20.8.63, and 
23.7*63— in R.Burton, 186/4. edition Preface, 
Vol. I: P. 0.8I4/1221, Burton to Earl Russel, 
Bonny River 23.3. 61}..
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had changed her policies: the King had no intention 
of changing his.
Burton reported that the position of a British
official at Whydah would he insupportable. All that he
could recommend was that an ambassador be sent to Abomey
once every three years to discover if the Pon had come
*
any nearer to changing their views. The 186U embassy 
did not therefore produce any alteration in British
policy towards Dahomey. The English found it impossible
either to influence or coerce the Pon: they therefore
2left them severely alone. This proved easier after the 
mid-l860s than it had earlier, since with the ending of 
the slave trade English interest in Dahomey tended to 
diminish.
The last slave ship appears to have left Dahomey in 
1865* The trade had of course been of an irregular nature
1 P. 0 . 8I|/1221 , R.Burton to Russel,
Bonny River 23.3.6^.
2 A British representative was sent 
to Abomey in 1867* His mission was 
however set in motion by the Lagos 
administration. The British 
government did not approve. See below,
P*
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for some time. Nevertheless, Gelelefs followers had 
intended again to make it the cornerstone of Pon economic
life. This was clearly indicated hy the fact that in the
early years of G-elele's reign palm oil production was
allowed to fall hy two-thirds. The economic fate of
Dahomey did not however lie in the hands of either the
new King or his fanatical followers. The outbreak of the
American Civil War, and the consequent vigorous action of
the Union Government in combating slave trading, soon
made it possible to end the export of slaves from West 
2
Africa. After 1865, the Pon had no choice but to 
concentrate on the production of palm oil*
1 M.M.C. Gabon IVVb Captain Caillet to 
C-in-C, 17.10.6fr
2 Por the ending of the slave trade from 
West Africa in general and from Dahomey 
in particular see-
C.Lloyd, op. cit*, pp.163-183:
D.Ross, TThe Career of Domingo Martinez
on the Bight of Benin1, Journal of African 
History. Vol VI, 1965, NoTL 
M.Beraud, fNote sur le Dahomey1, Whydah 
26.3*66, Bulletin de la Societe Geographic, 
November 1866.
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During the early years of Gelele!s reign the decline
in the export of palm oil from Whydah must have encouraged
/
the agents of Regis to look out for new trading opportunities. 
Porto Novo in many ways provided an ideal field for the 
firm's expansion. As the result of that town1 s position 
on the Lagoon near the mouth of the River Oueme, Porto Novo 
was hy the early 1860s a more important palm oil exporting 
port than Whydah. The trade of Porto Novo was dominated
hy Sierra Leoneans and hy Regis' Whydah rivals, the Afro- 
Brasilians. The French traders in the early 1860s 
determined to set about obtaining a share in the profits 
of the Porto Novo trade.
1 F. 0. 81+/1061 . Gambell to Clarendon, 
Lagos 2.2.53; m .M.C. Gabon IV^
Lt. Gelle to Marine, 1862: M.Beraud, 
'Note sur le Dahomey,Whydah 26.3•62* 
Bulletin de la Societe Geographic.
November 1866. In both 1858 and 
1862 it was estimated that Porto 
Novo exported between 4*000 and 5*000 
tons of palm oil. in the mid 18o 0 s 
it was estimated that Dahomey produced
6,000 to 7*000 tons of palm oil*
Whydah exported 2,300 tons of palm 
oil.
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Regis' decision to break into the Porto Novo 
market made straight-forward economic sense. There 
were, hov/ever, a considerable number of political 
complications. The first of these was that in the 
early 1860s it looked as if Porto Novo would soon 
become part of Britain's Lagos protectorate. This 
would have meant that merchants trading in Porto Novo 
would have to pay the high Lagos tariff. Not surprisingly, 
Regis was determined to avoid doing this. As far as
Regis was concerned the one sure way to prevent England 
seizing Porto Novo was to induce his own government to 
establish a protectorate there. The ruler of Porto Novo, 
King Sodgi, feared the English so much that he willingly 
co-operated. The trader’s manoeuvre was entirely
successful and in February 1863 & French protectorate 
was declared over Porto Novo. Marius Daumas, Regis'5 
principal agent at Whydah, had already been appointed 
French Vice-Consul in Whydah.
1 J.D.Hargreaves, pp.cit., pp.110-1k
C.W.Newbury, op.cit., pp.67-8
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The establishment of the protectorate, although 
it effectively kept the English at bay, did not entirely 
solve Regis's problems. Porto Novo was not itself 
situated on the Coast, but on the Lagoon* As a result, 
it was only possible to bring goods to and from Porto 
Novo by way of the Porto Novo beach, or by way of the
Lagoon from Lagos. The French did not of course wish 
to trade through Lagos and therefore needed free access 
to Porto Novo beach. This beach was, unfortunately for 
the traders, part of Dahomey, not part of Porto Novo. 
Marius Daumas 'understood this, but he had gone ahead 
with his plans to open a trading post in Porto Novo 
because the powerful Chaundadaton of Whydah had promised 
that it would be a simple matter to obtain permission 
from the Fon to trade there. For many years, however, 
Domingo Martinez had exercised a monopoly of the trade 
of the beach, where he had two important trading posts—  
one directly opposite Porto Novo and one at Cotonou, the
point at which the Lagoon most nearly joined the sea.
1 See above, Chpp. II p. 63
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Daumas found it far more difficult than, he had
M'
expected to break the Martinez monopoly. The rights
of the Brazilian were defended in Abomey by the Bokonou,
who seems to have had financial links with Martinez.
The Chaui^ci^daton himself appears to have been engaged
in a struggle to exclude the Bokonou from power on this
2
part of the Coast. The whole matter therefore became 
part of one of the factional struggles which characterised 
Dahoman politics during the reign of Gelele. It delayed 
Fon reactions to French moves for almost a year. The 
Chaundadaton, however, eventually won the day. The Fon 
proved willing to accept the French protectorate of 
Porto Novo, a term which they never really seem to have 
understood, largely because they felt that a French 
presence there would curb any British advance westwards 
along the Coast. They also proved themselves willing
1 The Bokonou was the Chief Priest of 
Fa and politically a very important 
individual. See Chap. VI p. 463.
2 M.M.C. Gabon IV B. Brossard de Corbigny 
to Laffon de Laaebat, Cotonou 12,6.64: 
M.M.C* Gabon^ M.Daumas to Baffin de 
Ladebat, Whydah 3*7*64.
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to allow the French to trade on the Porto Novo beach.
In the meantime, French activities had led to the 
development of a number of new difficulties. The first 
of these was that the officers involved in the new 
protectorate unjustifiably assumed that the French 
protectorate over Porto Novo included a French protec­
torate over Porto Novo beach. The French traders did 
not correct this mistake-— -presumably because they hoped 
the Fon would simply acquiesce in the loss of territory. 
The Fon, however, did not acquiesce: they were determined 
that their territorial rights should be recognised and 
that the French traders should pay rent for the beach, 
as Martinez had done.
Dahoman distrust of French moves was greatly 
increased by the fact that one of the Afro-Brazilians 
closely associated with Daumas, a trader named Carvalho, 
boasted that once the French were in control they would
1 R.Burton. op.cit., p.64:
D.Ross, The Career of Domingo 
Martinez on the Bight of Benin1, 
Journal of African History. Vol VI 
19^5 No.t. Martinez was said to 
have died in a fit of temper'when 
he heard the news.'
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open a channel through the narrowest part of the beach 
*1
at Cotonou. The Lagoon would then he joined to the 
2
sea. This idea was anathema to the Fon, since they 
feared that once European boats could enter the Lagoon 
at this point they would be likely to try to pass 
through Lake Hokue and up the River Oueme to Daba, the 
river port of the Abomey plateau. This would leave the
hinterland of Dahomey wide open to European penetration,
3
an eventuality the Fon had long taken pains to avoid.
1 M.M.C.Gabon IV Daumas to Laffin de 
Ladebat, Whydah U.9.6U.
2 It was an oft-repeated tradition that the 
Lagoon had been joined to the sea at this 
point before Gezo1s reign. It was said 
that Gezo, in order to destroy Porto Kovan
trade, had had it blocked up. It was 
certainly the case that French merchants 
did contemplate the scheme for opening the 
Lagoon to the sea at Cotonou. They in fact 
constructed a channel in 1885 See Chap IV pp.269 
p-2505. The opening of the Isthmus would have 
exposed a number of Fon coastal towns to 
bombardment from the sea.
3 The only other entrance was at Lagos. The 
Fon could not prevent the Europeans from 
entering the Lagoon* However, Lagos was 
far from the River Oueme and it was more 
likely that the Europeans would be tempted 
to venture up the tiver from Cotonou which 
was so much closer. That Fon fears were not 
groundless is shown by the fact that it was 
this route the French took when they Invaded 
Dahomey.
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The Fon, therefore, although prepared to welcome the
French to Porto Novo, and willing to allow the French
traders to use Porto Novo heach, were at the same time
determined not to yield up sovereignty over that beach.
On May 26th 1 861j. the pon began to take measures to ensure
that their will would prevail at Cotonou. The first
move was against Carvalho who had 53 barrels of rum
seized by the Fon when he was unloading them. This was
probably intended as a warning to the French whom the
Fon did not want to antagonise directly. Fon troops
were later stationed on the beach and Fon customs officials
were sent down to collect duty on all goods exported from 
1
the beach. French attempts to secure acknowledgement of 
their supposed landing rights at Cotonou were disregarded.
A French officer, Captain Desvaux, was sent to Abomey in 
October 1 Q6k but although well received, was quite unable 
to persuade the Fon to give up their claim to sovereignty 
over the entire beach.
1 M.M.C. Gabon IV Lt. De La Marche to 
Laffon de Ladebat, TSurpriseT (at sea)
7-9• 6I4.; M.M.C. Gabon IV3P Ed* Lefort to 
Laffdtn de Ladebat, Porto Novo 19.7.6U:
M.M.C. Gabon IV-z-k Daumas to Laffon de 
Ladebat, Whydah 4.9.61u
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On the 10th November the Chandadaton did 
announce some minor concessions. These were that 
Fon troops would he withdrawn from the beach and that 
30 barrels of Cavalho's rum would be handed back:
French claims to sovereignty were not, however, conceded* 
In the end the Fon won hands down. The French withdrew
their protectorate over Porto Novo despite anguished 
* 2pleas from Regis. They did so because of the 
impossibility of enforcing their views and because of 
trouble in Porto Novo after the death of King Sodji.
Re^ gis had no choice but to accept trade on Fon terms 
at Porto Novo and Cotonou. That this was not so very
1 M.A.E.Afrique 33 Laffon de Ladebat to 
Marine, Gabon 1*11*61*.: M.A.E.Afrique 53 
Laffon de Ladebat to Marine, Gabon 21.11.61*..
2 For an excellent detailed account of 
the European manoeuvres connected 
with the French protectorate of Porto 
Novo, see J.D. Hargreaves, Prelude to 
the Partition of West Africa, pp.110-18j 
see also C.W.Newbury, op.cit.* pp.67-72.
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difficult is proved by the fact that he was soon
•i
joined by two other French firms.
At Cotonou the Fon set up a customs system similar 
to that already in existence at Whydah. The French firm 
at Cotonou paid "both an annual rent and customs dues to 
the King of Dahomey. The French traders, however, still 
harboured hopes of freeing themselves from the exactions 
of the Fon t and in 1868 the Regis agent, M.Bonnaud, who
was also French Vice-Consul, produced a treaty supposed
<01
to have heen signed by the Yeovogtm of Whydah on behalf 
of the King of Dahomey. In this it was stated that 
Dahomey confirmed the cession to France of 6 kilometres 
of territory at Cotonou. It was claimed that this 
cession had already been made verbally to Desvaux. There 
can be little doubt that this document was fraudulent.
1 B.Schnapper, .op.cit. , p./73
The new trading firms were started 
by men who had previously worked 
with, or were related to, Regis. 
The first, Lasnier, Daumas & Co., 
started operating at Cotonou in
1866. The second, Cyprien Fabre, 
arrived in 1868. There was for a 
time intense jealousj^  and rivalry 
between Regis and the newcomers.
w i 90 *•
The French government did not act upon it* and at the
1
time it was of no Importance whatsoever© nevertheless* 
it later became the foundation of the French claim to 
Cotonou*
The withdrawal of the French protectorate over
Porto Hovo ended* for fourteen years* official French
interest in the Dahomey region# The British remained
in Lagos hut* after 1865* the government at home frowned
upon further expansion# nevertheless* the English did
develop in the 1860s a new policy towards the people of
the interior* Under Lt#Governor Glover* the Lagos
administration no longer regarded the Sgba as the centre
of civilisations attention was now focussed on maintaining
good relations with all the states in the area* on
2fostering trade and with preventing wars#
1 The treaty is reprinted in E*D#IX 
pp *26-8 2 U*A*E *Afrique k? BohnaiFd 
to M * A. # E # 22 * 5* 681 Ha r g re a ve e *
op* cit * * p #120 s C * W#Hewbury* o p * cit * * 
Pt¥9T~
2 BeIntyre* !Captain Glover’*
Journal of African History01963s 
A * A <» Ado rib i g’be * The Estpanslon of 
the Lagos ProtectorateT"Ph#D#
London 1959® p 1 ~ G G
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The Fon, noting the continuous deterioration in
Anglo-Egba relations, "began to hope again that the 
English might change their policy and co-operate with
Dahomey in an anti-Egha alliance. Even anti-Egha 
Lt.Governor Glover would not, however, accept Dahoman 
assistance against Abeokuta: the idea of Egha superiority 
over Eon "barbarism was far too deeply entrenched for that. 
Nevertheless, in ofder to expand Lagos influence, he did 
work to enter into closer relations with the Fon. In 
April 1867, therefore, Glover sent the District Commis­
sioner of Badagry, Thomas Tickel, to Abomey ostensibly 
on a mission of friendship to Gelele. The real reason
was to sound o\it the King on the possibility of estab-
2
l i s h m g  an English customs post at Cotonou* The Fon 
would not agree to this. They proposed that the English
1 F.0.84/1250, Glover to Earl Russel, 
Lagos 6.10.65, enclosing King of 
Dahomey to Glover, Canna 5.8.65:
C.0.147/11, Glover to Carwell, Lagos 
6.1.66, enclosing King of Dahomey to 
Lt. Governor of Lagos, received in 
Lagos 27.12.65.
2 C.0.147/14? Glover to Thomas Tickel, 
Lagos 28.12.66, enclosed in Glover 
to Colonel Blackball, Lagos 4.2.68.
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purchase the captives taken in war that year. They 
also reiterated their proposal for an alliance, with
A
the English, against the Egba. There therefore proved
p
to he no grounds for co-operation. Glover1s initiative 
did not receive the approval of the Governor-in-Chief
of the British West Africa Settlements; and the mission
3was never repeated.
After the Lagos-Egha hreak in 1865* the Eon did, for 
a time at least, cease to fear English hostility. As a 
result, they had no further use for the French missionaries 
and gave their dislike of non-trading Europeans full rein. 
In 1865 the Governor of St.Thome sent a garrison to Whydah 
to re-occupy the Portuguese j?ort there. The Fon, probably
1 C.0.1117/14* Glover to Colonel Biackhall, 
Lagos U.2.68, enclosing T.Tickel to 
Glover, Badagry 22.8.67.
2 C.0.1U7/1U, Glover to Colonel Biackhall,
Lagos A.2.68, enclosing T.Tickel to 
Glover, Badagry 22.8.67. To show his 
goodwill the King released/fche Christians 
captured at Isshaga. Since he had stated 
that some of them were dead when Burton 
tried to obtain their release, it can be 
seen that the Fon were seriously regarding 
Lagos as a potential ally.
3 C.0.1 47/1 k Governor-in-Chief to Duke of 
Chandos and Beckingham 12.2.68.
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hoping that the return of the Portuguese garrison heralded 
a revival of the slave trade, agreed to the emulsion
•i
of the missionaries from the former Portuguese fort.
The Catholic Fathers were then subjected to progressively 
greater interference. The end came in 1871 when a child 
died as the result of punishment dealt hy an over-zealous 
missionary: the Fon used this incident as a means of 
making it impossible for the Fathers to continue in 
Whydah. They first of all attempted to carry the offending
missionary off to Abomey for punishment. They only gave
up this idea on the payment of a substantial fine by the
Whydah Catholics. For fear of what might happen next,
the missionaries then withdrew from Whydah and established
2their headquarters at Porto Novo.
1 S.M.A. Old Vicariate 1865, Be la Mark 
to Courdioux, Surprise1 11+.2. 65: 
Beraud to Father Superior. Whydah 
11+.2.65: Governor of St.Thome to 
French Consul, Whydah 11.3*65. 
Eventually the French government 
persuaded the Portuguese to pay
the missionaries compensation for 
the repairs they had carried out 
on the fort.
2 S.M.A. Dahomey, Vicariate du Benin 
1871-3: Courdioux to Planque,
Porto Novo 8.9*71*
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During the first part of Gelelefs reign the Fon 
had gone their own way and defied the Europeans to do 
anything about it. They revived the practice of human 
sacrifice and they continued to raid for slaves. The 
export of slaves from Dahomey ceased, but not because 
of any pressure brought to bear on Dahomey itself: both 
French and English missionaries had been abused with 
impunity. French and English attempts to take over 
Cotonou had moreover been repulsed with ease. The Fon 
could not know that their success had been brought about 
by the fact that the Europeans were not sufficiently 
interested in Dahomey to take measures to enforce their 
wishes. G-elele's view that the Fon should not in any way 
give in to pressure, but should rely upon their armed
strength to carry out their aims seemed therefore to be 
justified. In the success of the Dahoman policy towards 
the Europeans during this period lies the reason for Fon 
resistance to European encroachment two decades later.
Perhaps the most important developments in the course 
of nineteenth century Fon history were taking place in the 
decade following 1865. These key changes concerned
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European activity on the Coast and the development of 
a semi-Europeanised society there: they arose partly 
out of economic circumstances and partly out of G-elelean 
anti-European fanaticism. The very success of the 
regime’s policy towards the Europeans contained the seeds
of future Dahoman humiliation. A number of immensely
important consequences emerged for example from the
regime’s hostility towards the Catholic mission. The
missionaries, in this era, closed their school at Vftiydah
and devoted their energies to Porto Novo: from then
onwards the missionaries remained constantly hostile to
Dahomey. They tended to identify their interests with
those of the state in which they operated. The Eon, who
had made their work impossible, they branded as barbarous
reactionaries. The Fathers, who influenced opinion both
locally, amongst the Europeans, and in Europe itself,
consistently presented the Eon as the villians in all
1Coastal political disputes. In a curious way, their
1 There was one exception. A missionary 
named Dorgere who worked at Whydah in 
the late 1880s and early 1890s presented 
the Fon version of events.
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attitude to Dahomey exactly duplicated that of the 
Church Mission Society missionaries during the 18i+0s 
and 1850s.
Missionary hostility towards Dahomey was of course 
very important in the development of future French 
attitudes to Coastal expansion. The anti-Fon bias of 
the Catholic Fathers was however as important in the 
field of local education as it was in forming European 
..views. It was they who educated the first Francophile 
generation on the Coast; this group of semi-Europeanised 
Africans inherited, and indeed exaggerated the missionary 
dislike of the Fon. To this mission-educated elite all 
things French were superior; Dahomey stood for everything 
opposed to their cult of French civilisation.
By the mid-l870s this group was beginning to become
immensely important: it was they who, from the start, 
acted as intermediaries between the French and the African. 
It was they Y/ho provided the French with interpreters, 
with clerks and, later, with lower-grade colonial officials. 
It was through them that the French acquired their know­
ledge of local affairs. Two men educated by the mission
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schools in this decade are especially worth mention.
One was named Xavier Beraud, the Euro-African son of 
Regis's chief agent at Whydah in 1865: the other was
his contemporary, and close friend, Bernardin Durand.
Both started life in Whydah, hut hoth came to centre 
their activities in Porto Novo. Durand became inter­
preter to the French Residency in Porto Novo— - a function 
he succeeded in doubling with that of procurer for the
Residency brothel. Beraud became Chief of Police in 
2
Porto Novo. They eventually became key men in the 
passing of information to the French administration of the 
late 1870s and early 1880s: both were influential at the
Court of Porto Novo: both were thoroughly Francophile 
and both hated the Fon kingdom.
It was not the missionaries alone, however, who 
were creating a new balance in the Europeanised society 
of the Bight. New developments in French trade also 
played a very important part. Whydah's palm oil trade 
did increase after the ending of the slave trade, but
1 E.Dunglas, E.D.XXI, p. 16
2 S.H.A, Dahoman Prefecture 1889-91:
Pied to Planque, Porto Novo 25.10.91*
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not as greatly as did that of Porto Novo and its transit
1
port, Cotonou. Porto Novo, in fact, by the mid-1870s 
had become the focal point of European activity between 
the Cold Coast and Lagos, The development of French
trade had a considerable effect upon Porto Novo society.
The former pupils of the mission school found their means
of livelihood in the French firms. The expansion of
trade tended to link many of the smaller African traders
with the French exporters. This was particularly true
of one of the most enterprising elements in coastal
2society, the Moslems. These small traders began to feel
1 F.0.84/1061 Cambell to Clarendon,
Lagos 2.2.58: M.M.C. Gabon IVjb 
Lt. Gelle to Marine 1862: M.Beraud 
Bote sur le Dahomey, Whydah 26.3.66: 
Bulletin de le Societe Geographic,
November 1866: M.A.E Afrique 77, 
D!Blteil to M.A.E., Whydah (received 
in Paris 26.12.80). Whydah exports
of palm oil rose from between 2,300- 
2,700 tons in an average year between 
1852 and 1862, to 3? 500 tons in the 
late 1870s. Porto Novo, in the former 
period, exported 4*000 tons. Exports 
via Cotonou alone, in the later period, 
amounted to 6,700 tons. In the late 
1870s Whydah exported 4*300 tons of 
kernels. Cotonou exported 6,400 tons.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Ig Ehermann to Ballay, 
Porto Novo 7.8.91.
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their own prosperity so linked to that of the French 
firms that they became strong advocates of the expan­
sion of French influence*
A new type of society was in fact, in Porto Rovo, 
in the process of formation— a society which was tied 
economically and sentimentally to France* Until the 
186Qs the only Europeanised group on the Coast had been 
the Portugese orientated, Afro-Brazilians, who had 
their centre at Whydah and whose acknowledged spokesman 
was the Ghacha* This group, although it enjoyed a brief 
come-back in the early 1880s, had become progressively 
less vigorous during the 1850s and '60s, partly as a 
result of Fon activities. In the 1850s the leading Afro-
Brazilian houses kept up an intensive commercial rivalry
1
with the French firm of Regis* Later, however, the 
Afro-Brazilians found themselves unable to withstand 
French pressure; the destruction of the Martines trading 
monopoly was perhaps the most fcotable event in the
1 A.Vallon, fLe Royaume Le Lahomey1, Revue 
Maritime et Coloniale, Iom*2* 1861, p*559*
- 200 -
whittling away of their commercial advantages. Many 
gradually attached themselves to the French interest:
Many of them, because the only educational facilities 
available to them were French, became culturally 
orientated towards France. This process was particularly 
marked in Porto Novo: Whydah remained a bastion of 
Portuguese influence.
The formation of this new economic grouping tended 
to produce some strange results. In spite of the 
influence of the Catholic Fathers, some branches of the 
old Afro-Brazil!an families gave up Catholicism and 
became Muslims-'— basically, it appears, to further their
commercial links with the interior. Commercially, and 
politically, this religious shift tended to cut the 
converts off from their Afro-Brazilian catholic relations 
and place them in the pro-French camp. There was even 
a Moslem branch of the Be Souza family residing in Porto 
Novo. An interesting example of the complicated personal 
histories of this group is provided by the career of 
Ignatio Paraiso, the man who became the leader of the 
Porto Novan Moslems in the period of the French conquest
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of Dahomey. This man claimed to he the deseendent 
of a Moslem Prince who had been sold into slavery but 
had later returned to the Coast. In fact, he appears 
to have been the son of one Barbiero Paraiso, who had 
come originally to Porto Novo as Domingo Martinez* 
barber. Ignatio eventually rose to being leader of
the pro-French Moslem group simply as a result, it
appears, of commercial success#
During the mid-years of Gelelers reign there was
then in the process of formation on the Coast, especially
in Porto Novo, a new part-literate, French orientated,
2
commercial society. The *new* men tended to be violently 
pro-French: indeed, they were far more committed to 
encouraging French expansion in the area than were the
1 Patou-Martt9 Etude sur Islam au Dahomev. 
PP.U8-56 and 56-96.------------------
2 J.Ballard, *The Porto Novo Incidents of 
1923: Politics in the Colonial Era1, Odu 
No.1, Vol.II, July 1965* Ballard*s 
article throws an interesting light on the 
later development of this society.
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1
French traders. They felt of course the need of 
European protection against local exploitation fop 
more than the powerful European firms.
During this pej£od of rapid assertion of Dahoman 
independence, developments in coastal society were, 
then, very unfavourable to the long-term interests of 
the Fon. Indeed, G-elelean policies had very few real 
successes to chalk up. The ending of the slave trade 
and the 1861+ defeat before Abeokuta destroyed the real 
basis of the Gelelean position. Of course the fiction 
that these reverses were merely temporary continued to 
be kept up. Indeed, it was maintained for fifteen years 
after 1861+ that the Fon were preparing to crush Abeokuta. 
The Dahoman army, however, only twice during these years 
advanced into Egba territory. In March 1873 they camped
for three days on the Ato hill overlooking Abeokuta, but 
then withdrew without engaging the enemy* They again 
advanced towards Abeokuta in 1873? this time destroying
1 E.Chaudin, Trois Mois de Captivite 
au Dahomey. Even as late as 1889 
few of the traders expected France 
to take over Dahomey. Chau din fs work 
shows this quite clearly.
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two .Egba Tillages: once more they encamped on the Ato
, hill but this time were driven back by the Egba under 
the leadership of a Christian, John Okenla, the Balaginnv 
The Egba forces were, at this time overwhelmingly superior 
since they were armed with automatic rifles while the 
Eon had only the old flint lock type of gun*
Even after Gelele had been King for a decade, 
a. It hough it must have been fairly obvious-that the aims 
which he sought to achieve were quite unattainable, no 
.new departures in Fon policy were initiated* This lack 
of drive and initiative seems to have been due to 
weakness and division in the Fon political leadership.
\  ‘ ‘ ‘ ^  V: \  ~ 1 . " , }
Dahoman, de c isionOmaking, after the collapse of Gezo1 s 
power, was clogged by the rivalry between the various 
factions at Court* The rivalry between the Chaundadaton 
and the Bokonou for influence on the Coast was only one 
example of this * Gelele may have had some intention of giv 
ing his Chiefs their heads during the first years of his
1 E*Dunglas, E*D*XX* p*126.
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reign and then gradually "bringing them under control# If 
this was his ambition* he was certainly quite unable to 
fulfil it#
By 1870, when the English botanist, A#J&Skertehly, 
visited Abomey, Dahoman politics again centred around
1
both the Yi-Dah$, a prince named Hanasou, and the King# 
Ihis clearly indicates that Grelele*s very throne was
seriously challenged by a very powerful group in the
\
Dahoman ruling class* Since Hanasou and a number of
his brothers were later killed by the 'reactionary 
2
party* it would seem that, over and above family and 
dynastic ambitions, the Vi-Daho*s faction stood for 
a change in policy* Very likely they recognised that 
the Geleleans fanatical hostility to Abeokuta was 
harmful to Dahomey: they probably also had greater hopes
of friendship with England. 2his could well explain why
1 A#J*Skertchly, Dahomey As It Is#
Ihis appears; clearly from Skertehly1 s 
account of his visit#
2 See below, pp#213-216*
Skertehly was so well treated in Abomey and why he 
formed such a high opinion of Hanasou* The indications 
are that in 1870 power was shared fairly evenly between 
the two groups: neither could gain the upper hand*
This is probably why the Eon army made two purposeless 
advances and retreats into Egba territory in the early 
1870s*
If the King had intended to attempt, eventually, to 
bring the Chiefs under his control/the circumstances - 
of his .elevation to the throne were very much against 
him: he was also, it appears, severely handicapped by the
early onset of ill-health. From almost the beginning of 
his reign G-elele appears to have suffered from a disease 
of the eyes;. As early as 1864 this eye trouble was
named as opthalmia and was said to be threatening to
■ • .V .%■■■' 3 ■
degenerate into total blindness. Skertehly, in 1870,
1 A •J.Skertchly, op.cit♦, pp.150-9
2 R.Burton, op.cit*,p*143«
' 3. M'.M*G*. Oabon-Oongo IV, Extract from . •- 
the 0ourrier•du Elavey 15.10.65• This 
: information in turn came from la Patrie 
which published news of: West African 
: affMrs reported by way of Qoree .
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confirmed that the Kingfs eyes were half concealed 
by cataract. That Skertchley met and talked to a man 
with weak eyes also confirms that at this point G-elele 
was at least partly able to fulfil his monarchial 
duties. Soon after this date, however, his condition 
must have deteriorated: certainly by 1875 he had.ceased 
to play any active political role.
During these years of feeble and divided leadership 
the Eon military effort was directed mainly against the 
minor states on the borders of Dahomey. Even against 
these petty political units the Eon were hardly successful. 
The chief sufferers in the Dahoman attempts to master 
their smaller neighbours were, not surprisingly, Atakpame, 
G-rand Popo, Porto Novo and Ketu.
Another ih the series of Eon raids on Atakpame took
place in 1877: as before, the Atakpams, although defeated
2were able to preserve their independence. Grand Popo also 
suffered from Eon determination to impose their hegemony 
over the small states to the West. The Eon attacked in
1 A.J.Skertchley, op.cit., p.U+1
2 J.E.Bouche, Bulletin de la Societe
de Geographic, 1875: TLetters to his Brother*.
P.Cornevin, Histoire du Togo, p.111
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1869» occupied the site of the town, hut found the
inhabitants had taken refuge across the lagoon, beyond
the reach of the Fon armies. Another attack was launched
in 1870 but by this time the Fon do not seem to have got
1
even as far as destroying the deserted town. The war
was then ended by the inhabitants of Grand Popo agreeing
2
to pay some sort of irregular tribute to Dahomey. Grand 
Popo could therefore be claimed to have been brought 
under Fon suzerainty. It was never possible, however, 
to exert this authority regularly.
, As far as the Fon were concerned, no change occurred 
in their relationship with Porto Novo although, of course, 
developments in French trade were quickly altering the 
composition of society there. The reign of King Mekpon 
(1864 to 1872), successor to Sodji, was one of extreme 
confusion— confusion made worse by abortive efforts on 
the part of the British to bring Porto Novo within the
1 S.M.A.Dahomey, Old Vicariate, 1869, 
Thallier to Planque, Whydah 28.11.69: 
Segner to Planque, Whydah 28.11*69: 
S.M.A. Dahomey, Old Vocariate, 1870, 
Gourdioux to Planque, Lagos 30.1.70.
2 F.0.84/1465 Strahon to Carnarvon,
Gape Ooast 22.11.75. Ihe tribute 
was paid in salt.
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the orbit of the Lagos protectorate.*^ Mekpon1 s power
within Porto Novo itself was challenged by a number of
important Chiefs, while his authority never seems to
have extended much beyond the actual boundaries of the
town. The King who followed Mekpon, King Messi, was a
drunkard who had even less success in establishing his
authority. The hinterland of the state, during his reign,
was largely controlled by the sons of Mekpon who had
enlisted the aid of the Egba. Messi was only just able,
probably with Fon aid, to prevent the rival dynasty from
2gaming control of Porto Novo itself.
After Messi died of drink in September 1872, the
son of Sodji, Prince Las si, came to the throne and he 
st ronsctook theyname of Toff a. His chief rivals were the Mekpon 
family who, with the aid of the Egba, still held large 
tracts of the interior of the state. Although Toffa had 
intrigued v/ith the British during the reigns of his
1 J.D.Hargreaves, op.cit., pp.118-20: 
C.Newbury, op.cit.,pp.71-76.
2 E.Lunglas, E.D.XX. p.128:
N.Baudin, !La Guerre Civile a 
Porto NovoT, Missions Catholiques, 
Nos. 297-8, 12.2.75 and 17.2.
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immediate predecessors, he gained the throne as a
■i
result of the support of the French merchants. He
was also committed to the Fon in that he had to rely
upon their support for protection against his rivals.
Perhaps in order to symbolise his solidarity with the
Abomey regime, Toffa began his reign with a very elaborate
traditional celebration of his three predecessor’s
2funeral rites.
From the beginning of his reign, Toffa1s power 
rested on the twin pillars of Fon and French support. 
Because of the growing influence of the French in Porto 
Novo, the King was surrounded by the new French orientated 
merchant-cl eric group who were violently anti-Fon in 
sentiment. In the early years of his reign, Toffa’s 
dependance on the Fon for the defence of his Kingdom 
meant that ultimate Dahoman control was easily maintained.
1 J.D.Hargreaves, op.cit., p.209:
A.Alcindele et C.Aguessy, Contribution 
a 1’Etude de l’Histoire de L ’Ancien 
Royaume ~de Porto Novo. p.77-86.
2 Annals of the Propogation of the Faith, 
1878, Vol.37, J.Poirier to Planque, 
Porto Novo 19*12.75 and Baudin to 
Planque, Porto Novo l6.ij-.75.
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The influence of the growing small trader group was, 
however, against the maintenance of this link with 
Dahomey. If France became willing to protect Toffa1s 
throne he might not prove such a willing vassal of 
Dahomey. The manner in which this able and ambitious 
monarch manipulated the political forces at work in 
his Kingdom in fact provided the key to the later 
development of French relations with the Fon.
To the East of Dahomey, the politics of the Kingdom 
of Ketu were also in a state of flux. The second Fon 
defeat at the hands of the Egba had re-info reed the 
Ketuans ambition to act independently of Dahomey. Fear 
of its powerful neighbour, however, continued to create
'i
strife in Ketuan society. As a result, Ketu did not
1 G-.Parrinder, op. cit., pp.l+7-8. In 1 867 
conflict broke out between the two 
societies which dominated Ketu life.
One of these, the Egbe Mayhon, was made 
up of farmers and war chiefs who favoured 
solidarity with the Yoruba. The other, 
the Egbe Afujere, which had the support 
of the traders, including the rich Moslems, 
favoured peace and trade with Dahomey.
The strife between these two societies 
led to the flight of the Aleldfctu Adiro 
to Meko.
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follow a steady foreign policy. Ketu co-operated with 
first one Yoruba state and then another and the outcome 
was that she never really forged close links with any 
of them. This was not disastrous for Ketu while Dahomey 
suffered weak, divided leadership: it did not however 
prepare the town for a later determined Fon assault.
The Fon in this period, then, had little success in 
restoring and extending their heggm0ny over even the 
minor states which surrounded them. Only in Porto Novo, 
where their position had never really been challenged, 
were they in ultimate control. Even there forces were 
building up which were later to challenge Dahoman sovereignty. 
It was only in Grand Popo that the power of the Fon state 
w'as expanded: yet even there the extent of Dahoman control 
remained very dubious.
In spite of this lack of success the first years of 
Gelele’s reign were the first in Dahoman history, since the 
time of Agadja,in which the Fon remained resolutely indepen­
dent of any outside power. No foreigners had any say in
Dahoman affairs. In spite, therefore, of the ending of the 
slave trade, the defeat by the Egba, and the failure to
-  212 -
bring new territories under Fon control, these years
appear to the Fon as one of the most glorious periods
in their history*
By 1875 Gfelele's reign was effectively at an end*
Although he remained King, all accounts stress that he
no longer had any say in the running of the country*
Only one European met a man said to be the King after this
date -—a Frenejt official, Dr* Bayol, who visited Abomey in
1889* Bayol saw this figure only when he arrived in
Abomey: all the official business of his embassy was
1
conducted through the Vi-Daho and the great Chiefs* It
is more likely that Bayol met one of the King's 'twins'
. . 2
who took the place of the monarch on ceremonial occasions* 
What in fact seems to have happened was that Gfelele, 
although he lived to a ripe old age, went blind at some 
point between 1870 (when Skertchley remarked that cataracts 
half-concealed his eyes) and 1875> when he ceased to be 
politically active*
1 See Chap*V pp*517-318*
2 See Chap*VI p*434.
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A power struggle had long been going on in Abomey 
between the supporters of the King and those of the 
Vi-Daho. On the King becoming totally incapacitated 
it appears that Hanasou temporarily, at least, became 
the man who dominated Fon politics. This became 
apparent in May 1876 when a very high-handed move by 
the British was treated much more respectfully than it 
could possibly have been if the Geleleans had been in 
full control.
Early in 1876, the Yeovogun of Whydah, after a
trade dispute with a Mr.Turnbull, the agent of the House 
of Swanzy, which had recently begun to trade at Whydah, 
confined the merchant, without his trousers, for two 
hours in a midden. On February 26th Commodore Sir William 
Hewett demanded that the Dahomans paid a,fine of 500 
panchions of rum (worth about £6,000). He threatened 
that if this was not paid in full by 1st June the coast 
of Dahomey would be blockaded. The British government, 
although they disliked Hewettfs aetionjand felt it had 
been taken simply to punish the Fon for their barbaric
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1
practices, felt "bound to "back the Commodore* The
immediate reaction of the Fon officials at Whydah, with,
it would seem, the sanction of the authorities then
dominant in A^ orney, was to gather the oil with which
2
to pay the fine. This was at the "beginning of May.
In late May the Fon attitude towards paying the fine 
underwent an abrupt change;^ the fine was not to be 
paid.
It seems probable that the soft line had been 
initiated by Hanasou and his supporters. A policy of 
giving way before European threats could not have had
1 For detailed accounts of the blockade 
and the events leading up to it, see: 
J.D.Hargreaves, op.cit., p.201-7: 
C.Coquery, TLe Blocks de Whydah*
Cahiers dyEtudes Africains;, 7*1962,
2 F.0.84/1464* Admiralty to F.0.9*6.76, 
enclosing Churchill to Hewett 16.5.76 
and Yeovogun of Whydah to Hewett, Whydah 
4*5*76: F. 0. 84/1 465* R.W.King to Derby, 
Bristol 2.8.76, enclosing extract of a 
letter from Captain Charles Holden to 
R.W.King, Bristol 2.8.76.
3 F. 0. 824/1465 Admiralty to F.0.4.7* 76, 
enclosing Commander Pawlett to 
Admiralty 1.6.76.
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the support of the Geleleans. In late May, then,
been
Hanasou must have^overthrown: the supporters of G-elele
must have reasserted their control of the state. Some
light can be thrown on this event by a close study of
one of the traditional historical tales of the Fon people.
This story is called, Death is Raider of the King*s Sons:
1
the Wilfull Heir-Apparent.
The events of which this tradition tells are said 
to have taken place at the time of the death of King 
Gelele*s mother. From European sources it can be
2ascertained that this sad event took place in 1876. The 
tale relates how, when the King was away at war, he 
returned to find that his three eldest sons were dead. 
There is no mention of any epidemic having swept through 
the royal family at this time. It seems fairly safe to
1 M.J. and F.S. Herskovits,
Dahoman Narrative, pp.374-6.
2 F.0.84/1466, Dumanesque to Lt.Gov. Lees. 
Lagos 14*9*76, enclosing extracts from
a letter from Resident Ahgewey to 
Dumanesque 2 8.9*76. The tale mentions
a raid on Meko. This does not however 
appear to be the 1882 raid in which the 
Fon destroyed that town.
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assume that the Vi-Daho and his brothers did not die 
natural deaths. In fact, it seems more than probable 
that a palace revolution had taken place. It does not, 
moreover, seem unreasonable to conclude that this took 
place in late May when the official Fon attitude to 
current problems changed so completely. Since this 
coup dT etat brought in a Thardf line towards the 
Europeans, it must have been conducted by the supporters 
of Gelele. That the King was !away at war1 when this
happened is probably a polite fiction covering the fact 
that the King was at the,time politically impotent. The 
tale certainly reveals that G e l e l e  Had no control over 
the course of events.
The second part of the story tells how the King 
chose a new Vi-Daho from amongst his remaining sons.
On the advice of a Chief who was after the KingTs death 
to become Yeovogun of Whydah, Gelele chose a prince 
named Kondo. How, from an oral history of Whydah it 
would seem that this Chief was named Kougbododhoue---
1 Casmir Agbo, Histoire de Quidah, p*56
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King Gelele*s great fetish doctor. There were 
indications early in Gelele*s reign that Priests made 
up a considerable part of the King's support. Later, 
in the reign of Gelele*s successor, this Nougbododhoue, 
along with Gelele*s chief wife, the Visesegan, attempted 
to seize power in order to have more vigorous anti- 
European policies implemented. it does seem as though 
there is a great deal of continuity here.
What appears to have happened in the early 1870s
was that the Geleleans, deprived of the active support 
of the King, had seen power slip into the hands of the 
Vi-Daho, Hanasou. He, together with a number of his 
brothers, had determined not to maintain his father's 
rigid attitude to the Europeans. Probably in this he 
had the support of the Whydah Chiefs who almost always 
worked toY/ards conciliating the Europeans. After the 
coup, indeed, it was said that the Yeovogun, Seklocka,
1 See Chap. V p. 362-7
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1
trembled for his head# HanasouTs moderate line, however, 
produced a reaction from the Oeleleans who, in seizing 
power, killed the Vi-Daho and his leading royal supporters.
The new Vi-Daho, Prince Kondo, soon proved that he 
was by no means Nougbododhoue’ s puppet. Presumably 
Kondo had some personal following: Nougbododhoue must 
have needed his support in order to carry out the coup.
It seems more likely, from his later actions, that Kondo 
only partly shared Nougbododhou6Ts rigid views: he must, 
then, have co-operated with the Geleleans to some extent, 
at least, simply as a way of advancing his claims to the 
throne.
1 M.A.E.Afrique 76, De La Jaille to 
Marine, Whydah 30«U«77: M.A.E.
Afrique 77? D* Eltell to Marine, Whydah 
20.8.80: Casmir Agbo, op.cit., p.SA 
Seklocka, w$owever, survived for three 
years but was removed in 1880, 
ostensibly on a charge of rape.
Agbo declares that the Yeovogun 
Dagba made an agreement in 1878 with 
Prance. Although the YeovogunTs 
name is not mentioned this could 
not have been so. That Agbo did not 
know of Seklocka's tenure of office 
indicates that oral tradition 
suppressed his name.
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Much of the latter part of the tale relates how 
the new Vi-Daho, against his father1 s wishes, began 
to initiate a very warlike policy. This part seems 
to refer to the fact that it was Kondo, under his 
later title of Behanzin, who led the Fon resistance to 
the French. It was probably added merely to blacken 
Kondo * s name and to disassociate Gelele1s other 
descendants from the war against the French. This part 
can therefore be safely neglected.
Gelele himself, although he no longer played a part 
in the affairs of state, was not removed in the same way 
as G-ezo had been. The fiction of his continuing to 
reign was the necessary background to Nougbododhoue*s 
powerful position. Only when the Fon factions were 
forced to sink their differences in the face of imminent 
foreign danger was Gelele finally liquidated.
The immediate result of the coup in Abomey was to 
end any Fon move towards paying the indemnify. The British
therefore, rather reluctantly, imposed a blockade on the
Dahoman coast. This seemed to the Fon- as it had in
1852 a prelude to an armed attack. Fon troops were
-  2 2 0  -
rushed to the Coast and all ’roads* to and from the 
coastal towns were closed. Knowledge of the British 
government’s reluctance to impose even a "blockade may 
appear to make Fon fears of a British invasion seem
somewhat exaggerated. It must he remembered, however,
that it was only two years since an English army had
marched to Kumasi. English Officers, moreover,
deliberately informed the French who no doubt passed
on the information to the Fon that the English con-
2
templated an immediate invasion. Fon fears were 
moreover greatly increased by the fact that an English 
gunboat made two voyages up the River Oueme to Dogba,
1 F. 0. 84/111.66, Admiralty to F. 0. 29.9*76, 
enclosing Commodore Hewett to Admiralty 
17*8*76, and Turnbull to Senior Naval 
Officer on the Bight of Benin, Porto 
Novo 31*7*76: F.O. 8I1/I W>5, Admiralty
to F.O. 25.7.76, enclosing Commander 
Pawlett to Secretary of the Admiralty*
Gape Coast Castle 22.6.76.
2 F.O.8V 1/467, Admiralty to F.O. 5*7*77,
enclosing Captain Sulivan to Lt.Gov. Lees, 
Whydah 6.5*77*
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the route to Abomey from which the Fon had always
A
excluded the Europeans,
Fon preparations for armed resistance proved 
2
unnecessary. The British governments intention was 
to lift the blockade as soon as a face-saving formula 
could be found. This requirement was met when Victor 
Regis, whose trade was suffering as a result of the 
blockade, offered to advance half the fine, in palm oil, 
and charge it to ^elele’s account.-^ In theory, the Fon
1 See p\?above: F.O. 84/1466, C.O.to 
F.O.8.11.76, enclosing Dumanesque to 
Lt.Gov. Lees, Lagos 23.9.76: F.O.
8I4/111-67» C.O. to F.O. 5*3*77* enclosing 
Dumanesque to Lt.Gov.Lees, Lagos 28.12.76.
2 M.A.E.Afrique 54* P.Beraud & S.H.Carrena 
to M.Cardonnet, Whydah 18.6.76. The only 
violence committed against Dahomey at this 
time was the firing of a stray shot from a 
French vessel on a village near Whydah. No 
damage v/as done. This incident, however, 
often featured amongst later Fon complaints 
of French misconduct.
3 F.O.84/1467* Admiralty to F.O. 18.4*77: 
Captain Sulivan to Commodore Sullivan,
Yi/hydah 17*3*77. The real sufferers 
during the blockade were the French traders. 
Neither the Popos nor Porto Novo were 
blockaded, and the Fon were able to buy what 
they needed from these ports#
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were tchupay the fine; in fact they seem to have known 
little or nothing of the R^gis arrangement except that 
the French had prevailed upon the British to lift the
A
"blockade. The English and the Dahomans, in the person 
of the Yeovogun of Whydah, then signed an agreement in 
which the Fon agreed to pay the fine.
It does not seem at all likely that the Fon knew 
what they were signing. The English officer in charge 
of the treaty-making, Captain Sulivan, took great pains 
to ensure that the Yeovogun understood the agreement.
A French merchant, indeed, at first wanted to act as 
interpreter. Sulivan would not allow this. However, 
the man who did the translation was a Dahoman educated 
at Whydah. No doiiht the French had him well primed. It 
would seem particularly unlikely that the Fon understood 
the agreement when it is considered that this document
1 M.A.E.Afrique 76, Extract from a letter 
from M.G-erma, Whydah 10.12.77. RegisT 
agent, Germa, informed the Yeovogun 
that Regis would give him the money to 
pay the fine. He also gave the 
Yeovogun instructions upon how he 
was to "behave to the Englishmen who 
came to arrange the lifting of the 
"blockade.
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also contained a clause whereby the Fon agreed to give 
up the export of slaves* As far as the Fon were 
concerned, the Europeans had once again given way "before
a Dahoman show of force. Gelelean policies seemed again 
to have "been justified.
1 F.0.8A/1U67, Admiralty to F.O.,
enclosing Captain Sulivan to 
Commodore Sullivan, Whydah 15*5*77«
F.0.Sip/1 U67* Admiralty to F.O.
5*7*77? enclosing treaty with 
Dahomey, signed on 12.5.77*
C H A P T E R  IV
THE YEARS OP SUCCESS 
1878-1889
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The withdrawal of the English blockade had 
left the Geleleans more than ever convinced that 
Dahaoman territorial integrity could best be defended 
by out-and-out resistance to European pressure. The 
political impotence of Gelele had, however, somewhat 
reduced their power# They had been unable to destroy
the coastal faction which favoured at least limited 
co-operation with the Europeans and they needed the 
co-operation of Crown Prince Kondo to maintain their 
position. The fact that no one group was strong 
enough to ensure that its candidate would succeed at 
the old King’s death made it certain that until the 
succession issue was settled, Fon politicalALife 
would remain, very unstable.
- 225 -
Although the lifting of the British blockade 
and the subsequent removal of any threat of British 
invasion indicated to the Fon that the Geleleans, led 
by Nougbododhoue, had been right in preaching armed 
resistance to any European attempt to interfere in 
their affairs, the blockade in fact proved to be the 
starting point of renewed European activity on the
•i
Slave Coast. The lull in European interest in this 
area which had provided the essential background to 
t he success of Gelele1s policy towards the Europeans, 
had come to an end. The first indication of this change 
came with the French determination to obtain confirmation 
of the rights on the Slave Coast, which, they claimed, 
had been granted to them in 1861}. and in 1868. They had 
two reasons for wanting this information. The first was 
that the importance of Cotonou, as an entrance port to 
the rich oil markets of the interior, was continually 
increasing. The second and more important reason was
1 Catherine Coquery 'Le Blocus de Whydah', 
Cahiers D'Etudes Africaines, 7. 1962.
—* 2 2 6  *"*
that they wished to have sufficient evidence to
force the English to acknowledge French claims to
Cotonou so that these claims could he used as a
bargaining counter in the forthcoming Gambia exchange
negotiations,
A French officer, Captain Serval, was therefore
sent to Whydah where, on the 19th April, 1878* he
SLsigned a Treaty of Friendship with the Yeovogun. The
most important clause of this treaty confirmed the
cession to France of six square kilometres of territory
at Cotonou. Serval took great pains to ensure that the
•5
Fon understood the treaty. His efforts to ensure
1 M.A.E. AYrique 76, M.A.E. to M.M.C,
Paris 16.7.1877: M.A.E. AYrique 76, 
note pour le Ministre 23.7.1877:
M.M.C. Afrique IV-iocMap n^e Allemand, 
Paris 11.8.1877: M.M.C. Gabon
Marine to Allemand, Paris 11.2.1078:
M.M.C. IV-]0a Allemand to Marine, Whydah 
A.6.1877: I.D.Hargreaves, op.cit., 
pp. 208 and 209. ~
2 The treaty is reproduced in E.D. XI pp.28-9
3 M.A.E. Afrique 76, report by Serval,
Whydah 23. II. 1878, reproduced in 
Revue Maritimes et Colonial,1878. t59.
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Dahoman comprehension were, however, frustrated by
the French traders-— -led by a long time resident on
the Coast, M.Colonna di Lecca. These men gave the
Fon to understand that the Cotonou clause simply
guaranteed French trading holdings at Cotonou*.
A  French official on the Coast, Dr Bayol, later
obtained a document, from the interpreter who had
taken the Serval Treaty to Abomey, in which M*Colonna
di Lecca assured King G-elele that the treaty in no
way compromised Fon sovereignty. This confirms
circumstantial evidence to the same effect: the
interpreters at Whydah were employees of the traders.
A  Regis trading agent later attempted to buy from the
Fon the rights over Cotonou which were already supposed
to have been ceded to France: the Fon, until the conquest, 
always
^mentioned that all that had been granted to the French 
at Cotonou was the right to trade.
The merchants were in fact playing a double game.
They were trying to involve France in Cotonou, but, at 
the same time, they sought to avoid bringing down on
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1
their own heads the wrath of the Fon* The Dahomans 
of course willingly agreed to sign a document which 
they believed simply* confirmed French trading rights* 
The French delegation therefore left Whydah convinced 
that they had obtained what they wanted, while the 
Fon remained happy in the knowledge that the French 
remained friendly and were at the same time interested
only in trade#
With good trading relations re-established on the
Coast, Fon attention was mainly concerned in the late
1870s with the problems posed on their eastern frontier
2
by the renewal of the Ibadan-Abeokuta struggle* The 
nature of the war forced both the Fon and the Bgba to 
reconsider their policies towards each other. Because 
of their long-established rivalry with Abeokuta, the
1 M.M.C. Senegal-T-h Bayol to Marine, 
Evguiries 11.10.1887: M.M.C. Gabon 
rVh*b Guillat to Bareste, Whydah 
11.9.188U: M.M.C. Gabon IV*C Germa 
to Bareste, Porto Novo 2.1.T881+.
2 S.Johnson, op.eit., pp.413-26. War 
"between the Ihadan and Egha "began 
in 1877.
- 229 -
Fon had for long been unable to see that the growing 
power of Ibadan posed a greater threat to Dahoman 
security than did Abeokuta. The fruitlessness of the 
anti-Bgba campaigns in the late 1860s and 1870s must, 
moreover, have convinced many of the Fon leaders that
the 1851 settlement in'the Egbado and Awori regions
would have to be accepted. Concentration on this old
grievance was in fact diverting Dahoman attention from
more urgent problems.
The course of the war between Abeokuta and Ibadan
made the new threat to Fon interests glaringly obvious.
Abeokuta had attempted to prevent Ibadan importing
supplies of arms through her territory. As a result
Ibadan began to expand her influence in the Ketu area:
an area in which the Fon had long been sensitive to
foreign intrigue. Ibadan1s purpose was to obtain
supplies of arms and ammunition from Porto Novo via
1
Meko— a rebellious vassal of Ketu. Toff a of Porto Novo
1 C.0.124-7/37» Lees to Hicks-Beech, 
Accra 26.4.1879* enclosing Moloney 
to Lees, Lagos ?.5*1879: E.Bunglas, 
E.D.XX pp. 129-30.
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was ready and willing to allow Ibadan supplies to pass 
through his Kingdom. It was good trade. Besides, the 
Egba had aided his dynastic enemies;and he was therefore 
willing to do them any harm he could. Dahomey, although 
the overlord of Porto Novo, never interfered in trade 
m atters. It was the ©en&o® of Ibadan1 s expanding 
influence on the frontier near the Fon province of 
Agony which really disturbed the Fon— -not Ibadan1s 
opening of a new trade route.
The Dahomans viewed this extension of Ibadan1s 
influence with such distrust that they determined to 
abandon their hostility to Abeokuta. They therefore
•i
sent ambassadors with proposals of peace to that city. 
That the Fon came to choose such a radical course of 
action is probably due to the influence of Prince Kondo. 
The Gelelean supporters of Nougbododhoue were never 
noted for a willingness to move with the times. The 
change in Fon policy, moreover, occurred almost
1 F.0.8V1W7, C.O. to F.O. 13.U.1877,
enclosing Onilado to Administrator 
of Lagos, Abeokuta 13»2*1877*
immediately after Kondofs influence began to be felt.
It is therefore fairly safe to ascribe this new policy
to Kondo1s innovating spirit.
It appears that the Egba did not at first accept
these Dahoman overtures— — probably because they suspected
treachery on the part of Dahomey. The Fon, however,
persisted, and by 1878 or 1879 the two states had made
peace. Hostages were exchanged in order to guarantee
mutual respect for the new pact. The Fon were now
free to take action to prevent Ibadan penetration of
the Kingdom of Ketu. On the request of the Ketuans 
2
themselves, the Fon, in May 1879* attacked and destroyed
1 C.0.147/37* Moloney to Lt.Gov.Lees,
Lagos 3.2.1879: 0.0.879/20, Howe
to Derby, Accra 6.2.1883, enclosing 
Moloney to Lt.Gov.Griffith, Lagos 
21.12.1882.
2 G.Parrinder, op.cit., pp.37-49: Ketu 
had for a long time played an ambiguous 
role in Toruba affairs. In the struggles 
of the preceding years, probably as a 
result of internal division, she sided 
with one power and then with the other.
As a result she had earned the disti*ust 
of all. At this point, fear of Ibadan 
and jealousy of Meko must have prompted 
her action
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Meko, the Ketuan town which had been co-operating 
*1
with Ibadan.
On the Coast in 1878 and 1879 events were also
taking a decisive turn. The French had already decided
in principle to appoint a salaried official to replace
the intermittently functioning trading Vice-Consulate
on the Slave Coast. The conclusion of the Serval Treaty,
with its confirmation of the Cotonou concession, made
the appointment more ixrgent. In November 1878, Lt.Col.
2
Ardin DfElteil was despatched to the Slave Coast as
3
Resident at Cotonou and Vice-Consul at Whydah. His task
1. G-.Parrinder, op. cit., p. 50: C.0.147/37* 
Lees to Hicks-Beech, Accra 26.5.79* 
enclosing Moloney to Lees, Lagos 14.5*79: 
M.A.E. Afrique 78, DTElteil to M.A.E,, 
Lagos 14*8.79. Parrinder gives the date 
of the sack of this town as 1882.
2 M.M.C. Gabon IV3C Mattea to Marine, 
Libreville 11.6.1880: <J.D.Hargreaves, 
op.cit., pp.207-9* DfElteilTs son
was an Agent, at Whydah, for the French 
firm of Fabre.
3 The Vice-Consulate at Whydah had lapsed 
many years before. Unofficially, Regis 
Agents had, however, continued to use 
the title.
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was to guard French interests all along the coast
*1
from Senegal to G-abon.
When he reached the Slave Coast in 1879* DfElteil 
found his position quite untenable. The Fon refused 
to recognise the cession of Cotonou. Indeed, D’Elteil^ 
demand that they recognise French sovereignty there was 
probably the first they had heard of the supposed cession. 
Moreover, in keeping with Gelele an custom, the Fon, when 
he arrived, declared they would receive no permanent 
French official who was not also a trader. It took the 
combined effort of all the French in Whydah to persuade 
the Yeovogun even to meet him: the Fon authorities dis­
regarded him and went so fax* as to prevent him moving 
freely along the Dahoman coast.
D fElteil therefore decided, and was supported in 
his decision by his superiors, that his position in 
Dahomey was quite intolerable. He withdrew to Lagos 
where he acted as an agent passing on information to
M.A.E. Afrigue 76, M.A.E. to M.M.C., 
Paris 7.11.T878, Presidential DAcree 
of„ 4*2.1879: J.D.Hargreaves, op.cit., 
p^8f7K209------------------- -------
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•1
the French Government* Experience of coastal
conditions led D ’Elteil to urge the French Government
(as the only way of gaining French rights) to forcibly
occupy lower Dahomey* He also wanted France to guard
her position there, against the English, by resuming
her protectorate over Porto Novo. King Toffa had
2
recently requested this. The French Government did 
not at this time seriously contemplate any such move 
against Dahomey: neither were they willing to risk 
antagonising Britain in Porto Novo® Toffa’s offer 
was, however, a useful diplomatic weapon to keep in 
reserve.
1 M.A.E. Afrique 76, D’Blteil to M.A.E., 
Lagos 14.8.79: M.A.E. Afrique 76, 
M.A.E. to M.M.G., Paris 19.11.79: 
M.M.C. Gabon IV3c M.M.C. to M.A.E., 
Paris 19.11*79: J.D.Hargreaves,
op. cit., p.2.10
2 M.A.E.Afrique 76, DfElteil to M.A.E., 
22.2.79: M.A.E. Afrique 76 DfElteil 
to M.A.E. 6.4*79? enclosing Toffa to 
D'Elteil, Porto Novo, 4.3,79: M.A.E 
Afrique 76, D’Elteil to M.A.E. 1.5*79.
3 J.D.Hargreaves, op.cit., p.214.
In 1879 the French saw their claims 
on the Slave Coast as a bargaining 
counter in negotiations with England, 
not as a basis for conquest.
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In fact it was not kept in reserve for long.
The English reaction to D ’Elteil’s activities in 
Porto Novo was to raise the British flag over Ketonou, 
a strategic point on the lagoon system between Porto 
Novo and Cotonou. At the &ame time, they gave encour- 
agement to the Chiefs of Oueme and Appa who were in
A
rebellion against King Toffa*s authority. The French 
coastal traders feared, more than ever, that the English 
were intent on making their tariff system continuous 
from the Gold Coast to Lagos. Merchant discontent with 
the existing situation was, moreover, increased by the 
fact that landings at Cotonou became well-nigh impossible 
because of the activities of man-eating sharks.
As the merchants saw it, the solution to this 
problem was to open a channel between the lagoon and the 
sea at Cotonou, Launches could then ply directly between 
the ocean-going vessels and Porto Novo. This plan had 
long haunted the coastal traders^ and was of course the 
one which had given so much trouble when injudiciously
1 J.D.Hargreaves, op.cit., pp.210-13
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aired "by Cavalho in 1862+. To prevent Fon
interferance with such a project?the merchants 
knew they sould have to have French protection* 
Therefore, so as to he able to put their project 
into operation and to ward off the threat of an 
extension of the Lagos tariff, the merchants also 
pressed the french government to occupy Cotonou and 
to assume the protection of Porto Novo.
1 M.A.E. Afrique 77? Bareste to M.A.E.,
Whydah 20.5*1881: M.M.G. Gabon IV3c 
Penfantany to M.M.C. 'At Sea1 26.T.82, 
enclosing Lemoux to Penfantany, 'At Sea' 
26.1.82: M.M.C. Gabon IV^e Grivel to 
M.M.C. 'At Sea* 10.7*82, enclosing 
Villeneuve to Grivel, Libreville 7*7*82: 
M.M.C. Gabon IVM.A.E. to M.M.C.
21.5.84, enclosing Colonna di Lecca to 
Bareste, Porto Novo 26.4*82, and Abbe 
Planque to M.A.E., Lyons (no date).
In the early 1880s the idea of connecting 
the lagoon to the sea at Cotonou was very 
much in the air. A naval officer even 
reported favourably on the project. The 
trader, Colonna di Lecca, declared that 
the deriving of any advantage from a 
Protectorate over Porto Novo would be 
dependent on putting the scheme into 
practice. He outlined a plan whereby 
this could be done without Fon interferance.
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After considerable hesitation, and even after 
having received advice to the contrary from the Naval 
authorities in the area, the French government, in 
April, 1883, determined to re-estahlish their pro- 
tectorate over Porto Novo. No move was made to 
occupy Cotonou. The Resident appointed to Porto Novo 
was the merchant Colonna di Lecca who, in 1878, had 
seen to it that the Fon remained unaware of the French 
interpretation of the Serval Treaty. The Fon evidently 
suspected no new departure in French policy. They were 
always willing to welcome traders and seem to have seen 
in Colonna di Leccafs new title only a move to hlock the 
English in Porto Novo. So unav/are were the Fon of the 
potential French threat to their interests that they
2immediately congratulated di Lecca on his appointment.
The French traders in the 1880s had learned to 
keep their ambitions to themselves. The Fon therefore
1 J.D*Hargreaves, op.cit., pp.29ii.-7.
2 M.A.E. Afrique 78, Colonna di Lecca 
to M.A.E. Porto Novo 7*^-1883.
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knew nothing of their plans for Cotonou. Indeed, with 
D'Elteil’s withdrawal, it must have seemed to the Fon 
that hoth French claims to Cotonou and the idea of 
appointing non-trading representatives on the coast 
had been given up. Franco-Dahoman trading relations
•i
continued to he mutually beneficial. If any European
power appeared to present any threat to Dahomey it was
England, whose attack on Ashanti, and whose blockade
of the Coast, had been followed up by expansion into
2
the territory of Dahomey's client Porto Eovo.
Even the English in the early 1880s did not appear 
directly hostile. The Dahoman position on the Coast 
seemed secure. Fon attention continued to be concen­
trated on their eastern frontier. In 1881, with
1 For the importance of French trade to the 
Fon, see Chap. Ill p.198
2 M.M.C. Gabon IV*zc Penfantany to M.M.C., 
Dakar 28.2.1882. In 1882 English 
participation in the trade of the 
ports directly under Fon control 
ended v/hen Swanzy withdrew from Whydah.
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Ketu<s support, the Fon raided Oyo country to the
2north-west of Abeokuta. In the next year they sacked
3
a number of Ketuan villages on the Upper Yewa. The 
Dahomans seem to have considered that this last raid 
would also have the support of Ketu. After the campaign 
they requested that Ketu provide them with food supplies. 
Their request was refused.^ The Ketuans seem to have 
decided that co-operation with Dahomey was no longer 
In their interests. They evidently considered that after 
her series of successful campaigns, Dahomey presented a 
greater threat to Eetufs independence than did Ibadan.
1 S. Johnson, op. cit., p.i.j.55* Johnson 
reports that Afun, the Chief of Ketu, 
was the Fon guide on this occasion.
2 E.Dunglas^ E.D.XX, p. 130. The Fon 
threatened that in the next year they 
would attack Oyo itself.
3 E.Dunglas, E.D.XX p.131« Dunglas
names the villages: Ibiyan, Aworo, 
and Tobolo.
L}. E.Dunglas, E.D.XX p. 1 51: C.Parrinder, 
op. cit, p. 51* When the Fon asked for 
food they received this reply
T If you want yams do as we do, 
cultivate your fields1.
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The Fon in the 1880s seem to have been making a
determined effort to strengthen their eastern frontier.
It was probably in the 1880s that they began, for reasons
of military security, to reorganise Agony into a province
administered on the same lines as Whydah. Oertainly it
was only in the 1880s that the Fiogbe, the head of the
Agony administration, came to play a prominent part in
1
Fon political life.
Since 1851, when Ketu had again begun to pursue a
policy independent of that of Dahomey, the Fon had resented
their independence and regarded it as a threat. Oral 
2
tradition suggests that it was the town*s proximity to 
Agony which finally determined the Fon to attack Ketu.
This may well be so. The value of the Agony area was 
continually increasing. Much of the palm oil which the 
Fon produced came from the east of Dahomey and had to be 
exported down the unprotected River Oueme. Ketu1s refusal to
1 M.M.C. Dahomey III, ^  Angnot to Bayol, 
Porto Novo 5*1*189o: M.M.O* to Dahomey 
III^ -k Bayol to Etienne, Porto Novo 
15 .1 .1890.
2 A.Le Herisse^ , op. cit., p 333
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co-operate further with the 3£on seems to have
determined the Fon to attempt to re-assert their
control of the town.
The determination to emharh upon an attack on
Ketu made it essential that the Fon re-assess the
nature of their new relationship with the Egba, who
had also been allied with Ketu against Ibadan. The
Egba hostages held in Abomey were sent back to Abeokuta:
the Egba were informed that the King to whom the hostages
had been sent had died and that his successor had deter-
1mined to resume the war against Abeokuta. It seems 
likely that this was a diplomatic move designed to 
sound out the Egba reaction to the new Fon policy 
towards Ketu. The evidence as to this reaction is
1 C.0.879/20 Rowe to Derby, Accra 6.2.83, 
enclosing tytoloney to Lt. Gov. Griffiths, 
Lagos 21.12.82. The Egba hostage who 
took this message back to Abeokuta In 
October 1882 was Okinkiola, son of 
Ogundipe, war Chief of Abeokuta.
.''X.:".. ,-v * 1
conflicting* but it docs seem that the Egba-Fon-
mutual agreement to suspend Hostilities, persisted •
v ' ■, ■ /: ‘ 2^ -v;; ' ■ ' ,
throu^ouirthe/188Qss* $herupture in Dahomey*^
relations witK Ketu^ does not therefore appear to
have effected for long the new relationship with J
Abeokuta * ^ ~  . ■ ■ ; '
She Fonknew that Ketu was too strdng for the
Fon army to overcome her defences easily* (They
therefore, in time honoured Dahoman fashion, reverted
to a ruse; in early 1883 they put about a rumour that
1 0*0*96/155 Howe to Befby, Accra 9*2*84:
V.B.Griffiths to Rowe, lagbs 17*1*84* 
enclosing It *(xOvernorfs interview with 
Ketu messengers; 0*0*96/168 Griffiths 
to Stanley, Accra 14*12*1885* enclosing 
statement by messengers from Prince Fetona 
of Ketu, signed by A*0* Willoughby, lagos 
3*11*85 * At one point the Ketu claimed that 
they would obtain assistance from the Egba.
It emerged later that they did not receive . 
it* Probably a number of Egba Chiefs would 
have liked, to support Ketu but never actually 
did so*
2 Ihere was no cbnflict between the two states 
in the 1880s. Moreover, in 1889* a French 
official, hr.Bayol, visiting Abomey, reported 
that he knew of Egba messengers having been 
in Abomey* ; It Is doubtful if he could have 
heard reports of the pre-1882 relationship*
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the Fon army had just been defeated hy the Mahi.
Ketu therefore felt safe from Dahoman attach, and 
in July 1883, after Egba encouragement, a Ketuan 
army under a new General, Agidigbo Hungho, was
A
despatched to campaign against the Ibadan* The Fon 
seized their opportunity, made a surprise attach on 
Ketu, and, in spite of the spirited resistance of a 
body of Moslems, were able to occupy the town. The 
Moslem resistance enabled a large number of people to 
escape. Nevertheless, the Fon were able to hill the 
A4&ketu, Olehu, as well as the old war Chief, Afun, who 
had not left the town with the army. The Ketu army had 
not of course been destroyed, and in case they shotild
1 C.0.96/155, Rowe to Derby, Accra 9.2.84., 
enclosing Evans to Rowe 3^.7*83:
G.Parrinder, op.cit., p.51: E.Dunglas,
E.D.XX p. 1 51 : A.B.Ellis, The Ewe-Speaking 
Peoples of the Slave Coast,1890. pp.327-8• 
Dunglas states that the Fon army was sent 
out in August 1883. European sources indicate 
that the Fon attach which followed the 
departure of the army took place in June 
or early July 1883.
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be intercepted by this army, the Fon retired— not,
1
however, before setting the town alight.
Perhaps to avoid interception by the vengeful
Ketu army, or perhaps intent on attacking another
Yoruba town, either Save or Okeiko, the Fon did not
retire directly to Dahomey but, instead, marched
northwards. During their march they were met in the
Save forest by the armies of the Bariba, the Oyo, and
the Save. The Fon army was very severely defeated and
2
many of the Ketu prisoners were set free.
1 G.Parrinder, op.cit., p.52: E.Dunglas,
E.D.XX, p. 131: 0.0.96/155, Howe to Derby,
Accra 9*2.84, enclosing Evans to Rowe 
30.7*83: S.Johnson does not mention this 
attack on Ketu.
2 0.0.96/151, Rowe to Derby, Accra 26.7*83*
enclosing Willoughby to Evans, Dagos 13*1*83: 
0.0.96/155, Rowe to Derby 9*2.84, enclosing 
Evans to Rowe, Lagos 30*7*S3* Neither oral 
traditions of Dahomey nor Ketu mention this 
Fon defeat. It seems that the Bariba were 
the principal architects of the victory. 
Greatly exaggerated reports of the scale
of the Fon defeat reached Lagos. It was even 
claimed that the King of Dahomey had been 
taken to Oyo and held captive. S.Johnson, 
op.cit♦, pp.45-8. Johnson outlines the 
Fon campaigns of this period very briefly**
For an analysis of the name Bariba see 
Oornevin, op.cit., pp.159-60. Presipably 
it was the state of Parakou with which the 
Fon came into conflict*
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The Ketu army returned to its devastated home
and, under the leadership of Agidigbo Hungbo, the
1
people of Ketu proceeded to rebuild their town.
Encouraged by the recent Dahoman defeat^ they soon
began raiding into Dahomey territory. Even more serious,
they organised against Dahomey a league consisting of
the Bariba, the Oyo Yoruba, and the Save. They even
managed to obtain promises of help against the Eon
2
from a number of leading Egba Chiefs. After an 
exceptionally heavy defeat,Dahomey now seemed to be 
confronted by the combined might of her eastern neighbours, 
all of whom were intent upon her destruction.^
Developments on the Coast in 1883 appeared to be 
equally threatening for Dahomey. The English continued
1 G.Parrinder, op.cit., pp.32-3:
E.Dunglas, pp.133-4.
2 C.0.96/1 35 Howe to Derby, Accx^ a 9.2.8I4., 
enclosing Griffith to Rowe, Lagos 17.1.8U 
and Minutes of an interview with Ketu 
messengers, signed by Hethersett,Lagos
11}.. 1 . 81}.
3 In the event, the Egba gave little or 
no assistance to Ketu.
•to intrigue in Porto Novo, but, potentially even more 
detrimental to Pon interests, were a series of ^ngliaji 
negotiations with Portugal for the transfer to England
1 ' J
of the Portugese fort at Whydah. The Pon were
; \  . . . .  2 
informed of these negotiations in April 1883# The
Commandant of the fort was immediately summoned by the
Whydah authorities and informed that the Portugese
1 J.D.Hargreaves, o p . c i t pp.301-3:
8 .E.Crowe, The Berlin-West Africa 
Conference; (S*Q»9:fe/i54» 0.0. to P.O. 
4.5*83, enclosing Draft VII of the 
proposed Congo Treaty with Portugal 
(relevant article, 14): C.O.879/22 
African 283, Derby to Young 21.6.84:
C.O.879/22 African 283, Derby to Young 
22.i8.84* The transfer of the fort was 
considered during the negotiations 
leading up to the Anglo^Portugese Congo 
Treaty of 4.2.84• In the Treaty,
Britain secured not the transfer, but 
the right of pre-emption over the fort. 
As a result of Pranco-German objections 
to the main body of the Treaty, it
was abandoned soon after its conclusion.
2 S.M.A* Dfthaman Prefecture, 1883-88, 
Menager to Planque, Agoue 4*5*B3:
M.M.C.- Afrique IY,1La M.A.E. to H.M.C.
27.8.84, enclosing Montaignac to
. Bareste, Whydah 14*7.84.
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must either re~affirm their friendship for Dahomey or
at once quit the Kingdom. The Pon were obviously intent
upon maintaing their right to determine who might occupy
the fort. Under pressure, the Portuguese Commandant
agreed to write to his superior, the Governor of St.Thome,
concerning the rumour that the fort was about to be
2
transferred to the English.
On the 7th June 1883 a Portuguese gunboat 
arrived in Whydah with a soothing but quite untrue
1 C.O.11*7/36, P.O. to C.O. 23.11 .78, enclosing 
Mourier to Lord Salisbury 1U.11.78: M.A.E 
Afrique 76, extract from a report from 
Commander Yaudereuil, Elmina 9.12.78: M.A.E 
Afrique 76, M.A.E. to M.M.C., Paris 13*3*76: 
M.M.C.Afrique IV^a M.M.C. to M.A.E., Paris 
21.11.78: J.A.Shertchley, op. cit., p. 17U*
The Portuguese had been in trouble before: 
in 1878 the Portuguese were accused of being 
too well disposed towards the English and 
on that occasion the garrison had been retained 
in Whydah against their will. The Portuguese 
had considered sending an expedition to the 
rescue. The government of the time wished to 
withdraw from the fort but national feeling 
in the Cortes had prevented this.
3 S.M.A.Dahoman Prefecture 1883-88, Menager to 
Planque, Agoue U*5*83: M.M.C. Afrique IY^ a 
M.A.E. to M.M.C. 27.8.8U* enclosing 
Montaignac to Bareste, Whydah 1U.7.8U*
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letter from the Governor of St. Thome, assuring the
Fon that Portugal had no intention of handing the fort
over to the English.*^ It then emerged that the Portuguese
were interested in "buying indentured labourers to work
on their plantations in St.Thome'. The Pon began to see
the Portuguese in a much more favourable light? and
negotiations about slave buying soon got under way. In
these negotiations the Portuguese Commandant relied heavily
2on the asistance of the new Chacha, Juliano De Souza.
De Souza’s knowledge of the language and outlook of both 
Portuguese and Pon, and his position as leader of the 
Afro-Brazilian Coastal group soon gave him the place of
1 M.M.C. Afrique IV-j1a M.A.E. to M.M.C. 29.8.83 
enclosing Bareste to M.A.E., Freetown 5*8.83.
2 Juliano was son of one of the important 
sons of old Francisco Felix who’disappeared’ 
between 1858 and 1860. He represented a 
more prosperous part of the De Souza clan 
than had Francisco Felix II who was his uncle, 
and who claimed to be head of the family in 
the days of Gelele. It would seem that 
Juliano had to ’dispose1 of a number of rival 
relations before he himself became acknow­
ledged head of the family.
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an essential intermediary between the two. The power 
that this position gave encouraged him to act as an 
independent agent, moulding both Fon and Portuguese 
proposals to suit himself*
During the discussions about this disguised revival 
of the slave trade, the Portuguese began to advance the
1
proposal that Dahomey should accept Portuguese protection.
In the first instance the idea seems to have been the
brain-child of M.Custoda Miguel Da Boya, the Governor 
/ 2of St. Thome, who was concerned to protect his source 
of slave labour* No doubt Da Souza interpreted this 
proposal to the Fon in a very much modified form— ~ 
in fact he seems to have suggested a version of the old 
Gezoan policy of reliance, in matters concerning the 
Europeans, on the Portuguese-supported Chacha. It indicates
1 M.M.C. Afrique IV^ a M.A.E to M.M.C 
14.5*i684, enclosing Montaignac to 
Bareste, Whydah 16.3*1864: M M.C 
Afrique IV ^^a M.A.E. to M.M.C. 27.8.84, 
enclosing Montaignac to Bareste,Whydah 
14.7.84*
2 M.M.C. Afrique IV^ a M.A.E. to M.M.C. 
9*6.84, enclosing M.Laboulage to M.A.E 
Lisbon 30.5.84.
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how severely the Fon yteve affected by the defeats of 
1883 and how worried they were by the prospect of 
Yorubaiand uniting against them that, under the leader­
ship of Kondo and Nougbododhoue, they did not reject 
such a proposal outright.
The difficulties of the political situation in 
Abomey must also have influenced the ruling clique 
towards accepting Portuguese overtures. One of Gelele’s 
brothers, who was influential in the army, in fact 
attempted to use the disillusionment created by defeat 
to oust the ruling faction.^ Although this coup failed, 
it is fairly obvious that the Kondo-Hougbodo dhoue group 
were beset by difficulties at home as well as abroad* 
Kondo, who was evidently of a much less fanatical turn 
of mind than Nougbododhoue, seems to have been especially 
attracted by the Chacha’s idea that Portugal could be 
relied upon to protect Dahoman territory on the Coast
1 S.M.A. Dahoman Prefecture, 1883-88: 
Menager to Planque, Whydah 19.10.84: 
M.M.C. Gabon IV3C M.A.E, to M.M.C. 
2.2.84: Planque to M.A.E., Lyons 
20.1.84
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against foreign intrigue. He was, indeed, sufficiently 
interested to propose sending Fon ambassadors to Lisbon 
to discuss the project. However, although. Portugal sent
a gunboat to Whydah in both January and May 1884, and 
although the Portuguese officers of these ships were 
feasted and feted to an unprecedented extent, no ambassadors
A
were sent. It may reasonably be inferred that Kondo was 
unable to persuade the traditionalists amongst his associates 
of the wisdom of such an alliance.
Although the Fon leaders procrastinated on the issue 
of the Portuguese alliance throughout 1884, they did take 
effective military and diplomatic steps towards mitigating 
the Yoruba threat to Fon independence. Their policy was 
to deal separately with their various enemies. First of 
all, on 15th February 1884, they made the position of Toffa 
somewhat more secure by destroying the town of Okeodan, 
which had harboured and given aid to Toffa’s dynastic
1 M.M.C. Afrique I V ^ a A.O’Neill to M.M.C. 
8.3*84: M.M.C. Afrique IVn a M.A.E. to 
M.M.C. 22.3.84, enclosing Montaignac to 
Bareste, Whydah 7.2.84: M.M.C. Afrique 
P^11a M.A.E. to M.M.C. 19*6.84, enclosing 
Montaignac to Bareste, Whydah 6.5*84.
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A
enemies. This attack was also intended as a warning
to the Egba that the Fon were still capable of vigoivms
action. In 1882+ the Fon either by threats or diplomatic
action did manage to persuade those of the Egba who were
2
contemplating aiding Ketu to give up any such idea.
The Fon-Egba guarantees of non-aggression may be even 
have been renewed. The Dahomans in the early part of 
1 882+, moreover, dealt so severely with the Yoruba town
1 C.O.879/20, Ikme to Kimberley, Accra
23.2.82, enclosing G-riffith to Rowe,
Lagos 7*2.82: 0.0*879/22, African 296, 
Young to Derby, Gold Coast 9*1*85? 
enclosing T.Tickel to Lt. Governor, 
Badagry 1 6.2.82+: Okeodan had been 
sacked by King G-eso but had since 
recovered. It had been known for some 
time in Lagos that Toff a had requested 
aid from the Fon against Okeodan.
2 0.0.96/*! 68, Griffith to Stanley, Accra
12+. 12* 85? enclosing statement made by 
messengers from Prince Fetona of Ketu, 
signed by A.C.Willoughby 3*11*85* The 
Egba did not aid Ketu. This may not 
have been due to Fon actions, but to 
Egba reluctance to co-oioerate with Ibadah 
which by this time had come to the assis­
tance of Ketu.
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of Save that they were able to reduce the town to a
tributary position.^ They were probably able to keep
the town under control until the French conquest.
In spite of this victory however it would seem
that the Dahomans had again to take the field, against
the Yoruba allies in the latter part of the same year.
Oral tradition gives the details of a campaign which can
only be placed at some time between July 1884 and June
1885* During this campaign the Fon army had to remain for
five months protecting Agony against the threat of Yoruba 
2attack* This long threat to Agony seems to have convinced
1 C.O.96/1 68, Griffith to Stanley, Accra 11+* 12. 85, 
e nclosing statement by messengers from Prince 
Fetona of Ketu, 3*11*85: G.Parrinder, op.cit., 
p.87. In 1883 Save had been one of the powers 
opposing Dahomey. In 1885 Ketu messengers stated 
that they had received no help from Save because 
the Fon had conquered the town and placed a consul 
there. Early 1881+ seems to have been the only 
time between 1883 and mid-1885 when the Fon could 
possibly have undertaken a campaign against Save. 
Parrinder states that the Fon ravaged Save in 1887* 
It seems more than likely that the attack to which 
he refers took place in early 1 881+*
2 A.be Herisse, op.cit., p.333* ho other authority 
makes any mention of this campaign. Le Herisse 
himself does not date it accurately. His des­
cription does not square with what Is known of 
the late 1883 campaign. It must have taken place 
before June 1885, when the campaigns which led to 
the destruction of Ketu began.
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the Fon that the continued existence of Ketu was too 
great a menace to their security to he tolerated.
Until this time it seems that the Fon had hoped that 
Ketu would again submit to Fon overlordship— as Save 
had done. Instead, Ketu, in her extremity, had turned 
to the other Yoruba states for protection. This 
strategically situated town was therefore acting as an 
agent, bringing the hostility of the other Yoa&ruba 
states to bear on Dahomey. It was decided that Ketu 
would have to be totally destroyed.
The Ketu were well aware of the fact that they had
embarked on a struggle to the death, and, in February 1885,
sent messengers requesting that Lagos take action to prevent
■1
the Fon again attacking them. Momentarily, at least, Ketu 
seems to have been deprived of the support of her major
1 C.O.96/166, Griffith to Derby,
Christiansborg Castle 1.6.85, 
enclosing Barrowr to Governor,
Lagos 20.2.85* The messengers 
from Ketu requested that English 
boats should patrol the Oueme to 
prevent the Fon crossing it to 
attack them.
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allies, rbadan and Oyo. Probably in order to prevent
any assistance reaching Ketu from Savalou, the Pon
1 -proceeded to reduce that town to obedience. in earljr
June 1885* the Pon, at the instigation of Toff a,
conducted a brief campaign against a series of Oueme 
2
villages. Then later in the year, probably in July 
1885, the Pon determined that the time was ripe for an
1 R.Cornevin, Histoire du Dahomey,
pp.131 and 1lp5l "Cornevm notes that
Lintonon G-baduidi, the seventh king 
of Savalou (1863-85) prepared to kill 
himself rather than co-operate with the 
Pon. His successor, Zoundela, the eighth 
king, did however co-operate and even 
lived some time in Dahomey. It seems 
therefore that in 1885 the Pon intervened 
successfully in Savalou to place a king 
favourable to Dahomey on the throne. Since 
later in the year the Pon were active on 
the Oueme, it would seem that this inter­
vention took place in the normal campaign 
season-—— January to March in 1885.
2 M.M.C. Gabon IV3C M.A.E to M.M.C. 16.7.85: 
Marchelli to Bareste, Lagos 6.6.85
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A
attack on Ketu* A  Fon army therefore marched on
Ketu and launched a powerful frontal assault on the 
2
city. The Ketu an s were however well prepared and 
after a stiff engagement drove off the attackers.
The Dahomans then retired beyond the range of the 
defenders1 guns and proceeded to lay siege to the town.
1 M.M.C. Gabon J27>> Dorat to M.M.C.,
Porto Novo, 21•12.85: C.O.96/168,
Griffith to Stanley, Accra 14.12.85* 
enclosing statement of messengers 
from Prince Fetona of Ketu, signed hy 
A.C.Willoughby, Lagos 3*11*85: S.M.A. 
Dahoman Prefecture 1883-88, Berenger 
to Planque, Porto Kovo 9*9.85* and 
Menager to Planque, Ague 21.0.85:
S.Johnson, op.cit., p.455: E.Dunglas,
F.D.XX, p. 142: A.Le Iierisse, op. cit., 
p. 333: G.Parrinder, op. cit., p.60 ~ 6/ 
Johnson gives 1886 as the date of the 
only Fon attack 011 Ketu which he mentions. 
Dunglas gives 1886 as the date of the 
second attack* Le HerissA states that 
Ketu was destroyed after three years 
campaigning. Go Parrinder accepts 1886 
as the date of the second attack hut 
notes that this date has not "been 
absolutely confirmed. European sources 
indicate that the second attack took 
place in July 1885 and that Ketu fell in 
late September or early October I885.
2 According to reports reaching Lagos, 
the Fon were assisted by a body of 
Portuguese troops.
This siege proved a lengthy business and dragged; 
on for threemonths* During these months the Fon, it 
appears, went in constant dread of massive assistance 
coming to Ketu from the other Yoruba towns* In early , 
September, indeed, they learned that Yoruba reinforcements 
were on their way* After scouring their country for 
reinforcements, -the Fon determined to make a supreme 
effort to deduce the town* Luckily no reinforcements : 
arrived in time and Ketuf;S strength failed* The Pon were 5; 
thus able to, enter the town and, uninterrupted, were able;f ■; 
to take their- Revenge on the , townwhich had so long resisted 
them* O n l y ‘/iowOT the inhabitants escaped* Those who 
were hot killed were led:;into^  Dahoniey, either to be 
exported as indentured labourers to St. Thome, or to be
1 S*M*A. Dahoman Prefecture, 1883-85: 
Menager to Planque, Ague 21*9*85• , 
Reports reaching Lagos state that 
Oyo had sent an army to the aid of 
Ketu, but on hearing the noise of 
Portugese cannon immediately
. . . retired, >
2 E♦Dunglas, B.B.XX:, p*141: 
r§* Parrinder * op*cit** p*58*
According to oral tradition this 
entrance was effected by treachery*
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1
put to work on the Fon palm oil plantations.
The Fon had achieved a re sounding success--
even though it had only been made possible by continuous 
dissention amongst the Yoruba states. Ketu had been 
totally destroyed and, for some time at least, any 
possibility of a Yoruba coalition against them had 
been scotched. Moreover, the Fon had in the course of 
two years successfully protected their client, the King 
of Porto Novo, and had re-established their paramountey 
over Save and Savalou. The Fon had in fact re-established 
their control of the border states which rejected their 
paramountey in 1852. Kondo and Nougbododhoue had proved 
themselves astute and courageous leaders.
1 M.M.G. Gabon 197^ Dorat to M.M.C., 
Porto Novo 21.T2.85s C.O.96/168 
Griffiths to Stanley, Accra 1^.12.85 
enclosing statement of messengers 
from Prince Fetona of Ketu, received 
by A. C.?/illoughby, Lagos 3*11*85;
E,Dunglas, E.D.XX, pp.1 hi-2.
G.Parrinder, op.cit., pp.55-61 
A.B.Ellis, Ewe-Speaking Peoples of 
the Slave Coast, pp. 327-8.
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nevertheless, although they had heen amazingly 
successful, the Fon had gone for long in great fear 
of a combined attach by a number of the Yoruba states*
During the long seige of Ketu, when their army had 
been immobilised outside this town and their country 
denuded of troops, this fear must have bemi particularly 
acute. This feeling provides a good deal of the 
explanation of why the Fon leaders, in August 1885, 
when the seige of Ketu was at its most critical stage 
agreed to accept the long considered offer of Portuguese 
protection*
It does not however provide the whole explanation. 
Events on the Goast as well as in the interior had been
A
moving quickly in 1 883 and in 1884* The death of Di Lecca,
1 M.M.C. Gabon IV^c M.A.E. to M.M.C.
18.9.83, enclosing Guilman to Bareste, 
Porto Hovo ^.7.83: M.M.C. Gabon 
note from L ! Avenir des Colonies et de 
la Marine (undated): M.M.C. Gabon IV^C 
Presidential Decree 12.7.83: Di Lecca 
died on 1U»5*83, and was followed by 
a series of shadowy trader successors, 
all agents of Mantes Freres and Borelli.
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the trader-Resident or Porto-Novo, had heen followed 
in May 1883 the appointment, to the post otJ Resident,
A
of a French Naval Ofricer, Colonel Dorat. Dorat!s
quickly implemented policy of attempting to re-inforce
the King of Porto Novofs power, and opposition to
2
English manoeuvres within that Kingdom, might have 
heen welcome to the Fon* The appointment of a non­
trading French official hacked hy French troops, alheit 
a very small number, however, proved very worrying 
indeed to the Dahomans* This development was douhly 
disturbing in that it was combined with a revival, for 
the first time since 1879* of French insistence on 
their possession or Cotonou. Both Dorat and his 
replacement Lt. Roget made a series of representations
1 M.M.C. G-abon Masseron to Marine,
Porto Novo 3.7*84. Dorat arrived in 
Porto Novo on 2.7.84.
2 J.D.Hargreaves, op.cit.. p.199:
C.Newbury op.cit., p.10§.
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to the Pon1 on the subject of their yielding up to 
Prance the rights which Prance acquired in the 1078 
treaty.
At first the Fon seem to have felt that, on the 
whole, the increasing French activity in Porto Hovo 
was "beneficial since it limited English ability to
1 C.O.879/21, African 278, Rowe to 
Derby 10.2.8U: Lt. Governor to 
Rowe, Lagos 12*2*81}.. The trading 
Residents, like the trading Consuls 
or Whydah, usea their position to 
increase the influence or their 
firms. They attempted to encourage 
the French government to contemplate 
expansion hut they were careful not 
to jeopardise their positions hy 
letting this he known to the Fon. 
Only one of them, A M.Germa, went 
too far; he offered, on hehalf of 
his company, to huy the coastline
of Dahomey,
2 Dorat received a Decree, putting the 
Resident of Porto ITovo in charge of 
Cotonou on 20*7*84* The Fon always 
maintained that they had never 
granted France rights of sovereignty 
over Cotonou.
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intrigue in chat state. In the latter part of
1884* however, the French activity in Porto Novo
was parallelled hy unprecedented French and German
activity on the Popos* It became obvious by early
^88b that the Europeans were determined to control
2the tiny Popo states. So much European intervention 
at both extremities of Dahoman coastal territory 
persuaded the Fon that the Portuguese were justified.
1 S.M.A., Vicariate du Benin 1880-82:
Menageto Planque, Ague 7.9*80:
S.M.A. Dahoman Prefecture, 1883-88: 
Menager to Planque, Ague 28.6.8 .^
This is shown by the tact that in 
June or that year they even allowed 
the Societe des Missions Africaine 
to re-open their Whydah mission 
station. The Society had had a 
catachist school HeBoljr in operation 
there since 1880.
2 0.Newbury, op.cit., pp.110-18 and 
Appendix pp.209-10: J.D.Hargreaves, 
op.cit., pp.323-8: French and. German 
claims in this area were extremely 
complicated. ' The final delineation 
was carried out in 1887 when France 
received only Grand Popo, the most 
easterly or three small states. The 
problem which, above*all, concerned
the European diplomats was how to 
establish a workable Customs system 
in their tiny, newly-acquired, territory.
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in their contention that Germany and France, as well 
as England, had designs on their oountry. The Fon, 
fighting a desperate war for survival in the interior, 
seem to have felt that they simply could not at the same 
time deal with the rising tide of European advance on 
the coast*
The Portugese were informed of this decision early
in 1885 and on the 25th June a delegation, headed by
a Portugest judge, Bernado leito, arrived in Whydah*
The delegation proceeded to Abomey where, on the 5th of
August, Leite signed, and Prince Kondo marked, a document
which came to be known as the Treaty of Aguinzuin. This
became effective on the 6th September, when the Governor
of St* Thom^, M.Oustado Miguel Da Boya arrived in Dahomey
1
and officially raised the Portugese flag at Whydah.
1 0*0.96/170, F.O. to 0*0. 14.12.85., 
enclosing documents issued by the Gov. 
of St* Thome: M.M.O. Gabon IV.-u BA. Boya
to Guilliat, Whydah 14.7.85s ft.M.0* Gabon l2Sb
Roget to Marine, Porto Novo 8.7*85: M.M.O#
Gabon Ip/;- Dorat to M.M.O., Paris 16*10.85: 
M.M.O. Gabon YIGuilliat to Bareste, Whydah 
11.9.85.
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The Portuguese version of this treaty placed the
entire coastline of Dahomey under Portuguese protection
and made Portugal responsible for Dahoman relations with
the European powers: it committed Portugal to buying one
hundred indentured labourers from Dahomey every year: it
also gave Portugal sovereignty over a small piece of land,
called Zomai, near Whydah, on which Portugal was to build
a barracks: in return for a small pension Dahomey was to
1give up the practice of human sacrifice*
The Fon view of the treaty was very different. The 
Dahomans were in fact aware of only part of it. They 
knew of the part referring to the selling of slaves,and 
they had agreed that Portugal should deal with any 
European attempt to violate the territorial integrity of 
their coastal provinces. It became apparent however, in
1 G.0.96/170, F.O. to C.O. 11|.. 12.1 885, 
enclosing documents issued by theVj 
Governor of St.Thome: M.M.C. Gabon/Im ,
Da Boya to Guilliat, Whydah 14.7*85: 
M.M.O. Gabon Ig6b to Marine,
Porto Novo, 8.7.85: M.M.G. Afrique rVAyt, 
M.A.E. to M.M.G. Paris 22*6*88, enclosing 
Diario do Governo of 8 and 9.5.88, 
containing Captain Roiin to Governor of 
St.Thome, 9•6.87•
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the course of the next two years, that they had made
no agreement to abandon human sacrifice: had made no
concessions of territory to Portugal, and had no idea
that the treaty stipulated that Dahomey became a vassal
of Portugal. Indeed, it would have been surprising, to
say the least of it, if the Fon, after their struggles
to preserve their freedom from European influence had,
tamely and unanimously, agreed to such a settlement with 
1
Portugal.
What the Fon did consider that they had accepted, 
apart from a purchase order for slaves, was the Portuguese 
offer to ward off foreign interference with Fon rights on 
the Coast. To them, the resurrection of the powers of the
M.M.C. Gabon IVh^ P.Oumoux to Marine, 
Whydah 10.10.85:" M.M.G. Gabon lVhc 
extract from a report from Captain 
Dumont, Dakar 8.3*86. The only 
opposition to the treaty came from 
Whydah, the area traditionally favour­
able to co-operation with the Europeans. 
The opposition came from the Yeovogun 
who was, it seems, personally jealous 
of the Chacha. He could, however, have 
had little support in the province and
A"bo?e5r1 toV soon after the signing 01 the treaty he T disappeared*,
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1
Chacha of Whydah was part and parcel of the agreement*
Juliano De Souza was to "be the agent of "both the Fon 
and the Portuguese in their relations with Europeans 
in Dahomey. The Fon would "be sheltered "by the Chacha 
from European ambitions while the Chacha would have behind 
him not only the authority of Dahomey but also that of 
Portugal. It is not difficult to see that it was 
Juliano himself who planted this idea in the minds of 
the Fon leaders.
The appointment of the Chacha as joint controller
of Fon-Portuguese foreign relations on the Coast also 
fitted in well with the ideas of the Governor of St.Thome. 
Da Boya, in establishing this protectorate, was motivated
1 M.M.C. G-abon IV^C J.De Souza to Dorat, 
Whydah 22.11.85: M.M.C. Gabon VI^
Gu illiat to Bare ste, Whydah 11.9.85:
S.M.A. Dahoman Prefecture 1883-88:
Menager to Flanque, Whydah 11.11.85*
2 M.M.C. Afrique VI 55k M.A.E. to M.M.C. 
50*86: M.Billot to De Freycinet, Lisbon 
17*2.86: M.M.C. Afrique VI55b M.A.E. to 
M.M.C. 25.3.86, translation from 'O'Seculo1 
3*3*63: M. M. C. Senegal IV-j g ^ a M.A.E. to 
M.M.C. 21.12.86: Consular agent at Whydah 
to Bare st e, Whydah 12+.10.86.
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partly by a desire to keep his sources of* indentured 
labour free from the prying eyes of the rest of Europe,
and partly by the nationalistic aim of preserving for 
Portuguese influence this section of the African coast.
He had no intention of establishing a real administration
1
on the Dahoman litoral. nevertheless, out of respect
for the dictum produced at the Congress of Berlin, which
stated that only, effective occupation entitled a European
power to claim possession of a section of the Coast, he
had to place the Dahoman coastline under the jurisdiction
of a Portuguese official. Such an official was ready
to hand. He was none other than Juliano Felix Da Souza,
newly created an honorary Lt.Colonel in the Portuguese 
2
army.
1 M.M.C.Gabon VIGuilliat to Bareste, 
Whydah 11.9.85? M.M.C Gabon I27a 
M.M.C. to Dorat, Paris 17.8.85*
2 M.M.C. Gabon VI De Boya to Guilliat, 
Whydah 1U.7-55* Tbe Portuguese
1 territory1 of Zomai was placed under 
the separate jurisdiction of Major 
Antonio Domingo Gortez du Silva Curado. 
In fact, however, he commanded only the 
Portuguese fort at Whydah.
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Juliano Felix De Souza had therefore created 
a remarkable position for himself. He had in fact 
formalised his role of intermediary between the Fon 
and the Portuguese. His position was, however, from the 
beginning dangerous, since it rested on the assumption 
that he could permanently keep the two parties to the 
treaty of Aguinzuin from learning that their interpretation 
of the treaty differed profoundly. Still, De Souza!s 
resumption of the powers of the Chacha marked the 
beginning of something of an Indian Summer in the history 
of the old-established Afro-Brazilian families. He and his 
relations, principally his son G-ermano and his brother 
Antonio, waxed rich and powerful. These De Souzas were 
again a force in Fon political life, and they were undis­
puted leaders of Afro-Brazilian society. They attempted 
as far as possible to resume the ostentatious way of life 
which the leading members of their family had followed in 
their hey-day: they constructed gracious houses for them­
selves in Whydah, houses which were to be landmarks long 
after their power had collapsed. They also attempted to 
resume ownership of land along the coast which had not
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been claimed by their family since the 1850s. They 
exploited their newly-found status to the full. In 
fact they considered themselves so indispensable that 
they had no hesitation whatsoever in endangering their 
position, by cheating both Fon and Portuguese out of
( .■j
the proceeds of the slave tra.de.
The lack of foresight displayed by the De Souza 
clan be cronies even more obvious when it is seen that Fon-
Portuguese relations ran into difficulties almost immediately
if
after the signing of the treats?-. On A/gust 21st 1885,
Fabre*s agent at Cotonou, fortified by the presence
1 M.M.C. Gabon 126b Roget to Marine,
Borto Novo 24*8.85: M.M.C. Gabon 126b 
Donat to Marine, Paris 10.10.85: M.M.C.
Gabon l27b Do rat to Marine, Porto Novo 
11.2.86 & 26.11.86: M.M.C. Senegal IV12ia 
Castellini to Bareste, Whydah 16.9*86:
C.0.96/170, F.O. to C.O. 10.11.85, 
enclosing G.Petrie to Salisbury, Lisbon 
24.10.85* The fact that Juliano De Sousa, 
as Chacha, acted as intermediary between 
the Fon and the Portuguese in the buying 
and selling of slaves aided their accumu­
lation of wealth. Between July 1885 and 
September 1886 approximately 640 indentured 
labourers were sent from Whydah to St.Thome. 
The English investigated the situation at 
Whydah and protested to Lisbon, but got no 
satisfaction. The trade in indentured labour 
was apparently legal.
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of an acting French .Resident and French troops in 
Porto Novo, put into operation the long prepared 
plan for joining the waters of the lagoon to the sea#
By using explosives, the merchants at Cotonou removed 
the spit of sand separating the sea from the lagoon.
They chose the month of August to do this because it 
was at this time that the waters of the lagoon were at 
their highest* Indeed, the Acting-Re sident and the 
merchants protested to the Fon that they took action 
only because the high waters in the lagoon threatened 
to flood the French factories. This was, however, only 
a ruse: the plan outlined by Colonna Di Lecca in 1882 
had been followed to the last detail. The merchants 
were in fact determined to improve their trading position 
even at the cost of incurring Fon hostility.
This action confirmed Fon fears that the increasing 
European activity on the Coast heralded some move
1 M.M.C. Gabon I26h Doget to Marine, 
Porto Novo 1.9.85: M.M.C. Gabon I26b 
Roget to Marine, Cotonou 27*0*85: 
M.M.C. Gabon IV^^q J.Pratt to Roget, 
Cotonou 21*9.85,
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prejudicial to Dahoman interests. On the 22nd August
the Fon authorities on the Coast rushed all available
troops to Cotonou, closed the roads, amd forbade any .
Europeans to leave the country. The Fon leaders in
Abomey, however, seem to have determined to follow the
treaty of Aguinzuin to the letter, and left the Portuguese
2
to deal with the French. Accordingly, Da Boya, who was 
still in Whydah, on the 13th September despatched the 
Chacha with a body of Portuguese troops to Cotonou. In 
an attempt to frustrate any further French attempt to 
make their will felt there, the Chacha raised the 
Portuguese flag over that town. Lt.Roget responded by 
sending a detachment of French troops to Cotonou, where 
they, in their turn, raised the French flag. Both
1 M.M.G. Gabon Ip6b Roget to Marine, 
Cotonou 27.9.65*
2 M.M.C. Gabon JVxG M.A.E. to M.M.C. 
22.12.85? enclosing; Guilliat to 
Bareste, Whydah 27.10.85: M.M.C.
Gabon IV^q Roeder to Pradier, St.Thome 
2I|,.2.86: M.M.C. Gabon 127b Do rat to 
Marine, Porto Povo 12.^86. This 
decision was not, however, taken without 
argument. It was rumoured in St.Thome 
that a number of the Fon wished to kill 
all the French on the Coast. Kondo1s 
will, however, prevailed.
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garrisons remained encamped there, surrounded by two
hundred Fon troops* On the 17th December, after a
series of French protests both on the Coast and in
*1
Lisbon, the Portuguese force was withdrawn. In Europe, 
at least, it was recognised that the French had the 
paramount claim to Cotonou.
In the eyes of the Fon the Portuguese had gone back 
on the most important aspect of the Aguinzuin agreement. 
They complained bitterly to the Portuguese that they had 
no right whatsoever to concede Fon territory to the French.
1 M.M.C. G-abon 126b Marine,
Cotonou 15.9.85: M.M.C. Gabon Igg-n 
Roget to Marine, Porto Novo 1.10.85: 
M.M.C.Gabon 127b to Marine,
Porto Novo 21.12.85: M.M.C. Gabon I2?a 
M.M.C. to Dorat, Paris 17*10.85:
M.M.C. Gabon Do rat to M.M.C.
Dakar 14.11.85: When Roget protested
to Da Boya that the Portuguese action 
was a violation of French rights, the 
Governor was genuinely surprised. He 
declared that in 1878 France had only- 
obtained trading rights in Cotonou.
The two men left the problem to be 
worked out by the metropolitan
go v e rnme nt s •
2 M.M.C. Afpique VI 53b M.Billot to M.A.E 
Lisbon^ 1 8.2.86, enclosing translation 
from rt>1 Seculo T, 18.2.86,
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Tne destruction of* Ketu without Yoruba intervention 
had, moreover, left Dahomey triumphant in the interior. 
After they had been let down over the Cotonou issue, 
the Fon had no further interest in close co-operation 
with Portugal. However, since they were still vitally 
interested in the export of slaves the Dahomans took 
no action to repudiate the Treaty of Aguinzuin.
PortugalTs failure to protect Dahoman interests 
left the Fon with the problem of how best to deal with 
French encroachment. The moment had passed when they 
might have attacked in the heat of their wrath.
Moreover, the fact that the cutting at Cotonou proved
1unnavlgable after the floods subsided made the problem
1 M.M.G. Gabon 126b Roget bo Marine, 
Porto Novo 29.8.85: M.M.C. Gabon I27t, 
Dorat to Marine, Porto Novo 7.1.86: 
M.M.C. Gabon l26h Roget to Marine, 
Cotonou 27.9.85. In September small 
boats had used the channel. The Fon, 
however, proceeded to block it by 
throwing baskets filled with sand into 
it. They were aided in their task by 
a natural subsidence of the lagoon 
waters once the rains were over.
appear less urgent. They therefore did nothing , more 
than protest and make vague threats of impending military 
action;# The situation at Gotonou had however he eh 
effectively changed. Even although the Fon administration 
of ihe area continued to function, the French flag now 
flew over the town. What was more, a French; garrison was 
established there to guard the flag.
The French administrators on the Goast had been 
impressed by the Fon reaction to the merchants^ initiative 
in Gotonou, and in 1886, moved very cautiously both 
in that town and in Porto Novo* They did continue to 
increase their control of these areas, but they advanced 
so gradually that they did not provoke the irate Fon to 
direct action. In January 1886 Dorat, despairing of 
re-asserting Toffa* s authority in Oueme, began to attempt 
to attach the Chiefs of that area directly to France 
rather than to Porto Novo ♦ In August, despite Fpn 
protests, the French began constructing a telegraph post
1 . Gabon Io7b Dorat to Marine,
• Porto Novo 21.1.86♦
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1
at Gotonou* In the same month, taking advantage of the 
presence of ships engaged in. laying the telegraph cable,
2
the French built barracks to house their Gotonou garrison* 
She Fon leaders protested vigorously against all these 
actions, but found none of them, individually, sufficiently 
provocative to launch a full scale attack on the French*
The cumulative effect of these French measures was, 
nevertheless, to strengthen considerably the French hold 
on Gotonou and Porto Uovo*
In the last months of 1886 a significant change 
took place in French activities on the Slave Goast*
This change was due to control of the French territories 
there being trasnferred from Gabon to Senegal* Officials 
began to appear on the Slave Goast who had already taken
1 M.M.G.Senegal IV^x M.A.E. to M.M.G. 
Paris 12*10*86, enclosing Barest© to 
M.A.B. Freetown 6*9#86: M.M.G. Senegal 
IYi2i Beauseet to Marine, Ille de 
Prince 22*8*86, enclosing J.F* and 
A*le Sousa to Fabre*s agent in Whydah 
(no date)*
2 M.M.G. Gabon IpRa *fco Marine,
Porto Kovo 5*6*85: M*M*G * Gabon Ip8a
Roget to Marine, Porto Novo 12*8*86*
3 M.M.G. Gabon Ipga Bor«t to Roget,
Porto Rovoi 11*4 *§7 •
part in the French advance into the Senegal hinterland, 
and who automatically applied this forward policy in 
their new sphere of action*
The first and perhaps the most important of these 
officials, Br. $e.an Bayol, the Lt*Governor of the Rivierea 1 
de Sud, came to the Slave Qoast in January 1887 with orders 
tOrina^: out the Franco-German frontier on the Popos • ;• This 
he did, in conjunction with the German Commissioner /; 
Falhenfchal,: in the first. months after his arrival • Buring 
his tour, in an attempt to define the Porto Novo-Bagos 
frontier as well, he set in motion a series of incidents 
which led to an acute crisis. Bayol^ it seems, was de* 
termined to show that the Fr^cji: had a right to Ketonou,; ^ 
the spot on the lagoon between Porto Novo, and Cotonou, where; 
the English had a toll house. The French flag was raised^; 
over Ketonou, French troops were installed there, and a 
rival, French, Customs post was erected. This new
1 M.A.B.y Afrique 83, Be la Porte to 
Bayolj Paris 20.9.86.
2 C.Newbury, op.cit», pp.114-15 s 
E.Dunglas, E.B.IX. pp.69-75.
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development in the struggle over conflicting claims 
to Ketonou led to an acute crisis in April-May 1887 
when the soldiers manning the opposing posts began 
firing on each other*
In June 1887 the Commander of the French South 
Atlantic fleet, Admiral Ribell, and the Governor of 
Lagos agreed to withdraw all troops from the disputed 
areas pending a delineation of frontiers. If mefchant 
reports are to he believed, Bayol1s actions during this
2crisis revealed irresponsibility and perhaps dishonesty.. 
Only after intervention by the metropolitan governments 
was the problem frontier defined in August 1889* The 
immediate result of Bayol1s activities was to outline 
clearly the French coastal officials* determination to 
expand French influence*
1 C.0.879/26 African 33^4*, Evans to Holland, 
Lagos 30*3*87: Evans to Holland, Lagos 
1.5*87, and Moloney to Meade, Lagos 
19*6.87, enclosing Convention of 18.6*87*
2 M.A.E.Afrique 83, Fabre to M.A.E. 8.9*87: 
Unnamed merchant to Fabre, Porto Novo 
5.5*87: unnamed merchant to Fabre, Porto
Novo 5*7*87* Bayol, without thought of 
the consequences, ordered French troops 
t o Ketonou. When things went wrong he 
blamed his subordinate, Dr.Pereton, the 
new administrator of Porto Novo, who had 
come with him from Senegal.
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While the French, were engaged in finding 
internationally accepted boundaries to their possessions, 
the Portuguese were active in attempting to instil some 
formal meaning into their Dahoman protectorate. The 
initiative in this matter had passed from St•Thome" to 
Lisbon. Da Boya v/as recalled, and a new Governor, Augusto 
Sacremento, was sent out with instructions to either 
Induce the Fon fully to implement the Treaty of Aguinzuin 
or to withdraw Portuguese protection from Dahomey: there 
was no question of Portugal using force to put the treaty
4
into effect. In order to regularise their protectorate, 
to make it acceptable in the eyes of the civilised world 
and, indeed, to make it pay for Itself, the Portuguese 
tried to persuade the Fon to permit the setting up of 
Portuguese Customs posts along the litoral: they also 
tried to persuade them to end the ceremonies which 
involved human sacrifice. A  Portuguese major,
1 M.M.C. Gabon 128a Foget to Marine,
Porto Novo 10.5.86: M.M.C. Senegal
IV12la M.A.E. to M.M.G. Paris 21.12.86, 
enclosing Vice-Consul at Whydah to 
Bareste 1h.10.86. M.M.C. Senegal I87c
Bayol to Governor 20*3*87
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Cortez Silva Curado, was sent to Abomey in April 1886 
to attempt to gain Fon consent to these points. It is 
doubtful If the Fon really knew what he wanted. At any 
rate he was unsuccessful.^ The Fon In fact had nothing 
to discuss: the treaty was now only useful to them in 
that it enabled them to sell slaves.
In February 1887 Sacremento (having given four months 
warning of his arrival) himself visited Dahomey. The Fon 
however refused to allow him to go to Abomey on the 
grounds that the King was away from the capital at war.
He had therefore to leave without undertaking any meaning- 
ful negotiations. In April 1887 a Portuguese delegation 
headed by Captain Vincente Da Rosa Kolim, and accompanied 
by the Chacha’, did actually get to Abomey. On their
1 M.M.C. Afrique IVj1a M.A.E. to M.M.C. 
Paris 6.4.86, enclosing Guilliat to 
Barest©, Whydah 18.2.86; M.M.C. Afrique
IV1;ja M.A.E. to M.M.C., Paris 6.8.86, 
enclosing Guilliat to Barest©, Whydan 
28.6.86.
2 M.M.C. Senegal IV^21a M.A.E. to M.M.C. 
19.4*87, enclosing Castellini to Barest©, 
Whydah 26.2.87: M.M.C. Senegal Iov 
Bayol to Governor 20.3.87: M.M.C. Senegal 
Iv12la M.A.E. to M.M.C.7.12.87: Billot to 
M.A.E. Lisbon 22.11.87.
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arrival the Fon immediately began to talk about the 
only part of their relationship with Portugal which 
still intei’ested them* They protested they were
receiving too low a price for their slaves* This set 
in motion a general investigation into the doings of the 
Chacha. In the course of this a Portuguese trader and 
rival members of the Da Souza clan decided that it was 
in their interests to reveal that the Chacha had hot only 
been cheating on the price of slaves, but that he had 
also totally misled the Fon as to the nature of the Treaty 
of Aguinzuin. The Fon then courteously but firmly declared 
that although they wished to maintain friendly relations
1
they would never agree to becoming a vassal of Portugal.
1 M.M.C. Afrique V l g ^  M.A.E. to M.M.C.
22*6.88, enclosing translation of King 
of Dahomey to King of Portugal, Secume 
16.7*87, and Diaro Do Governo St.Thome 
8 & 9-5-88, containing Captain Rolin to 
Governor of St.Thome, St.Thome 9-6.87:
M.M.C. Afrique VIgyu M.A.E. to M.M.C.
21.5*88. enclosing translated despatches 
which had appeared in Diaro Do Governo:
Governor of St.Thome to Marine 2.8.87, 
and 7 & 10-9-87: M.M.C* Afrique Vl^y^
Billot to M.A.E.4-1 •88, enclosing 
translation of a statement by Portuguese 
Minister of Marine, printed in Diaro Do 
Governo 28.12.87: M.M.C. Senegal 187b 
Bayol to Marine. Eyguires 11.10.87:
M.M.C. Senegal IV^pg^ Ribell to Marine,
Ille de Prince 26.6.87.
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The Portuguese, who had no intention of using force
against Dahomey, then officially abandoned their
protectorate. It is hardly surprising that Juliano,
Antonio, and Germano De Souza disappeared1 or died
2very suddenly afterwards.
As a result of rumours of impending Portuguese 
withdrawal from Dahomey, Lt.Governor Bayol had been 
instructed, in 1886, to consider whether it would be 
to the advantage of Prance to occupy the points cSSE
1 M.M.G. Senegal IV.]21 a M.A.E. to M.M.G.
?#12t87, enclosing Decree of Portuguese 
Council of Ministers 16.11.87* After this 
date only the fort of St.John the Baptist 
at Whydah remained officially in Portuguese 
hands.
2 M.M.&.Afrigue Vlgy^ M.A.E. to M.M.G. 
22.6.88, enclosing Diaro Do Governo
of 8 & 9*5*68 including Secretary General 
of St.Thome to Marine, St.Thome 23.10.87: 
M.M.G.Senegal Igjb Bayol to Marine,
Eyguires 11.10.87: M.M.G. Senegal TV±22el 
Ribell to Marine, Ille de Prince 26.6.87* 
The Chacha was arrested and then he 
disappeared1, not, however, before the 
Pon had invited the Governor of St.Thome 
to his trial. Germano and Antonio were 
poisoned.
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1
on the coast where France had historic rights* All the 
Fon had achieved by their association with Portugal was 
therefore to encourage the French to think that Dahomey 
would be willing to accept their protection instead of
that of the Portuguese*
Bayol visited Whydah in February and May 1887* As
a result of the information he gained thereyhe formulated 
the theory that "because the Whydah authorities had 
resented the revival of the Chacha1 s powers, they would 
he disposed to look favourably upon the advance of French 
power* He claimed that once the Portuguese withdrew, 
the Fon would naturally seek the protection of France.
That the Chacha had been overthrown and the Portuguese 
treaty rejected precisely because Dahomey would countenance 
no European attempts at control, no matter by whom, simply 
did not occur to Bayol* He reported that although it 
would be inopportune to expand French interests in 
Dahomey while Fon relations with Portugal were still in
1 M.A.E.Afrigue 83? De La Porte to Bayol,
Paris 26*9*86. This was the first official 
use of the phrase historic rights*. It 
referred to Cotonou, Porto Hovo, and even 
less justifiably to Whydah. In fact, the 
French had had from the King only the lease 
of the fort at WhydabL they had no legal 
claim to the fort, let alone to Whydah itself.
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doubt, it would be wise to follow a conciliatory policy 
so that Dahomey would be favourably disposed towards
A
France in the future.
Dahoman ideas on the subject of future relations 
with the Europeans can be seen very clearly in the 
Dahoman letter to the King of Portugal informing him of 
the Dahoman* s refusal to accept the Treaty of Aguinzuin.
In this letter.the King of Portugal was advised to warn 
other European nations against attempting to seize 
African territory. He was told that the Fon had resisted 
such attempts in the past and would do so again in the 
future. If the Europeans persisted in acting in this 
fashion, the Africans would cease to trade and would,
themselves, learn to manufacture the goods the Europeans 
2brought* There certainly was not much prospect of 
Dahomey being flattered into yielding territory to France.
M.M.C. Senegal Igy^ Bayol to Governor 
of Senegal, on board 'Message* 20,3.87, 
and Bayol to Marine, Eyguires 11.10*87*
M.M.C. Afrique M.A.E. to M.M.C.,
enclosing translation of King of Dahomey 
to King of Portugal, Secume 16.7.87.
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This was made evem more explicit when a treaty-making 
expedition to the Lower Oueme* undertaken on Bayol’s 
orders* produced a strong Dahoman protest reminding 
Prance that Dahomey would tolerate no European activity 
on that river,* The French Colonial Department never­
theless showed considerable interest in Dahomey once the 
Portuguese withdrew* The Foreign Ministry* however, on 
the reasonable grounds that France would encounter the
same difficulties as had Portugal, refused to countenance
2any sort of forward policy in the area.
In Abomey itself, the repudiation of the Portuguese 
alliance left the Kondo-Bougbododhoue ruling factions 
virtually without an agreed policy towards the movements 
of the Europeans on the Coast* Many of the Chiefs, 
probably the followers of Nougbodo dhoue, wanted an all- 
out war din the encroaching French* Kondo1 s views on this
2
M.M.C. Senegal IV-j22a M.A.E. to M.M.C 
Paris 22.9.87, enclosing Rolin to
Maillot, Dahomey 22.6,87*
M.M.C. Afriquegyp, Du Flouries to 
Kranz, Paris 31 i 1.88.
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cannot "be definitely ascertained, Nevertheless, since 
he was later more willing to compromise than was 
Hougbo do dhoue^it seems probable that, at this time,
A
he tried to restrain the more beligerent group.
The Whydah Chiefs certainly took a more tolerant line.
The Goastal areas had a vast network of vested interests
impelling them towax^ds maintaining good relations with
their chief trading partners* The Chiefs of these areas
also appreciated that their territory was wide open either
to bombardment or even attack from the sea, From the 
that
factyCotonou and Abomey-Calavi alone of the lands south
of the Marais later remained loyal to Kondo in the
successive struggle,it seems likely that these Coastal
Chiefs even contemplated ceding Cotonou to the French.
One of Kondo’s younger brothers, or half brothers,
2
Prince Topa, at this time began to gather a following to 
back his claim to the throne. He became the close ally
1 See Chapter V p,362-67*
2 This Prince appears as TDapehT in
the Hnglish records: he appears 
as lopa in the French.
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of tlie Whydah Chiefs. It can he reasonably inferred 
that he gained their support hy taking a very tolerant 
stand on the issue of how to deal with the French. He 
himself, however, as his later support for the war 
against France was to show, did not for a minute consider 
any cession of territory. Like the rest of the royal 
family, he was adamant on this point. However, he was 
probably willing to accept the status quo in Cotonou as 
a possible basis for re-establishing friendly relations 
with France.
Besides a reputation for flexibility in his dealings 
with the Europeans, Topa probably also had some dynastic 
link with the Coastal areas. At any rate he won the 
support of the Coastal Chiefs for his candidature to the 
throne soon after the abandonment of the Portuguese 
alliance. By December 1888 the rivalry between the two 
Princes had become so acute that Topa had withdrawn to 
Whydah to live amongst his supporters. He must have in 
fact had a fairly large and powerful following. If he had 
not had such a following, no doubt Kondo v/ould have had 
him disposed of in the traditional Dahoman manner.
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Fighting did not break out between the two parties, 
but Kondo attempted to undermine Topa's position by 
cutting off all Whydah trade with the interior*
In 1888, then, Whydah and its hinterland were to 
a large extent alienated from Abomey. Trade between 
the two areas was at a standstill, although communication 
had not completely ceased. Further to the east, Porto 
Novo, by 1888, was the seene of growing French activity. 
French government agents there were talking openly of 
taking over the coastal areas of Dahomey. The group of 
violently pro-French Creoles in Porto Novo society was 
rapidly gaining strength. Seeing the Dahoman confusion 
on the Coast, encouraged by talk of French expansion, 
and probably urged on by his Creole advisers, King Toffa 
determined to make a bid for independence of Dahomey.
This he did in the full knowledge that his army was
1 C.0.879/28 African 355? Moloney to Knutsford, 
Lago s 3*12.88: Moloney to Knut sfo rd, Lagos 
1 A.12.88, enclosing Minutes of interviews 
with Prince Fasinu, 30*11*88, and Princess 
Gibenbosi 10 & 12.12.88; C.O.879/29 African
5^5, Denton to Knutsford, Lagos 15.ij-.89, 
27.6.89 and 12.7.89. ’
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weak and that many of* his Chiefs would refuse to 
*]
support him*
Knowing that his own resources were in no way 
adequate to protect his position, Toffa must have 
made this “break in the expectation that the French 
would both maintain him in Porto Novo, and protect 
Porto Novo against Dahomey. His all-important object 
in his future relations with the French was therefore 
to draw France into his quarrel with Dahomey* The 
French were not informed that Porto Novo was making
Many of the Chiefs in Porto Novo were 
Toffa's dynastic enemies. They would 
welcome a chance to overthrow him.
The most important of the Porto Novan 
Chiefdoms, the Decame, or Oueme Kingdom
^row &ny allegiance 
to Toffa. Legally, the position of
this Chiefdom was dubious. Toffa was
its suzerain; the King of Dahomey was
Toffa* s suzerain. To whom did ToffaTs
Chiefs owe allegiance? Such feudal!stic
argument is pointless. The Decame, for
example, lay close to Fon territory.
The Chief of the Decame, Aide, was bound
to side with Dahomey.
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a bid for independence; they were told that Porto 
Novo was already independent, and that Dahomey was 
determined to destroy the town* They were assured 
that this was an attack on France as well as on Toffa.
The Fon, in the Porto Novan version of the
quarrel, were therefore portrayed as the aggressors*
France was to be asked to come to the aid of a small
nation about to be overwhelmed by a large, warlike 
1
neighbour, a form of propaganda which has frequently 
proved effective.
1 This is the version given by Akindele 
and Aguessy in Contribution a 1 'Etude 
d ’Histoire de Ancien Royaume de Porto 
Novo * Following Toffa’s line, French 
contemporary chroniclers of France’s 
war with Dahomey all regarded Dahomey 
as the aggressor. See, for example,
E.E*Aublet,_^La Guerre au Dahomey
Dahomey 1889-92: A.Barbou, Histoire 
de la Guerre au Dahomey: ,|p.A. De Sal inis, 
Le Protectorate Francais sur la Cote 
des Es&Laves; La Campagne du Sane
1889-90.
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The version of the quarrel with Toffa given by the 
Dah^.omans runs as follows: Toff a, in 1887? engineered
an incident as a justification for his quarrel with 
Dahomey* He rquested the Don to destroy a rebellious 
Porto Hovan town called Wefain. This was not an unusual 
request. He had frequently asked the Dahomans to destroy 
his enemies and the .Don willingly obliged. Toff a then 
asked that a number of his subjects captured in the town 
should be returned. Again the Don did as he asked. No 
sooner had these subjects been returned than Toffa closed 
all the trade routes between Dahomey and Porto Novo. At 
the same time he expelled all Dahoman traders from his 
town. He then announced that he had done this because
•i
the Don had wantonly attacked one of his villages.
1 M.H.G. Senegal IV Gel el e to French 
Pre si dent, Abomey 12.5 .89 and Gelele 
to Resident of Porto Novo5 Abomey (no 
date): G. 0.1 kl/l'\ , Denton to Knutsford,
Lagos 2 7 .6 .814.5 enclosing Gelele to British 
Government5 Dahomey 12.5 .8 9. This corres­
ponds closely to the Fon tradition recorded 
by A.Le Heriss©5 op. cit. p 334.
G.Newbury, op.cit, P.128. Newbury remarks 
that the Fon "official version of the quarrel 
can be found in J.M. & F.S.HerskovitsT 
Dahoman Narrative, p. 381 -I|.. This does not 
record the tradition nearly as well as does 
Le fierisse.
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This story is borne out by the observations of
Europeans on the Coast at the time* Ballot, the
French Resident, reported in May 1888 that although
Toff a spoke of an impending Dahoman attack on Porto
Novo, Fon messengers had just come to Porto Novo
leading with them eighteen captives. This Ballot saw
*]
as a gesture of goodwill* Toff a was continually
emphasising the danger from Dahomey, Ballot considered,
in order to obtain the despatch of a French gunboat and
troops to Porto Novo* Toffafs greatest fear, he declared,
n ~ 2
was that the French would withdraw as they had m  1865* 
Earlier in the year, according to the English District 
Commissioner at Badagry, Toff a had published an edict 
severing relations with Dahomey and banning all Dahoman 
trade with Porto Novo*^ In October, the same British
1 M.M.C. Senegal IV-j23a V* Ballot to 
Governor of Senegal, Porto Novo
12.5.80*
2 M.M.C. Senegal Vigo V*Ballot to 
Governor of Senegal, 15*4*88.
3 C.O.879/27, African 345? Moloney 
to Knutsford, Lagos 24.4.88, 
enclosing Millison to GolomidX 
Secretary at Lagos, Badagry' 23.4*88
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official reported that Toffa had put to death a number
1
of Porto Novan traders who had disobeyed this edict.
The view that the Dahoman version of their quarrel
with Toffa is an accurate one was moreover confirmed
by a report of a confession made by Toffa when in a
state of absolute panic after a Dahoman attack in
April 1889:-
TToffa a declar^ lui-meme dans une reunion
tenue devant les commercants qu!il avait
provo que le roi du Dahomey: c'est qui!il
comptait que les Francais le vengeraient.
Toffa a la soule caiise de cette invasion
2
et reconnait aujourd hui sa b£tise,1•
In early 1888, then, Toffa, knowing of the divisions 
in the Dahoman leadership, spurred on by the increasingly 
anti-Fon Creole group concentrated in Porto Novoj and 
confident of French support, totally rejected Dahoman 
overlordship.
1 C.0.879/28, African 355? Moloney 
to Knutsford, Lagos 20.10.88.
2 M.M.C. Senegal De Beeckman 
to Governor of Senegal, Porto Novo 
5*4*88. Most of the despatch is 
reproduced in B.D. XX pp.95-97*
This paragraph, the penultimate, 
has been omitted.
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The Abomey leaders were therefore faced with a 
situation of exceptional seriousness on the Coast.
Whydah was in a state of at least incipient rebellion 
while Porto Novo was openly hostile. Although Cotonou 
and Abomey-Calavi remained loyal to Abomey their 
position between Whydah and Porto Novo was obviously 
dangerous* It was not unlikely that Abomey might be 
cut off from the Coast, where lay the only sources of 
supply of arms and luxury goods. The Fon in Abomey in 
1888 concentrated their attention on attempting to 
secure a safe route to the Coast.
With their difficulties of supply in mind, the 
Abomey leaders toyed with the idea of establishing a 
new route to the Coast, via Ketu and Egb ado land. They 
considered rebuilding Ketu and placing there, as a client
■i
of Dahomey, the son of the last Alaketu, Prince Fetonah.
1 0.0. 879/28, African 335? Moloney to
Knutsford, Lagos 18.11.88, enclosing 
Willoughby to Secretary, Lagos 12.11.88: 
0.0.879/28, African 335? Moloney to 
ICnutsford, Lagos 31*7.88. Fetonah 
himself seems to have been playing a 
double game: while he was said to be 
negotiating along these lines with 
Dahomey, he was also seeking English 
protection for a re-established 
independent Ketu.
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After rebuilding Ketu they visualised attempting to
1
gain control of Illaro, Otta, and Ado. This could 
give them direct access to Lagos. When it is remembered 
that the Fon state was to be in existence for only another 
four years, such a policy may appear somewhat over- 
ambitious. However, it must be borne in mind that after 
the 1885 victories, Dahomey was stronger than it had 
been since the 1840s*
This projected movement ties in with the fact 
that a Dahoman embassy was sent three times to Lagos 
between December 1888 and dune 1889. Officially, the
1 0.0.879/^8, African 355? Moloney to
Knutsford, Lagos 21.8.88, enclosing 
Minutes of an interview with OJi 
Balagun of Okedo, 16.8.88: 0.0.879/28 
African 355? Moloney to Knutsford, 
Lagos 1.11.88, enclosing Minutes of 
an interview with messengers of the 
King of Iseyin 1.11*88: 0.0.147/66 
Moloney to Knutsford, Lagos 19*10.88 
enclosing Alafin of Oyo to Moloney,
Oyo 25.9,88. Dahoman raids in that 
year took place in Iseyin, Olcedo, and 
Oyo territory. These towns were so 
intimidated that they applied to Lagos 
for protection.
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purpose of the first two visits, in December 1888 and
1
April 1889, was to seek English protection for Dahomey. 
Unofficially it was stated that the real aim of the
embassy was to ensure that the Fon had access to a 
coastal port. The Fon wished to establish good relations 
with England so that they could trade through Lagos. 
Later, when Kendo and Top a became reconciled, the Fon 
changed their policy* Once the danger of a revolt in 
Whydah had been removed, Abomey no longer needed to seek 
a new route to the coast. The purpose of the third visit
1 C.0.879/29, African 355, Meade to 
Foreign Office 12.12.88: Pauncefoote 
to Colonial Office 17*12.88.
Protection1 had become a fashionable 
word. The Fon probably meant alliance 
in much the same way as they had thought 
of their relationship with the Portuguese 
as an * alliance1. Lagos treated the 
proposition seriously. Moloney considered 
(and the Colonial Office agreed) that the 
proposal should not at once be rejected.
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1
was to withdraw the request for protection.
The reconciliation itself probably came about 
as the inherent danger of an open split in Fon society
1 For the sources of information see f/n, 
p.287* The ambassadors were, on every 
occasion, the same. The official leader 
was Prince Fasinou, a fourteen-year-old 
son of Prince Kondo. The delegation was 
escorted by Princess G-ibenbosi Honi of 
Eetonou, who passed on to the Governor 
much of the information on Dahoman politics 
she had learned from the delegates. The 
strange composition of the party was said 
to be due to the fact that it was impossible 
for a senior Dahoman official to pass 
through either Porto Novo or Yorubaland 
without being detected. Princess Gibenbosi 
Honi was chosen to escort Fasinou because, 
being a citizen of Ketonou(at this point 
still under British protection) and trading 
regularly in southern Dahomey, she would 
not be suspect when travelling through 
Porto Novo. It was claimed by the delegation, 
on its third visit, that Fasinou was not 
Kondof s son and that the offer made by him 
to accept protection was therefore meaningless. 
The Princess believed simply that Fon policy 
had changed. So did the Lagos officials.
C.W.Newbury (op.cit., p.128) dismisses, in 
8 lines, the history of Fon relationship 
with both the Portuguese and the British 
during 1885 to 1888. He equates them with 
vague rumours of Fon application for German 
'protection.
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■became more and more obvious. It seems likely that
it was the French Resident, De Beeckman, who Drought
home to the Fon the extent of French ambitions in
Cotonou and the necessity for Dahoman unity. At the
Beginning of March 1889 he curtly informed the Dahoman
authorities that the French intended to replace the
Fon Customs posts at Cotonou with French ones. At the
same time he rather ominously remarked that the Fon
would do well to accept the French offer of compensation.
The threat posed By increasing French ambitions and By
Porto Novan rebelliousness in fact forced Kondo and Topa
into a reconciliation.
Soon after the reconciliation Dahomey closed the
trade paths and the Resident was asked to go to Whydah
2to receive a message from the King. De Beeckman left 
Porto Novo on the 27th of March and on the 29th was 
informed in Whydah, by a royal messenger, that French
1 Reproduced in E.D. IX, part 3, p.c//-95' 
De Beeckman to the Governor of 
Senegal, Porto Novo 6.3*89.
2 M.M.C. Senegal IV^^a Captain Bertin 
to Colonel Dodds, Porto Novo 5.U.89.
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attempts to end the Fon control of Cotonou would not 
he tolerated* This move seems to have been a diversion 
deliberately created to remove the Resident from Porto 
Novo. On the very day after De Beeckman left that town 
a Fon army arrived on the Porto Novan frontier* The
t.
Dahomans had determined to bring Toffa to heel* The 
Porto Novan army was severely defeated by a united army
p
of Ouemians, and Dahomans* Many of Toffa1s leading
3supporters were killed. The panic-stricken population 
of Porto Novo, headed by Toffa himself, fled across the 
lagoon to English, territoiy where they considered they 
would be safe*
1 M*M*C* Senegal IV'^Ra Captain Bert in to 
Colonel Dodds, Porto Novo, 29,3.89.
2 The sub»states in Porto Novo over which 
Tofra claimed to mile, took the Fon side 
in this conflict without hesitation*
3 M*IvuC. Senegal Irokin Eko
6*4*89: C.0.879/24, African 363? Denton 
to Knutsford, Lagos 3*4*89, enclosing 
F*Colley-Green to D*C. at Badagry, 
Ketonou 29.3.89: Higginson to Lagos, 
Colonial Secretary, Badagry 31.3.89s
F*Colley-Green to Higginson, Ketonou 
30*3*89*
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the
On the 29th? Captain Bertin ,y Officer in Command
of the tiny French garrison, reported that the Resident
and all the French traders in Fon territory had "been
seized and held prisoner. Both he and the French
traders in rorto Hovo requested Rear Admiral Brown De
Colstoun, Commander in Chief of the French South Atlantic
Fleet, to come to Porto Novo immediately. In order to
protect French lives Bertin considered that it was
essential to land troops at Whydah, Cotonou, Godomey,
and Porto Hovo# However, on the 6th April when a
company of Marines were landed at Porto Hovo they could
2find no opposing army against which to defend the town* 
The Dahomans, having demonstrated their strength hy 
anihilating Toffa1s army and destroying a number of his 
palm oil plantations, had simply retired# Moreover,
1 M.M.C. Senegal IV-j2/-La Brown De Colstoun 
to Marine 29*i+#89, enclosing Bert in to 
Brown De Colstoun, Porto Novo 30.3*89: 
Agents of Fabre and Regis to Brown De 
Colstoun, Porto Hovo U#h*89.
2 M.M.C. Senegal l^piLn Be Beeckman to 
Governor of Senegal; 10.1^ *89: part, 
but only part, of this despatch is 
reproduced in E.D.IX.
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the rumour reported, by Bert in, that the Resident and 
the French traders in Dahomey had been made prisoners, 
proved totally false* Neither De Beeckman nor the traders 
had been molested. De Beeckman's vie?/ of the situation 
was entirely different from that of Bert in* He realised 
that the attack on Porto Novo was directed only against 
Toffa and that the Europeans had nothing to fear* The 
Cotonou dispute, he emphasised, was quite unrelated to
A
the Dahomey-Porto Novo war.
The aim of this Fon move against Porto Novo seems 
to have been to Indicate, to the inhabitants of that 
town, Toffa's inability to resist Dahomey. This 
demonstration they expected would produce the overthrow 
of Toffa's regime* It was a method of getting rid of 
Toffa , deliberately thought out, so that it would not 
bring the Fon into direct conflict with the French. It 
was in order to avoid any chance of endangering French 
lives that the Fon refrained from making a direct attack
011 Porto Novo when they had the opportunity to do so after 
the destruction of Toffa's army.
1 M.M.C. Senegal IV12ka De Beectanan to 
Brown De Colstoun, Porto Kovo 1.U.89.
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So that there would he no misunderstanding of
their intentions, the Fon sent a series of letters to
the European administrations on the Goast, stating
j^' "j- Tjlf O
clearly their reasons for making war on Toffa* 
stated in these letters that the Fon did not wish to
harm either the people of Porto ITovo or the Europeans
in that town* The attack had heen made on the city in
order to demonstrate to its inhabitants that Toffa had
incurred Dahoman displeasure and ought to he deposed*
The Porto Novans had heen instructed to depose Toffa
and place Soginhe^ the candidate of the rival Mekpon
2dynasty on the throne. Indeed, only the arrival of the 
French troops had- prevented the overthrow of Toffa by
1 C*0*147/71 Denton to Knutsford, Lagos 6*89 
enclosing King Gelele to H*M!s Government,
Yavondi Palace 12*5*89: M.M.C* Senegal IV^ pi.-u 
Gel el e to President of France, Whydah 12* 5* $9*. 
M.M.C. Senegal Gelele to Resident;no date*
2 While Toffa acknowledged the authority of 
Dahomey, Soginhe had- been an Egha protege*
After Toffa*s deflection, Dahomey reversed, 
its policy ana supported Soginbe's claim 
to the throne.
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his panic-stricken people. Even with the presence of
French troops there was a great underswell of unrest 
*1
in the town#
During this crisis De Beeckman quarx^elled Bitterly
with Captain Bertin, who held his appointment independently
2
of the Resident* De Beeckman considered that Bertin 
was unduly favourable to Toffa, whom De Beeckman held
responsible for all the trouble. The Resident felt that
Toffa should not be supported, since this only drew
France into a quarrel with Dahomey. Bertin, However,
continued, against De Beeckman1s advice, to prop up
3Toffa*s tottering regime. The quarrel was made all the
1 C.0.879/29 African 385? Denton to Knutsford, 
Lagos 7*4.89, enclosing Peel to Acting- 
Governor 6.4*89*
2 At this period the Resident was in charge 
only of civil affairs. The Commander of 
the Armed Forces was responsible indepen­
dently for military policy. The Resident 
of Porto Novo took his orders from his 
superior officer in Senegal. Only in the 
Marine, in Paris, did this chain of command 
unite.
3 M.M.C. Senegal IV.]214b Governor of Senegal to 
Colonial Unoer-Secretary, St.Louis, 5.6.89, 
enclosing De Beeckman to Governor, Porto 
Novo 6^.5.89: G.G.A. G22, Rapport Du Capitaine 
Bertin, Porto Novo 14.1.89: S.M.A. Dahoman 
Prefecture, 1889-91, Piea to Planque, Porto 
Novo 4.4.89.
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more acute by the fact tnat because of Bertin* s 
alarmist reports, at the beginning of April, it was 
thought in France, for a time, that De Beeckman had 
allowed himself to be made a prisoner by the Fon*
Before this impression was corrected De Beeckman was 
recalled, fox1 lack of aang fro id. The Governor of 
Senegal v/as instructed to replace De Beeckman by a 
more senior official, Dr. Tautain, the Director of
A
Political Affairs in Senegal. Ultimately, De Beeckman
got the better of the quarrel. Bertin himself was 
2
recalled, while the Governor of Senegal commended 
De Beeckman*s conduct. Dr Tautain, moreover, after he 
had studied the situation, agreed whole-heartedly with 
De Beeckman*s analysis of the situation*^ Nevertheless, 
as a result of Bertin*s support,Toffa preserved his throne* 
The intention of the Dahomans in making this attack, 
as has been noted, was to force the people of Porto Novo
1 M.A*E* Afrique 125, Colonial Under 
Secretary to M.A.E., Paris 5*4.89.
2 M.M.C. Senegal I V ^ g b  to 
Colonel Dodds, Paris 3.6.89.
3 See below: Chap. V. p 3°6
30U ■“
to ovei4throw Toffa and put the now more amenable 
Sogihbe in his place. That the presence of French
1troops prevented Toffa1s overthrow astounded the Fon.
It was because the Dahomans had not reckoned on French
support for Toffa, and were shocked by this support,
that they sent letters on the 12th May to the French
and English, carefully setting out the reasons for their 
2
attack. The letters were primarily designed to prove 
the justice of the DohQman case. They also clearly 
informed the Europeans that if they wished to show good­
will towards Dahomey they would depose Toffa and place 
Sogihbe on the throne. A threat was, moreover, attached 
to this request: if the Europeans did not do as the Fon 
asked, then the Dahoman army would return to Porto Novo 
in eight month’s time, and would set about destroying 
the palm oil plantations around the town. This threat 
was designed to impress the French in that French trade
1 The Fon claimed that French troops had 
fired at Jibey on units of the Fon army. 
This incident appears to have passed 
unnoticed by the French.
2 See f/n 1, p .301
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would suffer: it would not, however, involve the Fon 
in any direct action against the French.
These letters, as well as dealing with Porto Novo,
also dealt with Franco“Dahoman relations as such.
Dahoman grievances against France were listed: the 
firing on Whydah; the deception of the Serval Treaty; 
the opening of the Cotonou isthmus and the latest
•i
addition, the action of the French troops at Jibey. 
All-in-all these letters give a detailed statement of 
Dahomey policy in the coastal area. Dahomey was determined 
that Toffa should he overthrown and would tolerate no 
further French territorial expansion on the Coast.
At much the same time, the third Fon embassy to 
Lagos rejected British intervention in the area. The 
conflicting directions of Dahoman policy were being 
sorted out. . Top a had returned to Abomey. The revolt of 
Porto Novo, combined with the inci^easingly hostile 
activities of the French, was forcing the various factions 
in Abomey towards a settlement of their differences.
1 see f/n 1, p.30U.
C H A P T E R  V
THE LAST YEARS OP INDEPENDENCE 
August 1889-April 1892
Dr. Tautain, the Senegal official who had heen 
sent to replace De Beeckman at Porto Novo, soon came 
to think of the situation on the Slave Coast in the 
same terms as his predecessor. He stated that Toffa*s 
activities in Porto Novo caused trouble with Dahomey, 
and recommended that the King should he deposed at the 
first favourable opportunity. Unfortunately for 
Dahomey his policies were never put into operation. 
Changes in Prance came to the aid of the unscrupulous 
monarch.
The conflicting reports of the Pon attack on Porto 
Novo had induced the Prench Colonial Department to 
undertake a general review of Prench policy on the
1 M.M.C. Senegal Tautain to Governor
of Senegal, Porto Novo 1.6.89.
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Slave Coast. The whole Prench approach to Colonial
problems was at this time in fact in a state of rapid
N *
flux. The change was clearly marked when Eugene Etienne,
the leading Parliamentary advocate of Colonial expansion,
2
entered the Cabinet as Colonial Under-Secretary. The 
Colonial Department had been up-graded and its staff 
strengthened to suit its new importance. A new atmosphere 
now pervaded the administrative approach to Colonial 
development.
One of the first acts of the newly-transformed
Department was to carry out a complete reorganisation 
of the administration of Prench West Africa. The
1 Eugene Etienne (1 8M+-1921 ) , Deputy for 
Oran. He entered the Tirard G-overnment
of February 1 889-March 1890 as Colonial 
Under-Secretary,
2 J.Chastinet, Histoire de la Triosieme 
Republigue, Vol.II: P.Berge, fLe Sous 
Secretariat et les Soxis-Secretafres 
d’Etat aux Colonies'. Revue Prancais 
d!Histoire d'Oueme Mer (1960)
Except for a brief spell in 188J+ the 
Colonial department had always been 
attached to the Marine. Etienne was 
given the position in fact, if not in 
name, of a Minister,
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establishments on the Slave Coast emerged from this 
as somewhat more important than hitherto. Phis 
increased importance was recognised in the fact that 
the Resident of Porto Novo gained a good deal of
1©
independence from control of the Senegal administration.
At the time of the reorganisation it was decided that
\
a senior official should be sent to the Slave Coast to 
take over from Dr. Pautain and make a thoroggh-going 
investigation of the area*s problems. (This new 
analysis of the situation was of course to supercede 
that of fautain.
Because of his experience on the Slave Coast in 
1887t the Lt.Governor of the Rivieres du Bud, Dr.Bayol, 
was chosen for the task. The instructions given to 
Bayol show that Etienne made no ma^or change in the 
aims of french. policy in the area* Bayol was to
1 M.M.C . Dahomey VXIjq, Decree of 1.9#89.
The Resident was still under the super­
vision of the Gov. of the Rivieres du Bud 
but could correspond directly with the 
Colonial Under-Secretary.
2 M.A.E. A#riwue 125. Etienne to Bayol. Paris 
12.8.89s C.W .Newbury, op.oit., p*129. 
Newbury interprets this document somewhat 
differently: he also quotes it as coming 
from ipkure*.
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investigate the possibility of reoccupying the french 
rort at Whydah; to decide whether or not the Coastal 
towns of Avrekete and Go do my should he occupied; to 
consider the hest way of putting into operation the 
clauses of the Serval Treaty which related to Cotonou; 
to decide whether or not King Toffa should he deposed.
In fact he was to look into all the various proposals 
made hy different officials over the preceding years.
What does mark a departure in the French approach 
is, that, although Bayol was instructed to find negotiated 
solutions to the political problems of the area— -and ahove
all the Cotonou problem-— the use of force to settle them 
was not ruled out. Until this date the Colonial Depart­
ment, although desirous of occupying Cotonou, considered 
that it would not he v/orth using force to achieve this 
objective. Policy was, now, that if French aims could 
not he achieved hy diplomacy, force might he used. 
Large-scale military operations were not however contem­
plated* Etienne was well aware that he would get little 
support from his Cabinet colleagues if a major expedition 
proved necessary. It was hoped that Bayol would he able
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to regulate matters on the Slave Coast, if not by
diplomacy, at least without calling on reinforcements.
The limited, nature of the involvement envisualised by
the Colonial Department is shown by the fact that
Bayol was infoimied that the Benin garrison, if really
nevessary, might be reinforced, by one Company of
Trailliers Senegalais.
The new attitude prevailing in the Colonial
Department was soon reflected in the general approach
to French problems on the Slave Coast. This can be seen
from the remarks made by Bayol during the Paris negotiations
on the delineation of the Lagos-Porto Novo frontier.
Bayol here declared that he reared, because of recent
Fon excesses, it would be necessary for France to teach
1Dahomey a severe lesson. According to the British 
diplomatist, E.G-.Egerton, the reason why the French 
wished to extend the Lagos Porto Novo frontier in^the 
interior, was that they wished to be absolutely undisturbed
1 G.O.879/29, African 365, P.O. to C.O.
5.7.89, enclosing E.G.Egerton to 
SalisTmry, Pax’is 1.7.89.
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A
in their operations against Abomey. Moreover, m
December 1889, before Bayol had sent in his report
on his attempt to * settle’ the Dahoman question
peacefully, the Colonial Department ordered the Military
Commandant in Senegal to send an officer to Porto Hovo
to study the conditions under which an expedition should
2
be sent against the Pon capital* The Prench were already 
thinking in terms of a conquest of Dahomey. The question 
as to what were the real rights of the Africans and the 
Europeans on the Coast was already an academic one.
Prance was now going to demand that her will be done.
Bayol disembarked at Cotonou on 1st October and 
proceeded from there to Porto Hovo, to decid.6 on the 
question as to whether or not Toffa should be maintained 
as King. Unlike his two civilian predecessors, Bayol 
declared that reports on King Toffa’s conduct were
1 C.0.879/29, African 365, P.O. to C.O.
10.7.89, enclosing Egerton to Salisbury, 
Paris 2.7.89.
2 P.A. de Salinis, La Campagne du Sane,
p.126. The officer involved was
Captain Septans who proposed, as did
the other military men later sent to 
Porto Hovo, a march up the river Oueme 
to Abomey.
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1
favourable. What seems to have influenced the 
Lt•Governor most strongly was Toffa’s willingness 
to do whatever the French wished. Toff a had little 
choice: his power was now entirely dependent on 
French support. This situation so endeared the King 
to Bayol that he decided against deposing him. His 
official reasons were that to remove Toffa would he 
embarrassing to the French representative, and that
the Porto Ho vans would find it difficult to adjust to a
2
more liberal regime. His real reason was that the 
French could never have found a more pliable puppet. 
This determination to maintain Toffa, although Bayol 
did not realise it, brought French and Dahoman policy 
in Porto Novo into head-on collision.
Having settled the problem of how to deal with the 
King of Porto Novo, Bayol proceeded to tackle the
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I-- Bayol to Etienne, 
Porto Novo 29.10,89.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Bayol to Etienne, 
Porto Novo IO.I.90. There was in 
fact no lack of claimants to the 
Porto Novo throne.
question of Cotonou. During his previous visit to 
the Slave Coast, Bayol had formed a favourable 
opinion of the Dahomans. This was based on the fact 
that he assumed, erroneously, that a courteous welcome 
to a French representative meant that the Fon were 
willing to meet whatever demands the French cared to make. 
The lit • Governor set out to improve Franco-Dahoman re­
lations in an optimistic frame of mind.
His first action with regard to the Gotonou question 
was to visit Loocou, the Yeovogun of Gotonou. This 
official received him politely and assured him of Dahoman 
goodwill towards France. Pleased by the success of this 
somewhat obvious venture, Bayol, on the 14th October, 
sent a letter to King Gelele, asking him to send to 
Gotonou someone who would have full powers to negotiate 
all the questions at issue between France and Dahomey.
The Fon reply came on the, 31st October. The King 
had no interpreter and could not understand the message
1 D.N.A.1889* Bayol to Etienne.
Ootonou 12.10.89.
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This was simply a diplomatic way of indicating that
the Fon would not for a minute enter*tain the French
proposals. The King requested that Bayol should send
his interpreter to Abomey. Bayol himself determined
to go to the capital. He considered that he could
find a peaceful solution to the Gotonou problem only
1by direct negotiation. Bayol, his secretary, M.Angnot, 
and an interpreter, Xavier Beraud, then left Cotonou 
for Abomey. They arrived there on the ^1st of November* 
They were greeted in Abomey with the elaborate 
ceremonies with which the Fon always greeted visiting 
Europeans. Bayol was well pleased with his reception 
and considered it an indication that Dahomey would be 
disposed to recognise the justice of French claims.
When he came to discuss political matters with Prince
i- f
Kondo he was, however, soon disirasioned. To BayolTs 
proposal that Gotonou should be handed over to the 
French, in return for a French payment of compensation 
for customs rights, Kondo replied, categorically, that
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Bayol to Etienne,
Cotonou U.11.89.
%
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it was impossible to cede even an inch of Dahoman 
territory. The compensation issue was treated by 
the Prince as irrelevant. Dahomey did not, and 
would not, recognise the Serval Treaty. Kondo then 
went on to list the grievances against Prance which 
Dahomey had accumulated during the previous ten years.
The recent French support for King Toffa received a 
prominent place in this recital. It was requested 
that Toffa be removed or, better, sent to Abomey*
Kondo rounded off by advising the French to recall to 
the French throne a member of either the Napoleonic or 
Bourbon dynasties, so that some control might be imposed 
on what he considered inconsistent French policy.
That a barbarous African prince should oppose the 
will of France, accuse France of pursuing an inconsistent 
policy, and then presume to advise a reorganisation of 
French political life, was too much for Bayol, who was 
reduced to a frame of mind bordering on hysteria.
1 sum involved was 20,000 francs——
only part or what the Fon customs 
brought in every year.
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From being inclined to think that Dahomey would 
willingly co-operate with France he swung over to 
the equally unfounded conviction that Dahomey was 
implacably opposed to the French and wislied to drive 
them from the Slave Goast. From that day until the 
31 st December, when he left Abomey, Bayol refused 
either to leave his house or to undertake any ceremonial 
duty.
Although the Lt. Governor continued to be treated 
with courtesy and consideration he began to imagine 
that his life was in danger. This is perhaps not so 
surprising when it is remembered that the most blocldy 
of the customs were m  progress during his stay. 
Nevertheless, there was no foundation for the charges 
of ill-treatment which he was later to make against 
the Fon. They seem in fact to have Deen produced in 
order to pro've that the failure of his mission in no
1 Bayol later made much or the fact that 
Porto Novons were sacrificed during his 
stay. This he took as a personal threat. 
Most likely they were sacrificed in order 
to show the French that the Fon were 
determined to break Toffa.
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way reflected on his own conduct. These fabrications 
were, however, developed and expounded in Etienne’s 
speeches in the Chamber of Deputies, passed into 
common verbal currency, and played a large part in 
the development of the myth which was used as the 
justification for French, expansion into the interior 
of the Slave Coast. The only result of Bayol’s visit 
to Abomey was that it became obvious that the French 
could only take full possession of Cotonou if they
■i
were prepared to seize it by force*
When in Abomey, Bayol was greeted by King G-elele. 
The King was described by M. Angnot as a thin old man 
aged about seventy-five. This would not, however, 
necessarily confirm that Gelele was still active and 
had kept control of all his faculties. It is mentioned
1 The account of Bayol’s embassy 
is based on the following:- 
M.M.C. Dahomey III^ Angnot to 
Bayol, Porto Novo 3.1.90: M.M.C. 
Dahomey III-j^  Bayol to Etienne,
Porto Novo 15.1.90: M.M.C. Dahomey 
^1b B&yol to Etienne, Cotonou 1.1.90: 
M.M.C. Dahomey Bayol to Etienne, 
Cotonou h«1.90 enclosing Bayol to 
Etienne, Abomey 6.12.90.
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fry a contemporary writer that there were men living 
in the Abomey Palace who closely resembled the King 
and who would on certain ceremonial occasions take 
the place of the King* Probably Bayol saw such a one.
Bayol did confirm that the King played no part in the 
making of political decisions.
In Afromey? Bayol!s demands had the effect of 
forcing the various factions to come together. The 
process had started in early 1889: Bayol1s clear outline 
of French intentions now induced them to close their 
ranks completely. A month elapsed between Bayol* s 
statement of French demands and the delivery of the 
Dahoman reply. This time seems to have been employed 
in formulating a reply acceptable to all shades of 
opinion* It was also used to redistribute offices 
amongst the various factions who had now agreed on a
2policy. Topa became Mehous Bougfrododhoue became Yeovogun
1. .E. Chau do in, Trois Mois de Captivite'' 
au Dahomey, p.2 73.
2 Casmir Agbo, Histoire de Ouidah, p5*6 
Nottgfro do dhoue is here given as the 
name of Gelele's !great fetish doctor1 
the last Yeovogun of Whydah.
iV
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of Whydah. The leaders of the two groups, previously 
bitterly opposed on issues of foreign policy, now 
jointly controlled Fon relations with the Europeans.
Topa, having become Mehou, gave up his claim to the 
throne. Kondo T s right to succeed was undisputed.
Gelele’s death was announced just before Bayol left 
Abomey* The old King’s life had depended on the ruling 
class being fairly evenly divided over the question of 
who should succeed him. It seems more than likely that 
he did not die a natural death. At any rate, at the 
end of December 1889 Kondo took the throne and the new 
’strong* name of Behanzin.
Bayol returned from Abomey firmly convinced that not 
only would the Dahomans never allow the French to establish 
themselves at the points claimed, by the French, along 
the coast, but also that the Dahomans were intent upon 
driving the French from the Slave Coast altogether. In 
his first conviction he was absolutely justified: he had
1 It was suggested by Xavier Beraud 
in March 1 891 that the King had been 
poisoned. (See below p.36^)
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been warned that Dahomey would never tolerate any 
French occupation of her territory* His second 
conviction, based as it was on his misunderstanding 
of the Dahoman attacks on Porto Bovo and his hysterical 
misinterpretation of his treatment in Abomey, was quite 
unfounded. The Dahoman aim was simply to maintain the 
status quo: to trade freely with the French but to 
prevent the French seizing Dahoman territory.
With regard to the immediate object of Bayol1s 
going to Abomey— — to come to some decision as to what to 
do about French claims to Cotonou, Bayol, on his return, 
offered as the only alternatives, two suggestions: one 
pacific and the other radical. His first suggestion was 
to place customs posts at Porto Hove beach and direct all 
shipping there instead of to Cotonou. Bayol considered 
that this would bring the King of Dahomey to heel since 
it would deprive him of Gotonou1 s revenues. This was not 
of course necessarily the case: the inalienable nature 
of Dahoman territory was far more important than was its 
economic value. Iiis ’radical* solution was to send a 
military expedition to the Slave Coast immediately and
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to use it to seize the ports of Dahomey to which the
(1 )French laid claim,v ' It was made clear in his military 
report that he himself was very much in favour of the 
Tradical1 solution
Bayol considered that an expedition would he
particularly successful at this time because Behanzin
would not he securely established on the throne so soon
after his father1s death. He also stated that^ince
the French did not intend to take Abomey, no serious
(2)opposition need be expected. After KondoTs careful 
explanation that any French attempt to seize Fon 
territory would meet with total resistance, it is difficult 
to see quite how Bayol arrived at this last view. The 
explanation must be simply that Bayol had become by this 
time emotionally committed to the idea of an armed attack 
on Dahomey; knowing that the metropolitan government 
would not allow itself to be involved in a major colonial 
war he convinced himself, and then attempted to convince
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I ^  Bayol to 
Etienne, If-. 1.1 890
2 M.M.C. Dahomey III^ Bayol to 
Etienne 11.1.1890
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his government, that no great military effort would 
he required to crush the Fon* To push home the message 
he added:
fDouan^.es \  Whydah et Cotonou et les 
contributions de guerre permettraient 
sans s'adresser au Parliament de
couvrir les frais de cette occupation 
qu’est pour l*avenir de nos Etablisse- 
ments du Golfe de Benin et le renom 
de la France en Afrique d!une importance 
exceptionelle.
Hot only could the occupation of coastal Dahomey be put
into operation without much opposition,but it would also 
cost no extra money.
Bayol had, then, during his stay in Abomey, become 
committed with all the hysterical violence of his unstable 
character to the idea of an expedition to seize southern 
Dahomey* He was convinced, it has already been noted, 
that Dahomey intended to expel the French from the Slave 
Coast. Soon after his return from Abomey, he began to 
inform the Colonial Department that Dahoman activities
1 M.M.C. Dahomey IIL^ Bayol to 
Etienne, 11.1*1890.
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were "becoming more and more hostile to the French.
A minor trade dispute at W'hydah, and a protest by the 
Cotonou authorities against the "burial of a French 
soldier without their permission, convinced him that 
the Fon were intent upon provoking a "break with the 
French. Quite how Bayol reconciled his conviction 
that Dahomey was about to attack the French with his 
view that a French expedition to seise southern Dahomey 
would meet very little opposition, he never explained, 
nevertheless, "believing the Fon to "be hostile, Bayol 
sent a request, on the 13th January, for an urgent 
decision as to which of his two proposed policies he
4
should put into operation.
The Colonial Department replied, on the 16th January, 
that the Government was unfavourable to an expedition 
which would require the voting of Parliamentary credits. 
Details of the sort of expedition contemplated by Bayol 
were requested. The Department wanted to know how many 
troops were required, if the operation was possible at 
that time of year, how long would such an expedition be
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I -- Bayol to Etienne, 
Porto Novo, 13.1.99
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likely to last and would it "be really necessary to
A
reinforce the Benin garrison? Unfortunately Bayol*s 
reply has not Been preserved. It would seem from 
comments on it-, however, that it was in line with his 
claim that very little resistance need "be expected*
He considered that the expedition could "be undertaken 
with the troops in the Benin Establishments reinforced 
"by the company from Senegal which Etienne had promised 
in August 1889* These would have amounted to less than 
1*00 men*
The Cabinet remained undecided, and determined to 
consult with Gommandant Fournier, the Commander of the
j
Cruiser, *Sane*, on duty off the West Coast* His reply
was that any expedition against Dahomey would be very
2 3dangerous indeed. The aim of the Government with regard
1 Victor Nicolas *LExpedition du Dahomey 
en 1890* Annex 8 Despatches: Golonial 
Department to Lt.Governor, 16.1*1890
2 M.M.C. Dahomey *Sane* to Marine,
Gabon 8.2.1890. It is from this 
reply that it canj?’ be learned what sort 
of expedition Bayol had prepared.
3 The Tirard Government, February 1889 to 
March 1 890.
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to Dahomey was to avoid any colonial reverse which 
might endanger its position in Parliament* It seems 
that although Etienne upheld Bayol*s view that an 
expedition should he made; he was over-ruled by his 
colleaugues who, following Fournier, feared that Bayol
1took an over-optimistic view of the military position.
On the 17th of February the Lt.Governor was informed 
that the Government had decided that any operation 
ought to be strictly limited to the defence of French 
territories an& protection of French nationals*
Bayol was warned to act prudently and to leave the 
direction of military affairs in the hands of the Officer 
Commanding the Military Forces; any military reverse,
eve^the most minor, he was told, could have very grave
2
consequences for the Government. The Cabinet had 
therefore ruled against any forward movement to seize 
Dahoman territory.
1 Eugene Etienne, Son Oeuvre. Etienne 
was later to claim that he wished to 
pursue a forward policy but was over­
ruled.
2 V. Nicolas, * I. * Expedition du Dahomey 
en 1890* Annex 8 Despatches: Colonial 
Department to Lt Governor, Paris 
-17.2.1890.
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While the Cabinet had been reaching their 
decision;Bayol had been taking measures to meet a 
Dahoman attack. In his view all the French traders 
in the Dahoman area were in serious danger. Bayol saw 
it as his duty to protect them* On the 12th of February 
the Lt. Governor was informed that the reinforcements 
from Senegal were soon to arrive at Cotonoii. On the 
13*frh he informed the chief agents of the two French 
trading Houses with agents along the Coast that their 
representatives should all take shelter by the 17th of 
February. At this time it seems that he intended that 
all Frenchmen should leave Dahoman territory by that 
date. This was in preparation for the expedition which 
Bayol was sure could be launched against the Coastal 
towns as soon as the reinforcements arrived.
The French traders in Whydah considered that the
Fon authorities would never allow them all to leave 
Whydah at the same time. They therefore determined to
barricade themselves into Fabre's factory in Whydah;where 
they were confident they could resist any Fon attack
until the arrival of French forces. They expected 
the arrival of th© French forces on the 19th of 
February* Bayol was later to swear that he had not 
told the general agents on the 1 3th that Whydah was to 
he occupied* Even if this is true, it does seem that 
Bayol must at some time have indicated that Whydah was 
to he occupied on the 19th; it is unlikely that these 
traders would have shut themselves up in an isolated 
building without the means to withstand a siege if they 
had not been convinced that they would soon he rescued* 
It was not that they expected to he attacked by the 
Dahomans; some of them later testified that the Dahomans 
had in no way molested them and were astounded at their
1 The Whydah traders involved were 
Bontemps, French Consular agent, 
and five other employees of Fabreo. 
There were also two of Mantes 
Freres et Borelli employees*
With them there was Father Dorgere 
who was in charge of the Lyons 
Fathers * Missionary Station in 
Whydah* Two G-erman traders of the 
House of Go delt and the German 
Consul, Randal, joined them.
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conduct."^  Bayol was in fact preparing to put his 
1 radical1 policy into action.
When Commandant Terrillon, the new Commander of 
the troops from Senegal^arrived in Cotonou on the 19th;the
1 M.M.C. Dahomey C.Eabre to Colonial 
Department, Marseilles 23.7*90? enclosing 
Bontemps* Report 2J+.2. to 8.5*1890, Porto 
Novo 11.5*1890:
M.M*C. Dahomey V^q copy of a letter from
M.Randal to Messrs Godelt, Lagos 10*3*90:
M.M.C* IHiL Bayol to Etienne, Paris 14* 12.90 
(Bayol*s defence):
M.M.C. Dahomey I-z l^ Guverville to Marine,
Whydah 3*10.90:
M.M.C. Dahomey XV^a E.Chaudoin*s petition to 
the Chamber of Deputies, Official Journal 
21.12.90:
M.A.E.Af rique 126, J.Bocamy to M.Bontemps 
1A. 2. 90:
M.A.E. Afrique 126, Eichemberger to 
M.Toglia, Porto Novo 13.2.90:
M.M.C. Dahomey Bayol to Etienne, Cotonou 
23*3*90- Mois
E. Chau do in, Trois/ae Captivite au Dahomey:
E • Chau do in, '* Troi/s Mo is de Captivite au Daho meyf 
Illustration. 1890.
The traders were later taken captive by 
the Eon. They considered that they had 
Been taken prisoner "because of Bayol* s 
"bungling of the political situation*
Some of them even laid a petition "before 
Parliament claiming compensation for 
official irresponsibility. Because of 
this dispute there is a vast amount of 
contradictory evidence on the subject.
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situation was, therefore, that all the traders had
fled from Dahomey, except those of Whydah, who had
shut themselves in Fabre’s factory. By the 19th the
Dahomans were thoroughly alarmed by the actions of the
French traders. The landing of the French troops at
Cotonou alarmed them even further,and on the same day
they closed all ’the roads1 in southern Dahomey. This
to Bayol Y/as final proof that the Fon were about to
attack* ^e considered that the roads had been closed
in order to prevent the Whydah traders leaving, and that
these traders were being kept in Whydah as hostages.
His anxiety was increased by the fact that Toffa was
continually bombarding the French administration with
1
reports of Dahoman preparation for war. Commander Terrillon, 
completely new to the area, was easily persuaded that the 
situation was urgent. He was shown Bayol*s instructions
1 The Dahomans were of course preparing 
as they had stated in May 1889 (see Chap.
IV.p. 30lj) for a raid on Porto Novo to 
destroy Porto Novo ’ s palm oil producing 
plantations. Toffa, in order to gain 
French protection presented these 
preparations in the light of an all-out 
Dahoman attack on the French.
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to protect Prenc]^ nationals and French territory* It
was decided that something had to he done to save those
Frencft: merchants in Whydah* Bayol wanted to seize Whydah
and Ootonou immediately * Terillon declared that it was
impossible to take both ports with only the 360 men now
under his command* Bayol had no choice but to agree*
An alternative plan was therefore concocted: the Fon
Authorities of Ootonou were to be seized so that their
lives could be bargained against those of the Whydah
Europeans. On the 22nd February these Authorities were
enticed to the Regis factory at Gotonou, made prisoners#
and despatched to Porto Hovo rtere they wens entrusted
to King Toffa as prisoners. Ootonou was then occupied*
1
In the process fifteen Dahomans were kille#. Phis was 
an act of unprovoked French aggression.
After the occupation of Ootonou, Bayol telegraphed 
the somewhat cryptic message to the Oolonial Department 
that he was 'Happy to announce the occupation of
1 M.M.O. Dahomey Voa Oolonel Terrillon* s 
Journal, 7*2* to 7*3*1890: M.H.G.
Dahomey Bayol to Etienne, Paris 14*12*1890*
- 331 -
1
Cotonouf. The Colonial Department was not so happy
to receive the message; it immediately demanded to
know why force had been used; had Cotonou heen attacked?;
did Bayol recall his orders to protect Drench nationals
2
and not to take the offensive? The Colonial Department 
considered that Bayol had exceeded his orders.
Luckily for Bayol the question as to whether or not 
he had exceeded his orders soon Became irrelevant. On 
the 23rd February the local Dahoman levies counter­
attacked and Bayol was able to use this attack as 
justification for his claim that the seizure of Cotonou 
had been a purely defensive measure. The assault itself 
was easily beaten off but nevertheless Bayol requested
that his garrison be reinforced by 230 men. This was in
3
order that he might go on to occupy Whydah. The Lt.
Governor* s interpretation of his ordersof the 17th February
1 M.M.C. Dahomey 1 ^  Tel. Bayol to / n 
Colonial Department, Cotonou 22.^2.90.
2 Victor Nicolas,LExpedition du Dahomey
en 1890, Annex 8 Despatches, Colonial ?
Department to Lt.Governor, Paris 22.^2.90.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey 3L-u Bayol to Etienne,
Cotonou 22+.2.90.
- 332 -
was that the occupation of Whydah would also be 
defensive;since it would be undertaken to protect 
French property and French nationals*
, At Whydah on the same day, the 24th, the Europeans 
in Fabre1s factory, having run out of food and despairing 
of the arrival of French troops, gave themselves up to 
the Fon authorities at Whydah* The Germans and a Dutch 
priest were allowed to go free. The Frenchmen were, 
however, arrested, stripped, chained, and confined in a 
tiny stinking room in the Agore*
The events of the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th of February 
added up to the fact that the French were now involved 
in a full-scale war on Dahomey* The French had on the 
Sliave Ooast 360 well-trained men, armed with modern 
rapld-firing rifies * The Dahoman forces could hardly 
, hope to destroy a force of this nature provided the 
French kept a vigilant watch against surprise attack*
The regiments of the Fon army were armed with various 
types of flint guhs* The most common type was a small
1 See p. 328, F/N 1.
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carbine/ grancais which seemed to be favoured particularly
by the Amazons. The other most usual type of gun was
the trade gun manufactured in Birmingham. One Oorps was
armed with what would appear to have been 1 nursery rhyme1
muskets described by Bayol as ,Tromblons au Espignoles*,
like those carried by French Sappers before the French 
2
Revolution. All these guns were charged with a diversity 
of objects, the most common being pieces of iron bars 
and small stones. The Dahomans also possessed some
3'
ancient cannon which were of no military value whatsoever.
The French government, as has been noted, was by no 
means as enthusiastic about the turn of events in the 
Slave Coast as was Bayol. After the first battle of 
Cotonou, although the seizure of that port was accepted
1 fMousquetons de la Cavalerie Francais 
Model 1822».
2 Short guns widening out from the middle 
towards the mouth. They had been sold 
by the Portugese to the Fon.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey IIIlb Bayol to Etienne 
Reseignements MiliTaires, Porto Hovo
11.1.90. It is reproduced in part in 
•Les Forces Militaires au Dahomey1 by 
J.Bayol in Revue Scientifique» Paris 
1892.
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"by Paris as ’defensive1 and therefore not contrary to 
the Cabinet’s instructions* Bayol was warned not to 
be so carried away by that first minor success as to 
exceed the orders given by the Government. Any advance 
beyond those orders* it was stated, would cause the 
Government grave embarrassment in Parliament.
These instructions ’That any operations were to
be strictly limited to protecting French nationals and
French interests’ were open to different interpretations.
The first interpretation was that the Lt.Governor should 
take no action to change the existing situation: force 
should only be used against attack. The second inter­
pretation (that of Bayol) was that French nationals and 
French interests could only be protected by occupying 
the Coastal areas and* above all* Whydah* where Frenchmen 
were held captive.
After the Dahoman ’attack’ on Cotonou;the French 
Government was divided as to whether to allow Bayol to
1 Victor Nicolas, ’L ’Expedition du Dahomey 
en 1890’* Annex 8 Despatches:
Colonial Department to Lt.Gov., Paris 2i+. 12*90.
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go ahead and occupy Whydah, or whether to order him to 
remain simply on the defensive at Gotonou. The point 
at issue viras notj would France he justified in taking 
Whydah, hut would an expedition he so expensive, or so
dangerous, that the Government's position in Parliament
? 1would he undermined. Etienne it seems supported Bayol.
As a result of the division of opinion, the Gahinet
temporarily allowed the men on the spot to carry on as
hest they could. The reiteration of the douhle-meailing
formula of 17th February was used as a cover for the
lack of Governmental decision.
On the 1st March the French in Gotonou again
repulsed a Dahoman attack^made this time it seems hy
2
the Dahoman levies raised south of the Lama. By the 
3rd March, however, another Fon army had reached the 
Gotonou area and on the night of the Uth launched an 
attack on the French garrison of that town. Taken hy
1 Eugene Etienne, Speech in Ghamher of 
Deputies, 11 *A* 1892. (See, Son Oeuvre)
2 M.M.G. Dahomey V2a Terrillon*s Journal, 
Estimates of Fon dead range from 190
to 300.
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surprise the French were nearly overwhelmed, nevertheless,
after the landing of reinforcements from the Sane*, now
stationed off Gotonou, the Dahomans were driven off
1leaving 127 dead inside the French lines. It seems
that there were about 35°00 troops involved in this
attack. The presence of the King, the numbers of Fon
troops involved, the speed with which they arrived at
Cotonou, and the fact that the Amazons played a leading
role in the attack,all suggest that it was the section
of the ’standing army’ stationed in Abomey which made
the attack. That the regular army arrived from Abomey
fully equipped and ready for war, only ten days after
the French seizure of Gotonou indicates that when news
of the French action arrived in Abomey; there was no 
*
diversion of opinion as to what action to take.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey V2a Terrillon1s Journal 
7«2. to 7-U.1690: J.Bayol, ’L ’Attaque 
de Gotonou’, Revue Bleue, lDaris 1892. 
Bayol claimed that the Fon had lost 
altogether 500 dead and wonded.
Porto No van spies put the Fon dead 
at 250. Both sources are unreliable. 
The French lost 8 men, 2 of whom were 
Europeans. 2 6 were wounded.
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This Pon army having heen repulsed before Cotonou,
retired to Ahomey Calavi. The French proceeded to bombard
•1
the town from the sea* On the 6th March it was learned
that a second Dahoman army of about 2,000 men had arrived
2
at Badoo on the River Oueme. It looks as though at 
least a part of the army guarding the Yoruba frontier 
had moved southwards to guard the Oueme route from Porto 
Novo to the Abomey plateau. On the 10th March it was 
learned that Behansin had gone northwards leaving a
. 3
considerable army to protect Godomy and Abomey Calavi.
The King was probably returning to the North to 
consult with the Chiefs as to what political steps 
should be taken to deal with the situation which had 
arisen on the failure of the Dahoman army to retake 
Cotonou. Such a decision was made even more necessary 
since the Northern Yoruba had taken advantage of the 
Dahoman war with Prance to attack north-western Dahomey.^’
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Vga Terrillon’s Journal 
7.2* to 7.4*1890: M.M.C. Dahomey l±lj 
Bayol to Etienne, Porto Novo U.4-90.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Vga Terrillon!s Journal 
7*2. to 7.4.1890.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey Bayol to Etienne,
Porto Novo I|.Iu90.
4 M.M.C. Dahomey Bayol to Etienne,
Cotonou 13.3.1890.
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The Pon defeat on the Coast and the successful Yoruha
raid on the North seems to have persuaded Behanzin to
seek allies. His first move in pursuit of this aim was
to offer the King of Portugal an alliance and to request
that the Governor of the Portuguese fort should assist
1
the Pon against the Prench. The attempt failed.
The French Whydah traders and Father Dorgere had, 
on the 27th February, been marched in chains from Whydah 
to Allada, where they remained until the King arrived
there, on the 13th of March. They were then brought 
before Behanzin, who, as soon as he was informed of the 
conditions of their captivity, gave orders that they 
should receive better treatment. Their clothes were 
returned and they were freed from their chains. They 
were sent (on the 20th) to Abomey, where they were well 
treated, lodged in the former ChachaTs residence,and 
allowed to move freely around the quarter in which the
house was situated.^
1 M.M.C. Dahomey 1..^  Bayol to Etienne,
Cotonou 8.3.90
2 M.M.C. DahomeyV^a Fabre to Colonial
Department, Marseilles 23.7.90. 
enclosing Bontemp's report on the 
captivity of the hostages in Abomey,
Porto Novo 11.5*90: E.Chaudin, Trois 
Mois de Captivite au Dahomey•
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As has been noted,the Government’s official 
policy remained to protect French nationals and French 
interests. The views of the Deputies, expressed in 
Parliament when a question was asked, on the 8th of 
March, about the situation in Dahomey, did not encourage 
those in the Cabinet who wanted the implementation of a
’forward1 policy on the Slave Coast. Etienne informed 
Bayol that Parliament would be unfavourable to any action
which was designed to do more than enforce treaties and
2 .protect French nationals. The formula covering policy
remained the same but it had been ascertained that 
Parliamentary opinion would support only a defensive war.
Bayol himself pressed on with his arrangements for 
an attack on VYhydah. he requested that the number of 
troops in the area should be increased by 150 men and 
that a blockade of the Dahoman Coast be put into operation
1 The question was asked by M.Deloncle, 
a member of the Colonial Group in the 
Chamber. It seems likely that the 
question was deliberately asked so as to 
sound Parliamentary opinion*
2 Victor Nicolas, L ’Expedition du Dahomey, 
Annex 8, Despatches: Colonial Department 
to Lt.Governor, Paris 9*3*1890*
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as soon as possible* Lt.Colonel Terrillon had however
by this time evolved a military policy of his own.
He considered that a march on Abomey, on the lines
of the English march on Kumasi, would be more effective
in forcing the Eon to agree to French demands than a
2seizure of Whydah. The French Cabinet, fearing for 
its position in Parliament, would of course have nothing
to do with the idea of a major expedition into the 
3
interior#
This difference in policy was the beginning of a 
bitter quarrel between Terrillon and Bayol. Its develop1 
ment seems to have been due, in so far as it did not
karise out of a personality conflict, to differing
1 M.M.C.Dahomey L-u Bayol to Etienne,
Cotonou U.3.90.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Bayol to Etienne,
Cotonou 11.3.90.
3 Victor Nikolas,LExpedition du Dahomey 
en 1 890. Annex Despatches: Colonial 
Department to Lt.Governor, Paris 13.3.90.
U Bayol had already quarrelled equally 
bitterly with Dr.Pereton in 1887 and 
with Dr.Tautain in 1889- It seems that 
he had a gift for it.
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opinions as to how Whydah should he occupied. Bayol 
believed that,after the arrival of the next 150 troops, 
Whydah could immediately be occupied. Terrillon, with 
a more sound appreciation of the military situation, 
considered that the Dahoman forces^in the Porto Novo- 
Cotonoii area, would have to be destroyed before it would 
be safe to remove the major part of the garrisons of 
those towns for an attack on Whydah. The quarrel became 
steadily more bitter, and by the 1 st March Bayol was
complaining that Terrillon was conducting military
1
operations without consulting him.
On the 26th March Terrillon1s forces marched into
the hinterland of Porto Novo, where he encountered and
defeated a body of Dahoman soldiers. Terrillon reported
that he was moving to disengage Porto Novo before marching 
2
on Whydah , The Colonel then proceeded to put a series of
1 M.M.C. Dahomey 1 ^  Bayol to Etienne,
Cotonou 26.3*90.
2 M.A.E. Afrique 126, Governor to 
Colonial Department St.Louis
28.3.1890, enclosing Lt.Col.Terrillon 
to Governor of Senegal, Cotonou 
26*3*90. No estimate of Dahoman 
losses is given although they were 
said to be heavy.
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Oueme villages to the sword. To Terrillon this 
campaign was a sensible military precaution. To the 
Dahomans it seems to have indicated that the French
were preparing to advance up the Oueme valley* The
2
Pon army at G-odomey was withdrawn to Allada^ where it
was in a position to move quickly to any point in the
coastal area which the French might attack.
Having ’disengaged1 the Porto Novo area. Terrillon
3
reported that he hoped to take Whydah within a week.
The fact that the men on the spot were about to take 
action which might have repercussions in Parliament 
seems to have stimulated the new Cabinet, in which 
Etienne remained Colonial Secretary, to take a decision 
as to the meaning of the formula which had until this 
time taken the place of a policy. According to the
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I.,. Bayol to Etienne, 
Porto Novo 28.3*$0.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey I-i-h Bayol to Etienne, 
Porto Novo 1.4.90.
3 M.A.E. Afrique 126, Governor of Senegal 
to Colonial Department, St.Louis, 
1.4.90, enclosing Colonel Terrillon
to Governor, Cotonou 31*3»1890*
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De
new Premier^yFreycinet, the CabinetTs main object was 
to avoid the expense which an expedition would have 
involved*, ^
The Cabinet was, moreover, doubtful if it would 
be wise to attempt to take Whydah with the limited 
number of troops available on the Slave Coast. The 
conflict between Bayol and Terrillon did nothing to 
increase the Governments confidence in the judgement 
of the Administrators of the area. It was therefore 
decided, that a peace settlement should be soiight before 
an attempt was made to take Whydah. If peace could not 
be mad-e before, it should be made immediately after the 
town was occupied. It was also decided that Bayol had 
better be removed. The official reason was, that since 
he had been in command when the v/ar broke out, he was
not a suitable person to conduct the peace negotiations. 
The real reason was most probably that the Cabinet had 
lost confidence in the Lt.GovernorTs judgement. On
1 De Freycinet, replying in a debate 
in the Chamber on 10.5*92.
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the 1st of April Bayol was informed of this new policy
1
and requested to return to Konakry immediately.
The Gabinet, having dismissed Bayol, proceeded 
to ask Commandant Fournier, the Commander of the ^ane', 
which was at that time lying off Cotonou, if an attack 
on Whydah had any chance of success. Fournier replied 
that there were only JQQ French troops on the Slave
Coast and that 1,500 would he necessary to make sure of 
2
success. The Cabinet immediately issued instructions 
to the effect that an expedition against Whydah was 
absolutely forbidden. The information provided by 
Fournier finally convinced the French Government that 
the Colonial administration in Benin had been acting 
irresponsibly.
The Commander of the French North Atlantic Fleet, 
Admiral Cuverville, was now made Supreme Commander of
1 M.A.E. Afrique 126, Colonial Department 
to Lt.Governor, Paris 1.U.1890.
2 Victor Nicolas, L !Expedition du Dahomey 
en 1890♦ Annex 8, Despatches Marine
to ^Sand1*, Paris 1 • 2+. 1 890: TSan£f! to 
to Marine, Cotonou 3*^«1S90*
3 M.A.E. Afrique 126, Colonial Department 
to Lt.Governor, 5*h* 1890.
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the land and sea forces in the area. As he was 
cruising off the Americas at the time, Commander 
Fournier was to exercise these powers until he arrived. 
The official reason for this transfer of control was 
that the war was being yraged by both land and sea, and 
that the Command should be unified. It was also decided 
that since a Marine officer was to be in charge in the 
Benin establishments, responsibility in Paris for affairs 
there, should, for the duration of the war, be trans-
A
ferred from the Colonial Department to the Marine.
On the 8th of April, Fournier, the new Commander, 
received instructions embodying the policy agreed upon 
by the Cabinet. Cotonou and Porto Novo were to be 
defended and the blockade to be maintained. Fournier 
was also instructed to enter, as soon as possible, in£o 
negotiations with Dahomey for a peace settlement. Peace
1 Etienne defended this action in Parliament 
on 10.5*1890 on the grounds that it was 
necessary to have a unified command. It 
is doubtful if he was as favourable in the 
Cabinet, He later, on 11.^.1892, declared 
that he had opposed (in the Cabinet) the 
veto on the expedition to Whydah.
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was to Id© made, if po ssible, on the ha sis that Dahomey 
should recognise the independence of Porto Novo, French 
possession of Cotonou, and that Dahomey should return 
the Whydah hostages. If the Dahomans would not agree 
to this the French were prepared also to offer the
King an annual pension equal to the customs receipts at 
1
Cotonou. No attempt was to he made to gain possession 
of more Dahoman territory.
Bayol himself left Cotonou on the 5"fch of April.
His achievement was that he, single-handed, manufactured 
the myth which was to he used to justify the French 
conquest of Dahomey. It was he who linked the fortunes 
of France in Benin indissolubly with those of Toffa;and 
it was he who invented the idea that the dearest Dahoman 
ambition was to expel the French from the Slave Coast.
He alone had heen in a position to ascertain the real 
aims of Dahoman policy. His interpretation of these 
aims, together with the continual barrage of anti-Dahoman 
propoganda kept up by ToffaTs Porto Novo supporters,
1 M.M.C. Dahomey 1 ^  Marine to Fournier, 
Paris, 8.4.90. D
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donvinced all the French in Benin, apart from the Whydah 
missionaries and the traders in contact with them;that 
Dahomey was hostile to France♦ Bayol started a war which 
the French Government of the day wished to avoid * It 
took six months to end the war* The myth of Dahoman 
injustice and hostility to France has lasted for as many 
decades#
After the departure of Bayol, the campaign went on 
under the impetus it had acquired while he was in control* 
The men in charge, Fournier, Terrillon, and the new 
Resident of Porto Novo, Viator Ballot, had come to the 
area when the war was in progress, and of course accepted 
the Bayol version of its outbreak. It was the accepted 
view amongst the French in Bonin that punitive measures 
* to teach the Fon a lesson1 would have to be taken against 
Abomey before the war could be ended•
In spite of the French Government’s hopes of peace, 
Colonel 1 Terrillon continued operations in the Porto Novo
1 M.A*B*, Afrique 126, •Sane1, to Marine, Cotonou 
22*4*90* This despatch summarises the views 
expressed at this period*
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area where the Fon had gathered in strength* The
French feared a Fonass's'auTt and, on the 20th April, in
order to forestall such an eventuality, attached the
Dahoman army, at Atcheribje, about seven kilometres
to the North of Porto Novo* The French claimed the
resulting battle as a resounding victory: the Fon
certainly suffered heavy losses and retired from the
field* Atcheribe could not however have been a very
dreadful blow to the Fon since they continued to operate
1
in the Porto Novo area. In fact the battle did not 
even distract them from their main purpose— -to destroy,
as they had threatened they would, the palm oil
2
plantations around Porto Novo. They did not wish to
1 M.A.E. Afrique 126, 'San^1 to Marine 
Cotonou 21.U.90: C.0.1i|7/7U, Moloney 
to Knutsford, Lagos 30.4.90: A.L’Dalbeca,
La France au Dahomey, 188U. Fournier 
states the Fon army consisted of 7 5000 
men of whom 300 were hilled. D fAlbeca 
says 1,000 were hilled. British sources 
indicate that the French vastly over­
rated Dahoman losses* Perhaps 100 tere 
hilled. It also seems very likely that 
the F^eft-ch over-estimated the number of 
Fon £roops involved.
2 See Chapter^V p*3°^
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fight the French: they simply intended to apply economic
pressure. Having destroyed innumerable palm oil
plantations the Fon proceeded to withdraw northwards*
The French continued to build defensive works around
1
Porto Novo but the Dahomans did not return*
Because of the official’s conviction that a Fon
attack was imminent, De Freycinet’s policy of negotiation
did not go into operation immediately* Indeed, the 
first peace moves came from Abomey* Some days after
they arrived in Abomey; the French hostages were summoned 
to an interview with a Oaboceer whose official capacity 
they did not know. This Oaboceer dictated a letter to 
the President of the French Republic in which it was 
proposed to return the hostages to Whydah on condition 
that the Gotonou Authorities were reinstated. The 
Resident of Porto Novo, Yictor Ballot, acting on 
Commander Fournier’s instructions, sent, on 21st April,
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I*a ’San<£’ to Marine, 
Cotonou 28.U*90. C.0.1U7/7U? Moloney
to Khutsford, Lagos 30.i-i-.90, enclosing 
Johnston (District Commisioner at 
Badagry) to Lagos Colonial Secretary 
5.5*90.
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two African messengers to Abomey to follow up this
correspondence. Their task was to see if it would
1
be possible to effect an exchange.
The messengers arrived in Cana on the 28th of 
April and were welcomed ceremoniously by the King at 
the Zagnando Palace. The Europeans were sent for and, 
after the envoys had delivered their ’message’, told 
that they were to be set free* Before they left Cana 
on the 2nd of May the King dictated a reply to Ballot 
in which, although a further protest was made against
French aggression, the key passage emphasised the Fon
1 M.M.C. Dahomey V 3 & C Fabre to Etienne 
23*7*90, enclosing Bontemp’s report,
Porto Novo 11.3.90: M.M.C. Dahomey V^a 
Declaration of Soissou and Aouge. The 
letters themselves are not in existence.
The first Dahoman letter must, however,
from Bontemp’s evidence, have been sent 
in the last days of March or the first 
days of April, probably before the 
departure of Bayol. It is unlikely 
that Bayol saw the Irony of the fact 
that Dahomey made the ftirst offer to 
restore the hostages— -Bayol had seized 
the Cotonou Authorities ostensibly to 
ensure that the French had people to exchange 
against the Whydah merchants. This aim was 
lost sight of remarkably quickly.
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desire to live in peace with the Europeans. Dahomey
as always wanted only peace and trade; the French would
he free and at liberty to trade at all points on the
Coast, provided France returned to the Cotonou Authorities
the positions they had held before the French seizure of 
1
that fort.
The hostages arrived at Whydah on the 5th May. 
Commander Fournier then informed the Whydah Authorities 
that if they were not on board a French ship by the 9th, 
the town would be bombarded and completely destroyed.
The Authorities stated that they thought the return of 
the French hostages to Whydah sufficient to obtain the 
release of the Cotonou hostages. They declared that they 
would have to consult the King before they could allow 
their prisoners to go aboard a French ship* The hostages 
were allowed to move freely about Whydah. After they 
arrived in the town they went straight to the Portuguese 
fort where the Portuguese Commandant, M. Dos Santos, 
took them under his protection. Next day Dos Santos, 
with a number of Portuguese troops, escorted them to the
1 M.M.C. Dahomey V-zo Behanzin to Ballot, 
Cana 2.5-90.
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*beaeh where they were picked up "by a hoat from the
*1
French ships off the Coast. To have stopped them,
the Whydah Authorities would have had to use force
against hoth the Portuguese and the French. This, it
seeins, they were afraid to do. The Fon Cotonou
Authorities were released and returned to Dahomey on
the 7th of May, immediately after the French party
arrived in Porto Novo.
An exchange had, then, ‘been effected. This was
not however what the Fon had wanted. They had intended 
that the French hostages should return in freedom to 
Whydah to begin trading again, and that the Cotonou 
Authorities should be restored to their former positions. 
What they wanted was simply a reversion to the political 
situation as it had existed before the French attack. 
Their political objectives took no account of the fact
that the Fon armies had been defeated. That no account
1 M.M.C. Dahomey V^a C.Fabre to Etienne 
23*7*90, enclosing Bontempfs report, 
Porto Novo 11.5.90; E.Chaudoin,
Trois Mois de Captivite du Dahomey.
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had been taken of the alteration in the coastal 
balance of power may have been partly due to the fact 
that the Fon attitude to current political problems 
had been worked out in 1889 only with difficulty, and 
consisted of the minimum programme on which the various 
factions within the ruling group could agree. Any 
change in this programme might have meant a return to 
earlier struggles to control decision-making. Even 
although they were anxious for peace, the Dahomans would
therefore maintain, at least until the French put forward 
alternative proposals, the programme of December 1889.
The French administrators in ^enin had been slow 
to put into practice the Governments instructions to 
enter into negotiations. They had not realised that the 
Fon had attempted to make the exchange of hostages into 
a peace settlement. Nevertheless, Commandant Fournier 
on the 21st of May advised Victor Ballot to send a 
messenger to Behanzin with an outline of the points on
which the French were willing to negotiate a peace
settlement. Ballot himself was not in favour of sending 
an ambassador, since he considered that only a severe
-  35U -
defeat would 'bring the Fon to agree to terms which 
he thought France might accept. Holding this view; 
he considered that sending a messenger would simply 
lower French ’prestige1 in the eyes of the Africans.
The man selected, hy Ballot, for this mission, 
was Bernardin Durand. Ho messenger would have heen
1
less likely to spread sweetness and light in Ahomey.
It seems that Ballot, knowing Durand’s devotion to
France and his linguistic ability, simply failed to 
realise how unpopular his choice of messenger would 
he in Ahomey. Durand arrived in the Dahoman capital 
on the 5th of May. There is no record of the wording 
of the proposals which Durand carried with him,hut it 
can he safely assumed that they were hased on the policy
1 See Chapter III p 197for outline of 
career of Durand. Ballot seems to 
have heen regarded hy his colleagues 
as an upright, honest man and, it 
seems unlikely even though he was not 
in agreement with official policy, that 
he would have attempted to undermine 
it hy sending on an unacceptable
messenger. The Porto Hovans, however, 
would have had no such scruples.
Durand himself applied for the job.
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set out by the Government in its instructions to
1
Fournier on the 8th April*
To have agreed to negotiate on the basis of Durand1 s 
proposals would have meant for the Dahomans a radical 
departure from the compromise on which the Fon ruling 
group had been able to unite. Many of the Chiefs do 
seem to have been convinced by the defeat of the Fon 
armies and by the recession of trade, that it was 
necessary to alter Fon political objectives and to 
make peace with the French* It was said that the loss 
of trade was heavily felt in Abomey; where the price of 
all European luxury goods had doubled. Moreover, the 
loyalty of the coastal towns, terrified by the French 
bombardments, seems to have been becoming doubtful*
According to reliable information received by the 
French from Dorgere, the Mehou Topa, and another of the 
King’s brothers, Prince Adoknin, were the leaders of the
1 Dux^and’s ’message’ being based on the 
statement of policy of 8.4.1890 would 
have proposed Dahoman abandonment of 
Gotonou and Porto Hovo.
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group who wanted a peace settlement. The majority
of the Chiefs, it seems, were in favour of a settlement
even if it meant that Dahomey had to accept a loss of
territory. Some of the Chiefs, indeed, may have wished
to make peace to forestall the French, under the influence
of Toffa, from beginning an all-out war on Dahomey. Fear
that the Yoruba, taking advantage of the Franco-Dahoman
conflict, might unite and make a concerted attack, probably
also influenced the Fon to seek a peace settlement.
The minority who were against the settlement were no
doubt the Geleleans,who were, as always, opposed to giving
in to European pressure and, above all, to ceding Dahoman
territory. Although a majority of the Chiefs were in
favour of a peace, Durand remained in Dahomey until the
end of June without receiving any reply to the proposals
2which he had brought. It seems, from later events, 
that the taking of a decision was held up, not by the
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Cuverville to Marine 
9.9*90: M.A.E. Afrique *126, Cuverville 
to Marine, Cotonou 1.8.90.
2 See below 361-362.
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strength of support for the Geleleans, hut hy distrust
of the French,greatly reinforced hy the distrust of the
•]French messenger.
When Durand was in Ahomey, a section of the Fon,
under the leadership of the King, was engaged in a 
retaliatory raid on a number of northern Yoruha villages. 
On his return to Ahomey,the King indulged in a 1 triumph* 
which it is to he presumed was designed to convince his 
people that the Dahoman military machine was sweeping 
all before it. Probably the King had associated himself 
with the northern campaign in order to enhance his 
prestige. The French hoped that this raid on Yoruha
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Vha Bernardin Durand 
to Ballot, Porto novo 5.9.90. Durand 
was aked to repeat his message at 
different times to different groups
of Chiefs. They then compared what he 
had said. A.M.Alexandre was called up 
from Whydah to check DurandT s trans­
lations of his offered letter. This 
checking and counter-checking of both 
Durand1s statements and the documents 
which he carried, indicates how much the 
Fon distrusted him.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Vha B.Durand to Ballot, 
Porto Novo 15.9.98,
- 358 -
1
territory would stir up the Egba to march on Ahomey.
It did not. The Egba had heen content, since 1878, if 
not to co-operate with Dahomey, at least to see in 
their mutual hostility to the northern Yoruha, and in 
the similarity of their problems in dealing with the 
advance of the Europeans from the coast, good rpsons
for maintaining a neutral attitude in the French- 
Dahoman conflict. While the King was engaged in raiding 
Yoruhaland, and for two months afterwards, the main
part of the Dahoman army was stationed in the south
2
awaiting any French movement.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey V^c C.Franco is to 
Ballot, Abeolcuta 7-7*90: Olindo
to Governor of Porto Novo, Abeokuta 
7th & 26th.7*90: M.M.C. Dahomey Vu0 
Francois to Ballot, Abeohuta 25.8.90: 
M.M.C. Dahomey 1/,-k Ballot to Etienne, 
Porto Novo 2.8.90.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey 1 ^  Ballot to Etienne, 
Porto Novo 2.4.90: M.M.C. Dahomey I-** 
Cuvervilleto Marine, Cotonou 3*7*90? 
The Dahoman army watching French 
movements was divided into five groups 
of between 2,000 and 4,000 soldiers 
stationed at strategic points in the 
©ueme valley.
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On the 10th of June while Durand was in Ahomey,
Admiral Cuverville arrived at Cotonou to take over 
the direction of French policy. Cuverville^ orders 
were the same as Fournier1s: to follow the policy 
laid down on the 8th of April. He was, however, also 
instructed to study the ways and means of making a
1
march on Ahomey in case such a march became unavoidable.
When he came to the Slave Coast,the Admiral seems 
to have had no preconceived notions as to the politics 
of the area. Ballot was of the opinion that Behanzin 
would never sign an acceptable Treaty until Dahomey 
had suffered a considerable defeat— -including, probably, 
the French seizure of Abomey. The Admiral at first 
accepted this view. However, during the first few weeks 
of his direction of affairs on the Coast, the Admiral seems 
to have met Father Dorgere, the Whydah missionary 
who had been one of the 1Whydah hostages1 and
1 M.A.E.Afrigue 126, Marine to Cuverville,
Paris 19*5*1890. This is an indication 
that enthusiasm for a forward action 
amongst the French in Benin was beginning 
to make it thought, in Paris, that no 
other action was possible.
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who had greater experience of Dahoman affairs than had 
any other Frenchman in the area. Dorgere and Cuverville 
had a great deal in common. This was especially true 
of their religious views; both were strong catholics 
and both disliked the Third Republic. Dorgere considered 
that an immediate peace settlement with Dahomey was very 
possible;and offered to go himself to Abomey to treat
with the King. The Admiral accepted Dorgere1s offer
1
enthusiastically.
been
Having .convinced of the usefulness of Dorgere s
j
mission, Cuverville immediately began negotiations with
the Whydah Authorities for the reception of the mission.
The Whydah Authorities were over-joyed,and Cuverville^
2messengers were received with great honour in Whydah. 
Dorgerefs instructions were very simple: to obtain the 
release of Durand and the 27 native employees of the
1 M.A.E. Dahomey 1^. Afrique 126, 
Cuverville to Marine, Cotonou
1.8.90.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey I** Cuverville to 
Mar ine, Co tonou 30.7*90.
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Whydah factory who had heen retained in Ahomey since
•1
the taking of the Whydah hostages^ to explain that the
French had promised to defend Porto Novo independence^
to attempt to gain Dahoman admission of the French claim
to Cotonouj to sound out Dahoman views on the subject of
2French occupation of the French Whydah fort.
Although Durand had heen, hy the end of July, in 
Ahomey for over a month and a half, no reply had heen 
made to the French proposals. This was due, as has heen 
noted, to the fact that Dahoman distrust of France was so 
reinforced hy distrust of Durand, that the Chiefs could 
not make up their minds as to what reply to make. On the 
30th of July, Dorgere arrived in Whydah, thus confirming 
that he was going to Ahomey to attempt to make a peace 
settlement. Dorgere was trusted and respected in Dahomey, 
lie had lived in Whydah many years and, it seems, had heen
1 Although Durand had sent letters from 
Ahomey, Durand1s long stay there had 
convinced the French that he was heing 
held as a hostage.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Cuverville to Marine, 
Cotonou 5*9»90.
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well liked* jj@ had, moreover, "been a captive in
Dahomey; that he was willing to return to the scene
of his captivity convinced the Fon of the sincerity
of his mission.
When Dorgere arrived in Ahomey he was greeted with
great honour and found that the King and his Chiefs were
2ready and willing to negotiate. Since the proposals 
Dorgere carried must have heen virtually the same as 
those carried hy Durand, it seems that it must have heen
the character of the ambassador which made the Pon alter
their attitude. It would seem therefore that on the news 
of DorgereTs arrival the majority of the Chiefs had 
determined at once to enter into negotiations. This ties
in with the fact that Durand reported that on the 1st of 
August a revolt occurred in which a number of important
1 The Dahomans had In 1 888 given his mission,
for the first time, the right to teach the 
children In their mission school in French, 
not in Portuguese* This concession would 
seem to indicate that Dorgere was highly 
respected in Dahomey* M.M.C. Dahomey V2a 
Lecron to Marine, Agou^ 31.10.90*
2 M.M.C* Dahomey Vj,a Dorgere to Cuverville 
Abomey 11*8*90. ^
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Caboceers, a number of Behanzin’s wives and a number
-]
of G-elele's wives all took part* Durand gives no 
reason for the revolt, staying simply $hat these people 
were discontented with the policy conducted hy the 
King* It seems reasonable to suppose from the date 
of their revolt they were making a last desperate attempt 
to prevent the King and the majority of the Chiefs from 
entering into negotiations with the French* The King, 
however, discovered the plot, put some of the conspirators 
in prison and had others executed* Given that these 
c onspirators would seem to have been opposed to any 
compromise with the French,it is reasonable to deduce that 
they were in fact the TGeleleanT party*
There is in existence a letter written in 1891
1 M.M•C* Dahomey VI Durand to Ballot, 
Porto Novo 13*9*90.
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A
to the Resident of Porto Novo by Xavier Beraud, which
seems, when carefully handled, to throw some further
2
light on this crisis in Dahoman politics* This letter
purports to he the tale of how King G-elele poisoned
himself in December 1889 and how his successor, against
the will of ^elele's closest supporters, adopted a
hostile attitude to the French. It therefore contains a
deliberately false interpretation of political events
3in Dahomey in 1889 and 1890. Its main purpose seems
1 Xavier Beraud was one of the violently 
pro-French group who surrounded the King,
Toff a, (see Chapter III p197). He was
at this time interpreter to the French 
Resident; he used this position to preijBBnt 
the Fon in as had a light as possible.
Moreover, he seems to have heen playing 
something of a double game, tie was greatly 
distrusted in Abomey hut in order to make 
himself more valuable to the French he 
attempted to present himself as an intimate 
of the Fon. He seems to have added notes 
to Fon communications in order to make his 
role seem authentic. This would seem to he 
the only possible explanation of letters 
such as that quoted by C.W. Newbury op.cit., 
pp. 131 -132.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey 11 Ip Beraud to E'hermann 
Porto Novo 12.3.91,
3 C.W. Newbury, The Western Slave Coast 
and its KiaigfaF, p. 1R9. Newbury takes
m this letter at its face value and finds 
the infox^mation that it gives doubtful.
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1
to have heen to show the new Resident that any 
French concession to Dahomey only added to Behanzin* s 
prestige;and so led him to pursue a more aggressively 
anti-French policy. Presumably it was designed by 
Toffa's supporters to prevent the new Resident making 
an# rapprochement with Dahomey. This seems especially
likely since it was written just after an embassy had
2
been sent to Abomey by the French. It contains only 
one piece of information of any importance. This is 
on the subject of a plot which took place against 
Behanzin.
Although this plot is said to have taken place 
just after Gelele’s death^it bears a close resemblance 
to that mentioned by Durand. Beraud says he acquired 
his information from a reliable source, ^e was a close
1 Ehermann became acting-Resident of
Porto Eovo on the departure of Victor 
Ballot on sick leave, in January 1891.
2 The October (1890) Agreement had only 
just been put into operation and the 
new Resident had not been long enough 
on the Coast to be known to be so 
reliably anti-Dahoman as had Ballot. The 
embassy was the Audeoud Embassy. See pp. 387- 
392.
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friend of Durand. It therefore seems likely that he 
acquired some information on the August plot from 
Durand, and proceeded to embroider this information for 
his own political purposes. If it is accepted that 
BaraudT s plot and Durand’s plot are in fact the same, 
some of the basic information given by Beraud can- be 
used to shed light on the composition of the G-elelean 
party which rose in revolt on the 1st August, 1890.
Using Beraud* s information, one of the leaders of 
the ’Geleleans* would seem to have been the late King 
Gelele’s chief wife, the Visesegan. Presumably she 
had held that position because she had shared the old
King’s views. Another important man in the plot was the
1
Yeovogun of Whydah. This was of course Nougbododhoue.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ig0 Ehermann to Ballot 8.9*91: 
Casmir Agbo, Histoire de Whydah. psy?
M.J. & F.S. Herskovits, Dahoman Narrative 
PP.37^-376.
He is described by Beraud as Chaudaton 
of Whydah, King Gelele’s fetish doctor.
Casmir/ Agbo names the last Yeovogun of Whydah 
nominated by King Behanzin after King Gelele’s 
death in 1889 as Nougbo do dhoue • He is, however, 
described as ’King Gelele’s quack doctor’. The 
two names would seem therefore to refer to the 
same person. The man who became, later, the 
Yeovogun of Whydah on Gelele’s death was the man 
who nominated Kondo Crown Prince in 1876. This 
yfoyQ&un was executed in Abomey in the summer of 
2ne °^.,the reasons given for his execution 
was that he mistreated the Whydah hostages.
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A ward Chief at Whydah, a M.Nicolas, was also involved 
in the plot. Another important Gelelean Chief involved 
was the Binazon. The attempt to seize control by this 
group seems to have been a last despairing effort by 
a minority of the Chiefs who could not hope to prevent, 
by normal means, the opening of negotiations. The power 
of the Geleleans seems to hai^ e been ended without too
much difficulty. Their policies had proved unwise when 
the Europeans began to- exert themselves.
Although Dorgere was given a very warm welcome in 
Abomey, ceremonial was not used as an excuse for delay, 
and the King and his Chiefs immediately got down to 
discussing peace terms. This was so unlike foinner Dahoman 
negoatiations with Europeans that it indicates that the 
important decisions had already been taken. By the 11th 
of Augustj Dorgere could write to CuSrerville that Dahomey 
accepted the independence of Porto Novo and that the 
problem of Cotonou could probably be settled, although 
the amount of the indemnity to be paid would involve 
lengthy negotiations. The King insisted that his 
Gaboceers should be allowed to return to Cotonou.
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However, He agreed that they were to have no dealings 
with and no jurisdiction over Europeans: their 
functions would he confined to governing the Eon
)and regulating all that related to the indemnity*v J
The only point on which Dahomey refused all compromise
was on the suggestion that they should agree to allow
2
French troops to reoccupy the French Whydah fort*
The Dahomans thus proved themselves willing to negotiate
and to make considerable concessions in order to obtain
a peace settlement*
Dorgere and Durand returned to Whydah on the 
3
2/+th of August, carrying with them a letter from the
1 This compromise (that the Fon Authorities 
would continue in Cotonou but would have 
nothing to do with the Europeans) gave the 
French control of Cotonou while, at the 
same time, satisfying Fon traditional 
scruples that no part of Dahoman home 
territory should be alienated*
2 M.M*C* Dahomey Vt,fl Dorgere to Cuverville, 
Aborney 11.8*90.
3 They took with them the Whydah traders1 
African employees who had been held in 
Abomey since the release of the hostages.
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1King. This letter confirmed that Dahomey was willing 
to accept a settlement along the lines Dorgere had 
indicated. The Dahomans did however protest against
what they considered ToffaTs false interpretations of
the boundaries of Porto Novo. The French were asked
to keep the King of Porto Novo under close supervision.
With regard to Whydah, the King confirmed that he could
not agree to the reoccupation of the French fort, hut
offered to expel the Portuguese from their fort, so
that it should not appear that the Fon favoured any
2nation more than they did the French. The letter also
incJ.uded a request that France should sign with Dahomey
a treaty for the mutual extradition of prisoners.
Cuverville was well pleased with the result of Dorgere1s
mission^ and considered that on the basis of these
3
proposals a settlement could be worked out.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Vga Behanzin to Cuverville, 
Abomey 18.8.90. 9
2 Cuverville indignantly rejected this 
offer. France did not wish to injure 
the rights of others.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey I_d Cuverville to Marine,
Cotonou 7*9»90.
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Rather predictably, the Resident of Porto Novo,
Victor Ballot, did not share Cuverville1s pleasure in
the result of Dorgere1s mission. Before Dorgere had
set out Ballot had complained of Cuverville^ sending
the missionary to Abomey. In Ballot1s opinion Durand
was being held hostage^and it was unlikely that Dorgere
1
would fare any better. That Dorgere had been one of 
the Whydah hostage group, who were bitterly critical 
of the Colonial Administration1s actions in Benin, 
probably increased Ballot*s hostility to the missionary. 
He did not change his views on Dorgere1s return. In a 
letter to the Governor of the Rivieres du Sud?he remarked
that Durand had confirmed the news which he had already
and 2
heard/that Behanzin would make no resonable concessions®
Ballot had completely absorbed the Bayo1-Toffa view of 
Dahoman affairs and regarded Behanzin as the extreme
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ik-^ Victor Ballot to 
Etienne, Porto Novo 2,8.90.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Vgc Ballot to the 
Governor, no date*. Since the letter 
is concerned with Dorgerefs recent 
return from Abomey it must have been 
written either at the end of August 
or the beginning of September.
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1anti-French leader in Dahomey® Ballot considered that
Behanzin was only buying time so that he could build
up his forces for another attack on the French.
Cuverville, however, after the successful outcome
of Dorgere’s visit to Abomey, on the 13th of September
sent Captain Montesquiou to Whydah to begin final
negotiations. Official treaty-making however proved
difficult and the negotiations dragged on without any
2sign of coming to a conclusion. The points at issue
1 Bayol, in Abomey, had been confronted with 
Behanzin’s(KondoTs)refusal to admit French 
claims to Dahoman territory. he had assumed 
that Behanzin was an extremist determined
to dislodge the French from the Slave Coast. 
Since he had considered, in 1887, equally 
without justifications that Dahomey was 
likely to give in to French demands, he 
assumed that King Celele had been friendly 
to France and that his successor had reversed 
this policy. Behanzin was therefore cast by 
the French Administration as an inveterate 
opponent of France. Dorgere, with first­
hand knowledge of Dahomey, knew better.
2 The actual linguistic difficulties were 
quite considerable. The Coussagan had to 
translate from Abomey-Fon into Whydah: 
Candido, a Whydah mulatto, translated from 
dhy&ah into Portuguese: Dorgere translated 
from Portuguese into French.
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were, the occupation of the Whydah fort by French
troops, the status of the Fon Authorities in Cotonou!*.
1
the question of a Cotonou railway, and the Dahoman
2
demand for a treaty of extradition*
On the 2nd October Cuverville himself went to
Whydah. Seeing that negotiations might drag on even
longerfhe prepared a brief statemen of the minimum
terms the French could accept* He then despatched
this document to the Fon negotiators, with a message
that if these terms were not agreed to within forty-
3
eight hours France would resume the war. It was 
signed on the 3rd of October— 'although not without 
protest. In the settlement Dahomey recognised the 
French protectorate over Port Novo and agreed to abstain
1 Phis was a new French ideas it was
probably thrown in as a bargaining 
point.
Jv 2 M.M.C. Dahomey Montesquioufs
correspondence, 13.9• to 2.10.90.
3 M.M.C. Dahomay Marine to the
Under-Secretary or State for the
Colonies, Paris 1.12.90, enclosing 
Cuverville to Coussagan (acting- 
Teovogun) Whydah 2.10.90.
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from raiding Porto Novo territory. Dahomey also 
agreed to recognise the French right to occupy 
Cotonou indefinitely. France was, however, to pay
a sum of not more than 20,000 francs annually to 
Dahomey as compensation for the loss of her Customs
1
rights at Cotonou.
As Cuverville took pains to point out, this was 
not a treaty hut simply an arrangement which safe­
guarded French rights and which re-established peace in 
2the area. It was laid down in the agreement that 
Dahomey would respect the French protectorate of Porto 
Novo: there was, however, no attempt to define the 
boundaries of this state nor of the French protected 
territories around Grand Popo. At Cotonou no attempt 
was made to define the relations between the French and 
the Cotonou Authorities whom, it seems to have been 
’understood’ 9 were to be allowed to return. The strongest 
part of the agreement was one which was later quietly
dropped and which went unmentioned in France. This was
1 IK, p.101. Arrangement between France
and Dahomey concluded 3.10*1890.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey I^H Cuverville to Marine
5.10.1890.
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the Treaty of Extradition to which, on Dahoman
1
insistence, Cuverville had agreed*
The agreement therefore really only provided for
the ending of hostilities• It made no attempt to
define future Franco-Dahoman relations* For Cuverville,
however, it was something more than a peace settlement.
1 Cest une oeuvre d1 apaisement qui 
retablira la confiance du Dahomey 
dans la loyaute et la generosite 
de la France.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey V., Marine to Under-Secretary 
of State for the^Solonies, Paris 1.12.90, 
enclosing Treaty of Extradition, Cuverville, 
Whydah 2.10.90. fhis provided for French- 
Dahoman exchange of criminals who had taken 
refuge in the other’s territory. For obvious 
reasons it was not mentioned in France. The 
Dahomans never claimed to have put it into 
operation.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey I,, Cuverville to Marine 
5*10.90. It is in this document that, as well 
as setting out his^own policy, Cuverville lists 
the sins of Bayol his unjustified seizure of 
Cotonou: the ill-treatment of the Cotonou
Authorities, etc. Cuverville even goes as far 
as to say that if judgement were to be made on 
the conduct of the two sides during the past 
year, Dahomey would appear in a far better light 
than would France*
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Cuverville, under the influence of Dorgere, declared
that the aggressive actions of the French over the
previous year had made it impossible for the Fon to
trust the French enough to sign a real treaty. By
this Cuverville seems to have meant that if the French
treated the Fon well, the Dahomans could be induced to
accept French guidance and tutelage. Cuverville then
went on to define the policy which he had pursued and
which he wished to be maintained.
’Ma politique avait pour le principal 
objectify de r^tablir d’abord le bon 
renom de notre pays et de prouver a ce
vaillant petit people que en France la
loyaute passe tout: il faut bien nous 
garder d’imiter sa barbare et son astuce.
La paix qui vient d’etre conclue ne 
durera qu’k cette condition.’*^
Cuverville, always,it seems, susceptible to ecclesiastical 
influence, was so impressed by Dorgere and his views that 
he completely adopted the missionary’s attitude to Dahomey. 
The Fon were assessed as a ’valiant little people’ who
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Cuverville to Marine, 
Whydah 5.10.1890?a
- 376 -
had been badly abused by the Colonial Administrators. 
Cuvervilles aim, like that of the Colonial officials, 
was to bring Dahomey under French influehce and thus 
civilise the country. This was to be achieved, however, 
not by conquest, but by binding the Dahomans to France 
by winning their sympathy and trust. The Frenchmen who 
were to win Dahoman trust were of course to be the 
Catholic missionaries. The 3rd- October agreement was 
viewed as only the beginning of the process of winning 
Fon trust and affection. Seen in this way it was not 
necessary to make nice definitions of boundaries and 
frontiers. By French exercise of goodwill and by the 
spread, of Christianity, Dahomey would come under French 
influence and no disputes Yirould. ensue. Cuverville 
himself stated that without tolerance and understanding 
the agreement would not preserve the peace.
From his vantage point of lofty goodwill, Cuverville 
considered that the Colonial officials had been ’misguided1 
in their dealings with Dahomey. While saying numerous
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I-zj Cuverville to Marine,
3.10.1890. J
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complimentary things alxrut the upright character of
Victor Ballot, Cuverville kept him completely in the
dark as to the course and conclusion of the negotiations
at Whydah.^ So doubtful was Cuverville of the likelihood
of the Colonial officials following out his policy that
he advised that the control of the Benin Establishments
2ought to remain in the hands of the Marine. The 
Government had, however, little idea of what Cuverville 
was about; and they paid no attention to his suggestion. 
Cuverville had brought the war to an end^and had thus 
saved the Government from what might have been political 
embarrassment. Beyond this, Paris was uninterested in 
Cuverville's policy in Benin.
The Admiral’s view that the October agreement was 
a hopeful foundation for future Dahoman relations was not
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ig^ Ballot to Ballay, 
Porto Novo 8.11.1890* Ballot did not 
hide his displeasure at being excluded.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey I ™  Cuverville to Marine, 
Whydah 5*10.90. Behanzin himself had 
requested this.
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widely shared. The Government, it has been noted, 
only accepted it to avoid possible political embarrassment. 
Etienne, who had in 1889 wished to occupy the whole 
Dahoman coastline and who was already talking in terms 
of using the Dahoman coast as a base for progress inland 
to link with the other advancing French frontiers in 
Senegal and Algeria, must have accepted this settlement 
as a temporary expedient due to the limitations imposed
A
on his policy by French politics.
On the Coast itself^Toffa and his supporters were
of course totally opposed to any rapprochement between 
France and Dahomey. Ballot, speaking for the Colonial 
officials, resented exclusion from the making of the 
settlement and considered that Behanzin’s record made 
it seem very unlikely that he would keep this treaty.2 
The Marseilles traders, influenced by a projected Customs 
reorganisation at Whydah, also protested vigorously against
1 Eugene Etienne, Son Oeuvre.
Etienne had spoken of this as 
early as 10.5*1890 in the Chamber 
of Deputies.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey 1 ^  Ballot to Ball ay, 
Porto Novo, 8.11.90.
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1
a settlement which left Whydah in Fon hands*
It did hot look as if tolerance and goodwill 
were going to get much of a chance. However, it 
must be added that it was, to say the least of it, 
unlikely that Guverville*s policy could have brought 
permanent, peace to the area* Dahomey was certainly 
willing to co-exist peacefully with the French: it is
possible that Dahomey would have abandoned (as in Gezo’s 
day) some of the state practices most obnoxious to 
the Europeans* However, Cuverville and the missionaries 
like the other Europeans, were intent on controlling 
Dahomey* Such control, it is certain, Dahomey would 
never have accepted*
In Abomey, the Fon, although impressed by Dorgere
2
and Guverville, were justifiably still suspicious of 
French intentions, Q)he Fon had suffered military defeat
1 M,M.G, Dahomey C.Fabre to the president 
of the Commission set up to examine the 
treaty made with the King of Dahomey* 
Marseilles, 3*1*1891*
2 Behanzin himself had asked that French 
Haval Officers should remain in charge 
of Slave Coast affairs.
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and were determined that they should not do so again. 
Their defeat they attributed to the supremacy of 
French military equipment. During the war, in July 
1890, they had already entered into negotiations with 
a German trader named Barth for the purchase of modern 
rifles and ammunition. At the end of the war Fon plans
for re-equipping their army went ahead rapidly. In
order to obtain money for this re-equipment, Behanzin,
soon after the conclusion of the October agreement,
began negotiations with Dos Santos (the Commander of
the Portuguese Whydah fort) for the sale of more
1
’indentured labourers’. To French Colonial officials 
this arms-buying and slave-dealing indicated not fears 
of French aggressive intentions, but Fon determination
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Vhc Ballot to Cuverville, 
Porto Fovo 11.8.1890: M.M.C. Dahomey Vla 
Durand to the Resident, Porto Fovo 15.9*90. 
It was rumoured that Behanzin had given 
Barth £5?000 to provide these arms. It 
was also rumoured that modern weapons were 
passing from Lome to Dahomey, in spite of 
the Imperial law forbidding this.
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to revoke the October treaty and make another 
attempt to expel the French.
In spite of the opposition to the October agreement^ 
the work of putting it into effect went ahead rapidly. 
Guverville, however, found it necessary to issue 
instructions that all French officials and officers 
should behave towards the Fon at all times in a prudent, 
moderate and circumspect manner. These virtues it seems 
had not been much in evidence when the Fon began 
rebuilding and re-occupying the native village at Cotonou.
The most difficult part of the pacification was of course 
the attempt to induce the Kings, Behanzin and Toffa, to 
live in peace. Behanzin had already indicated his
1 M.M.C. Dahomey 1*^ Cuverville to Marine, 
Cotonou 5«11*1890. The Fon had been 
authorised, it seems, by an unrecorded 
verbal agreement with Cuverville to re­
establish and rule the village of 
Cotonou. The Fon Authorities were to 
have no jurisdiction over the Europeans. 
The French Colonial officials on the 
Coast were never given the details of this 
agreement and remained mystified as to 
what actions their relationship with the 
Fon Authorities of the village should be.
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willingness to do this* Toffa of course had no choice
hut to fall in officially with the wishes of the French*
Unofficially his aims remained as before, to extend the
area of his rule by gaining French baching for his
ambitions* By the 10th of November the Dahomans had
1withdrawn all their troops from the disputed areas*
All French land and sea forces, except 600 Traillieurs
>■ 2
Senega^is, were then withdrawn from the area} and 
Cuverville was able to inform the Marine on the 8th of 
December that the work of pacification was complete.^ 
Cuverville had positive plans for winning Dahoman 
confidence, ensuring peace and generally drawing Dahomey 
under the influence of France* As a start he proposed
sending the enemies of Dahomey to Abomey on a mission 
of reconciliation* lie requested Dahoman permission
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I-z^  Behanzin to Ballot: 
M.M.C. Dahomey 111^  c Ballot to Cuverville 
Report on Mission to the Became, Porto 
Novo 13* 9 *1890*
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Vuk Marine to Etienne, 
Paris 1 .12.1890.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey I,^ Cuverville to Marine, 
Cotonou 8.12*1890.
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to do this. The mission was to he headed by Victor
Ballot, and was to consist of several French officers,
the principal French traders on the coast and four of
King ToffaTs laris. The Porto Novans were said to
have heen included in order to further the reconciliation
2
between Porto Novo and Dahomey. Although Guverville 
nowhere explicitly states it, it seems more than likely 
that the same motive lay behind the sending to Abomey 
of Ballot, the officers and the traders. Guverville 
however failed completely to inform the man whom he
instructed to make up the mission, as to what was to be
the purpose of their journey. It seems that he somewhat 
optimistically considered that a visit to Abomey would
at once persuade them that the Fon were, in his own
words, ’a valiant little people’ with whom the French
ought to co-operate.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey I^  Victor Ballot 
to Governor Ballay, Porto Novo 
9.12.1890.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Victor Ballot
to Governor Ballay, Porto Novo 
9.12.90: M.M.C. Dahomey 1-^ 
Guverville to Marine, Cotonou 
5.11.90.
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That such a visit would have convinced the 
Coastal Europeans of this is open to doubt: there was 
even less likelihood that a visit of Toffa!s laris 
to Abomey would have reconciled that monarch to giving 
up his ambitions. Cuverville was never hovirever given 
the chance to put his theories into practice. The 
French Government had transferred control of the Colony 
from the Colonial Department to the Marine only for 
the duration of the war. Eo notice was taken of 
Cuverviller s plea that the Marine might remain in 
charge. When the Admiral declared on the 8th of 
December that the pacification of the area was complete^ 
he was withdrawn and control was resumed by the Colonial 
Department.
When Cuverville left Benin in December his 
powers devolved (until Governor Ballay should arrive)
1 It was considered in Abomey during 
the French conquest that Toffa 
wished to become King of Dahomeyv 
There may well be some truth in 
this Dahoman nightmare.
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on the Resident of* Porto Novo. Ballot however 
contracted fever and was forced to leave for Prance 
on the 7th of January 1891* On Ballots departure, 
his deputy, M.Ehermann, a newcomer to the area, was 
left in charge. On the 12th of January Dahoman 
messengers arrived at Whydah with the request that the 
embassy which Cuverville had proposed to send to Abomey 
should now set out. Cuverville had not left any 
instructions as to what should be the conduct or the 
purpose of the mission: in fact, as has been noted, he 
had kept the Colonial Administration in the dark as to 
his intentions.
Governor Ballay, expressing the views of the 
regular Colonial Administration, had no desire to send 
an embassy to Abomey, since he considered that it would 
only be used by Behanzin as an indication that he had
1 Governor Ballay was Lt.Governor BayolTs 
successor. He had been instructed to 
visit Benin to supervise the resumption 
of political control by the Colonial 
Administration.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Igc Ehermann to Ballay, 
Porto Hovo 8.1.91.
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triumphed over the French* Nevertheless, he felt 
that to refuse to send the embassy which Guverville
had already requested would he an insult to Dahomey,
*1
and might provoke Behanzin to resume the war* A
resumption of the war, at this time, was contrary to
the wishes of the French Government. Ballay therefore
stated his views and requested instructions from 
2Paris. The Colonial Department, which, like Ballay,
was unsure of Guverville !s intentions, and saw no
3useful purpose in the mission, nevertheless agreed 
that to omit to send an embassy would he insulting. 
Ballay was therefore directed to send any available 
officers up to Abomey with presents for the King. 
Dorgere could be sent with the officers if it seemed
1 M.M.C* Dahomey Ik& Ballay to Etienne,
Porto Fovo, 9.3*91.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Ica Ballay to Etienne,
Porto Fovo 3*2.91*
3 M.M.C. Dahomey III2 Etienne to M.A.E, 
Paris 18.1.91: MA.E.to Etienne 10.1.91* 
Etienne had already asked both the Marine 
and the Ministere des Affaires, Etrangeres, 
‘kk© raison d*etre of the mission, Neither 
could" tell hirn^
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that his presence would he useful. 1
Five Officers, led by Commandant Audeaud, were
therefore despatched by Ballay to Ahomey. The embassy
had, however, nothing of an attempt to reconcile France
and Dahomey about it. Etienne sent instructions before
it set out, after having consulted Victor Ballot, that
3
Dorgere was on no account to take part in the embassy.
The removal of Dorgere meant that the policy of
drawing Dahomey into the French orbit by co-operation
Uwas set aside untried. The orders given to the
ambassadors were to hand over the-presents to the King
and to inform him that the Council of Ministers had
1 M.A.E.Afrique 127, Etienne to Ballay,
5.2.1891 .
2 Ballot had newly arrived in France from 
Benin.
3 M.A.E.Af rique 127> Etienne to M.A.E.
12.2.1891 . ’
If. At the request of Behanzin, Dorgere
did in fact go to Abomey at the same
time as the embassy. He went, however, 
as a private individual and was not
allowed to take part in official business.
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accepted the Treaty of 3rd October, With regard to 
the Agreement itself the ambassadors were to observe 
the greatest possible reserves any subject which 
might lead to discord was to be avoided. The embassy 
had no constructive purpose: it was sent merely in order 
to avoid trouble with Dahomey.
The embassy left Whydah on the 20th of February: 
it received such a warm welcome in Abomey that the 
ambassadors were soon convinced that Behanzin intended 
to live in peace with France. The ambassadors, however, 
seem to have regarded themselves as being not so much 
on a mission of friendship as on a reconnaissance
expedition. The reports submitted on the return of 
the embassy were largely concerned with establishing
a body of military information which would be utful 
in the conquest of Dahomey. The only remnants of
1 M.M.C. Dahomey III2 Ballay to Audeoud,
Porto Novo 9*2*91•
2 R.Cornevin, His to ire &u Dahomey, p. 33JU-.
Coruevin, having studied the mission1s 
reports, regards the embassy as a 
'Mission d1 espionage aedb dT information*.
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Cuverville’s ideas on the purpose of the mission 
were that four of Toffa’s laris were taken along: 
their visit certainly led to no decrease in Toffa’s
hostility to Dahomey*
Two incidents, which took place during the 
1embassy’s visit, had an unfortunate effect on future 
Franco-Dahoman relations. The first concerned the 
official French ’present’ to the King, which one of
the ambassadors found difficulty in believing cost
^  2 
the 3*000 francs supposed to have been spent on it.
The Dahomans, as this officer had foretold, were
displeased with the present, and even sent a group of
Caboceers to the French officers to complain that the
lengths of cloth which made up part of it were short
of the normal length. Although nothing further was
1 The ambassadors were, besides Commandant 
Audeoud, Captain Deceur, Captain Hoquart,
M.l’Aspirant d’Ambieres and Lt.Charles.
2 M.M.C* Dahomey Illg D’Ambieres report to 
Cuverville. The present consisted of 
some rieh cloth, two cases of champagne,
some cigars, ten centimes and some trade
umbrellas.
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heard of the matter^the poverty of the French ’present1 
seems to have been interpreted as something of an 
insult.
The second incident seems to have had its origins 
in a Fon political manoeuvre. When the officers were
■i
officially welcomed to Abomey, the Cougassan requested
that the French might carry palm branches as a sign of
peace. Commandant Audeoud, having asked about the
significance of this gesture, was assured by the Dahomans,
and by Toffa’s laris, that there was nothing humiliating
in it. In fact, those asking for Fon protection usually
2carried palm fronds. That the French should carry them 
was presumably meant to suggest to the Fon population
at large that the ambassadors were abasing themselves 
before the King. The Porto Novans must have been so 
frightened of the Fon that they gave the French false
1 The Chief who supervised the activities 
of the French at Whydah. He knew
Father Dorgere well. Since the destruction 
of the Gelelean party in June 1890 he had 
been ’acting-Yeovogun’ at Whydah.
2 F.Forbes, op.cit., Vol.II p.182
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information* On their return to Porto Novo, however, 
Xavier Beraud informed the French that this carrying 
of palms indicated to the Africans that ’France was
ashing pardon’.
The Porto No vans knew that the French had "been 
opposed to sending the embassy in the first place, 
in case it would mean a loss of French prestige.
They therefore played on this French fear. The palm- 
carrying served only to confirm general French 
suspicions that the existence of an independent Dahomey 
was a permanent insult to France. The mission of 
reconciliation on which Cuverville and the missionary 
group had placed so much hope had evolved into a 
reconnaissance mission which achieved nothing but to
1 M.M.C. Dahomey IIIp Xavier Beraud 
to Ballot, Porto Novo 11 .I*. 1891s
M.M.C. Dahomey III2 Audeoud to 
Ballay, Porto Novo 3.U*91* 
(Reprinted in E.D. IX. pp. 126-8).
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' ‘ 1 
sow deeper distrust between the two peoples*
Ihe Fon, although they wished to live in harmony 
with France, continued to be suspicious of French in­
tentions* Having ceded Porto Novo and. admitted the
V ■ ■ -- -  ■’ "-V. "  , . 2 ' ' "
French right to control Cotonou,they were determined that 
no more concessions should be made* Even a lease of land 
which Father ho rge re requested for his;, mis si oh at
, 1 (Che information on the Audeoud embassy, comes 
from:
: M*M*C. Dahomey Ica Ballay to Etienne, ,
Porto Novo 9*3.91:
M.M*0. Dahomey IIIp Ballay to Audeoud,
Porto Novo 9*2*91*
. M.M.C• Dahomey IIIp Audeoud Mission,
Decoeur1s Journal frepirinted in E.D.IX 
pp*105-15):
1 M.M*C * ^ Dahomey IIIo Mission Audeoud, 
Hoquart’s report, Porto Novo 2*4*91. 
.(reprinted in E *D*IX. pp * 128-34): . - 
M.M.C• Dahomey IIIp Mission Audeoudj 
Charles reports 
E.D.ir pp.115-25* '
: M*M*’G'.Dahomey IIIp AUdleoud Report:
Dahomey IIIp d1 Amblerefs Report.
2 It must be remembered that Cotonou, 
in the eyes of the Fon, had not been 
’ ceded to France• It was.part of the
Kingdom of Dahomey: the Fon still ruled
the Africans in the town. What had been 
ceded; was the French right to collect the 
Customs duties there*
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Whydah was refused.*^  * The Fon were, moreover, intent 
on equipping their army with modern rifles in case the 
French should again attack* Their pressing need was 
to obtain the wherewithal necessary for the purchase 
of these arms. Having lost the lucrative Cotonou 
Customs post, they attempted to modernise the method
of Customs collection at Whydah "by modelling it on the
Lagos system. This attempt came to nothing, probably 
because of French opposition.
The DahomansT main source of money for the purchase 
of arms continued, perforce, to come from the revived
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ica Report on the Benin 
political situation from 10.3.to 10.ii-.91.
Ho signature.
2 Etienne stated in Parliament, on 28.11.91>
that this Customs post was v/orth between 100,000 
and 150,000 francs per annum. France had agreed 
to pay Dahomey 20,000 francs per annum in 
compensation#
3 M.M.C. Dahomey C.Fabre to President of 
the Parliamentary Commission examining the
King °f Dahomey»
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slave trade* In the 1890s this trade was mainly
with German West African merchants who despatched 
the slaves to build railways and work plantations in 
the Congo, the Cameroons and St.Thome. With the
2
proceeds, the Fon proceeded to re-equip their army.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ikc Governor to Marine,
Cotonou 7»5*92: M.M.C. Afrique VI^qo
M.A.E. to the Colonial Under-Secretary,
Paris 25.I4..92, enclosing a translation 
of a Despatch from the Imperial German 
Commissioner in Togo, 12.3.92, showing 
that in November 1890, 200 men were
despatched to St.Thome: in September 
1891, 300 men to the Cameroons: in 
October 1891, 80 men to the Cameroons 
and in November 1891,300 men to the 
Congo. These were the Tofficial1 
German figures of the authorised export 
of ’indentured, labour1 and were produced 
only after French protests. It is very 
likely that many others were exported 
’unofficially’. The French agent of one 
of the trading Houses at Whydah reported that 
on 2.3.92 the German packet boat ’Woermann’ 
embarked 500 slaves.
2 A.L.D’Albeca ’La France au Dahomey* in 
Annex I. A list of these weapons sold 
by Germans at Whydah is given. This list 
is taken from the booksjjconsficatedjj of 
the German firms at Whydah. Between 
January 1891 and. August 1892, the Germans 
sold 1,700 rifles of various makes. They 
also sold 6 cannons, 5 machine guns and 
h00,000 assorted cartridges. More arms were 
probably bought from the Germans in Lome 
and Lagos.
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One of the employees of the German House of* Woeher 
and Brohm, named Richter, who had military experience
in Europe, spent September 1891, in Abomey, instructing
1
the Eon in the use of this new military equipment*
French fears of the importance of this re-armament seem 
to have Been exaggerated^since only the ’standing’ army, 
if that, could have "been equipped with the weapons*
The cannons and machine guns might have Been of some 
importance to the Eon hut, it seems, from reports 
during the conquest, that their usefulness was limited 
hy the inability of the Eon, in spite of Richter’s 
instructions, to manipulate them satisfactorily.
As has been noted, the Eon were totally opposed to 
making any further concessions, territorial or otherwise* 
They therefore disregarded French attempts to influence
them to end their traditional policy towards neighbouring 
African states: border warfare continued as it had always 
done. This the French put down to the Eon need for 
slaves to sell on the Goast. That the raids were
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ige Ehermann to 
Ballay, Porto Hovo 27.10.91*
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necessitated by commercial pressures, however, seems
unlikely, since the number of slaves being sold at 
1
Whydah was not in fact very great. It is more likely
that the raids were necessary in order to maintain Fon
authority on the Dahoman borders. The frontiers were
ill defined and the border villages always inclined to
seek independence:,, because of the Dahoman defeat at
the hands of the French it was probably essential to :
emphasise Fon control.
In May the Fon army raided somewhat unsuccessfully
on the borders of the neighbouring northern-Yoruba
states; in September they operated rather more success-
3
fully against a number of trans-Oueme towns; in October
1 M.M.C.: Afrique Yl100 M.A.B. to the
Colonial Under-Secretary, Paris 25*4*92.
2. M.M.C. Dahomey Ige Ehermann to Ballay, 
Porto Novo 8.7.91: M.M.C. Dahomey Igc 
Ehermann to Ballay, Porto Novo 7*8.91: 
M.M.C • Dahomey III2 Audeoud to Marine 
8.7*91* 3?he Dahomans pillaged a number 
of Yoruba villages but were driven back 
by the Baribas.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey Igc Ehermann to Ballay 
8.9.92. Toffa wished to use this raid 
as an excuse to arrest all the Dahomans 
in Porto Novo and thus provoke a break 
with Dahomey.
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and November they raided the Ouatchis of the lower
Mono valley to the north of Grand Popo. Unknown to 
the Fon, who had never been informed or invited to
agree, this territory was regarded by the French 
as being under their protection. For a time, indeed,
the French expected that their posts at Grand Popo
and Athieme would be attacked. Erhmann even sent ■
a strongly worded protest to Abomey. Behanzin, in
reply, explained that he was only asserting his
2authority within his own territory. In the event,
the French posts were never molestedyand Behanzin 
assured the Chiefs of Grand Popo that they had nothing 
to fear.^
1 M.M.C. Dahomey l£c Ehermann to Ballay 
29.12.91: E.D.IX P.1U7. Ehermann to 
Ballay 8.12.91*
2 M.M.C. Dahomey V k-k Ehermann to Behanzin, 
Porto Novo 10.12.91 : E.D.IX p.155. 
Behanzin to Ehermann, A'bb'mey 2.1.92. 
Dahomey had some claim to Grand Popo 
(See Chap.Ill p. 207).T^is letter had 
been translated, like most of Behanzin* s 
communications, by Xavier Beraud. Its 
accuracy is therefore rather doubtful.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey IgQ Ehermann to Ballay, 
Porto Novo 3.1.92.
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The French Administration in this post-war
period, although doing everything to avoid any immediate
conflict with Dahomey, nevertheless considered that
another war in the long run was inevitable. Erhmann,
however, after some experience on the Coast, recognised
that the Dahomans had no intention (at least in the
immediate future) of attacking the French. In order
to maintain if not good,at least peaceful^ relations,
he arranged that the 20,000 franc indemnity for 1891
1
should be paid to the Fon. During that year, indeed, 
no visible change took place in the relations between 
the French and the Dahomans: the Fon simply maintained 
their ancient ways, refused to accept European inter­
ference and remained thoroughly suspicious of French 
intentions*
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ig Erhmann to 
Ballay, Porto Novo 2^.9.91: 
M.M.C. Dahomey Ehermann 
to Behanzin, Porto Novo 
10.12.91 •
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Although little of great importance happened
on the Slave Coast in 1891, changes were taking place
in France which were to have momentous effects on
Dahomey* As has been noted, Etienne had, in August
1889, wished to occupy the coastline of Dahomey. By
May 1890 he was talking in the Chamber of Deputies
of a French advance from the Coast of the Bight of
1Benin to the Lower Niger. This would have linked up 
with other French inland movements from Senegal and 
Algeria.
The idea of gaining the Lower Niger for France 
seemed to have been frustrated by the Uth August 1891^  
Agreement with England. In this Agreement, made by the 
French Foreign Office against the wishes of the Colonial 
Department, the French agreed not to advance further south 
than the Say-B&rrciwa line. The French Colonialists saw 
that although France, after this, could not penetrate 
the Lower Niger from the north, a literal interpretation 
of the Agreement would not prevent France reaching the
river from the south from Porto Novo through Dahomey*
1 Response a une interpolation par 
M.Boissy d’Aglas seance du 10.11.90
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The conquest of Dahomey therefore became much 
more urgent* The advocates of Colonial expansion made 
considerable efforts to increase their support both 
in the country at large and in Parliament* One in­
dication of their success was the formation, in the 
autumn of 1891, of a Colonial group in Parliament.
That the conquest of Dahomey should be undertaken was
the most important immediate aim of the propogandists
1
for Colonial expansion.
The Agreement of the 3rd October with Dahomey
had been accepted by the French Government; and had been
laid before a Parliamentary Commission, presided over
2
by Admiral Yallon, for examination. This Commission
1 This paragraph is based on H.Brunshwig,
L TImperialisme Colonial Francais. Chap•
VII, on Marcel Blanchardfrancais et 
Anglais au Niger(1890-98)*, Be Monde 
Francais.1948: J.Flint, Sir George Goldie 
and the Making of Nigeria. Chap. VIII & X: 
&n article in the Revue dTiIistoire dT Outre 
Mer (1960) by Francis Berge, *Le Sous- 
Secretariat et les Sou Secretaires d*etat 
aux Colonies* shows clearly the develop­
ment of the power of the Colonial Under­
secretary and the relationship of this 
developing power to the Dahoman question.
2 Former Governor of Senegal, deputy for 
Senegal and an advocate of Colonial 
expansion.
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produced a import which was very critical of the 
Agreement. The majority of the Commission recommended 
that the Agreement should he ratified, since it had been 
concluded in accordance with Government instructions. 
They recommended, hoY/ever, that it should be approved by 
Presidential Decree, not by Parliamentary ratification. 
The more formal method would, they considered, be far
too solemn for an unsatisfactory agreement with a petty
African Kinglet.
Two of the members of the Commission recommended 
outright rejection. In the debate in the Chamber on
the 28th of November 1891, Etienne, indeed, stoutly
o
defended Government policy. He had no choice. The
1 The grounds of their criticism were that 
the Treaty was detrimental to French 
interests: they considered that Dahomey 
ought to have been forced to accept every 
French wish. Possibly there was also a 
desire to find fault with the work of an 
officer who was known to be anti-Republican.
2 As a member of the Cabinet he was bound to 
support publicly the policy of the Government 
even though he privately disagreed with it.
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Commissioners* Report, which in fact set forth his
own views, must, however, have given him every
satisfaction. Parliament accepted the report and the
Agreement was approved by Presidential Decree on the
3rd of December 1891 * Although the Agreement was
accepted, the Parliamentary debate indicated that a
majority in Parliament were didatisfied with the
situation and would approve a resumption of hostilities
in order to obtain more acceptable terms. The work of
converting Parliamentary opinion to a fforward1 policy
in Benin had been completed and the conquest of Dahomey
1
could be carried out whenever an opportunity arose.
Victor Ballot returned to the French Benin Settle-
2
ments in February 1892. Towards the end of March 
Ballot was informed that a band of Dahomans were again
1 Etienne resigned on 8.3.1892 on the 
fall of thep,fFreycinet Government.
He did so voluntarily, since he was 
offered the chance of remaining at 
his post in the Loubet Ministry that 
followed. His successor, Jamais, 
held the same opinions as himself 
and continued his policies.
2 Ehermann died soon after Ballot’s 
arrival.
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raiding in the Oueme area. On the 27th he sailed up
the river in the gunboat 'Topaz* to see for himself
what was happening. Beyond Daba the Topaz was fired
on by a group of 400 Dahomans: four Frenchmen were
wounded. Ballot took this to be an indication that
the Fon were about to attack the French-protected 
1
territories. He informed Behanzin that the French
government would look upon the attacks, on the Oueme
2villages and on the Topaz, as a very grave offense.
The King replied that he had only been ensuring 
control of his own territory, and that a French gunboat 
should not have been so far up the River Oueme without 
having first obtained permission from Abomey. The 
Oueme had always been forbidden to the Europeans who 
had not been authorised by the King to travel up it.
It was therefore not surprising that the ship had been 
fired on. Behanzin added, for good measure, that he 
had been informed that the French Chamber had declared
1 M.M.C. Dahomey J£d Ballot to Ballay 
8.4*92.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey V jt-k Ballot to Behanzin 
Porto Novo 28.3*92.
-  i + o u  -
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war on Dahomey* The Fon, declared Behanzin, wished
to live in peace hut if the French wanted to make war
then the Fon would he ready* The Dahoman^s were
obviously alarmed hy the fate of the Cuverville
Agreement, hy the voyage of the Topaz and hy Ballot1 s
message* They therefore rushed troops to the Porto
Novo border area* Ballot then judged that war was
2imminent and requested reinforcements* By the end of
April, however, he realised that the Fon troop move-
3
ments were merely defensive*
During the following months Behanzin continued 
to protest his pacific intentions* He pointed out that 
if he had wanted to make war on France he would have 
seized the French Residents in Whydah: this of course
1 This seems to have been a misinterpretation 
of the fact that the French Parliament had 
decided thatthe October Agreement should he 
accepted not hy Parliamentary ratification 
hut hy Presidential Decree.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Ina Ballot to Under-Secretary 
Porto Novo enclosing Behanzin to 
Ballot 10.1),. 92.
3 M.M.C. Dahomey lKa Ballot to Under-Secretary 
Porto Novo 8*5*92.
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lie had not done. The Fon protests were, however,
1
disregarded. The French government' decided to make
the relatively trivial Topaz incident their casus belli.
Action was taken quickly. The Senate and Chamber of the
French Parliament voted (by substantial majorities) on
the 12th and 13th of April, credits of three million
francs to be used for a war on Dahomey. On the 21st of
April it was decided to place the conduct of the war in
the hands of the Marine and to put Colonel Dodds,
Commander of the troops in Senegal, in command on the
2
Slave Coast with full military and civil powers.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey Ip- Ballot to Under­
secretary, Porto n o v o  8.5.18§2, 
enclosing Behanzin to Ballot 1.5.92:
M.M.C Dahomey Behanzin to Dodds,
Dahomey 10.6.92. These are only two 
examples from the flood of letters 
which Behanzin sent to the French
during May and June that year.
2 M.M.C. Dahomey Ig Marine to Dodds,
Paris I}.. 5.92: Berge, op.cit*, p.28, 
tells of a political quarrel which led to 
the resignation of the Minister of Marine 
before Dodds was given supreme command 
by land and sea.
THE KINGDOM OS' MHOMEY
The Fon monarch claimed sovereignty over two
distinct types of territory. He derived his power
of course from his rule of the Kingdom of Dahomey
itself. The frontiers of this state were never
carefully defined, hut it is possible to say that
hy the end of the nineteenth century the territory 
owing allegiance directly to Abomey was hounded in
the West hy the River Cuffo, in the East hy the River 
Oueme/ and in the South hy the sea. In the North the 
boundary ran between the Rivers Cuffo and Oueme",
beyond Atcherihe itself the most northerly Fon
centre in the Kingdom.
The core of the Fon state remained, throughout the 
nineteenth century, the territories grouped together
hy Agadja the Ahomey plateau area and the Provinces
of Whydah and Allada. As the result of innumerable campaigns 
in the course of the century, other areas were added to
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this core. The lands of the Mahi to the north of 
Dahomey, for example, were eventually completely 
absorbed in Dahomey. So, too, was the territory of 
Cotonou, between Whydah and Porto Novo, and the lands
A
of Agony between Abomey and the River Ouem^. These 
newly-acquired areas were not treated in a uniform 
manner. Cotonou and Agony were, late in the century, 
brought within the Fon administration system. No 
attempt was ever made to give Mahi any such Dahoman 
provincial organisation.
The King of Dahomey also claimed sovereignty over 
a shifting number of states on the borders of Dahomey 
proper. In Fon terminology, these states were referred 
to as part of the Dahoman ’family1: the King of Dahomey 
was described as the ’big brother* of the King of
1 The chief place in this area is now 
Zagnando. The office of Fiogbe itself 
may in fact date from the 1880s.
- koe> -
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the lesser states* The most important of these Kingdoms 
lay on the Eastern frontier of Dahomey, where the 
collapse of the Oyo empire had tended to force the 
smaller units of that empire to drift into the orhit 
of their larger neighbours. In the 1820s and 1830s 
Dahomey reduced a number of these minor states to a
tributary position Porto Novo, Ketu, Sabe, and Savalou.
In mid-century the Fon lost control of all except the 
first of these states. They were, however, able to 
re-establish their hegemony in the 1880s: Sabe and 
Savalou again acknowledged Fon overlordship; Ketu was 
destroyed because it refused to do so; Porto Novo was 
only able to proclaim her independence because of her 
close links with the French.
In the West, too, the Fon made intermittent 
attempts to assert their power over their smaller
1 F.0.8I|/893 Commander Wilmot to Commodore
Bruce, 1 HarlequinT, of Lagos 11.12.1852.
This is how King Sodji of Porto Novo 
described his relationship with the 
King of Dahomey. The terminology also 
applied to the other vassal states.
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neighbours in this case Atakpame and G-rand Popo.
However, although Grand Popo, in the 1870s at least, 
did pay some sort of tribute to Abomey, Dahomey was
A
never able to control these two states. Probably 
Fon success in the East and failure in the West can 
be explained by the fact that, as a result of long- 
established good relations with Ashanti, political 
security in the West was not as essential as it was 
in the East.
No attempt was ever made to rule these peripheral 
states directly from Abomey. The Fon never tried to 
place Dahoman representatives in positions of authority 
in the tributary kingdoms. They did not station^£fele,
1 Grand Popo paid tribute in 1870. 
The Atakpalme always declared 
that they had never paid tribute 
to Abomey.
- U10 -
or Consuls, as on the Oyo Yoruba model* ho attempt 
was made to control the day-to-day internal affairs 
of the states owing allegiance &o Dahomey* The Fon 
simply relied upon their military might to over-awe 
their tributaries and keep them subservient. All that 
they required of the vassals was that they fell in line 
with Dahoman foreign policy and paid regular tribute 
to Abomey* They never became part of the Kingdom of 
Dahomey proper.
1 C.O. 96/168, Griffith to Stanley, Accra 
11+.12.1 885? enclosing statement by 
Ketuan messengers from Prince Fetona, 
signed by A.C. Willoughby 3»11*1885:
J.Duncan, op*cit., Vol. II p.35.
A Ketuan ambassador remarked to the 
Governor of Lagos in 1885 that the Fon 
had placed a Consul in Sabe. It seems 
more than likely that this merely meant 
that Sabe had acknowledged Fon over­
lordship. The Ketuans, recognising that 
Sabe had become dependent upon Dahomey 
had unjust if iably attributed to the Fon 
the Yoruba system of Imperial organisation. 
Duncan mentions that a Dahoman was sometimes 
sent to fhelpT the Chief of a subject town. 
This seems to refer to small places either in 
or very close to Dahomey proper, not to the 
great tributary kingdoms.
- W1 -
An interesting example of how this system of
overlordship was formalised is given by a mid-century
French commentator:
!a la suite d'une guerre avec la tribfeL
des Nagos voisine/frontieres, quatorze
deputes de cette nation etaient venus
faire leur soumission au roi G-ezo et lui
demander 11 adjonction de leur territoire 
\a son royaume.
Le Migan fit appel 'a un certain nomhre l 
de cabocferes qui all^rent avec lui se 
pro sterner en face du roi, dont ils ecou-
terent la volonte transmise par le Mehu--
ils regagnferent ensuite leurs tahourets que
des esclaves avaient rangds autour du hassin 
et des quatorze deputes accroupis sur le 
sahle— — deux sieges plus e^eves etaient des­
tines au Migan et au Prince Bahadou. Ees
deput s's, admis a se faire entendre, expo­
se rent tout ce que leur nation avait souffert 
de la derniere guerre et declarerdnt se livrer 
axmerci, eux, leur families et leur pays. Le 
Migan leur fit signe d'aller s!agenouiller 
tout autour du hassin. La t£te inclinee sur 
le terrible recipient; puis le b&ton de justice 
fut passe de main en main dans le plus grand
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silence, interrompu seulement par les 
,ounf successifs dT acquiescement que 
.if&isaient entendre, en aspirant fortement 
cette syllabe, les membres du Consul.
Le "baton revenu jusqu’au Migan, ce Ministre
S'
Se leva et pressa legerement du Genou la
A  /  /
Tete de chaque depute, en prenant amsi
possession au nom du roi. Les nagos
furent ensuite admis d se couvrir devant
Gezo de toute la poussiere qui se trouva
a leur portee.; ils etaient su^ets de 
iDahomey. 1
The system was not satisfactory. The lack of 
close supervision made it very easy for the vassal state 
to throw off its allegiance, if the Fon suffered any 
military setback. Moreover, in practice, the freedom 
of the vassal states in internal affairs meant that there 
normally existed in these state* groups using dislike of 
the Fon connection to stir up trouble for the Fon- 
orientated ruler* The history of nineteenth century 
Porto Novo and Ketu largely consists of such intrigue. 
This continuous political instability made impossible
1 A.Wallon, ’The Kingdom of Dahomey’,
Revue Maritime et Coloniale. 1861,
Part II, tombe III, p.352.
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the achievement of the Fon aim of control without
day-to-day responsibilities* It meant in fact that
the Fon had frequently to intervene militarily# Such
military operations tended to involve Dahomey in large-
scale wars as in Ketu in 188M-5 and Porto Novo in 1889*
The Fon, then, failed to work out any adequate system
for governing the neighbouring states whose political
*1
stability was often essential to Dahoman security#
The administration of Dahomey proper followed the
logic dictated by the expansion of the Kingdom. The area
of the Abomey plateau was ruled directly by the King
Vi r
himself. Other virtually important parts of the 
Kingdom were ruled through appointed delegates. The 
oldest province, Allada, lying to the south of the Lama, 
was administered by Akplogan, who was directly responsible 
to the Migan, the King’s chief Minister at Abomey# Most
1 B.Awe, ’The Ajele System: A Study of Ibadan 
Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century’
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 
Vol#III, December 19&U, pp.25-^6. Ibadan, 
one of Dahomey’s major rivals, was able to 
work out such a system.
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probably also under the control of the Migan, since 
it had been created for reasons of military and political
security, was the province of Agony. This province, 
ruled by the Fiogbe", and lying between the Rivers Zou 
and Ouem^, was certainly reorganised, and was probably 
created during the last decade of Fon independence.
On the Goast there lay the two best known of the
Fon provinces Whydah and Cotonou. Of these two the
organisation of Whydah, dating from the reign of Agadja, 
was by far the more ancient. Traditionally, its 
Administrator, the Yeovogun (or ’Chief of the White 
Men’), ranked in importance in Dahomey only after the 
King and his two chief Ministers, the Migan and the 
Mehou. The province^ of Cotonou, on the other hand, 
only came into existence in the second half of the nine­
teenth century after the French began to trade there.1
1 I. Akin job in, op.cit.. p.22*8:
Lombard, ’Ville Africaine’, E.D.X 1953*
A settlement had been in existence at 
Cotonou since at least the 18th century.
It first became an important outlet for 
Fon trade when Martinez set up a trading 
post there. It was only in the 1860s, 
^ F r e n c h  became operative there, 
that it became a trading centre of the first 
magnitude.
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Its administration was modelled on that of* Whydah, and
hy the 1880s it had & Yeovogun at its head. This
official controlled the eastern part of the Dahoman
coastline -Abomey Calavi and Go do my, as well as
Cotonou itself. Both Yeovoguns were responsible to 
othe Mehu, not to the Migan.
It is difficult to assess exactly how independent
of Whydah Cotonou really was, since in the 1880s the 
armed forces of the two provinces were levied absolutely
A
separately. It would seem that they were administered 
independently. Although by the 1880s Cotonou was 
economically more important than Whydah, the Yeovogun 
of Whydah continued to be, politically, the more 
important figure. Whydah remained in charge of relations 
with Europeans. It was after all the office of Yeovogun 
of Whydah which Nougbododhoue took, at the death of 
Gelele, when he wished to be in a position to stiffen 
Fon resistance to French demands.
1 M.M.C. Dahomey III^ Bayol to Etienne,
’Military Information’ Porto Novo 11.1.90:
J.Bayol ’Les Forces Militaires au Dahomey*
Revue Scientifique. Paris 1892.
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These provinces (Allada, Whydah, Ootonou and Agony) 
were ruled by an administrative hierarchy appointed in, 
and in theory at least, dependent upon, Abomey. Other 
areas, however, also recognised as integral parts of 
Abomey, enjoyed no such organisation. The Fon area to 
the north of Abomey, around Atcheribe, to which Behanzin 
fled after the French occupation of Abomey, had no such 
administration. It was nevertheless massively loyal to 
the Aladaxanou dynasty. Similarly the territory to the 
South West of Abomey, containing the religious centre 
of Tado, remained completely outside the centralised 
system of government.
In the eighteenth century it had been necessary 
to create an administration to replace the newly over­
thrown Allada and Whydah governments. In the nineteenth 
century it was necessary to create a centralised admini­
stration for Ootonou partly because it was feared that the 
Europeans might move against it^and partly because of 
its ever-increasing economic value. Similarly, direct 
control of Agony had had to be instituted because of the 
exceptional strategic importance of that province.
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No such military, strategic or economic pressure 
had existed in the case of the Atcheribe and Tado 
districts* Older political forms there were never 
superceded. The localities simply continued to owe 
allegiance directly to the King of Dahomey. Village 
and family units sufficed to preserve these areas
•i
within the boundaries of Dahomey. Occasionally 
perhaps an official from Abomey might be sent to a
1 M.J.Herskovits, op. cit., Vol. II pp.23-6, 
remarks that his informants invariably 
postulated the existence of six provinces 
over and above the metropolitan district 
of Abomey plateau. The provinces were 
Allada, Whydah, Zagnando, Maxi (Sabe & 
Savalou) ,Atakpane and Adja (Tado). The 
first three, if Zagnando is taken as 
Agony, certainly existed as organised 
provinces. Maxi, or Mahi, if it is 
taken to be referring not to Sabe and 
Savalou but to the area to the north of 
Abomey containing Mahi and Fon peoples, 
was also part of Dahomey. So, too, was 
’Adja*. These last two were not however 
systematically administered as were the 
first three. Atakpame, in the nineteenth 
century, was not even loosely subject to 
Dahomey. Herskovits* informants did not
mention Cotonou which would in fact have
been the sixth area of Dahomey.
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locality to aid a Chief.1 This does not however appear
to have been a regular occurrence. Although, therefore, 
the remarkable Fon bureaucratic system was in the 
nineteenth century extended to new areas of Dahomey, 
there remained large Fon areas which were never absorbed 
into this machine.
The four provinces in which royal authority was
delegated v^ ere under the control of provincial Chiefs 
whose function, basically, was to see that decisions
of state taken in Abomey were implemented in the provinces. 
The four Chiefs, the Akplogan, the two Yeovoguns and the 
Fiogba, were also in charge of the day-to-day administration
of their territories. This entailed the supervision of 
customary law, the regulation of trade and agriculture 
and, at times, the levying of the armed forces. Reasoning 
by analogy from what we know of Whydah, it seems possible
1 J.Duncan, op.cit., Vol.II p.35
2 The provincial governors did not 
themselves go to war although they
conducted the levying of troops.
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that these provincial governors shared their power- 
with a council consisting of gatherings of provincial 
Chiefs and royal delegates in the provinces. In this, 
their position within their province was not unlike 
that of the King, in Dahomey as a whole.
It seems that when the central government was 
united and determined the local provincial Chiefs would 
have little say in the affairs of the province. When 
the central power was weak?the provincials wielded a 
good deal of power. It seems possible that on such 
occasions, as at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
the provincials were able to see to it that their own
1
men received royal appointments in the provinces.
That the provinces (or at least the older ones) had, 
in a period of uncertainty, a good deal of independence 
and were, perhaps, able to ensure that they had one of 
their own men at their head, would explain why Whydah 
in the 1870s and 1880s was always more inclined to 
conciliate the Europeans than was Abomey. It would also
1 McLeod, op.cit., pp.34-6
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explain why, when the great Fon Chiefs settled their 
differences in 1889, Abomey reasserted its control and 
the strong man, Nougbododhoue, became Yeovogun of 
Whydah. A permanent feature of Fon political life, in 
fact, would seem to have been a tug of war between 
Abomey and the provinces.
In the last resort, the central government always 
could control the provincial government* Even in day-to- 
day matters the powers of the provincial authorities 
were severely limited. In judicial matters, although
they could at any time convene a court, which would act 
in the King’s name, they had to refer to Abomey those 
cases which might involve the imposition of capital 
punishment: their powers were limited to sentences of
•i
imprisonment and the imposition of fines* In affairs 
of state, too, the provincial governors were always 
bound by decisions taken at Abomey. In only one recorded 
case (that of Whydah) did anyone in the four beaurocratic 
provinces hold authority direct from the King independently
1 J.A.Skertchly, op.cit., p.51
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of the provincial governor. This was the Chacha of 
Whydah who, between 1818-1858 and 1885-1 887, took 
over the functions of Yeovogun of Whydah, in so far 
as they concerned relations with the Europeans.
The central government of Dahomey functioned 
around the person of the King. This is not to say, as 
many nineteenth century European observers did, that 
the King was all-powerful. He had been, perhaps, in 
the days of Agadja and his immediate successors: even 
then it appears that the King had to struggle constantly 
to maintain his position. Since the mid-eighteenth 
century? the real power of the monarchy had declined 
and during Adanzin’s reign (1797-1818) Fon political 
life had drifted into a state of political feud in 
which rival groups struggled to gain control. Gezo, 
by virtue of his alliance with the outsider, Francisco 
Felix Da Souza, was partly able to retrieve the power 
of the monarchy and succeeded (until the last years of 
his reign) in controlling the actions of the great Chiefs. 
Despite his efforts, the tendency towards a break-down 
of the political system remained, and even in G-ezo1 s
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time the Fon monarch was no despot. This was ascertained
by the only two Europeans invited deliberately to observe
£the Fon process of political deqion-making. One of 
these, Beecroft, observed in 1850:
’I think it will be proved on the perusal
0 f this journal that this great Despot, 
the King of Dahomey, has been awfully 
exaggerated as to his wealth and power.
1 am perfectly satisfied that he is under
the control and opinion of several of his
n
principal officers.1 
and again,
*1 do declare he is not the despot
generally reported he has not his own
will.1 ^
The other, Forbes, stated:
’There is no Dahoman nation, but a few 
chiefs holding feudal power under a
3
high chief, Gezo.’
1 F.0.84/816 Beecroft to Palmerston 22.7*50*
2 F.0.84/585 Beecroft to Palmerston 4*10.51*
3 F.0.84/827 Forbes to Fanshawe, ’Bonetta’ 
Princes Island, 18.7*50.
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Decisions were taken in the name of the King and
these decisions were theoretically incontestable.
Ckmrt etiquette demanded extreme deference to the 
person of the monarch. Nevertheless, behind this
facade of royal authority lay the real power of the
Chiefs. Only at the great ceremonial assemblies of
the Chiefs, in July-August and November-December,
1
could really importantvdecisions be taken. A powerful 
King like G-ezo, at the height of his prestige, could 
normally control these meetings and obtain the decision 
which he himself favoured. Nevertheless, Gezo’s power
was limited; even he could not simply state his will--
although normally he could manoeuvre in such a fashion 
that he could obtain what he wanted. He could not, 
however, impose thoroughly unpopular policies. When
he did so, gambling on unforthcoming English support, 
he lost both his throne and his life. Gelele, a monarch 
whose political position was much weaker than that of 
his father, could only act as the most powerful elements
1 See below, p.477-78
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in the political life of his country wished him to*
This was clearly indicated in a conversation which
Gelele had in 1870 with the English botanist, Skertchly:
fHe (Gelele) said that he would think 
over the matter, hut that he knew that 
if he attempted to stop the Customs his 
people would rise against him and de­
throne him; and then where would he the 
gain?1 *
H*P.Burton stated the position even more clearly:
TThe ministers, war captains, and
fetishers may he, and often are,
individually punished hy the King:
collectively they are too strong
for him, and without their cordial
co-operation he would soon cease 
2to reign*1
The King was not a free agent* He shared power
w
with the great Pon Chiefs* It remains, hcjjever, 
exceedingly difficult to say exactly what pows?r was
1 J.A* Skertch]^, op * cit* *~ p* 305
2 R* P. Burton, op* cit., p.159
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possessed by different groups in Pon society. This 
is only partly because contemporary Europeans seldom 
penetrated beyond the facade of royal ci^ potism. It is 
also because the political, economic and religious 
factions of Pon government were bafflingly intermingled. 
Institutions of government, political activity and 
economic development were all shaped by what is, as yet, 
an imperfectly understood view of the world. This 
philosophy, for example, dictated that there should be
an element of dualism throughout the whole Pon govern­
mental system. Each official had to be complemented
by others whose functions dovetailed his own.
1
This system of fhappy pairs’ seems to have been
based on an idea of the necessity of a balancing
opposites left and right: royal and non-royal:
pinterior and exterior: sacred and profane. The Mehou 
was the complement of the Migan: within the Palace were 
women officials -the Gundene and Yewe who duplicated
1 P.P.Burton, op.cit.. p.1^2
2 Palau-Marti, op. cit.. pp.200-i|
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the functions of these male ministers. It was even 
necessary that the Migan and the Mehou complemented 
each other physically; the Migan was supposed to he 
of massive huild: the Mehou of a less imposing stature.
Even if such traditional precepts were, upon occasion, 
twisted, or even evaded, the necessity of creating 
balance between opposites, together with the impossibility 
of certain men fulfilling some functions, must have 
considerably effected the course of Fon political 
development.
Traditionally sanctioned institutions could of 
course be adopted and developed to embrace entirely 
new functions. This in fact happened in the case of
the monarchy which being at the apex of the Fon political
system summed up in itself the Fon concept of duality.
The King of Dahomey always had a mythical double; that 
of Gezo was Gakpwe: that of Gelele was Addokpon. In the
1850s, with the adoption of the palm oil trade as the 
corner-stone of Dahoman economic life, Gezo, in order
1 See below, pp.
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to cLisguise the unpalatable fact that the warrior 
King of Dahomey obtained most of his income from trade, 
began to conduct his business operations under the
•i
name of Gapwe. A British Naval Officer, who was
conversant with the affairs of the Bight of Benin in
the 1850s, makes this point quite clearly:
'I have ascertained positively that 
Prince G-arpuay, named by them (British
merchants) and also by the natives, is
really another name of the King of Dahomey,
which he uses in all his transactions
that he does not wish his own name to 
2
appear in.'
In this case something is known of both the 
politico-economic pressures at work and of the nature
1 R.P.Burton, op.cit., p.268:
J.A.Skertchly, op.cit., pp.270-72:
M.J.Herskovits, op.cit., p.50:
Palau-Marti, op. c l ' t p.-t 58 and
pp. 117-223: P.Mercier, in 'African 
Worlds' (Ed. Daryll Porde) pp.232.
For a brief summary of this 
argument see G.Newbury's 1 Introduction1 
to R.P.Burton's Mission to Gelele, King 
of Dahomey, p.36.
2 F.0.2/20 Campbell to Clarendon, Lagos 
7*3*1 857? enclosing Commander Bay to 
(Gommoddre Adams, 'Pirefly' 2 JLj. 2 ♦ 57 •
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of the institution in the process of change. Much 
of the philosophic framework within which Pon 
political life took place remains, however, conjectural,
and although the course of Pon institutional development 
can often he charted, conclusions as to why such 
developments took place must remain largely tentative.
The majority of the inhabitants of Dahomey, 
excluding the vast servile population, were free men. 
They were peasants, who could be neither bought nor 
sold, who were required, upon occasion, to serve in the 
army, but who certainly had no say in the government 
of the country. In theory any of them could be raised, 
by the King, to the position of a Minister of State.
No doubt a few, even in the nineteenth century, received 
some such advancement. The great beaurocratic posts
had been created in the eighteenth century in order to
1 A.Le Hertsse'1’, op.cit., p.4 . There are 
indications here that Behanzin's Piogbe 
was not of the charmed circle.
E.Chaudoin, op.cit., p.278. The Chuydaton
of Whydah just before the conquest was 
also a 1new man!*
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aid the King in running and controlling the expanding
Fon state. In order to prevent male members of the
royal family, rivals or potential rivals of the King,
from using the powers of office to advance their
claims to the throne, Princes of the blood had been
excluded from these offices. In theory, ministers
were freely chosen by the King. In fact, beau-r-ecrats
began to be drawn from a limited number of ministerial
families. Dalzel's story of how one Mehou took great
pains to avoid his son taking over his functions seems
to prove that it was in the eighteenth century that
these offices became hereditary. By the nineteenth
1
century they certainly were. Ko doubt an heir could 
occasionally be passed over and another member of the 
family selected, if there was some pressing reason for 
so doing. It is sometimes mentioned that high dignitaries
1 A.Le Herisse^ , op. cit., p«37:
P.Mercier, Civilisations du Benin, p.11*2: 
Palau-Marti, op. cit., p.1i-|.0:
P.Forbes, op.cit., Vol.I p.27:
A.Dalzel, The Plistory of Dahomey, p. 17^ 4-
had the right to select men to fill certain posts.
Since office was in the main hereditary this seems
very unlikely indeed. Probably the official had
only the ceremonial right of presenting the new
man to the King, Court and people. When the King
himself wished to give a personal supporter a position
in the beaurocracy it seems likely that he had to
create a new post. Prince iKondo;, for example, seems
to have engineered the appointment, in the mid-l880s,
of a personal friend to the probably newly-created
2office of Fiogbe.
Something of an oligarchy was therefore created :
not, perhaps, a closed oligarchy, but an oligarchy 
nevertheless. Moreover, the royal family remained 
powerful. Considering the number of eighteenth century 
coups and conspiracies, it seems unlikely that their
1 R.Burton, op.cit., p.138
2 M.M.C* Dahomey III^ Angnot to Bayol, 
Porto Kovo 5*1 *1890: A.Le ,-Herisse, 
oppcit., p.If.# It emerged during 
BayolTs mission to Abomey that the 
Piogbe was a very close associate of 
Kondo. The Piogbe was probably a 
fnew! man.
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power was ever “broken. At any rate, at the turn of 
the century, the monarchy (as a result of hoth economic
and political difficulties) ceased to he ahle to control 
the political life of the state. Members of the great 
ministerial families could not themselves reach the 
highest dignity in the land, hut they could intrigue 
with ambitious members of the royal family. They could, 
thus, along with the royal family, play at politics in 
order to achieve for themselves office, wealth, influence 
and power.
The royal family and the ministerial families
were closely linked by ties of blood. The eldest
daughter of the King by one of his wives given to him
after he became Vi-Daho, always married the Migan. The
second daughter married the Mehou. The KingT s sons, on
the other hand, were brought up in the households of
1the great ministers. The royal and ministerial 
families were, thus, closely linked by upbringing,
1 A.Le Herisse*", op. cit., p.8:
R.F.Burton, op.cit.. Pp. 139,
176-77 and 212.
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training and marriage. By the first decade of the 
nineteenth century there had, inevitably, come into 
existence a political circle made up almost exclusively 
of members of the royal family and their ministerial 
allies. This circle was divided into factions whose 
rivalry occasionally erupted into violence.
Politically the monarch was only the leader (or 
even figure-head) of one of the competing factions 
into which the ruling class was divided. The eighteenth 
century crisis reached its culmination in 1818. G-ezo 
himself was only able to secure the throne, and indeed 
maintain himself on it, as a result of the assistance 
he received from a non-Bahoman, Francisco Felix Be Souza. 
The power of the monarchy had been so eroded, before 
Gezofs accession, that only with external aid could the 
King control the turbulent political class. When he 
came to the throne, even Gezo had to acknowledge the 
increasing power of the royal family by creating for 
the Princes positions of second-in-command to all the 
great Chiefs of the bureaucracy.
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Gezo was powerful enough to make sure that
although the Princes were granted an official place
in the Administration, they were still excluded from
1
positions of real control. With the accession of 
Gelele, however, some at least of these Princes were
able to advance themselves into positions of actual 
2power. .. They also managed to gain positions of real
3importance in the army. After the political upheavals 
in the late 1870s and 1880s, when conditions rivaled 
those at the beginning of the century, the last barriers 
to the ambitions of the royal family were swept away: 
they were able to seize even the highest offices in 
the land. One of Behanzin’s brothers, Topa, was Mehou:
1 A Le Herisse, op.cit., pp.33 & 44:
J.A.Skertchly, op.cit., p.131.
According to Le Herisse the office 
of Binanson, second-in-command to
the Akplogun, was created for a Prince. 
Skertchly writes that the Binanzon was 
second-in-command to the Mehou. This 
was probably a mistake. Skertchly does 
however confirm that the Binanzon was 
of the royal family.
2 The Chuydaton of Whydah,for example.
3 See below, p. 466
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another, Gautchili, was Gaou.
In spite of the fact that the monarch’s political
powers were often severely limited, the King remained 
the focal point of national life. The King’s importance 
in the political life of the state varied. At the 
height of his power Gezo dominated Dahomey: by the end 
of his reign Gelele was a political cypher. It always 
remained essential, however, that the monarch played the 
central part in the continuous round of religious 
ceremonial which was vital to the perfect functioning 
of the Fon world. This was so in spite of the fact that 
in the eighteenth century King Tegbesou had cast aside 
some of the more politically hampering attributes of 
the monarchy. it was the case even though it was quite 
normal for a substitute to take the place of the King 
in a public ceremony.2
The heir to the throne, the Vi-Daho, had a recognised
position in Fon society. The word ’Vi-Daho’ means,
1 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., p.11:
Palau-Marti, op.cit., pp.133-4 
P.Hazoume, Doguicimi, pp.483-4
2 J.A*Skertchly, op.cit., p.290 
E.Ghaudoin, op.cit., p.273
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literally, ’grand-son’. This indicates fairly 
clearly that the succession had not always proceeded 
from father to son. Indeed, both Agadja and Kpengla, 
according to the normally accepted geneologies, 
succeeded brothers. Nevertheless, by the end of the 
eighteenth century it seems to have been normal for a 
son to succeed his father. The pains which tradition 
takes to portray Gezo as a son of Agonglo underline^ 
this point.
According to tradition, the Vi-Daho was chosen
for his kingly virtues by the monarch after consultation
1
with the Gods by way of the Btcokonou , Frequently, it 
was said, the consent of the Migan and the Mehou was 
necessary before the King could make his selection.
His choice was always restricted to those sons born of 
women given to the King by his father when he himself 
had become Vivjdaho probably the Kposi. Sons by wives
1 A.Le Herisse^ op.cit., pp.6-9:
M. J.Herskovits, op.cit., PP.30-32 
& 37"38. Herskovits throws very 
little light on the role of the 
Vi-Daho. For the role of the 
Bukonousee below, p. 463-464
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taken earlier, and toy wives of the tolood royal, were 
excluded from any claim to the throne*
Although the Vi-Daho was said to have little or 
no political influence, he in fact played a vital role 
in the life of the Fon state: he was the focal point 
of the opposition to the King. Badahou was the leader 
of the opposition to Gezo: Hanasou to that of Gelele.
The important Princes were intent on succeeding to the 
throne as quickly as possible and were therefore the 
natural political enemies of the King. Even Kondo, 
who came to toe Vi-Daho only as a result of the over­
throw of Hanasou, protoatoly had his father removed as 
soon as a settlement with his political rivals permitted 
him to do so. Hanasou was in fact the only Vi-Daho in 
the nineteenth century to die "before his father; his 
attempt to take over had "been premature. Gelele1 s 
supporters were stronger than he and as a result it was 
he, not Gelele, who was fremovedT. One of the King’s 
sons "became Vi-Daho only when there was an opposition 
sufficiently strong to force the King to recognise its
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candidate as his successor. Only ifjliad no choice 
would a King he likely to acknowledge what must have
heen an unwelcome change in the political situation.
Far from heing chosen hy the King, then, the 
Vi-Daho appears to have heen chosen in direct opposition 
to the King's wishes. The support which the VlTDaho 
attracted may have heen due to the nature of his 
political views. It is more likely that his views were 
designed to attract political support. Prohahly, too,
a Prince's impox,tanee varied according to the strength
of his links with other memhers of the Fon political 
class. The mothers of Princes likely to succeed to 
the throne were said, according to tradition, to have 
heen given hy the King to the Vi-Daho. However, if 
a Prince had to force the King to recognise him as 
Vi-Daho, it seems likely that he would have attempted 
to gain allies hy contracting to take as wife, when 
Vi-Daho, daughters of important Fon Chiefs* The 
King would have had little say as to which women he
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he gave to the Vi-Daho. The Princes of the
next generation would, therefore, he ahle to
draw on their mother's relatives for political
support. Moreover, the mothers of claimants
to the throne were often themselves powerful
in the Palace bureaucracy; one of the most important
rivals of Gelele, for example, was the son of the
Ya Vedo. The political power of the various
Princes was therefore invariably related to their 
) *
mothers1 importance in the state. A Prince aspiring to
he recognised as Vi-Daho may also have heen able to 
draw on contacts made when he was a child. This 
would not he difficult since Princes were not brought 
up in the Palace, hut were brought up in households 
of the great Ministers. A Prince might, in childhood, 
form close relationships with a politically important 
family that would, later, stand him in good stead.
1 A.De Herisse^ , op.cit., p.8 
E,Chaudoin, op.cit., p.272.
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Gelele1s eldest son, Bedozan, for example, was
educated at the home of the Chief Priest of Pa, the 
1Bokonou.
The choosing of a Vi-Daho was therefore a political 
manoeuvre rather different from that presented in 
tradition. He was not the choice of the King^ and it 
seems possible that the role of the Bokonou in consulting 
the oracles had more political than religious significance. 
Probably the Migan and the Mehou played a key role in 
the nomination of a ViSDaho. It was perhaps these two 
officials who formally indicated to the King that the 
time had come for an heir to be appointed. They them­
selves may or may not have been in sympathy with such a 
move. Certainly when Badahou was nominated he had the 
support of the Mehou. No doubt the views of the Migan 
and the Mehou were exceptionally important in any far- 
reaching political initiative. Nevertheless, it does 
seem that they, like the King, had to act in accordance 
with the views of the majority of the powerful Chiefs.
1 R.P.Burton, op.cit.,pp.176-7
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A prince even after becoming Vi-Daho could not 
be sure of succeeding his father* The King might be 
able to rebuild his political fortune and even eventually 
dispose of his unwelcome heir* Nevertheless, in two 
out of three struggles occurring in the course of the
nineteenth century between the Vi-Daho and the King, 
the Vi-Daho, it seems, did manage to have his father 
removed* The 1876 succession dispute was, moreover, 
somewhat unusual in that it was sparked off by and 
centred around an acute crisis in external relations*
Both sides in the dispute had then to act more pre­
cipitately than they would perhaps otherwise have done*
It seems in fact that normally the Vi-Daho acted only 
after he was sure of overwhelming support from the 
political class. The King then died and the Vi-Daho 
succeeded to the throne.
Possibly the King was actually rather than sym­
bolically slain during the course of the hwe hu li-len 
custom. Since Geso and Gelele both seem to have died
during seasons when yams are harvested in Dahomey, the 
ceremony may, in the nineteenth century, have been used
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for its original purpose. An outline of this custom, 
given hy a modern French writer, indicates that this 
ceremony may well have had its origins in the ritual 
killing of the King:
TCfest un rituel de purification de la
personae royale; il a lieu tous les ans 
au mo is de septemhre, mois qui marque le 
debut de 1r ann'^ e dahomeene avec 1 ’ appari­
tion des premieres ignames. L1 expression 
se traduit, terme a terme:
hw^ hu li-len
annuel du corps lavage
Dans ce rituel le roi est en quelque sorte
dedouble7 en/la personne d’un petit enfant 
qui est enter re7 vivant, le roi est done 
virtuellement mis a mort et emporte avec 
lui toutes les impuretes; la vie peut 
recommencer avec l’ann^e, rien ne peut 
plus entraver la marche. La veille du jour 
de la ceremonie, le roi dort a Calamina, la 
ceremonie devant avoir lieu au village de
Hunto, situ^ a 5 km au sud de Calamina.
Dks I'aube, les ahosi (femmes du roi) se 
mettent a filer du coton; le fil est 
aussitfit remis aux tisserands qui fabri- 
quent sur seise metiers autant de bandes
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d'etoffe, celles-ci serviront a confec- 
tionner un pagne dans la journ^e meme.
Les ahosi apportent le pagne termine7 
aupres de la riviere Hunto on doit 
avoit lieu la ceremonie, en mime temps 
que trois pagnes de fabrication europ^enne, 
dee boissons, etc. Des serviteurs de 
Houdouhwe7 (le chef tresorier du roi) con-
duisent a l ’endroit un petit garcon non
* ?
pubere, et ils creusent un trou profond.
Vers la fin de la journee, le roi, 
accompagnd' dTune nombreuse suite, se rend 
au lieu de la ceremonie. Apr^s avoir 
travers^ le Hunto, le cortege sfarrete et
le roi poursuit, accompagn^ uniquement de 
Migan et de Mew (ses premiers ministres de 
droite et de gau^ fche, respectivement), du 
Vidaho, du bokonon du palais et de quelques 
ahosi portant le crachoir royal et des 
boissons. Le roi se deshabille completement 
et revet de ses habits le petit garcon, lui 
met ses colliers, ses sandales, etc.Ensuite, 
hokonon coupe les cheveux et les ongles 
du roi; celui-ci se lave alors avec de lfeau 
de la riviere quTon lui a apportee dans une 
jarre, puis s’habille avec des pagnes
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europ^ens et chausse ne nouvelles sandales.
On jette dans le trou tous les objets ayant 
servi au bain, du roi (jarre, eponge, etc.)* 
les cheveux et les ongles coupe^, ainsi que 
le pagne blanc; le petit enfant est descendu
vivant dans le trou et enterre. Le roi
* \ / \re joint le cortege reste a l'efcart, qui le
salue: E dio leu (il a ^chang^ la mort)*^
The deaths of Gezo and Gelele together with the
the succession of Badahou and Kondo were regarded as 
natural constitional events; the new King publicly and 
privately honoured the memory of his father* GezoTs 
succession,on the other hand, represented a violent 
break with the past; he was the representative of a 
rival line, not the son of Adanzan. Adanzan was kept 
alive after he had been deposed; his memory was execrated 
and it was declared that he ought never to have been 
: King at all. Gezofs succession was something entirely
different from the normal succession of the Vi-Daho.
1 Palau-Marti, op.cit., p.131
The original information on this 
custom seems to have come from 
J.Bertho, TNotes Africaines:19&5T 
Ko .27 pp.14-15* Palau-Marti*s 
account, however, seems more 
useful.
See also G.Parrinder, West African 
Religion, p.136.
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The Vi-Daho, on his father's death, might find
it necessary to dispose of a number of his brothers---
rival claimants to the throne. In the nineteenth 
century only Gelele was faced with this situation. 
According to tradition, fraternal rivals were not 
usually killed. More often than not they were exported 
as slaves. Gelele secretly kept one of his rivals, a
■i
brother, Godo, alive, although a close captive. If 
a prince was killed his blood was not spilled; he was 
sewn into his hammock, secretly carried down to Whydah 
and deposited in the ocean. The career of an ambitious 
Fon Prince, if not nasty and brutish, was certainly 
very liable to be short.
2
According to tradition? there were seven Ministers 
of outstanding importance— the Gbonougan Daho—  who 
along with the King saw to the smooth running of the
government of the state. These were the Migan, the Mehou,
the Yeovogun, the Adjaho, the So gun, the Tokpo and the
1 R.F. Burton, op.cit., p.131, f/h.9
2 A.Le Herisse^ , op.cit., pp.37-45
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Akplogun. In nineteenth century Dahomey they were 
the most ancient and honourable offices of state.
In origin they were probably priestly offices of 
the King's household. At any rate, all of them had 
been in existence since the first half of the 
eighteenth century. By far the most important of 
these dignitaries were the Migan and the Mehou. In 
practice and theory the functions of these two 
officers were complementary. Between them they 
supervised almost every function of the Fon state. 
Together they played an important role in the selection
4
of a successor to the King, and they acted as Regents
2for three days after the King's death. The Migan and 
the Mehou wielded an influence unrivalled by any of 
the other Cfbonougan Daho. In the main their beauro- 
cratic functions were supervisory: those of other 
Gbonougan Daho were more specific and were more limited.
1 See above, pp. 435-6
2 A.Le Herisse'", op. cit., p.41
In the household of the early Aladaxanou Kings, 
the Migan had his place at the right-hand of the 
King and acted as the royal priest-executioner • In 
the nineteenth century his duties in this capacity 
were still his most important functions it was he who
despatched the most important sacrifices in the ceremonies
necessary to the continuation of the Fon world* The
Migan had, besides, important judicial functions: he
was the supreme judge in all cases with which the King 
himself did not deal* As part of his judicial power 
he had the right to keep the most important prison in 
Abomey* Moreover, he also was the peopled representative 
before the King: this duty may have entailed his per­
suading the King to take action which he did not wish to 
take— an action like nominating a Vi-Daho*
After the conquest of Allada the Migan* s power was 
enlarged so as to make him overseer of the officers of 
that province: it seems likely that after theOrganisation
of Agony$; he was also charged with the administration of 
that territory. That he dealt with these provinces
- 447 -
probably ties in Yfith the fact that he was responsible
1
for all administrative matters concerning the army.
The Migan's opposite number, the Mehou, sat on 
the left-hand of the King. He also had functions 
which were in some way priestly for he acted as 
executioner at the sacrifices for the King's double.
The Mehou was the King's representative before the 
people. His duties included looking after the affairs
of the royal family; judging them, naming them and
2 3perhaps arranging their marriages. One account states
that the office of Mehou was created only after the
conquest of Whydah. This seems unlikely; his duties 
are so interwoven with those of the Migan that the two 
offices must have had their origins at about the same 
time. The difficulty may have arisen out of the fact
1 A.Le Herisse', op. cit., pp. 30;38;40: 
R.Burton, op.cit., pp.137-8: 
J.Skertchly, op.cit., p.445
2 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., pp.41-2
3 A.Le Ilerisse", op. cit., p.41
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that after the conquest of Whydah the Mehou was
charged with overseeing the affairs of that province.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century he
probably came to be charged with supervising the
affairs of Cotonou as well* The Mehou also saw to
the affairs of all European visitors to the Court and
organised their ceremonial reception. He was the
Minister consulted ultimately on all matters concerning
*1
the regulation of trade with the Europeans*
The Yeovogun of Whydah ranked after the Migan 
and the Mehou in the traditional picture of the Dahoman 
Ministerial heirarchy. His office seems to have been 
formed by an amalgamation of the duties of a number of 
beaurocrats of the former Kingdom of Whydah. Unlike the 
other G-bonougan Daho;his position seems to have had 
little of the priestly about it. His high status, far
above that of the Akplogun was due to the importance/
attached to trade with the Europeans. For much of the 
nineteenth century his real power was no greater than
1 R.Burton, op.cit., pp.138 & 150
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that of the Akplogun nor; indeed^ of the more recently 
created provincial governors. From 1818 to 1858, and 
from 1885 to 1887? the Chacha was in control of relations 
with the Europeans. Moreover, during the greater part 
of Gelele's reign political power-in Whydah rested with 
the Choydatcm, not the Yeovogun. In fact the office 
of Yeovogun of Whydah only regained its traditional 
importance when the central government recovered its 
unity on the accession of Behanzan.
The office of Adjaho had probably a priestly origin. 
It was he who administered the oath at trials before the 
King. The Adjaho was the official who had under his 
control the administration of the royal palaces. He 
maintained, contact between the outside and the inside, 
the palace and the world: he was in fact in charge of the 
Owutunum, or King's euntrchs. He also supervised the 
activities of the King's spies. An English commentator 
gives a guide to this institution:
1 R.Burton, op.cit., p.40
2 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., p.42
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’In the house of each minister lives 
a King’s daughter and two officers; 
these superintend the minister’s 
trade, on which he pays tribute 
according to their report. If a 
dispute arises in which the King’s 
interest is at stake, these officers 
report direct; and if the dispute is 
serious, the minister is arrested or 
fined. The whole system is one of 
espionage, cunning, and intrigue.’
This account may over-estimate the ’espionage’
activities of these ’ministerial assistants’ who were
2normally, it seems, referred to as’legedes’. Their 
main function may have been simply to act as second- 
in-command to the great beaurocrats. These lege,'d6s 
do, nevertheless, seem to have acted as intermediaries 
between the court and the great officials. In time 
of political crises the role of such an intermediary 
may not have been all that far removed from that of a 
spjf. The Adjaho’s relationship with these legedes must 
have given him a position of considerable influence.
1 P.E. Forbes, op.cit.. pp.34-35
2 M.d.Ilerskovits, op. cit., Vol. I pp. 69 & 1j12
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The duties of the So gun in the nineteenth century 
concerned only the royal household: his functions had 
not multiplied as the Kingdom expanded. His rank did 
not correspond in any way with his power and was thus
purely honorary. The importance of the Tokpo is 
however much more easily recognised; in origin his 
office was probably that of a priest of the various 
agricultural cults. In the nineteenth century he was 
in charge of the organisation of agriculture and markets 
throughout the Kingdom. Even before 1851 the ceremonies 
of agricultural production and trade were closely super­
vised from the centre. After G-ezo’s economic revolution 
the Tokpo played a key role in trade with the Europeans 
as well as in the internal organisation of the state.
The last official in the traditional list of 
Gbonougnan-Daho was the Akplogun. The original duties 
of this official seem to have been of a priestly nature 
in that he was a guardian of the royal tombs at Allada*
After the conquest of Allada he became governor of that
1
province of Dahomey.
1 For the work of the provincial governors 
see pp. 418-9
-  4 5 2  -
Although the Gabonougnan-Daho held, the most 
honourable offices in Dahomey, their actual power
was not therefore necessarily commensurate with their 
status* Indeed, Francisco Felix Da Souza, as Chaeha 
in the first half of Gezo’s reign, and Nougbododhoue, 
as the King’s chief fetisher in the second half of 
Gelele’s reign, wielded considerably more influence 
than any of them* Nevertheless the administrative 
power of the Migan and Mehou was as great as their rank 
indicated* New officers were, however, created in the 
course of the nineteenth century, with functions as 
important as those of most of the other Gbonougan Daho* 
The Fiogbe and the Yeovogun of Cotonou were at least as 
important as the Akplogun. Politically and administ­
ratively these officials were certainly more important 
than the Sogun* Moreover, the ever-increasing power of 
the Princes of the blood adversely effected the real 
influence of the Gbonougan-Dalio• It seems likely that 
the Yeovogun of Whydah was not the only b^auro-e-rat whose 
power at times was circumscribed by his royal second-in- 
command. By the nineteenth century therefore, the power
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structure of Dahomey had so altered that the 
Gbonougan Daho were not the only men who, together 
with the King, wielded great power. Indeed, their 
political importance might in fact he considerably 
less than that which was held by one in a relatively
■i
minor office.
In Dahomey, the Palace and its inhabitants played 
an exceptionally important part in the life of the 
state. In Fon thoiight, the Palace was in fact the 
’complement’ of the country: the organisation of the 
women of the Palace, the ’interior’, in many ways 
duplicated that of the male functionaries of the ’exterior’.
1 Palau-Marti, op.cit., pp.197-204*
Palau-Marti has worked out, by theorising 
elaborately on Fon numerical symbolism, 
that there were, as Herisse stated* seven 
Ministers of outstanding importance: the 
Gbonougan Daho. From this number is 
excluded the Sogan and the Yeovogun. In 
it are included the Gaou and the Kposu.
The latter Chiefs had, however, unlike the 
Gbonougan Daho, a purely military role.
The Gbonougan Daho were a group of Ministers 
traditionally ’great’, whose power in the 
nineteenth century was not necessarily 
commensurate with their high status.
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Apart from the King, a number of eunttchs, and the
very young amongst the King’s sons, no men were
permitted within the Palace. In the reign of Gelele,
and of Behanzin, there were altogether about 8,000 
1
Palace women. Many of these women were slaves, 
others were either the wives or daughters of the King, 
priestesses, or Palace attendants.2
The most important of the Palace women, at least 
in ritual matters, were the Kpodjito, or ’mothers’ of 
the Fon monarchs. The actual mother, or the repre­
sentative of the mother, of the reigning King, was the 
leading figure in this group. Indeed, in ceremonial
affairs she was the second most important person in 
3
the Kingdom. If the mother of the King were alive^ it
1 A.Le Herisse^ op.cit., p.27
2 R.F.Burton, op.cit., p.153:
J.A.Skertchly, op.cit., p.145;
The female attendants in the 
Palace who acted as messengers 
between the Palace and the 
exterior v/ere called ’Paros’.
3 Palau-Marti, op.cit., p.21 5
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was essential to the continued smooth running of the 
Fon world that she lived in the Pala&e and performed 
her religious duties there. How essential this was 
is shown hy Gezo * s frantic search of the New World for
his enslaved mother* If the King’s ’real* mother were 
not alive then some specially sanctioned substitute 
had to take her place and perform her duties. Women 
of the Palace were also appointed to act as the ’mothers’
of former Kings— -tending their tombs and playing a
leading part in the ritual ceremonies due to their
memories. Every one of these Kpodjito ranked as very
high dignitaries at the Court.
non—
Most of theyslave women of the Palace were wives 
of the King. Only a limited number were, however, virives 
in any real sense of the vrord. Many of them were members 
of groups with special duties which had little to do with 
normal marital relations. The most remarked upon were 
those of the King’s wives who made up part of the
•i
standing army the Amazons. They were in fact the
1 See below, pp.466-7 and 472 for the 
organisation of the Amazons in war.
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King's 'bodyguard* These women, who numbered about
2,000, were bound by the same conventions as the other
royal wives: they lived in the Palace and were forbidden
1
any contact with any man other than the King* In spite
of their warlike attributes they sometimes did bear
children to the King*
The 'real1 wives of the King were the Kposi, or
Wives of the Leopard. There were about forty of these 
.. 2
KSppagii* who were young and attracive, who lived with the
King in his part of the Palace and whose duty it was to
3
attend the monarch* Of all the King's wives, only the
Kposi could produce an heir to the throne*^" The Kposi
were therefore originally the women who formed a Prince's
5stud when he became Vi-Daho* After one of them began to
1 JLA.Skertchly, op* cit.* pp*359-60* 
This law was not always enforced*
2 A.Le Herisse', op* cit*, p.27
3 A.Le Herisse^ , op* cit *, p.27: 
R.P*Burton, op* cit*, p.211
i\. Palau-Marti, op.cit* * p. 129
5 See above p.2+35
-  k5S -
grow old, or perhaps after the King realised that one
of them might be of more use to him elsewhere, a woman
who had been one of the Kposi could cease to be one
and might move on to take up some position elsewhere in
the Palace. In 1863 the mother of two of the King’s
important sons, and of his eldest daughters, was the 
1
she-Yeovogun. Former Kposi, the mothers of claimants
to the throne, were therefore to be found in positions
of power throughout the Palace beaurocracy.
2
It has been suggested that the Kposi watched over 
the activities of the royal Ministers^and thus played 
a vitally important part in the administration of the 
state. The Kposi were, according to this argument, 
divided into groups of 8, one of which was always with 
the King. It was the duty of each of these groups to be 
present at all the King’s interviews with certain 
functionaries, and to remember the report made and views 
expressed by these functionaries. Over a period of time 
it was presumed that the Kposi would be able to detect
1 R.P.Burton, on.cit.. p.212
2 M.J.Herskovits, op.cit.» Vol.I p.111
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any subterfuge or any discrepancies in what whs 
reported by those with whom the King had to deal.
There is, however, no contemporary evidence to 
support the contention that the Kposi played such a 
role. It does seem an unlikely activity for these 
women who were essentially the King’s personal attendants.
It was only really after they had ceased to be Kposi that 
they moved into the bureaucracy. If they had acted as 
the royal archivists they would have become more valuable 
as they grew older. In fact, however, the Kposi were 
always young. No doubt after being with the King for some 
time a number of them exercised considerable influence 
at Court. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the Kposi 
ever had any institutionalised bureaucratic functions.
The wives of the King who did play an important 
part in the state bureaucracy were called the Naye^
These women may have been former Kposi. They probably
also included in their number women who had formerly 
belonged to a less important group of the royal wives.
Each of these Nay^, and there were fifty-one of them in
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the second half of the nineteenth c entury, acted as 
the counterpart of a male minister and was usually 
referred to as that ministers 'mother1 * The 'mother'
of the Migan was known as the Gundeme, that of the
2
Mehou, the Yewe. The Yewe was in charge of the women 
of royal blood within the Palace; the Gundeme was in 
charge of the others* The two female ministers also 
duplicated the 'overseeing' functions of their male 
equivalents* They did more that this, they also 
watched over the activities of the male ministers 
themselves* This was in fact the most important 
function of all these 'mothers'; their task was to 
memorise the reports and scrutinise the doings of the
1 J.A.Skertehly, op.cit*, p*251*
2 A.Wallon, Revue Maritime et Coloniale, 
t.II, p*358t1861*R*Burton* op.cit*T 
p.212. Button at this point refers to. 
the Mehou's 'mother' as Bgbelu, or the 
•female Mehou'. gallon, writing only
a few years before Burton refers to the 
* she-Mehou' as 'Bgbelou' * It is probable 
therefore that 'Egbelou? was the personal 
or 'rank' name of one particular she-Mehou.
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male bureaucrats* The 'mother1 of a Minister was 
always present when that Minister had an important 
interview with the King* She probably also consulted 
with her male counterpart as to the wisdom of his 
actions♦
The state bureaucrats were not the only men who had 
•mothers* within the Palace* Every European visitor to 
the Court found that one of the King's wives had been 
appointed to watch over those of his nationality who 
ventured to Afromey* The male attendants also had 
their counterparts within the Palace.* Even the Court 
eunuchs had their female counterparts in the Ya Vedo 
and her deputy, the Yissegan* Some, at least, of the 
•mothers' of the attendants had, at an earlier stage in 
their career, been Kposi* The Ya Ye do was the mother of 
a riyal claimant to the throne in 1858; the Vissegan in 
1890 was described as being King Gelele*s chief wife* 
Their status was in fact little different from that of 
the 'mothers* of the Ministers*
1 R*P*Burton, op.cit** p*141
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The majority of the King’s wives had however no 
part in the functioning of the state machine. Such
wives the Ahosi— —had the simple duty of cooking for
the royal hoiisehold. They had little or no communication
1
with the more important royal wives. It seems not 
unlikely that their hirth was more lowly than that of 
the politically important women. The Ahosi within the 
Palace in fact corresponded to the mass of the Fon 
peasantry in the state.
Nevertheless, in spite of this Palace check on the 
activities of officials and in spite of the contacts 
maintained hy Adjaho, the monarch never had full control 
of the ministers of state. Perhaps the very fact that 
so many checks existed indicates how ineffective they 
all were. Ministers, Princes, and Priests all had their 
allies within the Palace as well as withoixt. The system 
of supervision "broke down completely when’ the succession
was in dispute and it was around that issue that Non
political quarrels tended to centre. The Kposi themselves
1 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., p.27
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were the mothers of the claimants to the throne*
They were therefore very willing to intrigue to 
secure the succession for their sons* G-ezo had 
attempted to place more and more power in the hands 
of the women of the Palace whom he hoped he could 
control more closely than the great Chiefs. After the 
breakdown of his system the women of the Palace were as 
heavily involved in political conflict as the males 
outside it. In two, and probably in all three of the 
violent political upheavals recorded during the last 
two decades of Dahoman independence, women of the
A
Palace played a leading role.
Besides the wives, the ministers and their ’doubles1 
the King’s immediate entourage consisted of a number of 
personal attendants. Prominent amongst these were the 
King’s Chief Diviner, the Priest of Pa, the Bokonou.
1 The revolt of Nougbododhovie and
Yissegan in 1890; the revolt of 1884 
and the killing of Hanasou and his 
brothers in 1876. Vissegan had long been 
associated with Nougbododhoue. She 
probably therefore played a part in the 
events of 1876.
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He v/as consulted on all matters of state, including
£he selection of an heir, and was therefore an
1
extremely important figure at Court. Important also—  
if only as a messenger 'between the palace and those 
outside— —was the Tononou, or chief euntfch, and one 
of the few males allowed within the Palace. His duties 
were to look after the welfare of the women of the 
Palace. Prominent amongst those always attending Court
were the half-heads— or Lari the King’s messengers
whose duty it was to carry messages at full! speed from
the Court to the provinces.2
The Fon military organisation, like the Fon civil 
beaurocracy, was a highly complicated social machine.
1 It was Behanzin’s Bokonou who befriended 
and gained the confidence of Dorgere.
2 A.Adande, ’Les Recades des Hoi du Dahomey’, 
A.F.A.N.. 1962* As a sign of their royal 
authority the ’half-heads’ carried the 
famous ’Recards’ or staffs of office. 
Everyone had to give way before them. In 
origin this appears to have been a Yoruba 
office introduced during the period of 
Yoruba dominance.
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Indeed, the two were not really separate institutions.
All the civil ministers, apart from the provincial 
governors, had a traditional military role. Even the 
Court Eool, the Kpofensu, had a well-defined place in
•i
the army. The King himself went to war, as did the
Migan and the Mehou. The monarch was in charge of his
2Amazon guards: the Migan was responsible for the right
wing of the army: the Mehou was responsible for the left.
The preliminary strategic decisions where and when to
attach were taken like all other political decisions;
the whole political class took part. Indeed, the military 
leaders were just as heavily involved in political life
ifU/vtiAjkk.
as were the officials of the civilian beau roc racy. The 
actual command of the army while on campaign was left to 
the G-aou— -a military Chief who had no civilian duties. 
Besides being Commander-in-Chief, the G-aou was, in battle
1 A. J. Skertchly, op. cit., p.24l7* He was 
leader of a company equipped with blunderbuses.
2 The King was accompanied by his Amazons, 
who took up a central position in the
Eon battle formation. He did not lead his 
army: probably so that no blame should fall 
upon him in the event of defeat. Since he 
was the living embodiment of Dahomey itself 
his life was presumably too precious to 
expose to danger. Although he did not fight, 
he certainly took part in the making of all 
military decisions.
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the leader of the right wing of the army. His 
Lieutenant, the Kposu, was leader of the left wing.
In the reign of Gelele, Princes of the blood became 
powerful in the army as Seconds-in-Gommand to the 
G-aou and the Kposu. In the reign of Behanzm the 
Gaou himself was a brother of the King*
The King!s wives, a section of whom played an
cL?JA'‘'
important role in the civilian bureatxcracy, also ful­
filled an essential role in the functioning of the 
military machine. The military section were called 
the Minos, the famous Amazons. Although the King*s 
wives had, in the eighteenth century, been mobilised in 
an attempt to increase the armed forces of the state, it
was Gezo who first made the Amazons/permanent part of the 
Fon army* They formed the King!s personal bodyguard,
came to be one of the most reliable elements in the army 
and, indeed, held a central position in the normal Fon 
battle formation. As the female civil administration 
duplicated the male, so, too, did the female military 
heirarchy follow the older male organisation. The Gundeme
1 A.LB Herisse^ , op. cit., p*63. The titles of 
these royal officers were the Matro and the 
Aouigbame.
commanded the right wing of the Amazons while the Yewa 
commanded the left. jn battle the Amazon right was led 
by a she-Gaou, the Akpadume, and the left by a she-Kposu, 
the Fosupou. As befitted Ahosi, the Amazons, when not
at war, lived in the various royal Palaces cut off from
1the society of all men except the King. The Amazon 
officers, however, played an equal part with the males
in taking military and, indeed, political decisions.
The Fon army consisted of a number of units recruited
in a variety of ways. The most important section, made up 
of both male and female troops, and the one which bore 
the brunt of the fighting, was the standing army. The core 
of the standing army, the 2,000 Amazon troops, was, when
p
not at war, stationed in Abomey or Cana.
1 See above, p.456.
2 R.P.Burton, op.cit., p.263:
A.J.Skertchley, op.cit., p.433:
A.Le Iierissd', op.cit.. p.67:
M.J.Herskovits, op.cit., pp.80-81.
Burton estimated the total number of 
Amazons at about 2,300; of these 1,700 
were actually fighting women. He fulfills 
a useful function here in cutting down the 
extraordinary estimates of previous visitors. 
Skertchley states that they may have numbered 
4,000 but indicates his doubt. Le Herissd" 
gives figures (probably vastly exaggerated) for 
only a few of GeleleTs Amazon regiments. 
Herskovits seems to have felt that Burton*s 
estimate was low, but he tended to exaggerate 
both the size ana the organisation of the 
Kingdom. Altogether, 2,000 Amazons would not 
seem to be an unreasonable figure*
-  4 6 8  -
One part of the male section of the standing army--
the section usually seen by Europeans was stationed
for ceremonial purposes at Abomey* Another section was
normally stationed on the frontiers watching the activities
of the neighbouring peoples. During most of the century
there was a high concentration of troops in the Agony
area watching the Yoruba. The remainder of this standing
army was made up of troops stationed at various Customs
posts throughout the Kingdom. Altogether it seems that
there were more than three thousand permanent male
1soldiers. Gezo, again, is often credited vfith the
2creation of this standing army. Since he was the first 
Eon monarch to pursue policies of continuous war on 
powerful neighbours, this does not seem unlikely.
1 The more x^ eliable commentators did not attempt 
to estimate the number of men in the standing 
army. Bayol estimated the royal army which 
attacked Cotonou at about 3,000. Possibly 
half of these were male. The other half of 
the standing army was at the time stationed 
on the eastern frontier.
 ^ A.Le ^ Plerisse, op. cit., p.56. According to 
tradition the Chacha advised Ofezo to create 
such an army. See Ghapter 1 p.20
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ProTaably the majority of the nineteenth century
i •Eon annual ©ampsfgns were simple pun&tive expeditions,
or slave raids, and were undertaken by the standing 
arm^y alone. When a major campaign was contemplated 
a general levy of all the ahle-hodied men was undertaken. 
This was put into operation hy the various x^rovineial
A
governors. The levy then met the rest of the army at 
2Gana. These recruits had not of course the skill or
A.Le Iierisse, op. cit., p.70.
It is known from a report made hy 
Jean Bayol(see f/n 2 helow)that in “1889 
troops were levied from All a da, Whydah 
and Cotonou province. Le Herisse mentions 
the Agony contingent. Troops v/ould also 
have heen drawn from the Abomey plateau*
It is doubtful if any were drawn from the 
areas of Dahomey not under central super­
vision. Even in the organised provinces 
the number of troops raised depended both 
on how much independence the governor had 
and how committed to the war the provincial 
Chiefs were; the provincials v/ere seldom as 
willing to fight as the Eon of Abomey. The 
Agon/y troops, for example, often ran away.
The subject states did not contribute troops 
to the Eon army. If they were involved in a 
war, as the Dekame was in the war against
France, their army remained a separate entity.
•:r ^  -lh part m  J.Bayol, nes purees 
Militaires au Dahomey. Revue SciehfiT*iqile, 
Paris 18927
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the stamina of the standing army and in order to 
combat these weaknesses, many of them were introduced 
into the regiments of the standing army. These there­
fore gained in numbers, while at the same time the 
trained troops lent impetus and morale to the recruits. 
Nevertheless, sections at least of the levies did 
fight alone.
.There also existed side by side with what may be
termed the system of state recruitment, another method
of obtaining men. A number of important Chiefs sometimes
or, indeed, it may have been always, themselves provided
a number of fighting men for the Dahoman forces. The
2
Chacha did so in the reign of C-ezo. Such groups seem 
to have functioned as units on their own. That these 
did not come only from the !unorganised1 areas of the 
country is indicated by the presence of the Chacha1 s
1 A.Le Herisse^ , op. cit., p.70, mentions 
the Aladatu, the troops from Allada, 
and the Adopo from Agony.
2 A.L.DTAlbeca, TAu Pays du Fon1 , Tour du 
Monde, 1895. p.88. D!Albeca states that the 
Chacha was wealthy enough to raise 1,U00 
soldiers.
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forces amongst their number. The very existence 
of these regiments indicates the survival of a non­
state organisation and points to the weakness of the 
beaurocracy and, indedd, of royal control. It may be
a reflection of the breakdown in monarchicial control 
in the second half of the nineteenth century that
instances of the great Chiefs* independently providing
forces are more numerous in the reign of '^elele than
1
m  that of his predecessor.
Once assembled for a normal campaign-- one not
involving a siege, or a v/ar on two fronts---the Eon
army travelled quickly towards their objective. The 
best means of attack had already been learned from the 
spies. The essence of any Eon attack was surprise, 
preferably at dawn. The Eon army would frequently make
a false start feigning to be about to make war in an
an area far from its real objective in order to lull
its victims into a false sense of security. The Bahomans 
attacked in an arc formation with the G-aou in command of 
the right wing, the Kposi in command of the left and the
1 A.Le Herisse^ , op. cit., p. 69.
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Amazons, also divided, into right and left under their 
own officers, at the centre. The King's Amazon "body­
guard, whose place was officially "between the two 
Amazon wings, were normally held in reserve and only 
used as emergency reinforcements* The Amazon regiments 
had the most ferocious reputation of all the troops and 
in difficult attacks like those on Atakpame in 1814-8, 
Abeokuta in 185"©, and Cotonou in 1892, "bore the "brunt 
of the attack* In most of its campaigns during the 
course of the nineteenth century the Fon army acted as 
a unified force. In order to combat attack on a number 
of fronts during the war against the French, however, 
the Fon divided their forces into separate units, each
1 Some of the nineteenth century commentators 
state that the Migan commanded the first 
male regiment on the right wing of the 
army while the G-aou commanded only the 
second: similarly, the Mehou was said to 
command the right division and the Kposu 
the left division on the left wing.
Although there are records of the Gaou 
and the she-Gaou having taken part in, 
and, indeed, having been killed in battle, there
is no record of any such thing happening to the 
Migan or the Mehou.
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under one of the great officials* Even at full 
strength, as in the campaigns against the Egba and 
the French, it is doubtful if the Fon had ever more 
than 16,000 to 20,000 troops under arms*
When on campaign each soldier was supplied with 
weapons and ammunition. The levies, however, received 
no pay and had to find and carry their own provisions* 
Every soldier, in theory, was supposed to bring back 
a captive, or a head, for the Itln^ , who bought them at 
§ fixed price at one of the customary post-campaign 
ceremonies in Dahomey. In this way the King, in the
first decades of the century, was supplied with slaves 
for export and, in the second, with slaves to work the 
palm oil plantations. Throughout most of the nineteenth 
century the Fon forces were armed with trade guns.
Thanks to Gezo's close association with Francisco Felix 
Da Souza, these were abundantly available in the first 
half of the century. Dahomey was not, however, provided 
with repeater rifles as soon as its Yoruba neighbours*^
1 See Chapter III, p. 203
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It was only just "before the final overthrow of the
Kingdom that the Fon obtained from the German traders
at Whydah any large supply of these weapons. The
greatest losses sustained by Fon troops seem to have
occurred, however, not as a result of enemy action,
1but as a result of the ravages of disease.
There were, besides what might be described as 
the official standing army, other organised bands of 
permanent Dahoman fighters. These were the male and 
female game hunters. Their main duty was to supply
the Palace with fresh meat, but they had, as a
2
secondary task, the policing of the countryside.
There is a great deal of tangled 
information available on the Fon army 
in both secondary and primary material.
The following have been found most useful: 
M.J.Herskovits, op.cit., pp.70-101:
A.Le Herissd', op. cifll' pp. 59-72:
A.J. Skertchly, op.cit., pp.AA3-60:
R.F.Burton, op. cit.'. bn. 63-86:
¥•¥•<?• Dahomey iil-i-K Bayol to Etienne.
1Military Information' Porto Kovo 11.1.70, 
Reproduced in part in J.Bayol, 'Les Forces 
Militaires au Dahomey,' Revue Scientifique, 
Paris, 1892.
2 A.Le Herisse, op.cit., pp.89-90.
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In this police work they acted in co-operation 
with the soldiers stationed at the various toll
posts throughout the Kingdom. The soldiers watched 
travellers and could if necessary fclose* the paths.
The hunters, at the same time, scoured the country­
side for malefactors in particular runaway slaves.
As a means of controlling criminals this system was
*1
probably effective; as a means of controlling 
political movements j_n -^ 0 country, completely ineffec­
tive. Many of to3.1 posts were under the control
2of the great Chiefs, and besides, the hunters were 
themselves officered by members of the political1 
class.
(a w >
The civilian beaurecracy and the military machine 
were two of the great institutions of Fon corporate 
life. Another was the organised religious life, taking 
place around the various cult houses erected for the 
worship of the ’Great Gods*. The followers of these
1 A.Skertchly, op.cit., pp.8^-85:
A.Le Herisse', on. cit., pp*88-89-
2 The King frequently ’gave the right* 
to levy toll to a favoured Chief.
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cults, who made about half the population of the 
Kingdom, were closely supervised hy the chief Priest 
of each house# According to anthropological accounts, 
the cult houses were rigidly controlled hy the
•i
monarchy* Little or no direct evidence exists as to 
how far the monarch was actually ahle to watch over 
the activities of the priests. It does, however, seem
unlikely that the cult houses--whose chief Priests came
from the same families as the other Pon leaders were
in fact closely supervised# More prohahly the priestly 
class was involved in the same jockeying for position 
as were the leaders of other institutions of Pon life. 
One of the dominating figures of nineteenth century 
Dahoman political life, Nougbododhoue, was, after all,, 
a priest. Moreover, there is some indication that the 
priests of one of the most important cp.it s, that of 
Sakpata, the smallpox cult, were traditionally hostile
1 M.J.Herskovits, op.cit., pp. 132-1^ .
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to monarchical power. The great emphasis placed 
publicly upon the cult of the royal ancestors probably 
arose out of continual attempts by successive kings to 
magnify the importance of the monarchy vis-a-vis the 
cults.^
Decisions of state, to be put into operation by
Urvt'ww
the beaurecracy, the army, and the priests v^ ere taken
at Abomey by the political* class acting in the name
of the King. Important decisions, those which involved
argument, tended to be taken only during the annual
3
customs of July-August or November-December, when all 
the able-bodied Chiefs of Dahomey were assembled
1 Palau-Ivlarti, op. cit., p.1 33-
No source for this is given although 
by implication it would appear to be 
oral. The examples given date from 
the eighteenth century, not from the 
nineteenth.
2 This would apply to the growth of the 
ceremonies until the death of Gezo.
The growth of the ceremonial making 
of human sacrifices, after Gezo’s 
death, was probably the result of an 
emphasising of traditional and anti- 
foreign policies.
3 The dates of the customs varied: the 
date of the fIrstmight7 on occasions, 
be in June rather than in July or 
August.
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together. They came together to celebrate the
religeous rites due to the monarchy, to present reports, 
to discuss the next seasonTs campaign and to bring 
tribute. It was then that there took place the com­
plicated bargaining and the occasional outbursts of 
hysterical violence which characterised Fon political 
life.
It was in July-August and Rovember-December that
the most important ceremonies of the Fon year took 
place. The Fon Court was, however, throughout the 
year involved in a continual round of ceremonial duties—  
This has been somewhat obscured by the way in 
which contemporary writers used the term 1 customs1.
Originally the word meant the charges paid to the King
2at a certain season of the year. It came to mean the
1 Politically, the July-August 
ceremonial seems to have been the 
more important.
2 R.F.Skertchly, op.cit., p.178: 
R.F.Burton, op.cit., p.200. 
Skertchly gives the following 
definition:
* certain state cereomonies, 
the performance of which 
has become imperative through 
long usage.1
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the ceremonies seen hy the Europeans when they visited 
Abomey to pay their respects to the King. By 
the nineteenth century the word had come to cover 
every ceremony seen in Abomey, A distinction was made - 
only for the Grand Customs. which were celebrated after 
the death of a king* Every ceremony seen in Dahomey in 
a normal year was, however, described as part of the 
•annual customs•* Few visitors, however, stayed in 
the Abomey plateau for more than three months and each 
tended to assume that the ceremonies he witnessed were 
the Dahoman customs. In their writings they convey the: 
impression that elaborate court ritual lasted only for 
about three months* This was not the case; the Court 
was, throughout the year, apart from the campaign season 
involved in a continuous round of ceremonial duties* 
Indeed, even the annual campaign might be described 
as a ceremonial duty*
Practically every event in the life of the Fon 
state required ritual expression— royal funerals, the
i  ■ . , r • ^
return of an army from war, or the paying of tribute * 
These ceremonies can be divided into two types: the
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public and the private* In order to enhance their
prestige most of the Kings attempted to add to the
number of public celebrations* Rot surprisingly,
Gezo*s reign was the period of the nineteenth century
most fertile in liew ceremonial forms* His reign saw,
for example, in commemoration of the defeat of the
Oyo, the inauguration of the *0yo customs* at Gana*
This ceremony which usually took place in June after the
return of the army from war, had as its outstanding
feature the sacrifice of a number of men dressed in the
1
costume of the Oyb* Gezo*s reign also produced the
much-remarked Gun Custom: the firing to Whydah— a
custom which seems to have been designed to emphasise
the King*s close association with the Whydah merchants
and the prosperity which the association had brought 
2
to Dahomey*
1 J*Duncan, op*cit«a Yol.I, p*219:
3£,P.Burton, op.cit*, p.126:
A*J.Skertchly, op»cit* * pp*179-80*
2 A*J.Skertchly, op*cit*, p.421*
He declares that the custom was 
instituted by F*P. De Souza. After
the reign of Gezo it was practised 
in a much less spectacular fashion, 
since it was in fact very expensive. 
The last time it was performed was 
in 1885 to celebrate the Portugese 
alliance *
In spite of nineteenth century innovations,
the most important public ceremonies, the Sosin or
Hors e Tying Custom and the Attoh or Platform Customr
remained basically the same as in. the eighteenth
century* These were *made* by the King for his
father5 the 1 Bush King also Jmade1 customs for his,
father* It was these customs, those involving large
scale human sacrifice, which the various European 
. "V \ l
writers usually described*
Perhaps politically less important, but more
important for the perpetuation of the Fon state, and
indeed, the Fon world, were the private ceremonies
conducted by the King and his immediate attendants*
Such were the Hwe-Li-Len. or the seasonal custom
1 ' “
celebrating the rebirth, of the monarch, and the Sin-
1 For a useful outline of these customs see 
G *C oquery-Yidr ovi t ch, La f.fete des coutumes 
au Dahomey* Annales Vol*19, no*4*1964♦
2 See above, pp*441*443*
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1
Kwain or Watering of the King^s Grave custom.
By far the greatest number of human sacrifices, 
of course, took place during the Grand Customst or 
ceremonies taking place after the death of a King#
In the nineteenth c entury only one such celebration 
took place# Adanaan. was deposed, he did not die: 
Gelele had no major funeral ceremonies because in 
the years after his death his countrymen were heavily 
involved in foreign wars# Ihe Grand Customs of 
1858-60, following the death of Geao, are therefore 
unique#
(The first major ceremony took place in January 
1859* when the King*s body was placed in a vast grave 
and surrounded by the bodies of a number of his wives 
and male attendants# Ihis was the Kingfs official 
burial# He would have been given a preliminary burial
1 A#J*Skertchly, op.cit*♦ pp*383-413# 
Skertchly was the only European to 
witness and record this ceremony#
E*J•Herskovlts, op.cit* , Vol#II, 
pp#57-69* Herskovxts was present at 
a Colonial celebration of this ceremony* 
R.E.Burton, op#cit#, pp#308-314:
E.E.Eorbes, op.cli#♦ Vol.II, pp.128-174# 
Both these observers were in Abomey when 
the ceremony took place, but they did not 
actually witness it#
immediately after lie died. Ihis would have been a 
secret ceremony that probably took place befprethe 
public announcement of his death and one that involved 
very few human sacrifices. In January 1859 about 800 
people, some of them the King*s slave-wives, some his 
male retainers, either killed themselves, or were killed, 
in order that they: might accompany the King to* the here-
2  ' / V. - ■ . - .
after. Ihe grave.was then temporarily closed.
1 1  J .Poirier, Mort Da Roi Messi including 
Baudin to Planq^ uie , Porto Novo 16.4 .75 :
Annals of the Propogation of the Paith,
,1876t Yolv57, and also in Missions 
5"atKollques. 1875 ♦ Ihe preliminary burial 
was a normal fon^deviee. Ihe ceremonies 
following; the death of a Lahoman King; 
closely resembled those performed on 
similar occasions in Porto Novo. The 
preliminary burial in Porto Novo was 
also a secret affair.
2 F.0.84/1088, Cambell to Malms bury, Lagos
4.2.1859# A.le Herisse, o p . c i t pp.178-181:
J .Poirier, Mort Du goi Messi, including 
Baudin to planque, Porto tfovo 16.4 *75:
Annals of the Propogation of the Paith»1876, 
Vol.fff, also in Missions Gatholiques 1875 »
Since the figure of 800 came to Consul Gambell 
second or third-hand, it cannot be regarded as 
reliable. However, it does broadly correspond 
with the humber of human sacrifices made at 
later funeral ceremonies. Nobody of importance 
was sacrificed to accompany the King* In Porto 
Novo important Ministers delegated slaves to be 
sacrificed as a substitute for themselves. Pro­
bably the same thing happened in Abomey* :
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Eighteen months later the grave was re-opened
in preparation for the year-long ceremonies which
accompanied the official installation of the new
King* The focal point of these ceremonies seems to
have heen the removal of the deceased Kingfs head
1
and its display to the crowd by the new King* A 
French trader named Lartlque, who was present at a 
number of the ceremonies which took place in July 
and August 1861, reported that he saw Gezo in his
1 Travassos Valdez, Six Years of a travellers1 
Life in West AfricaY Vol. I (Jhapter VI: 7
Dr. Repin, •Voyage Au Dahomey1 Tour De Monde, 
1863, p*67• '
Valdez was never in Abomey, but was on 
good terms with the Whydah Portuguese 
who knew more about traditional Fon 
ceremonial than any other non-Dahomans • 
Although he visited Whydah just before 
Gelelefs installation,the forthcoming 
ceremonies were probably a constant 
topic of conversation in Whydah*
Kepin, on this point, simply quotes 
Valdez*
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grave, surrounded by the bodies of 600 women, and
that he himself witnessed the killing of over 700
men while he was in Abomey«. He stated, moreover,
that another 700 were going to be killed in October
2
of that same year# Ihis impressive report is
borne out by the much less detailed account left by
the Rev# P# Bernasko, who was also present at a number
of these ceremonies and who estimated that about 2.000 
3
people had been massacred for Greso*s funeral ceremonies 
Altogether, Bernasko*s estimate does not seem unreason­
able; if anything it is too conservative#
1 Ihis figure therefore accords well with 
Gambell1 s figure of 800 killings iii the 
1859 ceremonies#
2 M#A#B#Afrique 51* J #Lartique>
•Relation du Voyage a Dahomey (1861)4 
partly reproduced in W#Brunschwig
•L*Avenir Be L^Afrique Noire du XIX 
Sciecie a nos Jours1, Quoted by 
B#Duhglas, B»D#XX, pp#103-6#
3 ill of those sacrificed were either 
captives; or slaves. See Ghap#III p#165#
4 Extract from a letter from the Rev# P# 
Bernasco, Whydah 29 #11#1860: Wesleyan 
Missionary Notices, 25#2#61 reproduced 
in R.Burton, op.cit#* 1864 edition, 
Appendix III, Vol*#!, p#330.
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It is well-nigh impossible to make even an approxi­
mate estimate of the number of human sacrifices made in
1
Dahomey during an 1 average1 year. (Bhere is no evidence 
whatsoever as to how many human sacrifices were made in 
the first half of Ge&o’s reign. In the second half of 
his reign, as a result of English influence, the numbers 
fell. Eorbes in 1850 saw only 34 sacrifices: he never­
theless states that 140 sacrifices, had been made in 1849* 
Shere can b© little doubt that during the reigns of 
G-elele and Behanzin fantastic numbers of beings were killed, 
in the course of the public festivals. Buschart in 1852 
saw 80: Wilmot in 1862 saw 20: Burton in 1864 saw 80:
Tickel in 1867 saw 150: Skertchly in 1871 saw 70: Bayol
in 1889 saw 80.
ihese men witnessed only the public celebrations, 
lOhey were, moreover, in Dahomey for only about 3 months, and 
therefore did not know of all the ceremonies, taking 
these facts into consideration, Skertchly estimated that
1 If indeed there ever was such a thing 
as an ’average1 year. Human sacrifices 
were made not only for the death of a 
King, but also for his mother, xt may
be that they were also made for the 
dead King’s ’mothers’.
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about 200 human sacrifices must have been made during 
the year in which he visited Abomey. . • This figure 
seems particularly reliable since Skertchly,/ who was 
permitted: to see more than most Europeans visiting; 
Abomey, does, not appear to have been a;man likely to .. 
exaggerate* He had, moreover, the benefit of being 
able to check his observations against:Burton1s attempt 
to cut down to siae all imaginative reports of. Bon 
blood orgies.
The, great majority of the victims were either 
prisoners of war or slaves* Some visitors to Abomey 
were assured that the victims were all criminals. One 
of the travellers (Wilmot) was however able to identify 
the victims he had been told were criminals, as Yorubas. 
Most witnesses agree that those sacrificed were normally
. 1 Bayol spoke of 200 gictims during his 
stays he did hot see them. Tickel, 
in a very vague report, seemingly-designed 
to: paint; Dahomey in as bad a light as 
possible, estimated the number of victims 
sacrificed at almost 500 during his stay.
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1
prisoners of war*
The upkeep of the great ever-increasing apparatus 
of state, and the royal elan, made for a very consid­
erable economic drain on the resources of the country* 
The vast majority of Dahoman producers cultivated the 
land. Their1 s was a subsistence economy: only if
agriculture failed, as it did in 1849, did they starve* 
The ruling classes were economically parasitic: part
of their upkeep came from the payment of taxes on 
agricultural produce, part from the payment of tribute* 
Most of the funds which supported them came, however, 
from trade and taxes on trade* Borne of this income 
came from internal trade and from Dahoman trade with
1 The paragraphs on the customs are based on 
the following books, Duncan, Forbes, Burton, 
Skertchly, Be Herisse'and Herskovits and on 
the reports listed below*
Commodore 'Wilmot1s* Report (pub* by Burton)*
0*0*147/3*4, Tickel to Glover, Badagry 22*8*6?: 
0*0*147/14, Glover to Blackall, Lagos 4*2*68: 
J*Bayol, M*M*0* Dahomey III**, Rapport 
Journalier de Mission a Abomey, Porto Novo 5*1*90* 
M.Coquery-Vidrovitch, 'La Fete des Cautumes au 
Dahomey1, Annals, July, 1964, this article gives 
a useful survey of the Dahoman customs*
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neighbouring states* It is practically impossible 
to determine how great this was: contemporary writings
indicate that revenue from this source was not in­
significant:
'On arriving at the square about two-o-elock 
in the afternoon of today, I was surprised 
to see a considerable increase in the number 
of Muslim spectators to the Custom* I was 
afterwards told that a large party of Haussa, 
and other northern people, had arrived on a 
visit to the Kingdom to dispose of their 
wares, and also to buy slaves* From 
repeated inquiries I ascertained that these 
traders succeeded in buying ninety-four of 
the Hago captives from the King, the price 
he received being on the average about sixty 
dollars (&2) per man*1 ^
Most of the revenue for the upkeep of the Court 
and its personnel came, however, directly or indirectly 
from the profits of trade with the Europeans• In the 
first half of Gezo's reign, Be Souza, controlling the 
greater part of Dahomey's trade. \ath Europe, made 
generous grants to the royal treasury* Gezo, as a
1 J*A*Skertchly, op*cit*» p.346*
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result, was able to obtain arms, bribe and buy the 
Great Chiefs, and pursue an ostentatious policy of 
extravagant public consumption* He was in fact, 
for almost two decades, well able to provide for the 
upkeep of the ruling class*
In the 1840s, after the onset of De Souza's 
financial embarrassments, it was the difficulty of 
maintaining this lavish expenditure that convinced 
Gezo his country needed a new staple trade, while he 
himself needed a new ally# He did manage to provide 
the new export trade, but he could not find the new 
ally* It was not the economic crisis of the early 1840s, 
nor indeed the famine of 1849, but the political search 
for a new ally in the 1850s that destroyed Gezo* The 
political climate at the beginning of Gelele's reign 
severely hampered the growth of the new palm oil trade: 
nevertheless, it survived and for the remainder of the 
century provided adequately, if not lavishly, for the 
upkeep of the Court and the ruling class* It was, 
therefore, only between the 381-Os and 1850s that the Fon 
economy was under any real strain during the nineteenth
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century. Even during these decades political upheavals 
were only partly caused by economic troubles.
The instability of the Bon state was due to 
political rather than, to economic weakness: it was due
to the political strength of a constantly feuding ruling 
class* Gezo and Kondo were intent upon building a 
monarchy strong enough to control this class* Building 
on the foundations laid by eighteenth c entury monarchs, 
these two leaders expanded the centralised system of 
Government. It was remarkable in its time, and place, 
even if not so complete as present-day Fon traditions 
indicate. Alongside their system there continued in 
existence, however, a form of non-centralised government, 
with powerful Chiefs in control of the levers of power. 
During the course of the e entury these Chiefs were able 
to penetrate into the apparatus of state-government and 
thus render it useless as a form of monarehial control.
Sometimes, as in the great days of Gezo, it seemed 
that a strong central government might finally be 
established: at other times, as in the first two decades
of Gelele's reign, Fon politics were simply the politics 
of anarchy: sometimes, as when Kondo was Crown Prince
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the two elements in Fon political society struggled 
openly for supremacy* The strife, however, was always 
there* It was this continual struggle for power which 
explains the proliferation in the Fon system of govern­
ment of the various checks on. bureaucratic power* It 
also explains the spirit of treachery and suspicion 
which pervaded Fon political life. The underlying 
conflict goes a good deal of. the way towards explaining 
the periodic outbreaks of hysterical and murderous 
violence indulged in by the ruling class. It also 
gives a background to the almost incredible horror of 
the continuous mass slaughter which characterised Fon 
religious life *
THE CONQUEST
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EPILOGUE 
IHE COBQUESff 1892-94
Colonel Dodds arrived at Cotonou on the 20th May- 
1892# His instructions were to take measures to guarantee 
Prench possessionson the Slave Coast against Dahoman 
attack, to study the situation there and to put the 
Government in a position to take a decision on future 
policy. Besides this, he was to occupy Why&ah and 
inflict upon the Bon a defeat severe enough to ensure
1
that they would be willing to treat seriously with Prance.
The Colonel advised that a severe blow could best 
be effected by an attack on Abomey; he recommended that 
such an attack should be made by way of the River Ouem£. 
The government accepted Dodd*s proposals and agreed to 
despatch to the Slave Coast the troops he considered
1 R.Cornevin, Histoire du Dahomey, pp.339-357# 
*Les Divers Episodes De la Lutte Contre le 
Royaume d* Abomey (1887-1894)1 in Revue Pran- 
cais dfHistorie D*Outre-Mer, vol.47* I960 
pp.161-212. Cornevin gives a very useful 
accurate account of the conquest* Ikere are, 
of course, a great number of contemporary 
histories of the conquest, see Bibliography. 
Hone really adds anything to the ifficial 
accounts on which the above has been based.
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1
necessary for such a campaign.
Ihe Pon were aware of Prench movements and of
course prepared to resist. Ihey amassed an army which must
2
have consisted of between 12,000 and 15,000 men. She 
Prench began their not unexpected attack by a sea bombard­
ment of various Bahoman coastal towns. A section of the 
newly formed Expeditionary Boree then advanced along 
Lake Nokue and forced the Pon army watching Porto Novo 
to withdraw. After having cleared the Porto Novo area 
the Prench began the first stage of their campaign against 
Abomey by moving up the River Qmemd as far as Gbede. On 
the 4th October they began their overland attack and ad­
vanced via Paguessa, Samio, Koto, Kotokpa, Ouaka and Dio-
3
koue to Cana, which they entered on the 6th November.
1 M.M.C-. Dahomey Y^ Dodd's Report on Campaign
of 1892-3, Chapter I.
2 M.M.G. Dahomey Ygfl Dodd's Report on Campaign
of 1892-3, Chapter L. O.W.Newbury, op.cit..
p.123* Newbury considers the numbers of Pon 
troops involved to have been between 8,000 and 
10,000.
3 M.M..C. Dahomey YV Dodd's Report on Campaign
of 1892-3, Chapter YI. A.Le Herisse, p.346. 
Dodd's report and Le.Herisse's account can be 
taken as the official account of the war from 
both sides.
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The Ion fought the Prench all along the line.
At every spot which could he defended they put up a
furious resistance. Nevertheless, the Dahomans found
it impossible to prevent the inexorable advance. A
Prench bayonet charge always scattered even their
finest troops.
During the advance on Gana the Prench lost
1
only 11 officers and 70 men. Disease carried off
more of these than did Dahoman fire power. Pon resis-
2
tanee, although heroic, was hardly very effectives 
The Prench were, because of the Pon habit of always 
removing their dead from the field of battle, never 
able to ascertain exactly how many Dahomans they had 
killed. It is fairly certain, however, that the Amazon, 
corps and the Royal army were practically wiped out;
1 M.M.C. Dahomey IFg Dodds1 Report on 
Campaign of 1892-7, Conclusion*
2 M.M.G. Dahomey V* Dodds1 Report on 
Campaign of 1892-;?, Chapter Vis 
R.Cornevin, op.oit*, p.343* On the 
6th October the Prench captured and 
shot three Germans and a Belgian who 
had been with the Pon army. Presumably 
they had been instructing the Dahomans 
in the use of their newly-purchased 
weapons •
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losses amongst the Princes of the Blood were also said
to have "been exceptionally heavy. Although no accurate
figure can he given, Pon losses must have amounted
1
to between 3,000 and 5,000 dead*
With the Prench army before Cana, Behanzin offered 
2
to make peace. However, owing to the Prench over­
estimation of Dahoman resources, the Pon proved quite
; . 3 '-"
unable to meet the invaders exhorbitant demands. The
Expeditionary Porce then resumed its march on Abomey and
entered the partly destroyed capital on the 17th November
The invaders now considered that their main task
was over* They now hoped that the non-Dahomah peoples,
1 liunglas, E»D*No .XXI* p*82.
2 M*M*C • Dahomey Vga Dodds* Report on the 
Campaing of 1892-93, Chapter VI* He had
already done so at Koto, but had been
unable to accept the Prench demand that 
the Pon abandon their defensive positions*
3 M*M*0* Dahomey VV Dodds * Report on the
Campaign of 1892293, Chapter VI* M.M*C* 
Dahomey I8, Dodds1 to Marine, Porto Novo
23*11*1893♦
4 M*M*0* Dahomey Vga Dodds* Report on the
Campaign of 1892-93, Chapter VI* M*M*C*
Dahomey Dodds to Marine, Porto Novo
23.11•1893*
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or the Fon themselves, would rise against the defeated
Behanzin, kill him and perhaps put in his place someone
1
with whom the French might deal more easily* When
this did not happen, and when the Fon did not submit ,
2
the Frencjh issued a proclamation deposing Behanzin*
Illness amongst the troops, and difficulties in 
communications in the dry season, made the French work 
to end operations as quickly as possible. Dodds, now 
promoted to General, left Abomey for Porto Novo on the 
30th of November. The Abomey expeditionary force was 
dissolved on the 1st of December* Only four posts
3
manned by French troops were left north of the Lama*
1 M.M.C* Dahomey Lambinet to Marine,
Whydah 30(?).5*1S§3*
2 M#A*B* Afrique 12 Proclamation by
Dodds, Porto Hovo 3*12*1892*
3 M*M*C. Dahomey V,- Dodds* Report on
Campaign of 1892-3• Chapter VI*
M.M*C. Dahomey V-,n Dodds* Report on 
Campaign of 1893-4v Introduction*
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Having largely withdrawn from the; Abomey plateau;.the 
Prench proceeded to occupy the lands of the old kingdoms
of Whydah and Allada. They encountered no opposition in
, . 1 ‘ . - . 
these territories*
In the north, Behanzin. and his followers had with­
drawn to Atcheribe where the King began to re-organise 
hia shattered forces. She population of the area in 
which Behanzin established himself was completely loyal, 
The King was, moreover, able to draw food supplies from 
the fertile province of Agony. Behanzin evidently ex­
pected the Prench to behave as the goruba invaders had 
previously done; to maintain some sort of remote control 
in return for the payment of tribute. The withdrawal 
of the greater part of the Prench force South of the Lama 
must have strengthened this belief.
The Pon army gradually reassembled and Behanzin, 
by March 1893, was able to count on the support of 2,000 
armed men. A start was even, made on the recruitment of
1 M.A.E*. Afrique 127, Dodds to Marine,
16.12.1892. Tel.
M.M.G. Dahomey V/- Dodds1 Report on 
Campaign of 1892-7,, Chapter VII.
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young girls to take the place of the fallen Amazons.
Royal control was gradually reasserted over all the
1
Abomey plateau outside the Prench posts. Armed bands
of up to 20 Pon warriors regularly patrolled the area*
The Prench posts Horth of the Lama even began to fear
for their communications with the Goast.
While rebuilding their position at home, the Pon
tried to obtain external assistance. They attempted
to win German support, and, on the adyice of a contact
in Lagos, named Jackson, they even sent an embassy to
Paris to appeal for the personal intervention of the Prench
President. These Pon attempts to win European sympathy
2
of course gained them nothing.
1 M.A.E. Afrique 127 Dodds to Marine, 
Porto Wovo 11*12.1892:
M.M.G. Dahomey Dodds* Report on
Campaign 1893-4, Gnapter I:
M.M.G. Dahomey 1 ^  Dodds to Marine, 
Whydah 20.4.1893:
M.M.G. Dahomey Vo*. Lambinet to Marine, 
Whydah 25.6.1893?
M.M.G. Bahomey Vga Eumas to Marine, 
Whydah 8.7.1893.
2 M.M.G. Dahomey V^Qa Dodds' Report on 
Campaign of 1893-4, Chapter I:
A.Le Herisse, op»cit., p.348:
B.Denglas, B.D.X2CT p;77-8 
R.Gornevin, op.clt., p.349*
While looking to Europe the Dahomans also, during 
April 1895» conducted a series of abortive peace negoti­
ations with the Europeans stationed on the coast, The 
Eon were willing to cede the area south of the iama, to 
accept a French protectorate, and to hand over all their
arms and ammunition* They would not, however; accept
' " ■ ■ ■ ; ■' 1 . v- .■ - ' ;v ;'
that Behanzin be deposed*
The continuing existence of the Dahoman state and
the refusal of the Eon to accept French terms, convinced
the Brench on-the-spot that another major expedition
would have to be undertaken against Dahomey* The
metropolitan government agreed^and General Dodds, who
had left the Slave Goast on 23rd April, returned on the
3 :
30th August, with instructions to pacify the country*
1 M*M*Q • Dahomey Tga Lambinet to Marine, 
Report on Negotiations with Behanzin, 
March to May 1893:
M.M*0 * Dahomey V10 a Dodds1 Re port on . 
Campaign of 1893-4> Chapter I*
2 M,M*.C* Dahomey V« • Lambinet to Marine, 
Report on Negotiations with Behanzin, 
March to May, 1893*
3 M.M*G* Dahomey Dodds1 Report on 
Campaign of 1893-4, Chapter I*
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In the face of a renewed invasion the Fon saw 
that resistance was impossible}and again attempted to 
make peace* On the 3rd November, Fon messengers arrived 
in the French camp offering to hand over all their remain­
ing arms and ammunition, provided that their King!s title 
was respected. Dodds took no notice of the Fon terms and 
told messengers, that if the Princes, and Chiefs wished 
to surrender they would have to give themselves up. Many 
of the important chiefs now began to submit to the French. 
By the 20th December the French held the majority of the 
Dahoman leaders captive and had effectively occupied the 
Abomey plateau. Behanzin was reduced to the position of 
a fugitive, fleeing from village to village with an escort
of only four or five men.
With the most important Dahomans now in their charge , 
the French began to take soundings as to where to find a 
new monarch. It soon became apparent that the old anta­
gonisms in the royal house had by no means died away. The 
French found a number of former friends of G-elele who were
1 M.M.G.* Dahomey ^ * ‘D~---
1
Campaign of 1393-47 Chapters V & VI. 
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hostile to Behanzin* Indeed, many of the royal clan, 
seeing, presumably, a chance of saving their positions,* 
began, to e cho the French contention, that Behanzin alone 
had been responsible for the war with the French* On 
the advice of those members of the royal family willing 
to co-operate with the French, Dodds chose.Prince 
Goutchili, a brother of Behanzin and a former Gaou, as 
the next King of Dahomey* Shis Prince, was then desig­
nated King by the unanimous choice of the Princes and
1 '
Oaboceers assembled by the French*
According to an account given later by one of the 
Fon Princes, the Fon aristocracy were told that Behanzin 
supported this move. Only later did they discover that
Goutchili was involved in an underhand manoeuvre to gain
• ■ 2  ; ;  : 7  ;■ ... v  ' r  - . .. \
the throne * Since Dodds1 principal adviser tras Behanzin *
former rival, (Dopa, it is hardly surprising that something
of a plot against Behanzin had occurred« When Dodds
1 M.M.G. Dahomey YLrt Dodds* Be port on 
Gampai&x of 1893^?^ Ghapter Vx.
2 A.De Berisse, op.cit♦, pp*351-2
B.Dunglas, B.D.XXl, p.* 104* 
P.Hazaume, op.cit♦, pp.36-8*
Kazaume considers that Goutcheli 
was in fact chosen by Behanzin. and 
made a blood pact with the former 
King. This does not seem to accord 
with the evidence.
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chose him as King, OoutGheli had not actually made 
his peace with France* Topa and a daughter of Gelele, 
named Yaya, soon, however, brought him to Dodds* He 
was, then, on the 15th of January, presented to the 
people under the title of Agoli-Agbo, the new King of 
Dahomey*
On the 25th of January the new King informed Dodds
that he knew where Behanzin was hiding. A detachment
of French troops was sent to the ex-King* s place of
concealment, and Behanzin was persuaded to give himself 
2
up* On the 29th of January the puppet King, Agoli-Agbo,
3
signed a treaty of protection with France. Ihe Kingdom 
of Dahomey was shorn of the coastal regions and Allada* 
In the future the King was to reign only under the guid­
ance of the French Resident. In 1900 even the fiction
4
of the continuing Fon monarchy was abandoned*
1 M.M.G. Dahomey V1n Dodds1 Report on 
Campaign of 1893™$?' Chapter VI*
2 M.M.G. Dahomey V1Aa Dodds* Report on 
Campaign of 1893-$? Chapter VI.
3 R.Cornevin, op.clt., pp*355-7 
Gornevin reproduces the treaty.
B.Dunglas, B.D.XXI, pp.110-113*
4 O.W.Hewbury, *A Rote on the Abomey 
Protectorate*, Africa. Vol.XXIV,
R0.2* April 1959*
The memory of Behanzin* s kingdom was, 'however,
. , - - 1 ' ■' , • 
kept alive in that in June 1894? its name was bestowed
on the new French colony. Since then Dahomey has been
the name of a state far greater than the nineteenth
century Fon kingdom.
1 M.jyLCU Dahomey 'V‘H 1 Presidential 
Decree of 22nd June? 1894#
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P.O.84 Slave Trade General Correspondence 1816-92.
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was usually found to concern Dahomey much more 
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Colonial Office Records
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0.0*96 Gold Coast Original Correspondence 1843-49;
1883-85* This seriea was found particularly 
useful in the eighteen forties before consuls 
were placed in the Bight of Benin# It also 
contains Lagos correspondence 1883-5*
0*0.147 Lagos Original Correspondence 1861-1894*
This series is, after the mid eighteen sixties, 
the most fertile source, in the English records 
of information on Dahomey.
C.0*267 Sierre Leone Original Correspondence
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ally in dealing with the affairs of the Popos, 
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C.0.806 and C.0.87^j? Africa, s Confidential Prints.
It was sometimes more convenient, and some­
times, because the originals had been destroyed 
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Admiralty!♦ In letter 1816-40, from officers of the West 
Africa Squadron* In the second and third 
decade of the nineteenth century this series 
supplements the slave trade file. After the 
mid eighteen thirties all the relevant infor­
mation was found in the Foreign Office records*
French Archives : Colonial Archives (in custody of the 
Minist$re de la France d!Outre-Mer).
The documents in these archives are classified according 
to territory and subject. Material on Dahomey is therefore 
found under a series of headings. The system leads to 
frequent duplication and to the occasional appearance of 
documents in somewhat unlikely folders. Only those folders 
which have been found to contain relevant material are 
listed below. After 1878 these archives were by far the 
most fertile source of material on Dahoman history.
AFRIQTJB I 4 - 10. Letters to and from the Officer command­
ing the Hiaval Division (1842-54)#
IV 9 - 11. The Independent Kingdom of Dahomey 
(1845-88).
VI 36, 43, 53, 67, 68, 82, 83, 92, 100, 107, 109,
116. Diplomatics Affairs (Germany and Portugal) 
1883 - 94.
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SENEGAL I; 87 - General Correspondence Sept. 1886 - August 
1889. ‘ : ‘ '
X 89 - General Correspondence 1886-89• (In fact thie 
folder contains Lt. Roget1s despatches; from 
August to December 1886.)
Ill 5b - Voyage of the Malouine 1837-40.
III 20 - Diplomatic Affairs; Portugal.
IV I9d - Diplomatic Affairs; England, Porto Novo 
: 1886-90.
IV 42 - Correspondence concerning Whydah 1818-50.
IV 120-125 - Expansion territoriale et politique 
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GABON I 25 - 28 - General Correspondence, Benin June
1884- September 1886.
IV 3 - Expansion territoriale et politique indigene -
a, The Popos 1881-5,
b, c, d, Porto Novo and Cotonou 1865-88. .?
VI lb - Diplomatic Affairs; England; Porto Novo
1863-5. / '1 . ; ' :?v;
VI 4 - 5 - Diplomatic Affairs. Portugal, 1864-1902*
VII lc - Administrative Organisation; Porto Novo 1863.,
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XIII2 - Commerce; Porto Novo 1859-66#
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April 1893*
III-^_2 ~ Explorations, Missions 1889^-93. Angot; 
Bayol; Ballot; Auideoud*
^1-5 ” Expansion territoriale et politique indigene 
1889-95* Relations with chiefs*
^1-11 ~ Military expeditions; relations with 
Dahomey 1889-94 *
VIg - Diplomatic Affairs 1889-95* Native recruit­
ment*
71^ - Diplomatic Affairs; relations with Germany*
YII^ - General Administration; Administrative 
Organisation 1889-95*
Minist&re des Affaires &trang§res» Paris.
The material concerning Dahomey has been found in 
the bound volumes of Memoires et Documents. These contain 
correspondence with the Marine, with merchants and with
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deputies etc* These documents often supplement the more 
extensive M.M.O. collection*
Memoires et Documents. Afrique. 51-54, 76-83, 125-127.
Btablissements franeais du Golfe de Guinee 
(1838-94).
Archives in West Africa
French West African Archives contain a great deal 
of material relating to Dahoman history. Since, however, 
it was much more convenient to use the Paris archives 
reference has only been made to those files containing 
documents not available in Paris.
Government - General Archives - Dakar.
Series 8.G. - contains correspondence on Dahoman political, 
administrative and muslim affairs 1886-1920. 
8.G. 1-3 - Political situation and administrative
organisation 1886-98*
Dahoman National Archives - Porto Novo
This collection is uncatalogued. Titles refer to 
folders and bound volumes of manuscripts.
General Correspondence 1887-88, 1888-89*
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Missionary Archives
The correspondence contained in both relevant 
archival collections (those of the Methodist Missionary 
and the Society of African Missions) is uneven both in 
bulk and in value* Missionary correspondence nevertheless 
produced a seri.es of insights into Bahoman affairs* The 
archives of the S.M.A* are moreover exceptionally useful 
during the 1880s in that they produce a coherent non- 
official view of the activities of French administrators. 
Methodist Missionary Archives 
Belevant material is classified under:
Correspondence: West Africa: Gold Ooast.
Biographical: West Africa: Box 2, Box 3 and Box 4*
Society of African Mission Archives - Rome
The correspondence from the missionaries on the 
Bight of Benin (Bahomey, Old Vicariate 1861-71* Bahomey, 
Vicariate du Benin 1871-82, Bahoman Prefeecture 1883-91) 
is classified by year under the general reference 12/80200*
Unpublished Theses
A.A.B* Aderbigbe: Expansion of the Lagos Protectorate
1863-1900, Ph.*B*, London, 1959*
I*A* Akinjobin: Bahomey and its neighbours 1708-1818.
Ph*B. London 1963*
R#J* Gavin: Palmerston’s policy towards East and West
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Africa 1830-1865. Ph.D. Cambridge, 1959.
¥.H. Scotter: International Rivalry in the Bights of
Benin, and Biafra, Ph.D. London, 1933.
R.H. Stillard: The Rise and Development of Legitimate
Trade in Palm Oil with West Africa. Birmingham, 
M.A. 1938.
Published Sources
a) British-
Parliamentary Papers:
, t ' •
1842 XX, XII (55^) Report of Select Committee on British 
Possessions on the west Coast of Africa.
1847-48. XXII (272, 366, 536, 623) Pour Reports from Select 
Committee on the Slave Trade*
1849 XIX (309, 410) Two Reports following session.
1850 IX (53,590) Report of Select Committee of House of Lords 
1852 LIV (221) Papers relating to the reduction of Lagos
by H.M. *s forces.
1861 LXITT (1) Slave Trade Correspondence, Africa (Consular).
1861 LXY (2904) Despatches relating to the taking of Porto
Hovo.
1862 LXI (1) Slave Trade Correspondence, Africa (Consular).
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1862 IXI (3599 365) Papers relating to the occupation of 
Lagos.
1865 XXXVTX (533) Papers on War between Mative (Uribes in 
the neighbourhood of Lagos.
1887 IX (1,167) Correspondence between Native (Uribes in 
the interior and negotiations for peace con­
ducted by Government of Lagos.
G#W. Mewbury: British Policy towards West Africa. Select
Documents (1786-1874)> Oxford 1965*
R. Mertsleti (The Map of Africa by (Treaty, (London 2nd 
edition 1896)♦
b) French
Annales Maritimes et Colonlales 1816-47 (after 1843 
one volume called Revue Ooloniale) 
continued as Revue coloniale 1848-58
11 11 iferae algerienne et coloniale 1858-61
H 11 Revue Maritime et Coloniale 1861-96 
Extracts from the reports of administrators and explorers 
were published in this official journal.
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Etudes Bahomeennes, Eg* IX Porto E o v o  1953. A selection 
of documents from the local archives, by 
J ♦ Lombard.
A. de launay Pawlowskl: Bibliography raisonn<5e des
, ouvrages concernont le Bahomey, Paris 1895.
c) Works containing primary material
Books and articles containing oral traditions have 
been listed under this heading. Very often, however, 
such works also contain the collector's comments and 
interpretations. The classification of such compilations 
cannot therefore be exact.
A.I. B’Albeca: Le Bahomey en 1894* Paris 1895*
... la Prince au bahomey. Paris 1895*
... les Stablissments francais du Gtolfe de Benin.
Paris 1889*
... Au Bahomey Hier et Aujourd* Hui in llRevue de
Famillett Paris May 1892..
... Au Bahomey in "Tour du Monde", Paris 1895*
... Au Pays des Eoues, in'Tour de Monde*1, Paris 1895
A. Akind61e et 0* Aguessy: le Bahomey. Paris 1955*
Contribution a 1*etude d’histoire de l'ancien 
royaume de PorioEovo. Memoires G^dtilfan. Io. 25 
Bakar. 1953*
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Casmir Agbo: L^histoire de Whydah. Avignon 1959.
Mission Dahomey et Golfe du Benin. Revue 
Francais, Paris January 1891.
Da Guerre Civile ^ Porto Eovo in ^Missions 
Catholiques11 Lyons February 1875*
Les Forces Militaires du Dahomey in ltRevue 
Seientifique, vol.49, Paris 1891*
LJAttaque de Cotonou in * Revue Bleu1, Paris 
1892 *
Kote sure le Dahomey in 11 Bulletin de la Societe
Geographies, vol. 12, Paris 1866*
Capttaine Bertin: Reseignments sur le royaume de Porto
Hovo et Le Dahomey# Revue Maritime et Coloniale
1890.
A. Borghero: La Guinee et Le Dahomey in Annals of the
Propagation of the Faith 1862, 63, 64, 67*
Gapt. Blanchelys Voyages a Abomey. Missions Catholiques, 
t 23, 1891*
J#B* Bouehe: Rote sur les Republics Minas de la C8te des
Rsclaves in Bulletin de la Societe Geographic, 
Paris 1875.
P. Bouches Sept Ans en Afrique Occidentale. La C&te 
des Bsclaves et le Dahomey. Paris 1885.
A. Bouet: Le Royaume cLe Dahomey in Illustration July
1852*
V. Ballott 
E. Baudin; 
J. Bayol:
*
M# Beraud:
I.*J# Bowden: Adventures and Missionary Labours in
several countries in the interior of Africa 
from 1849 to 1856, Charleston 1857*
A. de Brue: Voyage fait en 1843 dans le Royaume de Bahomey,
in Revue Coloniale 1845*
R.Burton: A Mission to Gelele King of Bahomey, 1st
edition London 1864*
2nd edition 1966 (edit# G.W* Hewbury).
All references in the text are, unless otherwise 
stated, to this edition#
I# Canot: Memoirs of a Slave trader (set down by Brants
Mayer) London. 1935» edited by A* W# Lawrence*
B,* Ghaudoim frois mois du| captivity au Bahomey, Paris
1891.
•v* fro is mois du eaptivite au Bahomey in
“Illustration1* Paris 1890*
Le P* Chautard: Le Bahomey, Lyons 1890*
Hi* Clappertons Journal of a Second Bxpedition into the 
Interior of Africa* London 1829*
R. Corneyin: Histoire du Bahomey* Paris 1962*
Histoire du logo* Paris 1959*
J* Duncan* fravels in West Africa in 1845-46. London 
1847.
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B.. Dunglas: La Premise attqque des Dahomiens contre Abeo- 
kouta lax Etudes Dahomeenes vol.2, 1948.
• La deuxiime attaque. des Dahomeens contre
Abeokouta in Etudes Dahomeens vol.2, 1949.
... Contribution a 1* histoire du Moyen-Dahomey
(Royaum.es d* Abomey de Ketou et de Ouidah.) in 
Etudes Dahom&ens vols. 19 and 20 1957 and 
vol. 21 1958.
J. Dupuis: Journal of a residence in Ashantee, London
1824 *
E. Etienne: Engine Etienne, DSputfi dfOran. Son oeuvre
coloniale, algirienne et politique (1881-1906) 
M  Discours et ecrits divers r&uvis et edites
par la !,D£peohe Coloniale" Paris 1907*
A. B. Ellis: The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast 
of West Africa. London 1890.
E. Poa: Le Dahomey. Paris 1895*
P. E* Porbes: Dahomey and the Dahomans. London 1851.
T. B. Preeman: Journal of various visits to the Kingdoms 
of Ashanti, Aku and Dahomi. London 1844*
Lt* Chillevin: Voyage au Dahomey. Eouvelles Annales des
Yoyages 1862♦
Lt. Gelle: Kotice sur Porto Eovo in "Revue Maritime et
Coloniale 1864* t.lOi
^artly reproduced in -^tudes -^ahom^ens vol.^
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P* Haaouma: Le Pacte de Sang au Pahomey* Travaux et
Pon life in the time of Grezo*)
M* J* Herskovita: Pahomey. An Ancient West African
Kingdom, New York 1938*
H* J* and P* S* Herskovitas Bahoman Narrative, Evanston,
Hi Huntley: Seven Years Service on the Slave Coast of West 
Africa, London 1836*
S * Johnson: The History of the Yorubas, 6th edition London 
19)66*
Prince de Joinvilles Yieux: Souvenirs (1818-48) Paris 1894 
J* Laf.fi.tte-: Le Bahome, souvenirs de voyage et de mission
Tours 1873* '
A. Le Herisse: L^Ancien Royaume du Pahomey* Paris 1911*
H* Adolphe Lara (ed): Lettre It la Ligue des Brdits de 
lf Homme* Lyons 1905 ♦
Ji Leod: A Yoyage to Africa, with some account of the
Memoires de I’lnstltut dfEthnologie no* 25* 
Paris 1937#
is a novelPoguicimi* Paris 1938. (This  
in which the author attempts a recreation of
1958
Manners , and Customs of the' Bahoman People, 
London 1820i~
'I
\ 1
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J* Lombards Cotonou. Yille Afrieaine, in etudes 
Bahomeennes1 Ho* X 1955#
Km Palau Martis Le Roi-dieu au B&nin, Sud-Togo, Bahomey, 
Rigeria occidentale. Paris 1964*
Abb! Menager: La Guinea, Bulletin de la Societe de
Geographic de Paris, I*XVT 1878#
P* Mercier: flhe Pon of Bahomey* in African Worlds ed* 
Baryll Porde* London 1954*
♦ ♦* Civilisations du Benin (Connaissanee de
l,Afriq.ue) Paris 1962*
Abbe Ih* Moularo: Histoire et l^gende de Chabe (Save)* 
Gonquete de Ketou par Grille et Gonquete 
dfAbomey par la Prance*
• •• Gtaiezo ou Gu£dizo Massigbe •
*** Histoire des W^menous ou B^kanminous
Etudes Bahomeennes. Hew Series, Ho* 2 June
1964* No*5* Bee* 1964, No*4* May 1965*
M* Be Monleon; Le Bahomey en 1844 ? in Revue Coloniale, 
vol* 6, 1845*
Gr* Parrinder: She Story of Ketu. An Ancient Yoruba King­
dom* Ibadan 1956*
R*P*Pied: !lBe Porto Hovo ^ 0yo,f in Les Missions Catholique
t.24, 1892*
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J. Porier: Extract of. a letter to Father Planque, Porto
Novo 19th Dec* 1874 including extract from a 
letter from Father Baudin to same, Porto Novo 
16th. April 1875, in Armais of the Propagation 
of the Faith, vol. 37f 1876*
ML* Quenum: Au Pays des Fons, Paris 1938* Also in Bulletin
du Oomite dfEtudes Histo-riqu.es et Sclent if iques 
de I'Afrique Oceidentale Francaise, vol* 18, 
1955.
Dr# A* Repins "Voyage au Bahomey” in Le Tour du Monde 1863 
Reproduced in Etudes Bahomeennes, vol* III 1950 
Osgb. Servals 1 Rapport; sur une Mission au Bahomey* in Revue 
Maritime et Coloniale 1878, vol* 59*
J* A# Skertchly: Bahomey as it is. London 1874*
ML* F* ^ossouhonto; *Les anciens rois de la dynastie
d^Abomey* in Etude©/Bahomeennes, vol* 13 1955* 
N* F. de Souzas "Contribution h lf histoire de la famille 
de Souza1* in Etudes Bahomeennes, vol* 13 1955* 
A* Vallons Le Royaume de Bahomey in Revue Maritime et 
Ooioniale, Paris 1861, t.IX and III*
P. Vergers Les Afro-Americaines. M^moire de I’institut 
Francais d*Afrique Noire, No*27, Bakar 1953*
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Francisco de Valdez: Six Years of a travellers life in
West Africa, London. 1861*
(sometimes written Francisco de Travassos Valdez)
d) Works on the French Conquest of Bahomey
The conquest was the subject of a great number of 
books published during the last decade of the nineteenth ’ 
century* The following are a selection of the more useful.
B.E* Aubiet: La Guerre au Bahomey 1888-1893, Paris 1894.
i*v ; t , La Conquiete du Bahomey 1893-94, Paris 1895*
A* Barbou: Histbire de la guerre au Bahomey, Paris 1893*
J* 1* Brunet et 1. Siethlen: Bahomey et d6pendances,
Paris, 1900*
L. Grandin: A l*aasaut du pays des r.ois# Le Bahomey.
Paris, 1895*
V. Nicolas: LfExpedition du Bahomey en 1890• Paris,
Limoges, 2nd edition 1893* 
j* Poirier: Gompagne du Bahomey 1892-4. Paris, Limoges, 
1895* , ••
J. Be Riois: La Guerre* de Bahomey 1889-92* Paris 1893•
A. Be Salinis: La Marine au Bahomey. Gampagne de la 
Naide 1890-92. Paris 1901*
La Protectorat francais sur La Cote des Esclaves 
La campagne du Sane (1889-90) d ’aprfcs des
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.♦* documents inedits* Paris 1908.
P. Schelamear: Souvenirs de la campagne du Dahomey.
Paris 1896*
0* H* Poutee: Du Dahome au Sahara. La nature et l*homme«
Paris 1899*
e
e) A selection of eighteenth and nineteenth oentury works
providing background information on nineteenth century
Dahomey •
<J* Adams: Sketches taken during ten voyages to Africa
between 1786 and 1800. London 1822.
«• * Remarks on the country extending from Cape
Palmas to the River Congo. London 1823.
J. Aitkins: A voyage to Guinea, Brazil and the West Indies
in the Swallow and Wymouth, 2nd edition, London, 
1737*
J * Barbot: A description of the coasts of North and South
Guinea; and of Ethiopia Inferior, vulgarly 
Angola.In Churchill*s Voyages, vol*5* London, 
1732 *
A. Benezet: Some historical account of Guinea. London,
1788*
R.: Burton: Abeokuta and the Cameroon Mountains • :.An •:
exploration. .London, 1863. ; ;
• .* . , Wanderings in. West Africa, from Liverpool to ; .
Pernando Po. London., 1863*
¥• Bosman: A New and Accurate Description of the Coast; :■ 
of Guinea, divided into the Gold, the Slave 
and the Ivory Coasts. 2nd edition, London, 
1721.
B. Cruikshaiik: Eighteen Te^rs on the Gold Coast of Africa
London, 1853* / ; ;
Vice Admiral Cuvervilie: Le R.P. Do.rgere au Dahomey.
;: ; "Auxere. (suppl.Ma I'ami du Drapeau), September 
1900. '
A. Dalzel: The History of Dahomey; An Inland Kingdom of
Africa; compiled, from Authentic Memoirs. 
London 1793*
0. Dapper: Description de l^Afrique. Amsterdam 1680.
W. Hutton: A voyage to Africa* London, 1821.
P. Labar.the: Voyage a la cote de Guinea. Paris 1803*
R. Norris: Memoirs of the Reign of Bossa Ahadee, King of
Dahomey, An Inland Country of Guiney, London, 
1789*
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W* Smith: A new voyage to Guinea. London, 1744*
W. Snelgrave: A New Account of Some Ports of Guinee
and the Slave Trade. London, 1734.
E. Yiard: Au Bas-Niger. Paris, 3rd edition 1886.
E. Bouet-Willaumez: Gommerce et traite des noires aux
cotes occidentales dfAfrique. Paris, 1848.
f) Secondary Works
This thesis touches on a number of far-reaching 
historical problems - for example the development of 
French Imperialism and the decline of the Gyo Empire.
The following list is not, therefore, exhaustive and 
includes only those works most directly relevant to the 
history of nineteenth c entury Dahomey. 
a ; Adan.de: Les Recedes des rois du Dahomey. Institut
Francais d'Afrique Noire, Dakar, 1962.
J* P. A. Ajayi: The British Occupation of Lagos 1851-61
in Nigeria, No* 69* August 1961*
J* P. A. Ajayi and R. Smith: Yoruba Warfare in the 
Nineteenth Gentury. Cambridge 1964*
J* P. A* Ajayi: Christian Missions in Nigeria 1841-91*
London, 1965*
. -  5 2 4 ''-- ;i' ; ‘V/..
I* A. Akinjobinr The prelude to the Yoruba Civil Wars 
of the nineteenth century* Odu* -VoI*I,, 
no.2* 1965.
A chronology of Yoruba History*. Odu* Vol.II 
no. 2. January 1966.
Agaja and the conquest of the Coastal Aja 
States, 1724-30* In Journal of the Historical 
Society of Nigeria. Vol.II no.4 1963.
B. Awe: ; The Ajele System. A study of Ibadan Imperial­
ism in the 19th century. In The Journal of 
the Historical Society of Nigeria, Vol.Ill, 
no • 1., 19.64 ♦
jy A. Ballafd: The Porto Novo Incidents of 1923: . Politics
in the Colonial Era' in Odu. Vol. 2, no .1 
July 1965.
Also in Etudes Bahomeennes New Series. No.5 . 
October 1965* ■
W..R. Basebm:, The Sociological ..Role of the Yoruba Cult- 
: Group. In Memoirs of the American Anthropo­
logical Association, no* 63*
S. Berbain: Etudes sur la traitS desnoirs aif/Golfe de
Guin6e. Le comptoir francais de Juda (Ouidah) 
an XVIIIe siecle, Memoires deyifXnstitut 
Francais d1 Afrique Noire,, no .3 • Paris. :
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J* Berge: Etude sur le Pays Mahi, 1926-28# (Cercle de
Savalou Golonie du Bahomey) In Bulletin du 
Gomite dfEtudes Historiques et Scientifiques 
de ltAfrique Occidental© Prancaise, vol* 11 
no* 4*
P* Berge: Be Sous-Secretariat et Les Sous-Secretaires
d*etat au?: Colonies in Revue d*Histoire d* 
Outre-Mer, I960*
J# Bertho: Origins of the Yoruba in Bahomey - logo in
Africa XIX 1949 •
• Races et Lahgues du Bas Bahomey et Bas logo,
in Hotes; Afrieaines. Ho* 26, 1945*
S* 0* Blobaku: The Egba and their neighbours 1842-72.
Oxford, 1957#
fit. Blanchard: Administrateurs d*Afrique Noire# in Revue
dfHistoire des Colonies t.IX no. 40, 1953*
EE* Blet: Histoire de la colonisation francais© #
Grenoble and Paris 1946-50*
A* Boahen: As ante-Bahomey Contacts in the nineteenth
Century# In Ghana Hotes and Queries. Ho* 7. 
January 1965*
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Hv Brunschwig: Mythes et Realites de 1* Imperialism©
colonial francais 1871-1914* Paris I960, 
English edition* £ qn : t't 66 
... L 1 avenement de l*Afrique noire du XIX0
siecle a nos jours. Paris 1963#
E# M. Carroll:. French Public Opinion, and Foreign Affairs 
1871-1914* Hew York 1931*
J* Ghastenet Be Gostaing; Histoire de la Proisi&me 
Republique* Paris 1952#
R. J • R. Church: West Africa. London 1957*
R* Cornevin: Les Divers Episodes de La Lutte Contre 
Le Royaume B * Abomey (1887—1894) iu Revue 
Francais D*Histoire dfOutre-Mer, vol* 47,
. . . I960.' ■
C # Cdquery: Le Blocus. de Whydah, in Cahiers B 1 Etudes 
Afrieaines, 7, 1962#
G# Goquery-Yidrovitch: La fete des coutumes au Bahomey
in Annales - Economie, Societes, Civilisations 
vol. 19, no* 4• 1964*
■ S.# E* Grow©; The Berlin; West Africa Conference 1884-5 • 
London 1942.
K* 0# Bike: !,Beecrpft 183 5-49!t in Journal of the Higerian 
Historical Society, vol. I Beeember 1956#
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P# Bllingworth: Christianity and Politics in Pahomey 1843
67* Journal of African History, vol* 5, no*2* 
1964*
A* Etiennes Le R*P* Porgere* ancien missionaire au 
Pahomey* Toulon, 1909*
£• Pindlay and W* Holdsworth: History of the ¥esleyan
Missionary Society, London, 1921-24*
J* Flint: Sir George G-oldie and the Making of Rigeria.
London, I960*
M* Fortes and E* Pritchard: African Political Systems,
London, 1940*
0* H* Fyfe: A history of Sierrec Leone, London, 1962*
J. Qeays “Origine, Formation et Histoire du Royaume du^ 
Porto Hovo,? in Bulletin du Comite d ‘Etudes 
Historiques et Scientifiques de 1‘Afrique 
Oecidentale Prancaise, vol. J, no* 4* 1924*
J. P. Hargreaves: Prelude to the Partition of Yfest
Africa, London, 1963*
M* J* Herskovits: “The Best Priend in Pahomey'* in Regro
Anthology, ed* Haney Ounard, London, 1954*
M* J* and P* S* Herskovits: “An outline of Pahoman
Religious Belief1* in Memoirs of the American
Anthropological Association, no* 41* 1955*
J. Herskovits. Kopytoft: A Preface to Modern Nigeria
“The Sierras Leonecyas ±n Yoruba 1830-90“. 
Madison, Milwaukee and London 1965*
HI. Lefaivre: Dictateurs Noirs, les dernier rois due
Pahomey. Hevue df Histoire des Colonies, 1937* 
J. R • Knox: Catholic Pioneers in West Africa. Publin,
! ■ . 1956. 1
C. Lloyd: The Navy and the Slave Trade, London, 1949*
W* P. MacIntyre: Commander Clover and the Colony of Lagos
1861-73• Journal of African History, vol* IV, 
No* 1 1963* ' '
W* L* Mathieson: Creat Britain and the Slave Trade,
London, 1929*
P. Masson: Marseille et la colonisation francaise - Essai
d*Histoire coloniale, Marseille 1906*
*•• Une double enigme : Andre Brue. In Revue d!
Histoires des Colonies, t* XXV, 1932*
P* Marty: Etudes sur 1‘Islam au Pahomey, Paris 1926*
B* Maupoil: La Ceomancie k 1* ancienne Cote des Esc laves,
Travaux et M^moires de lfInstitut d‘Ethnologic 
no* 42, Paris 1943*
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P* Mereier: *Hotice sur le peuplement Yoruba du Pahomey - 
Togo*. Etudes Pahomeennes IV 1950#
G. E. Metcalfe: Maclean of the Gold Coast. The Life and
limes, of George Maclean 1801-1847* London, 
. 1962*
P. Morton-Williams: The Oyo Yoruba and the Atlantic
Trade 1670-1850* Journal of the Historical 
Society of Higeria, vol* III, Ho* 1, Peeember, 
1964*
A* Murphy: The Ideology of Prench Imperialism 1871-81,
Washington P.O. 1948.
0* W. Hewbury: *A note on. the Abomey Protectorate*,
in Africa, vol* 29, no*2, 1959*
* * • An Early Enquiry into Slavery and Captivity in
Pahomey. In 8aire, vol* 14, no* 1, I960*
•** The Western Slave Coast and It*s Eulers,
Oxford, 1961*
G. Parrinder: Yoruba-speaking peoples in Pahomey,in Africa,
vol* 17, no. 2, 1947*
«** West African Religion. ' Illustrated from the
beliefs and practices of Yoruba, Ewe, Akan and 
kindred peoples* London, 1949#
... Theistic beliefs of the Yoruba and Ewe. Peoples
of West Africa in African Ideas of God. ed*
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. E, W. Smith., London., 1951*
P. Pelissier: Les .pays du Bas-Oueme* Gahiers d?Outre-
Mer, vol* 15, no* 59, 1962*.
J* P* Almedia Prado: Les relations de Bahia (Bresil) avec
le Dahomey* In Revue d*histoire des Colonies, 
vol* XLI, 1954*
K* Polanyi: Sortings and "Ounce Trade1* in the West African 
Slave Trade* Journal of African History vol*.
V, no* 5, 1964*
J. Renaud: Le General Dodds* Les,Grands Soldats Golonr-
ioux. Paris 1951*
J*. P. Regis: . Les Regis au Dahomey,, un centenaire familial* 
..Marseille, 1941* ' - /■
B. Ross: The. .Career of Domingo Martinez in the Bight"
of Benin, in Journal of African’.History, Vol.
VI, Ho.. I, 1965. •
B. Schnappef: La politique et le commerce francaise dans
le Golfe de Guinee de 1858 & 1871, Paris 1961*
J* Suret Canale: . Afrique -Hoire,, Paris 1961*
P • A. Talbot: The Peoples of Southern Nigeria, London^
1926* ' . ; ■
C • Tardis: Porto Novo, les Nouvelies Generations Afrieaines 
entre leurs Traditions et LfOccident* Paris . . 
and, La Haye, 1958*
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A* Terrier et 0. Mourney: ^Expansion francaise et las>
Pormation Territoriale, Paris, 1910.
A# S. Tidjani: *Calendrier agraire et religieux au
Bas-Dahomey* in Premiere Conference Inter­
nationale des Africanistes de lf0uest* Comptes 
Rendus, vol. 2♦ Dakar *
L* K* Waldman: An unnoticed aspect of Archibald Dalzel's
The History of Dahomey, in Journal of African 
Hitory, vol* VI, no* 2* 1965*
P* D* Walker: I* B* Preeman; the son of an African,
London, 1929*
E* G* Waterlot: Les Bas-Reliefs des Batiments Royaux
d'Abomey (Dahomey) Travaux. et M&noires d e 
dfc ltlnstitut d*Ethnologie, Ho* I* Paris,
1926*
' . . . ABmBDA  ;
Pour, studies of some importance, have been.published 
since the virtual completion of this thesis* Two.are 
articles appearing in Cahiers: D ’Etudes Afrieaines, no* 25 
VoIU ¥11, 1967. . . ’
The first of these articles is fA ® . \v A
: ‘ . 811» *image dit Dahomey ■ d aha’ la pres so . franc ax b e :
■. (1890-5), les sacrificesfhumali|dh* . v ; ■ :
The second v ■ ‘ '
Vhifa reprise des relafioils• "f'ranco-dahom^eiies -au
IJXe sieclbs la mission d*Auguste Bouet li la cour 
d VAbomey (1851) * ■’ g1
The foxmier analyses the content of a •number.-;of. JArench works 
concerning Dahomey and throwssome light on the development 
of prench.attitude®, to,Africa in general and to Bahomey in
particulaxh, during;, the lattes? part of the X9th - century# ' The .
second of these articles9 which concerns . the sending of the 
first Prench 19th century embassy-, to .Abomey, in itself perhap 
not ■ a sub ject of overwhelming impprctance, neverthele'ss adds’;
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considerably to our knowledge of the rather dubious 
activities of Viator.Regis *
Two books relating to the subject of this thesis 
have also been published very recently* One of these, 
"The. Eighteenth Century Slave Trade from Dahomey,r by the 
late Karl Polanyl (Washington 1967) has, for a variety of. 
reasons, proved unobtainable. It appears, however, that 
the work is basically an expansion of the arguments 
which appeared in the author's treatise on the economics 
of eighteenth century West African trade. These appeared
in an article called "Sortings and "Ounce Trade" in the
w
West African Slave Trade. Journal of African History, 
Vol. V, no.3, 1964*
Another book "The Fon of Dahomey" by W. J. Argyle 
(Oxford 1966) has more direct bearing on nineteenth 
century Dahomey. This study is basically an. anthropolo­
gist's analysis of the best known published works on pre­
colonial Dahomey. The author considers a number of con­
temporary descriptions of the kingdom along with various 
modern accounts of the Eon state and then, from these, 
produces his own version of Bahoman corporate life*
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Argyle fails completely to utilise the vast wealth 
of contemporary unpublished material concerning Dahomey. 
Indeed he has left untouched many of the more obscure 
published nineteenth c entury work^. Moreover he does not 
appear to have consulted such an essential and easily 
accessible work as Akinjobin* s study of eighteenth 
century Dahomey, nevertheless, Argyle has used his 
material wisely and has presented the, to date, most 
lucid and comprehensive study of pre-colonial Dahomey.
Argyle*s work and this thesis overlap at a number 
of points. Argyle, for example, has a chapter on nine­
teenth c entury Dahoman history. Being based, however, on 
entirely fairly well known sources,the chapter, although 
it raises a .number of questions which it is hoped are 
given tentative answers in this thesis, does not really 
break new ground.
Some conflict with Argyle's work might also be 
expected to arise in the sixth chapter of the thesis. In 
fact the approach to the material has been so different 
that the resulting accounts of the Eon state hardly over­
lap and are, in fact, largely complementary. In the 
thesis deductions about the nature of the state have been 
made from the way in which it appeared to function in the
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nineteenth century. Argylers account is based on a 
critical assessment of various known descriptions of 
Dahomey•
Only at two points do interpre^tations presented 
in the thesis clash with those in Argyle’s book. Argyle 
feels that certain nineteenth century authors have over­
estimated the role of the Kings1 spies in Pon government. 
Perhaps these writers did stress this point too strongly* 
Nevertheless such espionage activities were the probable 
outcome of Dahoman political life as it existed in the 
nineteenth century.
Argyle also produces a theory in which he attributes 
many Pon military manoeuvres, not to rational calculation, 
but to adherence to a long established formula of supposed 
ly supernatural origin. This new interpretation fits the 
facts and seems thoroughly acceptable.
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